Dameion Deon Redd, Sr. v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-24-00060-CR

DAMEION DEON REDD, SR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 71st District Court
Harrison County, Texas
Trial Court No. 23-0059X

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Chief Justice Stevens
MEMORANDUM OPINION

A Harrison County jury found Dameion Deon Redd, Sr., guilty of one count of injury to a

child and two counts of aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§§ 22.02, 22.04 (Supp.). The jury found the State’s punishment-enhancement allegation true,

assessed a sentence of life imprisonment for the injury to a child, and assessed sentences of

seventy years’ imprisonment for each count of aggravated assault.

On appeal, Redd challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the jury’s findings

of guilt. He also argues that the trial court erred by admitting, during the guilt/innocence phase,

surveillance footage that the State failed to disclose before trial. Last, Redd argues that the trial

court erred by admitting judgments of Redd’s prior convictions during the punishment phase

because the State did not disclose them before trial.

We find that legally sufficient evidence supports the jury’s verdicts of guilty on all

counts. We also find that Redd was not harmed by the admission of the surveillance footage or

the judgments of conviction during punishment. As a result, we affirm the trial court’s

judgment.

I. Legally Sufficient Evidence Supports the Jury’s Findings of Guilt

The record establishes that a shooting occurred at the Decker Place Apartments at 2500

East End Boulevard South in Marshall, Texas. While Redd stipulated that Elizabeth Murray and

her son, Ryan James, were shot and suffered serious bodily injury, Redd argued at trial and

argues on appeal that the evidence is legally insufficient to establish that he was the shooter.1

1
To protect the identity of the child, we use pseudonyms for the child and his mother. See TEX. R. APP. P. 9.10.
2
Redd also argues that, should we find the evidence legally sufficient to support the jury’s finding

that he was the shooter, the evidence is still insufficient to show that he knowingly or

intentionally injured Ryan because nothing established that he intended the result. To evaluate

those claims, we turn to the applicable standard of review.

A. Standard of Review

“In evaluating legal sufficiency, we review all the evidence in the light most favorable to

the trial court’s judgment to determine whether any rational jury could have found the essential

elements of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.” Williamson v. State, 589 S.W.3d 292, 297

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2019, pet. ref’d) (citing Brooks v. State, 323 S.W.3d 893, 912 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2010) (plurality op.); Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Hartsfield v.

State, 305 S.W.3d 859, 863 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2010, pet. ref’d)). “Our rigorous [legal

sufficiency] review focuses on the quality of the evidence presented.” Id. (citing Brooks, 323

S.W.3d at 917–18 (Cochran, J., concurring)). “We examine legal sufficiency under the direction

of the Brooks opinion, while giving deference to the responsibility of the jury ‘to fairly resolve

conflicts in testimony, to weigh the evidence, and to draw reasonable inferences from basic facts

to ultimate facts.’” Id. (quoting Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 13 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007)

(citing Jackson, 443 U.S. at 318–19; Clayton v. State, 235 S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007))).

“In our review, we consider ‘events occurring before, during and after the commission of

the offense and may rely on actions of the defendant which show an understanding and common

design to do the prohibited act.’” Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “It is not required

3
that each fact ‘point directly and independently to the guilt of the appellant, as long as the

cumulative force of all the incriminating circumstances is sufficient to support the conviction.’”

Id. (quoting Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Circumstantial evidence and direct evidence are

equally probative in establishing the guilt of a defendant, and guilt can be established by

circumstantial evidence alone.” Id. (citing Ramsey v. State, 473 S.W.3d 805, 809 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2015); Hooper, 214 S.W.3d at 13). “Further, ‘we must consider all of the evidence

admitted at trial, even if that evidence was improperly admitted.’” Id. at 297–98 (quoting Fowler

v. State, 517 S.W.3d 167, 176 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2017), rev’d in part by 544 S.W.3d 844

(Tex. Crim. App. 2018)).

