Jason Edward Goswick v. the State of Texas

Affirm and Opinion Filed December 4, 2024

In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-23-00346-CR
No. 05-23-00395-CR

JASON EDWARD GOSWICK, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 416th Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause Nos. 416-80112-2023 & 416-80654-2023

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Chief Justice Burns, Justice Reichek, and Justice Nowell
Opinion by Justice Nowell
A jury convicted Jason Edward Goswick of possession with the intent to

deliver more than four but less than 200 grams of methamphetamine and unlawful

possession of a firearm by a felon. In four issues, Goswick argues the trial court

erred by overruling an evidentiary objection and the evidence is insufficient to

support the convictions. We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

FACTUAL BACKGROUND
On June 17, 2022, at 2:30 a.m., Officer Dean Riano from the McKinney Police

Department stopped a minivan Goswick was driving. Barbara Lira was in the
passenger seat, and the vehicle was registered to Miko Lira. The minivan was beaten

up, a garbage bag covered a missing window, and power tools, trash, and

miscellaneous items filled the back.

Riano observed Goswick was “very fidgety, sweating profusely, was having

a hard time answering some of my basic questions.” Goswick’s behavior was “odd”

and “just a little off.” After Goswick consented to a search, officers found: a pouch

containing two bags of a white crystalized substance, which Riano identified as

methamphetamine; a digital scale; a prescription bottle with no label containing

white pills, which officers believed to be hydrocodone; baggies with marijuana; one

empty plastic baggie; and a loaded handgun. The pouch containing

methamphetamine was located on top of the center console. The scale and

prescription drug container were found in a black backpack behind the center

console. The loaded firearm was located “just outside kind of where the armrest sat,

just to the side of that in the vehicle. . . . basically in the center console area.” The

drugs, drug paraphernalia, and firearm were easily accessible to Goswick and his

passenger.

A lab later confirmed the white crystalized substance was methamphetamine,

and the police department determined the methamphetamine weighed sixty-four

grams.

Ryan Slicker, an officer with the High Intensity Drug Trafficking Area Group,

which is an organization under the Drug Enforcement Administration, testified as an

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expert. Slicker explained that a general dosage amount of methamphetamine is 0.2

grams, and users generally possess one to three grams “at the most.” In his

experience, possessing more than one ounce, which is 28 grams, shows a person is

selling some of the methamphetamine or “it’s going to be a group package where

they’re buying a larger amount to distribute back out. Start getting into a few ounces,

it’s going to be definitely somebody that’s in a group or somebody that’s going to

be selling, piecing that out and selling it.” Slicker testified the drugs Goswick

possessed appeared “to be a distribution amount of methamphetamine. . . . for

somebody to be walking around with that amount of methamphetamines would be

unusual.”

As to Goswick not possessing a large amount of cash, Slicker explained that

low-level dealers do not have a lot of money because higher-level dealers may

“front” drugs to lower-level dealers to distribute. “So you may have a kilo level

dealer that gets fronted methamphetamine, and yes, they pay back that debt.” Officer

Randall Willemstein, a narcotics investigator, also testified: “So from my training

and experience in investigating narcotics, investigating street level narcotics, I would

say this [fact pattern] fits. A lot of times they can get the drugs on what’s called a

front so the dealer who provides that other dealer, the street dealer with the drugs,

will give them the drugs with the expectation that once they’re sold that they get

paid back that money.”

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On cross-examination, Officer Willemstein was asked why he believed

Goswick intended to deliver or sell the methamphetamine considering officers found

only one plastic baggie in the van. Williamstein replied: “from my experience as a

narcotics investigator, commonly used packaging is not what everyone assumes as

this cookie cutter, perfect plastic bag that you would put it in. It could be something

as simple as a grocery bag where they rip off the end, put the drugs in there, and tie

it off.” Slicker also agreed individuals may sell drugs and not have a lot of baggies

explaining: “Maybe they just don’t have it on them, maybe they ran out of them, or

maybe that’s not how they distribute it out. Maybe they distribute it out in aluminum

foil, maybe they distribute it out in balloons. There’s [sic] different ways to sell it

versus baggies.”

Slicker testified Goswick’s digital scale appeared to have “a lot of crystal

methamphetamine like residue left on top of it.” He explained that scales used by

dealers often have residue on them and, the appearance of Goswick’s scale “leads

me to believe that person is distributing.”

