Christopher Hernandez v. the State of Texas

AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed June 26, 2024

S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-23-00565-CR

CHRISTOPHER HERNANDEZ, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law No. 2
Rockwall County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR2-22-0075

MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Goldstein, Smith, and Garcia
Opinion by Justice Garcia
This appeal involves the denial of a motion to suppress statements appellant

made to the police during the investigation of an accident and potential assault. In a

single issue, appellant argues his unwarned statements concerning his alcohol

consumption resulted from custodial interrogation and should have been suppressed.

As discussed below, we conclude the trial court’s denial of the motion to

suppress was not erroneous because appellant’s encounter with the police was an

investigative detention, not custody, and therefore Miranda warnings were not

required. The trial court’s judgment is affirmed.
I. BACKGROUND

On the evening in question, Kenyae Green was driving an Amazon truck when

he encountered a red pickup truck “facing sideways in the north lanes” with front

end damage. Green called 911. He said that he saw a male on the driver’s side next

to the open door of the pickup and a female exiting the passenger side. The two were

“exchanging words,” and the female was “trying to get away.”

Deputy Cole Donaldson was dispatched to the scene. He believed he was

responding to an accident where “a female subject was running and screaming for

help with a male subject chasing after her.” When Deputy Donaldson arrived, he

saw the wrecked vehicle and several people standing around. He described the scene

as “hectic.”

Deputy Donaldson made contact with appellant, who confirmed that he was

the driver of wrecked vehicle. When asked if he had anything to drink that night,

appellant responded affirmatively. The female (later identified as appellant’s

girlfriend) was upset. When Deputy Donaldson asked if she was injured, appellant

said, “It’s all my fault, it’s one hundred per cent my fault.” The deputy did not know

what appellant was referring to at that point.

Deputy Donaldson decided to separate appellant from others on the scene by

detaining him in handcuffs and placing him in the back seat of the patrol car. When

he was seated in the police vehicle, Donaldson asked what happened. Appellant said

that he had hit the guard rail and he was “drunk.” When asked how much he had to

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drink, appellant initially said seven bottles of alcohol, but then changed his answer

to “two beers and a shot.” Appellant was subsequently arrested and charged with

driving while intoxicated.

The case was tried to a jury. During trial, appellant moved to suppress the

unwarned statements he made after he was placed in the patrol car. The trial court

denied the motion and appellant’s statements to the officer were played for the jury.

The jury found appellant guilty of the charged offense. The trial court found

that appellant had a previous conviction of operating a motor vehicle while

intoxicated and assessed punishment at 365 days confinement in the county jail. The

trial court also made written findings of fact and conclusions of law, finding, inter

alia, that appellant was not in custody when the deputy placed him in the patrol

vehicle. This timely appeal followed.

II. ANALYSIS

A. Standard of Review and Applicable Law

Appellant argues the incriminating statements he made while handcuffed and

seated in the patrol vehicle should have been suppressed because he was in custody

and no Miranda warnings were given. The State responds that the encounter was an

investigative detention and therefore no Miranda warnings were required.

A trial court’s ruling on a motion to suppress evidence is reviewed for an

abuse of discretion and should only be reversed if the outcome is outside the zone of

reasonable disagreement. Wexler v. State, 625 S.W.3d 162, 167 (Tex. Crim. App.

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2021) (citing State v. Cortez, 543 S.W.3d 198, 203 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018); State v.

Story, 445 S.W.3d 729, 732 (Tex. Crim. App. 2014)).

When there is a mixed question of law and fact, we apply a bifurcated standard

of review. Id. Total deference is given to the trial court’s factual assessment of the

circumstances surrounding the questioning. Id. If the trial court does not make

explicit findings of fact, “we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the

ruling and assume the trial court made implicit findings of fact that support its ruling

as long as those findings are supported by the record.” Id. (citing Herrera v. State,

241 S.W.3d 520, 527 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)). When, as here, the trial court makes

explicit fact findings, we determine whether the evidence, when viewed in the light

most favorable to the trial court’s ruling, supports those findings. State v. Kelly, 204

S.W.3d 808, 818 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

We then review the trial court’s legal ruling de novo unless its explicit fact

findings that are supported by the record are also dispositive of the legal ruling. Id.

We will sustain the trial court’s decision if it is correct on any theory of law

applicable to the case. Arguellez v. State, 409 S.W.3d 657, 662–63 (Tex. Crim. App.