“Legal sufficiency of the evidence is measured by the elements of the offense as defined

by a hypothetically correct jury charge.” Id. at 298 (citing Malik v. State, 953 S.W.2d 234, 240

(Tex. Crim. App. 1997)). “The ‘hypothetically correct’ jury charge is ‘one that accurately sets

out the law, is authorized by the indictment, does not unnecessarily increase the State’s burden of

proof or unnecessarily restrict the State’s theories of liability, and adequately describes the

particular offense for which the defendant was tried.’” Id. (quoting Malik, 953 S.W.2d at 240).

Here, by a three-count indictment, the State alleged the following: (1) that Redd

“intentionally, knowingly, [or] recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to [Elizabeth] by shooting” her

while using or exhibiting “a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, during the commission of the

assault”; (2) that Redd “intentionally, knowingly, [or] recklessly cause[d] bodily injury to [Ryan]

by shooting” him while using or exhibiting “a deadly weapon, namely a firearm, during the

4
commission of the assault”; and (3) that Redd “intentionally [or] knowingly cause[d] serious

bodily injury to [Ryan], a child 14 years of age or younger, by shooting [him] with a firearm.”

B. The Evidence at Trial

Elondria Love testified that she and Redd were married for four and one-half years and

that Redd had lived with her in the Decker Place Apartments for approximately one month.

Love lived in apartment G-1, while Elizabeth and Ryan lived in apartment E-1, where the

shooting occurred. Apartment E-1 and G-1 were located on the northwest corner of adjacent

buildings. Testimony at trial established that buildings C, E, and G looked the same, while other

buildings appeared different.

The shooting occurred in the first few minutes of November 28, 2022. Mack Butcher, a

9-1-1 dispatcher for the City of Marshall, testified that he received three phone calls informing

him of the shooting at the Decker Place Apartments. In one of the calls, Roderick James

informed Butcher that his girlfriend, Elizabeth, and son, Ryan, were bleeding after “something

came through the window.”

Tanner Garner, a patrol officer with the Marshall Police Department (MPD), testified that

he was dispatched to Decker Place Apartments at 12:01 a.m. on November 28. Garner was

approached in the parking lot as he arrived on the scene by Love who said, “[I]t was probably

my ex.” Garner’s body camera showed that Love identified her “ex” as Redd and told Garner,

“[H]e’s been threatening me and everything. I’ve got divorce papers and all.” She added that

Redd had threatened to “come out [t]here and shoot [her] house up” five or ten minutes before

the shooting.

5
John McCollum, an officer with the MPD, testified that he responded to Apartment E-1,

where he found that Ryan, a five-year-old child, had sustained multiple gunshot wounds, and

Elizabeth had been shot in the arm.2 Elizabeth said that she was putting Ryan to bed in his room

when she heard six or seven gunshots come through the window. Elizabeth said that she did not

see the shooter and had “no clue” who it was. McCollum saw bullet holes coming through the

bedroom window with “glass on the inside,” demonstrating that the shooter was outside during

the incident. While at the apartment complex, McCollum was informed of Love’s report that

Redd had been “making threats probably about five, ten minutes” before the shooting. When

initially questioned about Redd, Elizabeth said she had “no clue” who he was.

Garner, who found six nine-millimeter casings on the outside of Ryan’s bedroom

window, testified that, based on the location of the casings, “the person who shot was standing

right at the window.” Even so, Edgar Pineda, another MPD officer, testified that no one saw the

shooter.3

Pineda spoke with Love, who testified that Redd’s threat was made by phone.4 At trial,

Love said that Redd had called her over “FaceTime video” and was supposed to be “bringing

[her] kids some money for their birthdays,” which she told Redd to leave with their father instead

of coming over because she did not want to see him. Love testified that an argument ensued, that

Love threatened her over FaceTime, and that she was about to call the police when she heard

2
Elizabeth and Ryan described their injuries in detail for the jury. Additionally, Dr. Christin Ann Ho and Dr. Steve
Megison testified about Ryan’s extensive injuries.
3
Pineda testified that a firearm is a deadly weapon.
4
In Love’s phone, Redd’s phone number was listed as (903)578-----.
6
gunshots. Pineda also spoke with Love’s boyfriend, Gamon Champion, who said that Redd had

threatened him, that he was Redd’s target, and that Redd told him he was going to “shoot [the]

place up.”