As to the gun, Slicker testified that guns and drugs “go hand and hand. So a

lot of times whenever you find drugs, you’re going to find a firearm. . . . The drug

trade is a very dangerous business. It’s not like you can call the police when you’re

being robbed for your drugs or when somebody breaks into your house to steal your

drugs so you have to protect yourself.” Based on the gun’s location in the minivan,

he believed the gun was being used in commission of the felony.

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Slicker believed Goswick was distributing methamphetamine based on the

quantity of drugs, location of the drugs near the center console of the car, and the

appearance of Goswick’s digital scale.

LAW & ANALYSIS

A. Evidentiary Objection
In his first issue, Goswick argues the trial court erred by admitting State’s

Exhibit 9, which contained his driver’s license record from the Texas Department of

Public Safety. We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an

abuse of discretion. State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 688 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024). A

trial court abuses its discretion if its decision lies outside of the zone of reasonable

disagreement. Id. at 688-68.

During its case in chief, the State offered its Exhibit 9, which the prosecutor

described as “another certified document from the Texas Department of Public

Safety with the Defendant’s driver’s license records.” The following exchange then

occurred:

[Defense counsel]: Your Honor, I’m going to object that it
doesn’t seem to be certified, Your Honor. It’s just a copy off of the
website.
[State’s Counsel]: Right there.
(Sotto voce discussion between counsel)
[Defense counsel]: And it also has a lot of hearsay in it regarding
prior charges in here.1

1
For purposes of our review, we will assume that Goswick’s objections at trial were sufficient to
preserve his complaints on appeal.
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[State’s Counsel]: Your Honor, the State’s argument would be
that this is a certified record. It came as a whole document so we’d be
offering it as a whole document.
The Court: The objection’s overruled. It’s admitted.

State’s Exhibit 9 states it is a “Certified Abstract Record – Law Enforcement:

03/08/2023,” and the exhibit contains Goswick’s name and identifying information.

The bottom of the exhibit states:

Pursuant to the authority contained in the Texas Rules of
Evidence 902, Section 4, and Transportation Code, Section 521, I,
Mimzie L. Dennis, do hereby certify that I am the custodian of driver
records of the Driver License Division, Texas Department of Public
Safety. The information contained herein is true and correct as taken
from our official records. This is to certify that notices of convictions
for the traffic law violations and incidents of motor vehicle accident
involvement are received and recorded, along with the official action
by the Department of Public Safety, in the computer records of JASON
E GOSWICK.
In Testimony Whereof, I hereunto set my hand and affix the Seal
of the Department of Public Safety of the State of Texas on 03/08/2023.

Mimzie Dennis’s signature appears below this paragraph and next to the DPS seal.

Rule 902 governs self-authenticating documents. See TEX. R. EVID. 902. A

copy of an official record or a document that was filed in a public office as authorized

by law may be self-authenticating. See TEX. R. EVID. 902(4). DPS driving records

are self-authenticating public records. See Nalls v. State, No. 02-16-00328-CR, 2018

WL 651193, at *4 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Feb. 1, 2018, no pet.) (mem. op., not

designated for publication) (citing Abbring v. State, 882 S.W.2d 914, 916-17 (Tex.

App.—Fort Worth 1994, no pet.); TEX. R. EVID. 803(8), 902(4)); see also Lopez v.

State, No. 08-99-00158-CR, 2000 WL 1231515, at *10 n.47 (Tex. App.—El Paso

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Aug. 31, 2000, no pet.) (not designated for publication) (citing Smith v. State, 895

S.W.2d 449, 455 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1995, pet. ref’d); Abbring, 882 S.W.2d at 917).

DPS driving records also are admissible under Texas Rule of Evidence 803(8) as

public records exceptions to the hearsay rule. See Nalls, 2018 WL 651193, at *4

(quoting Abbring, 882 S.W.2d at 916-17); see also TEX. R. EVID. 803(8) (public

records exception to hearsay rule); Lopez, 2000 WL 1231515, at *10 n.47.

The trial court acted within its discretion by concluding State’s Exhibit 9 is a

certified copy of Goswick’s DPS driving record. As such, the record is a self-

authenticating public record and exempt from the hearsay rule. We conclude the trial

court did not abuse its discretion by admitting State’s Exhibit 9 over Goswick’s

objections. We overrule Goswick’s first issue.

B. Evidentiary Sufficiency
Goswick raises sufficiency of the evidence challenges in his second, third, and

fourth issues. When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a

conviction, we consider the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict.