2013); Swain v. State, 181 S.W.3d 359, 365 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

Miranda and Article 38.22 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure deem

statements produced by custodial interrogation inadmissible unless the accused is

first warned that (1) he has the right to remain silent, (2) his statement may be used

against him, (3) he has the right to have a lawyer present prior to and during any

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questioning, and (4) if he is unable to hire a lawyer, he has the right to have a lawyer

appointed. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 479 (1966); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC.

ANN. art. 38.22. In addition, Article 38.22 requires a warning that the accused has

the right to terminate the interview at any time. Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526. The

warnings are required only when there is a custodial interrogation. Id.

“Custody is a mixed question of law and fact that does not turn on credibility

and demeanor unless the witness testimony, if believed, would always decide the

custody question.” Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 167; see State v. Saenz, 411 S.W.3d 488,

494 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). The ultimate legal determination of whether the person

was in custody under those circumstances is reviewed de novo. See Kelly, 204

S.W.3d at 818. If a suspect is in custody, any statements produced by custodial

interrogation are inadmissible unless the accused is first provided warnings as

required by Miranda and Article 38.22. Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 167; see also

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479; TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.22.

A custody determination requires two inquiries: an inquiry into the

circumstances surrounding the interrogation and an inquiry into whether a

reasonable person in those circumstances would have felt that he was not free to

leave. Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 167 (citing Thompson v. Keohane, 516 U.S. 99, 116

(1995)). Restricted freedom of movement, and an individual’s belief that he is not

free to leave however, does not conclude the inquiry. “The ultimate inquiry is

whether, under the circumstances, a reasonable person would have believed that her

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freedom of movement was restricted to the degree associated with a formal arrest.

Id. (citing Stansbury v. California, 511 U.S. 318, 322 (1994)).

The Texas Court of Criminal Appeals outlined four general situations that

may constitute custody: (1) the suspect is physically deprived of [his] freedom of

action in any significant way, (2) a law enforcement officer tells the suspect that [he]

cannot leave, (3) law enforcement officers create a situation that would lead a

reasonable person to believe [his] freedom of movement has been significantly

restricted, or (4) there is probable cause to arrest, and law enforcement officers do

not tell the suspect that [he] is free to leave. Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 167–68 (citing

Dowthitt v. State, 931 S.W.2d 244, 255 (Tex. Crim. App. 1996)). In the first three

situations, the restriction of movement must amount to the degree associated with

an arrest, rather than an investigative detention. Id. at 168. The fourth situation

requires that the officer’s subjective intent be either “communicated or otherwise

manifested to the suspect.” Id.; see Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 254; see also Stansbury,

511 U.S. at 324–25 (officer’s subjective intent is irrelevant if it was never conveyed

to the suspect.).

We examine the circumstances manifested to and experienced by a suspect

to determine whether a reasonable person in that situation would have felt there was

a restraint on his freedom to a degree associated with an arrest. State v. Ortiz, 382

S.W.3d 367, 373 (Tex. Crim. App. 2012) (“[O]nly the objective circumstances

known to the detainee should be considered in deciding what a reasonable person in

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his position would believe.”); see also Thompson, 516 U.S. at 113 (“[I]f encountered

by a ‘reasonable person,’ would the identified circumstances add up to custody . . .

.”); Berkemer v. McCarty, 468 U.S. 420, 442 (1984) (the only relevant inquiry is

how a reasonable person in the suspect’s position would have understood the

situation). The defendant has the initial burden to establish that his statement was

the product of a custodial interrogation. Herrera, 241 S.W.3d at 526; Wilkerson v.

State, 173 S.W.3d 521, 532 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005).

B. Custody or Investigative Detention?

There is no dispute that warnings were not given before appellant made the

incriminating statements that ultimately resulted in his arrest. Appellant argues he

was in custody because he was handcuffed, placed in the back of Deputy

Donaldson’s patrol car, and was not allowed to stand back up. Our inquiry turns on

whether the encounter constitutes custody for purposes of Miranda or an

investigative detention for which Miranda warnings were not required.

“Both detention and arrest involve a restraint on one’s freedom of movement;

the difference is in the degree.” Ortiz v. State, 421 S.W.3d 887, 890 (Tex. App.—

Houston [14th Dist.] 2014, pet. ref’d). An arrest involves a comparatively greater

restraint. State v. Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d 281, 290 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008). When

called upon to distinguish between the two, courts examine several factors,

including:

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the amount of force displayed, the duration of a detention, the efficiency
of the investigative process and whether it is conducted at the original
location or the person is transported to another location, the officer’s
expressed intent–that is, whether he told the detained person that he was
under arrest or was being detained only for a temporary investigation,
and any other relevant factors.

Id. at 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 2008).