Robert Farnham, a sergeant with the MPD, testified that he went to Love’s apartment and

noted that it was “set up exactly the same” as Elizabeth’s apartment. Farnham also noted that

Love slept in the back bedroom of the apartment, just as Ryan slept in the back bedroom of

Elizabeth’s apartment. According to Farnham, Love was “really frantic” and afraid for her

safety and the safety of her children living there.

Based on Love’s and Champion’s statements, the MPD began looking into Redd’s

whereabouts. According to Pineda, Redd lived in the Ward Plaza Apartments in Marshall,

Texas, with his girlfriend, Shereka Newson. Mark Sedwick, a special agent and cellular analyst

with the Federal Bureau of Investigation, testified that he could determine the approximate

location of cellular devices based on their distance from certain service-provider towers.

Sedwick opined that it took only five or six minutes to drive from Redd’s Ward Plaza apartment

to the Decker Place Apartments. Sedwick testified that his analysis of Redd’s phone number and

Verizon tower records showed that the phone was located at Redd’s home at 11:01 p.m. on

November 27. According to Sedwick, Redd’s phone made three outgoing calls a 11:01, 11:01,

and 11:03 on the night of November 27. Screenshots of Love’s phone showed that she had

received calls from Redd’s phone on November 27. From “between 11:04 and 11:47, there was

RTT data,” which Sedwick described as background-signal measurements from a cell tower.

Sedwick testified that there “was a gap in time from 11:47 to 12:01 where there was no data,”

7
followed by an “incoming call . . . that went to voicemail at 12:01, [and] another at 12:04.”5

Sedwick determined that Redd’s cellphone was on the move and that a license plate reader

picked up Redd’s vehicle at 12:04 a.m. on November 28. Even so, Sedwick testified that he had

no data that placed Redd’s cell phone at the crime scene.

Farnham noted that there were several surveillance cameras that could show Redd’s route

of travel during the incident and obtained surveillance footage from Redd’s apartment complex,

Texas State Optical, Miracle Buds, All Seasons, and an E-Z Mart. Farnham testified that the

Ward Plaza Apartments surveillance footage showed Redd leaving his apartment and driving off

in a gray Chevrolet Venture van, which had a black stripe along the side and was registered to

Newson.

According to Farnham, Redd left his apartment at 11:27 p.m. on November 27, which

“correlate[d] with the shooting.” The van was caught heading southbound by All Seasons’s

surveillance video at “11:35 p.m. headed towards Decker Place Apartments.” Then, Texas State

Optical, which was one block north of Decker Place Apartments, recorded the van traveling

northbound “at 19 seconds after midnight” on November 28. The van was next captured by

cameras owned by Miracle Buds and All Seasons at a time that, according to Farnham, showed

that the van “was going quite fast” after midnight. During cross-examination, Farnham admitted

that, because there was no video of Decker Place Apartments, he could not be “a hundred percent

positive” that Redd was there.

5
Love testified that she called Redd at 12:04 a.m. on November 28 to see where he was and if he had committed the
shooting.
8
Farnham testified that the van never returned to Redd’s apartment but that Redd was

caught on camera walking back to his apartment at approximately 12:35 a.m. on November 28.

Youndell Rudd testified that he was friends with Redd, who often parked the van in his

backyard. Rudd said that the van was not there when he went to bed on November 27 but that it

was in his backyard on November 28 when he woke up in the morning.

