In the Interest of S.J., a Child v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00038-CV

IN THE INTEREST OF S.J., A CHILD

On Appeal from the 115th District Court
Upshur County, Texas
Trial Court No. 292-24

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice Rambin
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Mother appeals the trial court’s order terminating her parental rights to her child, S.J.,

who was removed as a newborn by the Texas Department of Family and Protective Services.1,2

The trial court found that the Department had proved five statutory grounds allowing

termination, under subsections D (endangering conditions or surroundings), E (endangering

conduct), N (constructive abandonment), O (failure to comply with service plan), P (endangering

use of controlled substance), and R (child born addicted to controlled substance). See TEX. FAM.

CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D), (E), (N), (O), (P), (R) (Supp.). The trial court also found

termination to be in S.J.’s best interest. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(2) (Supp.).

Mother argues that the evidence is legally and factually insufficient to support all the alleged

grounds for termination. Mother asserts that the Department’s allegations of drug use against her

are conclusory because “no positive drug test for the mother from any point in the case was

admitted into evidence.”

On accelerated review,3 we find that legally and factually sufficient evidence supports the

trial court’s termination under ground E. Among other things, Mother failed to comply with the

testing requirements of a court-approved family service plan that specifically mentioned

1
We use initials, pseudonyms, or descriptive terms such as Mother and Father to protect the identity of the child.
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 109.002(d) (Supp.); TEX. R. APP. P. 9.8.
2
Father’s parental rights were also terminated in the same proceeding, but he did not appeal the judgment.
3
See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 263.405; TEX. R. APP. P. 28.4; TEX. R. JUD. ADMIN. 6.2(a) (requiring appellate courts
to dispose of appeal from a judgment terminating parental rights, “so far as reasonably possible,” within 180 days
after notice of appeal is filed); In re D.S., 602 S.W.3d 504, 512 (Tex. 2020) (“As we have long acknowledged,
children’s lives cannot be ‘kept in limbo while judicial processes crawl forward[.]’” (alteration in original) (quoting
In re B.L.D., 113 S.W.3d 340, 353 (Tex. 2003))).

2
methamphetamine. The trial court could reasonably consider the ongoing non-compliance as

presumed positive tests for methamphetamine. Additionally, there was testimony regarding

Mother’s inconsistent history of visiting the child, as well as Mother’s unstable employment and

housing situation. Considering the aggregate weight of the evidence, we find that termination on

the basis of ground E is supported.

We are required, however, to review the evidence regarding grounds D and E.

We find the evidence regarding ground D factually and legally insufficient. Ground D

focuses on the conditions at or before removal. The testimony from the Department was brief.

In a combined hearing regarding both Mother and Father, the Department’s presentation of its

contract caseworker consists of fourteen pages in the reporter’s record or roughly seven pages

per parent. Though the Department asserts that S.J. was born with methamphetamine in her

system, the Department did not put into evidence a drug test to that effect.

Termination, however, may be upheld on a single statutory ground.

Therefore, based on the ground E finding, we affirm the trial court’s judgment

terminating Mother’s parental rights.

I. Standard of Review

“‘The natural right which exists between parents and their children is one of

constitutional dimensions.’” D.V. v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 722 S.W.3d 854,

858 (Tex. 2025) (quoting Wiley v. Spratlan, 543 S.W.2d 349, 352 (Tex. 1976)). Consequently,

“[p]arents . . . benefit from an otherwise-inapplicable elevated standard of appellate review.” Id.

(citing In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d 230, 235 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam)). “On appellate review, we are

3
tasked with ‘undertak[ing] “an exacting review of the entire record with a healthy regard for the

constitutional interests at stake.”’” In re C.C., 720 S.W.3d 41, 50 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2025,

no pet.) (alteration in original) (quoting In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d 498, 503 (Tex. 2014) (quoting

In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d 17, 26 (Tex. 2002))). “[T]he appellate standard for reviewing termination

findings is whether the evidence is such that a factfinder could reasonably form a firm belief or

conviction about the truth of the State’s allegations.” In re C.H., 89 S.W.3d at 25. Though both

legal and factual sufficiency review deal with whether “a reasonable factfinder could form a firm

belief or conviction,” there is a difference between legal and factual sufficiency. In re A.C., 560

S.W.3d 624, 631 (Tex. 2018).