An investigative detention “occurs when a person yields to the police officer’s

show of authority under a reasonable belief that he is not free to leave.” Johnson v.

State, 414 S.W.3d 184, 193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013); Horta v. State, No. 05-19-

00080-CR, 2019 WL 6696038, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas Dec. 9, 2019, no pet.)

(mem. op., not designated for publication). “Thus, while a citizen’s freedom of

movement is limited by an investigative detention when he ‘yields’ to the officer’s

authority, the limitation is temporary and is for the purpose of an investigation.”

Kellett v. State, No. 05-22-01213-CR, 2024 WL 1171382, at *3 (Tex. App.—Dallas

Mar. 19, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). “A person held

for investigative detention is not in “custody.” Dowthitt, 931 S.W.2d at 255; Norman

v. State, No. 07-18-00218-CR, 2019 WL 3519316, at *4 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Aug.

1, 2019, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). Accordingly, the right

to Miranda warnings is not triggered during an investigative detention. Hauer v.

State, 466 S.W.3d 886, 893 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2015, no pet.) (citing

Berkemer, 468 U.S. at 440); State v. Stevenson, 958 S.W.2d 824, 829 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1997). An individual is not in custody for purposes of Miranda unless the

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detention restricts freedom of movement to the degree associated with a formal

arrest. Wexler, 625 S.W.3d at 168–169.

There is no bright line establishing when a person who is handcuffed is per se

in custody. In re S.C., 523 S.W.3d 279, 283 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2017, pet.

denied); Martinez v. State, 304 S.W.3d 642, 653 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2010, pet.

ref’d) (collecting cases). Handcuffing for purposes of an investigative detention—

including investigation, maintenance of the status quo, and officer safety—does not

necessarily give rise to a custodial investigation. Martinez, 304 S.W.3d at 652; Ortiz,

421 S.W.3d at 890; see also Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d at 283 (handcuffing does not

convert a detention into an arrest). Likewise, a suspect’s placement in the back seat

of a patrol car does not equate to custody under Miranda. Keaton v. State, 755

S.W.2d 209, 210 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 1988, pet. ref’d); Roberts v. State,

No.’s 07-15-00282-CR, 07-15-00283-CR, 2017 WL 2823777, at *6 (Tex. App.—

Amarillo 2017, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication).

Moreover, the combination of the two factors—handcuffs and placement in a

patrol car— do not necessarily establish custody. See Balentine v. State, 71 S.W.3d

763, 771 (Tex. Crim. App. 2002). A suspect who is temporarily handcuffed and

placed in the back of a patrol car for purposes of an investigatory detention is not

necessarily in custody, particularly when the officer tells the suspect he is not under

arrest. In re S.C., 523 S.W.3d at 283. If an officer tells an individual he is not under

arrest, this is the “most important” circumstance offsetting physical restraint in

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determining whether the individual is in custody for purposes of Miranda. Id. at 284.

(quoting Howes v. Fields, 565 U.S. 499, 515–16 (2012); see also Champagne v.

State, No. 04-17-00029-CR, 2018 WL 442763, at *3 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Jan.

17, 2008, no pet.).

When Deputy Donaldson handcuffed appellant and placed him in the patrol

car, he believed he was investigating an assault. He told appellant, “I’m going to put

you in handcuffs, you’re not under arrest. You’re just being detained, o.k.?”

Significantly, appellant understood that he was not under arrest, and replied, “No,

I’d rather be under arrest.” See Ortiz, 383 S.W.3d at 373 (focus is on objective

circumstances known to detainee). Deputy Donaldson told appellant that while he

could get to that point, “you’re just being detained right now.”

After he was handcuffed, but before he was placed in the patrol car, appellant

asked to speak with his girlfriend, and Deputy Donaldson allowed him to do so.

Deputy Donaldson said he would not have allowed this interaction had appellant

been under arrest.

After appellant was in the car, the deputy asked him if he had a driver’s

license. Appellant asked if he could step out because it was in his back pocket.

Deputy Donaldson allowed appellant to step out of the car and assisted him in

retrieving his wallet. Donaldson testified that he typically does not allow suspects

who are in custody to do this.

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The back door to the patrol car remained open while Donaldson asked

appellant what had occurred. Appellant was concerned that his girlfriend would get

in trouble, and initially said he had consumed seven bottles of liquor. When Deputy

Donaldson expressed disbelief, appellant amended his answer to say that he had

consumed two beers and a shot “not too long ago.” The door to the patrol car was

not closed until after appellant made these statements. After Donaldson conferred

with other officers on the scene, appellant was arrested.1

Deputy Donaldson testified that he was not arresting appellant when he

handcuffed him and placed him in the car, and did not have probable cause to do so

at that time.2 Instead, appellant was handcuffed because Donaldson was trying to

secure the scene and make sure everyone was safe. Donaldson said he put appellant

in the patrol car so he could talk to him about what happened “without worrying

about him trying to talk to other people.”