According to Farnham, the Ward Plaza Apartments surveillance footage showed that,

after Redd walked back to and entered his apartment, he exited several minutes later with

Newson after removing the dark shirt he was wearing. The couple got into Newson’s silver

Chrysler 300 and drove to an E-Z Mart, where Redd was spotted wearing an undershirt. Redd

walked into the store but bought nothing. The couple then returned home.

Scott Smith, a lieutenant with the MPD, testified that he followed behind Redd and

Newson the following morning in an unmarked vehicle as they left Ward Plaza Apartments in

Newson’s vehicle at about 7:15 a.m. and drove to Rudd’s house. Once there, Smith spotted the

Chevrolet Venture van on Rudd’s property, and Redd was arrested when he attempted to retrieve

the van.

At trial, Newson testified that she was asleep when Redd woke her up to see if she would

go with him to the E-Z Mart. According to Newson, Redd appeared normal.

At trial, Love’s credibility was called into question. Both Newson and Winfred Lee, who

knew Love and Redd, testified that Redd had lived with Love for a couple of months. Lee said

that Love contacted him “out of the blue” to give him information suggesting that she wanted to

help Redd. According to Pineda, Love maintained that Redd had only lived with her for about

9
one month. Love also told Pineda that it was strange that the shooting happened in a different

apartment because she was confident that Redd knew which apartment she lived in. Love

admitted that she did not know whether Redd was the shooter. Ben Daily, a private investigator,

testified that Love was previously convicted of giving a false report to police officers that she

was robbed in exchange for thirty dollars. According to Daily, Love’s story changed, and she

altered important facts.

After hearing the evidence, the jury rendered verdicts of guilt.

C. Legally Sufficient Evidence Establishes that Redd Was the Shooter

“[J]uries are not permitted to come to conclusions based on mere speculation or factually

unsupported inferences or presumptions.” Hooper v. State, 214 S.W.3d 9, 15 (Tex. Crim. App.

2007). Yet, juries are permitted to make rational inferences, which are “conclusion[s] reached

by considering other facts and deducing a logical consequence from them,” as opposed to

“[s]peculation[, which] is mere theorizing or guessing about the possible meaning of facts and

evidence presented.” Id. at 16. In the absence of eyewitness testimony, “the State may prove the

defendant’s identity and criminal culpability by . . . circumstantial evidence, coupled with all

reasonable inferences from that evidence.” Gardner v. State, 306 S.W.3d 274, 285 (Tex. Crim.

App. 2009).

As to his convictions for aggravated assault with a deadly weapon, Redd challenges only

the element of identity. Redd argues that, in the absence of any eyewitness testimony or physical

evidence placing Redd at the Decker Place Apartments during the shooting, only speculation

supports the jury’s finding that Redd was the shooter. In support, Redd cites to Winfrey v. State,

10
393 S.W.3d 763 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). In that case, after a high school teacher was murdered

in his home, nine people were questioned in connection with the murder. Id. at 764, 765. The

defendant, who was sixteen at the time, was charged with capital murder and conspiracy to

commit capital murder, and her father and brother were also arrested. Id. at 765, 767. Even so,

DNA from blood drops, hair, fingerprints, and a bloody footprint found at the scene did not

match the defendant or any of her family members. Id. at 765, 772. Moreover, the Texas Court

of Criminal Appeals discussed the State’s other evidence but ultimately concluded that

(1) testimony that the defendant wanted money, believed that the victim had some in his home,

and would be an “an easy lick” did not reveal any intent to kill the victim and was less

incriminatory considering that no money was taken during the course of the murder;

(2) testimony from the defendant’s father’s cellmate only incriminated the defendant’s father, not

the defendant, and contained information that was proven false; (3) testimony that the defendant

shaved her pubic hair after learning that law enforcement found pubic hair at the scene was not

significant in light of unchallenged testimony that she regularly shaved it; and (4) defendant’s

discussion of an alibi at the time of the murder did not indicate guilt since an alibi is a legitimate,

non-statutory defense. Id. at 770–72. Also, the defendant’s father was acquitted of murder, and

the State elected not to indict him for conspiracy; the defendant’s brother was also acquitted of

murder and conspiracy to commit murder. Id. at 765 n.1. Accordingly, the Texas Court of