Edward v. State, 635 S.W.3d 649, 655 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). The verdict will be

upheld if any rational trier of fact could have found all the essential elements of the

offense proven beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. “This familiar standard gives full play

to the responsibility of the trier of fact fairly to resolve conflicts in the testimony, to

weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate

facts.” Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979). The finder of fact is the sole

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judge of the weight and credibility of the evidence. Edward, 635 S.W.3d at 655.

When considering a claim of evidentiary insufficiency, we must keep in mind that

the finder of fact may choose to believe or disbelieve all, some, or none of the

evidence presented. Id. The evidence is sufficient to support a conviction if “the

inferences necessary to establish guilt are reasonable based upon the cumulative

force of all the evidence when considered in the light most favorable to the verdict.”

Id. at 655-56. When faced with conflicting evidence, a reviewing court presumes the

fact finder resolved those conflicts in favor of the verdict and defers to that

determination. Id.

1. Possession with Intent to Deliver
In his second issue, Goswick argues the evidence is insufficient to support the

conviction for possession of a controlled substance with intent to deliver. To obtain

a conviction for possession with intent to deliver methamphetamine, the State had

to establish that Goswick knowingly possessed between four and 200 grams of

methamphetamine, a controlled substance, with the intent to deliver. See TEX.

HEALTH & SAFETY CODE 481.112(d). Goswick concedes the evidence shows the

police discovered two bags of methamphetamine weighing between four and 200

grams. However, he argues, the evidence is insufficient as to the elements of

possession and intent to deliver.

To prove the requisite intent, the State was required to prove Goswick

exercised control, management, or care over the methamphetamine and knew it was

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contraband. Peacock v. State, No. 05-21-01045-CR, 2022 WL 16959257, at *2 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Nov. 16, 2022, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication)

(citing Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 413 (Tex. Crim. App. 2016)). Regardless of

whether this evidence is direct or circumstantial, it must establish that his connection

to the drugs was more than fortuitous. See id. (citing Blackman v. State, 350 S.W.3d

588, 594 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011)). Mere presence at the location where drugs are

found is insufficient by itself to establish the requisite degree of control to support a

conviction. Id. (citing Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006)).

That said, possession need not be exclusive. Id. (citing Henry v. State, 409 S.W.3d

37, 42 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2013, no pet.)). Where, as here, the

defendant was not in exclusive possession of the place where the methamphetamine

was found, there must be additional independent facts and circumstances linking him

to the contraband. Id. (citing Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 413–14).

The following is a non-exclusive list of possible “affirmative links” Texas

courts have recognized as sufficient, either singly or in combination, to establish a

defendant’s possession of contraband: (1) the defendant’s presence when a search is

conducted; (2) whether the contraband was in plain view; (3) the defendant’s

proximity to and the accessibility of the narcotic; (4) whether the defendant was

under the influence of narcotics when arrested; (5) whether the defendant possessed

other contraband or narcotics when arrested; (6) whether the defendant made

incriminating statements when arrested; (7) whether the defendant attempted to flee;

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(8) whether the defendant made furtive gestures; (9) whether there was an odor of

contraband; (10) whether other contraband or drug paraphernalia were present; (11)

whether the defendant owned or had the right to possess the place where the drugs

were found; (12) whether the place where the drugs were found was enclosed; (13)

whether the defendant was found with a large amount of cash; and (14) whether the

conduct of the defendant indicated a consciousness of guilt. Id. (citing Evans, 202

S.W.3d at 162 n.12).

Even in the absence of direct evidence, we must view the circumstantial

evidence in a light most favorable to the verdict and defer to the jury’s responsibility

to draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. Id. at *3 (citing Villa v. State, 514

S.W.3d 227, 232 (Tex. Crim. App. 2017)). Although the Evans factors guide our

analysis, no single factor is dispositive because our ultimate inquiry is whether the

jury was rationally justified in finding appellant guilty based on the combined and

cumulative force of the evidence and reasonable inferences therefrom. See id. (citing

Tate, 500 S.W.3d at 414).