Under these circumstances, it was not unreasonable for Deputy Donaldson to

place appellant in the patrol car in handcuffs for safety and to secure the scene. This

display of force did not transform the investigative detention into an arrest. See

Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d at 291 (concluding officer’s handcuffing of defendant was

temporary detention, not an arrest, because it was done, in part, to enable officer to

1
Field sobriety tests were not performed.
2
After Donaldson leaves appellant in the car, about fifteen minutes into the video, appellant’s girlfriend
asks to speak with appellant and Donaldson declines saying, “He is in custody.” But this was after appellant
made the incriminating statements.
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make protective sweep of scene); Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W. 2d 115, 117–18 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1997) (holding that removing suspect from car, handcuffing him, and

walking him back to patrol car was reasonable to protect officer safety and did not

constitute an arrest); Hauer, 466 S.W.3d at 891–92 (determining that appellant was

not in custody for purposes of Miranda, even though officer handcuffed him and

placed him in patrol car during DWI investigation); Watson v. State, No. 01-21-

00281-CR, 2023 WL 4239869, at *5 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth June 29, 2023, pet.

ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (not unreasonable to place driver

in handcuffs in patrol car at chaotic scene).

After appellant’s wallet was retrieved and he was re-seated in the patrol car,

he shifted as though he might try to get up again. Deputy Donaldson said, No, no,

no, set backdown [sic].” According to appellant, this is further indicia of custody.

We disagree.

The body camera video does not conclusively show whether appellant was

trying to exit the vehicle, or merely shifting his position. But even if he was

attempting to exit, “one is not free to leave both when arrested and when temporarily

detained for investigation.” Francis v. State, 896 S.W.2d 406, 410 (Tex. App.—

Houston [1st Dist.] 1995, pet. ref’d).

Appellant was handcuffed approximately five minutes after the police arrived,

and placed in the patrol car one minute later. The squad car door was not shut, and

appellant was not locked in until after the statements were made, approximately ten

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minutes into the video. Thus, the restriction on appellant’s freedom of movement

was brief, and also weighs in favor of the conclusion that the detention was not of

the degree associated with an arrest.

Appellant insists that the use of handcuffs in this situation was not justified

by any special circumstances. It is well-established, however, that reasonable safety

concerns, the need to investigate, and the need to maintain the status quo are

precisely the type of circumstances that justify the use of handcuffs. See Balentine,

71 S.W.3d at 771; cf Campbell v. State, 325 S.W.3d 223, 236 (Tex. App.—Fort

Worth 2010, no pet.) (handcuffing violated Miranda when it was not for safety,

investigation, or to maintain the status quo). These are the exact concerns Deputy

Donaldson testified about here. And to the extent that appellant challenges the

reasonableness of those concerns, we note that allowances must be made for the fact

that officers must often make quick decisions under tense, uncertain, and rapidly

changing circumstances. Rhodes v. State, 945 S.W.2d 115, 118 (Tex. Crim. App.

1997). We therefore judge the reasonableness of the officer’s actions, from the

perspective of a reasonable officer at the scene, rather than with the advantage of

hindsight. Id. In this instance, a reasonable officer arriving at the scene of an accident

and potential assault where a distressed female was seen running away from

appellant could reasonably have concluded that temporarily detaining appellant in

handcuffs was necessary to secure the scene, investigate, and insure the safety of

everyone present.

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Given the totality of the circumstances, it was reasonable for the trial court to

conclude that appellant was temporarily detained for the purpose of investigation

and was not in custody for purposes of Miranda. See Koch v. State, 484 S.W.3d 482,

491 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.); Sheppard, 271 S.W.3d at 291,

Hauer, 466 S.W.3d at 891–92. Appellant’s issue is resolved against him and the trial

court’s judgment is affirmed.

/Dennise Garcia/
DENNISE GARCIA
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
230565F.U05

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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT

CHRISTOPHER HERNANDEZ, On Appeal from the County Court at
Appellant Law No. 2, Rockwall County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. CR2-22-0075.
No. 05-23-00565-CR V. Opinion delivered by Justice Garcia.
Justices Goldstein and Smith
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee participating.

Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is
AFFIRMED.

Judgment entered June 26, 2024

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