Criminal Appeals reversed the defendant’s convictions because no physical evidence connected

the defendant to the crime scene and “[t]he only evidence that purported to directly connect [the

defendant] to the crime scene was a ‘[dog] scent lineup,’” id. at 765, that “simply indicate[d] that

11
[the defendant] had had some contact with [the victim’]s clothing, although the timing,

circumstances, and degree of that contact cannot be determined,” id. at 768.

This case is easily distinguishable from Winfrey because of the evidence establishing

Redd’s intent to commit a shooting in combination with evidence of his proximity to the scene

during the time of the shooting. The evidence at trial demonstrated that Redd had called Love on

November 27. According to Love, whom the jury could find credible, she had a conversation

with Redd over FaceTime during the last hour of November 27 that became threatening. Both

Love and Champion told officers that Redd had made a specific threat to “shoot up” Love’s

apartment five to ten minutes before the shooting. Surveillance footage shows that Redd left his

apartment in the van at 11:27 p.m. on November 27, and, at 11:35 p.m., the van was seen

heading southbound to Decker Place Apartments. Although the shooting occurred at Elizabeth’s

apartment, officer testimony showed that Love’s apartment was “set up exactly the same” as

Elizabeth’s apartment and that Love’s bedroom was in the back bedroom just as Ryan’s bedroom

was in the back bedroom. The shooter had walked to Ryan’s bedroom window and stood outside

as he fired several rounds.

Sedwick testified that there “was a gap in time from 11:47 to 12:01” when there was no

activity on Redd’s phone, during which the shooting occurred. However, there was activity both

before and directly after the shooting. Calls to law enforcement prompted officers to be

dispatched at 12:01 a.m. on November 28, but the shooter was nowhere to be seen. Texas State

Optical, which was one block north of Decker Place Apartments, recorded the van traveling

northbound “at 19 seconds after midnight” on November 28, and other surveillance cameras

12
show that the van was traveling “quite fast.” The evidence established that Redd had parked the

van at Rudd’s house, walked home, reached his apartment at 12:35 a.m., and changed his shirt

before going with Newson to the E-Z Mart. The following morning, Redd returned to Rudd’s

house to retrieve the van and was arrested.

From that evidence, any rational jury could believe that Redd had threatened Love and

Champion with shooting Love’s apartment and that, based on the surveillance footage placing

him near the Decker Place Apartments at the time of the shooting, Redd had acted on his threat.

It could have believed the State’s theory that Redd had simply mistaken Elizabeth’s apartment

for Love’s apartment and fled the shooting. The jury was also free to determine that Redd’s

actions in driving the van at a fast speed after midnight, dumping it in Rudd’s backyard, and

walking home indicated a consciousness of guilt. The jury could also find that Redd

purposefully changed his shirt, woke Newsom, and traveled with her in a different vehicle to be

spotted on E-Z Mart cameras without the van or the dark-colored shirt that he was wearing to

establish some sort of false alibi. We find that those conclusions reached by the jury were

logically made after considering the facts presented and the reasonable inferences arising from

them. Viewing the totality of the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury’s verdict, we

conclude that legally sufficient evidence supports the jury’s finding that Redd was the shooter.

D. Legally Sufficient Evidence Establishes Injury to a Child

Redd also argues that the evidence was insufficient to establish that Redd intentionally or

knowingly6 injured a child. A person commits injury to a child if he intentionally or knowingly

6
The State’s indictment only listed intent and knowledge as the mens rea for the offense.
13
causes by act “serious bodily injury” or “bodily injury” to a child. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 22.04(a). “Injury to a child is a result-oriented offense [and] requir[es] a mental state that

relates not to the specific conduct but to the result of that conduct.” Williams v. State, 235

S.W.3d 742, 750 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007) (citing Alvarado v. State, 704 S.W.2d 36, 39 (Tex.