Intent to deliver may be proved by circumstantial evidence, such as the

quantity of drugs possessed, the manner of packaging, whether the defendant

possessed a large amount of cash, evidence of drug transactions, and the nature of

the location where the defendant was arrested. Id. (citing Taylor v. State, 106 S.W.3d

827, 831 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2003, no pet.)). Intent to deliver is a question of fact

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for the jury to resolve, and it may be inferred from the defendant’s acts, words, or

conduct. Id. (citing Taylor, 106 S.W.3d at 831)

Goswick was driving the van where the drugs were found at 2:30 a.m.; he was

present when the search was conducted. He acted odd and fidgety, was sweating

profusely, and could not answer basic questions. Officers discovered the drugs in an

enclosed place, the van, that Goswick appeared to have the right to possess. The

drugs and loaded gun were located in close proximity to each other and accessible

to Goswick. In addition to the methamphetamine, Officers found marijuana and a

prescription bottle with no label containing small white pills; they also found a

digital scale with crystal methamphetamine residue on top of it, which is consistent

with the appearance of a scale used by a distributor.

While Goswick’s mere presence in the vehicle where the drugs were found

would be insufficient by itself to establish the requisite degree of control to support

a conviction, we conclude the other evidence, when viewed in the light most

favorable to the verdict, supports the jury’s conclusion that Goswick possessed the

methamphetamine.

As to his intent to distribute, witnesses testified the amount of

methamphetamine that Goswick possessed was greater than an amount that a mere

user possesses. Goswick possessed sixty-four grams, and a user-amount is one gram

or less. Further, Goswick possessed a digital scale with methamphetamine residue

and a loaded gun, which “go[es] hand and hand” with drug distribution. These facts,

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taken together with the location and accessibility of the drugs and when viewed in

the light most favorable to the verdict, support the jury’s conclusion that Goswick

intended to distribute the methamphetamine.

We overrule Goswick’s second issue.

2. Unlawful Possession of a Firearm

In his third issue, Goswick argues the evidence is insufficient to support his

conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm by a felon. A person who has been

convicted of a felony commits an offense if he possesses a firearm after conviction

and before the fifth anniversary of his release from confinement. See TEX. PENAL

CODE § 46.04(a), (e). The parties stipulated at trial that Goswick had been convicted

of “Abandon Endanger Child Criminal Negligence” on February 20, 2019, and June

17, 2022, is a date prior to the fifth anniversary of Goswick’s release from

confinement. Goswick argues the evidence is insufficient to show the element of

possession.

To establish the possession element, the State was required to prove: (1)

Goswick exercised actual care, control, or custody of the firearm; (2) he was

conscious of his connection with it; and (3) he possessed the firearm knowingly or

intentionally. See Dickerson v. State, No. 05-20-00339-CR, 2021 WL 5410523, at

*2 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (citing Cude v. State, 716 S.W.2d 46, 47 (Tex. Crim. App. 1986); Hall

v. State, No. 05-18-00755-CR, 2019 WL 3773852, at *4 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug.

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12, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)). The evidence must

establish that Goswick’s connection to the contraband or firearm was more than

fortuitous. See id. (citing Hall, 2019 WL 3773852, at *3 (citing Blackman v. State,

350 S.W.3d 588, 594–95 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011))). Thus, mere presence at the

location where contraband or a firearm is found is insufficient, by itself, to establish

the requisite degree of control to support a conviction. Id. (citing Hall, 2019 WL

3773852, at *3 (citing Evans v. State, 202 S.W.3d 158, 162 (Tex. Crim. App.

2006))). However, presence or proximity, when combined with other evidence, often

referred to as “links,” either direct or circumstantial, may well be sufficient to

establish care, custody or control of the contraband or firearm. Hall, 2019 WL

3773852, at *3 (citing Evans, 202 S.W.3d at 162). There is no set formula to

determine which links are sufficient and the number of links present is not as

important as the “logical force” or degree to which the factors, alone or in

combination, tend to link the accused to the contraband or weapon. Id. (citing Porter

v. State, 873 S.W.2d 729, 732 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1994, pet. ref’d)). The absence of

certain links does not constitute evidence of innocence to be weighed against the

links present. Id. (citing Satchell v. State, 321 S.W.3d 127, 134 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 2010, pet. ref’d)).

Some factors that may establish a link to a weapon and/or contraband include

the following: (1) whether weapon was in plain view; (2) the accused’s proximity to

and the accessibility of the weapon; (3) whether the accused owned or controlled the

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place where the weapon was found; (4) whether the place where the drugs and

weapon were found was enclosed; (5) whether the accused was found with a large

amount of cash; (6) whether the accused made incriminating statements when

arrested; (7) whether the accused attempted to flee; and (8) whether the accused

made furtive gestures. Id. (citing Tate v. State, 500 S.W.3d 410, 414 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2016)).