Crim. App. 1985)). As applicable here, a “person acts knowingly, or with knowledge, with

respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause

the result.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(b). “It is not enough for the State to prove that the

defendant engaged in the alleged conduct with the requisite criminal intent; the State must prove

that the defendant caused the result with the requisite criminal intent.” Estrella v. State, 546

S.W.3d 789, 795 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2018, pet. ref’d) (citing Cook v. State, 884

S.W.2d 485, 490 (Tex. Crim. App. 1994)).

Both Love and Champion testified that Redd had threatened their safety, and we have

already concluded that the evidence is legally sufficient to establish that Redd desired to “shoot

up” Love’s apartment. By pointing a firearm in the direction of an occupied room and pulling

the trigger, a rational jury could find that Redd was aware that his actions would result in injury

or was reasonably certain to result in injury. See Cavazos v. State, 382 S.W.3d 377, 385 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2012); see also Earle v. State, No. 06-20-00038-CR, 2020 WL 6749945, at *5 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana Nov. 18, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op., not designated for publication). At trial,

Redd stipulated to Ryan’s serious bodily injuries.

Even so, Redd argues that nothing shows he intended to injure Ryan, a child. However,

“[a] person is nevertheless criminally responsible for causing a result if the only difference

14
between what actually occurred and what he desired, contemplated, or risked is that . . . a

different person . . . was injured.” TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.04(b). As a result, when someone

desires to injure an adult but injures a child instead, the doctrine of transferred intent applies.

Thompson v. State, 236 S.W.3d 787, 800 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007); Zubia v. State, 998 S.W.2d

226, 227 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (per curiam) (rejecting defendant’s argument that he could not

be convicted of injury to a child because he intended to hurt the child’s uncle and not the child);

Bravo v. State, 471 S.W.3d 860, 868 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2015, pet. ref’d).

Accordingly, we find that the evidence was legally sufficient to establish that Redd knowingly

caused serious bodily injury to Ryan.

Because we reject Redd’s legal sufficiency complaints, we overrule his first point of

error.

II. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting Surveillance Footage

Under Article 39.14, the State is required to “produce and permit the inspection” of

“evidence material to any matter involved in the action.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.

39.14(a) (Supp.). In his second point of error, Redd argues that the trial court erred by admitting

the surveillance footage from All Seasons, Miracle Buds, and E-Z Mart because the State

allegedly did not disclose it or make it available for inspection before trial. When Redd objected

to admission of the surveillance footage on those grounds, the State represented that all the

surveillance videos were on the same “jump drive” that was copied by Redd’s counsel.

“We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion.” Flowers v. State, 438 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d)

15
(citing Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). “Abuse of discretion

occurs only if the decision is ‘so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable

people might disagree.’” Id. (quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008)). “We may not substitute our own decision for that of the trial court.” Id. (citing Moses v.

State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). “We will uphold an evidentiary ruling if it

was correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Id. (citing De La Paz v. State, 279

S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)). This standard of review also applies to alleged

Article 39.14 violations. State v. Heath, 696 S.W.3d 677, 703 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024).

Although the State initially believed it had disclosed all the videos on the same “jump

drive,” it later clarified that it “thought everything that was transferred on the jump drive was

given to [Redd].” The State continued, “It was an oversight. None of that was intentional.” In

any case, the “old concept of ‘bad faith’ no longer applie[s] to Article 39.14.” Id. at 707. We

assume, for the purposes of our analysis, that the videos were not disclosed in accordance with

Article 39.14.

Even so, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has noted that a “trial court [i]s within its

discretion to fashion a remedy it deem[s] appropriate.” Id. at 708. Here, the trial court

determined that an immediate recess was necessary to permit the defense to review the

surveillance footage from All Seasons, Miracle Buds, and E-Z Mart. As a result, the trial was

paused until the following morning, where Redd’s counsel confirmed that he had reviewed the

videos with Redd and did not seek additional time to prepare. Because the trial court fashioned

16
an appropriate remedy for the lack of timely disclosure, we cannot say that the trial court’s

decision to admit the videos was outside the zone of reasonable disagreement. See id.

Moreover, violations of Article 39.14 are subject to a harm analysis. Watkins v. State,

619 S.W.3d 265, 291 (Tex. Crim. App. 2021). Because the State’s duties under Article 39.14 are

statutory in nature, error “must be disregarded” unless it affects a defendant’s “substantial

rights.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). Here, Redd has not explained how he suffered substantial harm

from the untimely disclosure of three surveillance videos, considering the videos from Texas

State Optical and Redd’s apartment complex show his comings and goings during the relevant

time frame.

Also, “[a]n error [if any] in the admission of evidence is cured where the same evidence

comes in elsewhere without objection.” Davis v. State, 614 S.W.3d 223, 229 (Tex. App.—

Texarkana 2020, no pet.) (second alteration in original) (quoting Lane v. State, 151 S.W.3d 188,

193 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004)); see Josey v. State, 97 S.W.3d 687, 698 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2003, no pet.) (“If the same or similar evidence is admitted without objection at another point

during the trial, improper admission of the evidence will not constitute reversible error.”). “This

rule applies whether the same evidence was admitted ‘without objection . . . before or after the

complained-of ruling.’” Davis, 614 S.W.3d at 229 (quoting Lane, 151 S.W.3d at 193). The trial

transcript shows that Farnham described each video in detail and that Redd failed to object to

Farnham’s testimony. As a result, we overrule Redd’s second point of error.

17
III. The Trial Court Did Not Abuse Its Discretion by Admitting Prior Judgments of
Conviction at Punishment

In his last point of error, Redd argues that the trial court erred by admitting judgments of

conviction for burglary of a habitation, evading arrest, possession of marihuana, displaying a

fictitious vehicle registration, and two counts of misdemeanor family violence assault. Redd

argues that the State failed to disclose the judgments of conviction under Article 39.14.

In Watkins, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals found that “[t]he State erred by failing

to produce [judgments of prior convictions] prior to trial in violation of Article 39.14(a).”

Watkins, 619 S.W.3d at 291. Accordingly, the trial court had erred by admitting the exhibits

over a proper objection. Id. at 290. Even so, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals noted that the

statutory error was subject to a non-constitutional harm analysis. See id.; Gray v. State, 159

S.W.3d 95, 98 (Tex. Crim. App. 2005). Under that standard, any error “that does not affect

substantial rights must be disregarded.” TEX. R. APP. P. 44.2(b). “A substantial right is affected

when the error had a substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury’s

verdict.” King v. State, 953 S.W.2d 266, 271 (Tex. Crim. App. 1997).

In conducting our harm analysis, we note that the State provided ample notice of its intent

to use each conviction at trial. The State’s notice alleged that Redd was convicted of each

offense and provided the cause number, court of conviction, date of the judgment of conviction,

and the sentence for each offense. Kaylee Wallace, a crime-scene investigator with the Harrison

County Sheriff’s Office, took Redd’s fingerprints and examined his signature and testified that

they matched the fingerprints or signature for the judgments of conviction introduced by the

State. Without objection, Wallace testified about each judgment of conviction against Redd.
18
Because the jury heard Wallace’s testimony that Redd was convicted of burglary of a habitation,

evading arrest, possession of marihuana, displaying a fictitious license plate, and two counts of

family violence assault, without any objection, error in the admission of the judgments of

conviction was cured. See Davis, 614 S.W.3d at 229. As a result, we conclude that Redd did not

suffer non-constitutional harm, and we overrule his last point of error.

IV. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Scott E. Stevens
Chief Justice

Date Submitted: December 10, 2024
Date Decided: January 8, 2025

Do Not Publish

19