The evidence showing Goswick possessed the methamphetamine overlaps

with the evidence showing he exercised control over and was aware of the loaded

firearm. The firearm, like the drugs, was in an enclosed space, the van, that Goswick

drove and in which Goswick and his passenger were the sole occupants. Goswick

was fidgety and sweating profusely, displayed odd behavior, and struggled to answer

basic questions. The firearm was found in the center console area, was only “slightly

covered,” and was accessible to him. Slicker testified that guns and drugs “go hand

and hand. So a lot of times whenever you find drugs, you’re going to find a firearm.”

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the

evidence supports the jury’s conclusion that Goswick possessed the firearm. We

overrule Goswick’s third issue.

3. Use or Exhibition of a Deadly Weapon

In the jury charge for punishment, the jury was asked: “Do you find beyond a

reasonable doubt that the Defendant used or exhibited a deadly weapon, to wit: a

firearm, during the commission of the offense?” The jury answered affirmatively. In

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his fourth issue, Goswick argues the evidence is insufficient to support the jury’s

finding that he used or exhibited a deadly weapon in the commission of the offense.

To support a deadly weapon finding, the deadly weapon must be “used” or

“exhibited” during the commission of a felony offense, or during immediate flight

from the commission of a felony offense, and the defendant used or exhibited the

deadly weapon, or was a party to the offense and knew that a deadly weapon would

be used or exhibited. Bailey v. State, No. 05-22-00064-CR, 2022 WL 17261058, at

*3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Nov. 29, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for

publication) (citing TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. art. 42A.054). The “use” element can

be satisfied by evidence the accused, in the commission of a felony, used the weapon

to protect or facilitate the care, custody, and management of contraband. Id. (citing

Coleman v. State, 145 S.W.3d 649, 654 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)). A deadly weapon

is “exhibited” if it was consciously shown, displayed, or presented during the

commission of a felony offense. Id. (citing Patterson v. State, 769 S.W.2d 938, 941

(Tex. Crim. App. 1989)).

When determining whether a weapon was used as a deadly weapon in

furtherance of possession of a controlled substance, reviewing courts consider the

cumulative effect of several factors, including: (1) the type of gun involved; (2)

whether the gun was loaded; (3) whether the gun was stolen; (4) the proximity of the

gun to the drugs, drug paraphernalia, or drug manufacturing materials; (5) the

accessibility of the gun to whomever controlled the premises; (6) the quantity of

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drugs involved; and (7) any evidence that might demonstrate an alternative purpose

for the presence of the gun. Id. (citing Coleman, 145 S.W.3d at 658–60 (Cochran, J.,

concurring); Hall v. State, No. 05-18-00755-CR, 2019 WL 3773852, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Dallas Aug. 12, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication)).

The focus is on the proximity of the gun to the drugs, not the proximity of the gun

to the defendant. Id. (citing McClenon v. State, Nos. 05-14-00833-CR, 05-14-00834-

CR, 2015 WL 4739589, at *5 (Tex. App.—Dallas Aug. 11, 2015, pet. ref’d) (mem.

op., not designated for publication)).

The evidence established the gun was loaded, located in close proximity to

the drugs and drug paraphernalia, and easily accessible to the car’s occupants,

including Goswick. The evidence also shows the quantity of drugs in the vehicle was

far more than a user would possess and Slicker testified that drugs and guns “go hand

and hand.” No evidence indicated the gun might have had an alternative purpose.

Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict, we conclude the jury

could have reasonably have found Goswick used or exhibited a deadly weapon while

committing the offenses. Consequently, the evidence is legally sufficient to support

the deadly weapon findings. We overrule Goswick’s fourth issue.

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CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s judgments.

/Erin A. Nowell//
ERIN A. NOWELL
JUSTICE

230346f.p05
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)

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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

JASON EDWARD GOSWICK, On Appeal from the 416th Judicial
Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 416-80112-
No. 05-23-00346-CR V. 2023.
Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Chief Justice Burns and Justice
Reichek participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 4th day of December, 2024.

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Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

JASON EDWARD GOSWICK, On Appeal from the 416th Judicial
Appellant District Court, Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 416-80654-
No. 05-23-00395-CR V. 2023.
Opinion delivered by Justice Nowell.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Chief Justice Burns and Justice
Reichek participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered this 4th day of December, 2024.

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