For legal sufficiency, the review is as follows:

In a legal sufficiency review, a court should look at all the evidence in the
light most favorable to the finding to determine whether a reasonable trier of fact
could have formed a firm belief or conviction that its finding was true. To give
appropriate deference to the factfinder’s conclusions and the role of a court
conducting a legal sufficiency review, looking at the evidence in the light most
favorable to the judgment means that a reviewing court must assume that the
factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor of its finding if a reasonable factfinder
could do so. A corollary to this requirement is that a court should disregard all
evidence that a reasonable factfinder could have disbelieved or found to have
been incredible. This does not mean that a court must disregard all evidence that
does not support the finding. Disregarding undisputed facts that do not support
the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and convincing
evidence.

If, after conducting its legal sufficiency review of the record evidence, a
court determines that no reasonable factfinder could form a firm belief or
conviction that the matter that must be proven is true, then that court must
conclude that the evidence is legally insufficient.

In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d 256, 266 (Tex. 2002).

4
“The distinction between legal and factual sufficiency lies in the extent to which disputed

evidence contrary to a finding may be considered.” In re A.C., 560 S.W.3d at 630. “In

conducting a legal-sufficiency review, the reviewing court cannot ignore undisputed evidence

contrary to the finding, but must otherwise assume the factfinder resolved disputed facts in favor

of the finding.” Id. at 630–31 (emphasis added).4

By comparison, for factual sufficiency, the review is as follows:

Factual sufficiency . . . requires weighing disputed evidence contrary to
the finding against all the evidence favoring the finding. In a factual-sufficiency
review, the appellate court must consider whether disputed evidence is such that a
reasonable factfinder could not have resolved it in favor of the finding. Evidence
is factually insufficient if, in light of the entire record, the disputed evidence a
reasonable factfinder could not have credited in favor of a finding is so significant
that the factfinder could not have formed a firm belief or conviction that the
finding was true.

Id. at 631 (emphasis added) (footnote omitted) (citation omitted).

Under this approach “[t]he assumption that the factfinder resolved disputed evidence in

favor of the finding if a reasonable factfinder could do so remains.” In re Commitment of

Stoddard, 619 S.W.3d 665, 674 (Tex. 2020).

However, rather than “disregard[ing]” disputed evidence that a reasonable
factfinder could not have credited in favor of the finding, the court must
determine whether, in light of the entire record, that evidence “is so significant
that a factfinder could not reasonably have formed a firm belief or conviction”
that the finding was true.

Id. (quoting In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266).

4
“Weighing conflicting evidence and inferences to determine whether a verdict should be vacated . . . is
appropriately a part only of the reviewing court’s factual sufficiency review[.]” In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d 336, 347
(Tex. 2009) (emphasis added). That is not to say that legal sufficiency review is entirely devoid of weighing:
“[d]isregarding undisputed facts that do not support the finding could skew the analysis of whether there is clear and
convincing evidence.” In re J.F.C., 96 S.W.3d at 266 (emphasis added).

5
“Reviewing courts . . . must defer to the factfinder’s judgment as to the credibility of the

witnesses and the weight to give their testimony, including reasonable and logical inferences

from the evidence.” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d 269, 279 n.50 (Tex. 2024). “Such inferences must

be reasonable and based on other facts proved.” Id. “Our opinion does not render the clear-and-

convincing-evidence standard toothless; instead, it properly defers credibility determinations to

factfinders at the trial court level, who most closely interact with the witnesses.” Id. at 279.

Generally, “[o]nly one predicate ground and a best interest finding are necessary for

termination, so ‘a court need uphold only one termination ground—in addition to upholding a

challenged best interest finding—even if the trial court based the termination on more than one

ground.’” In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d 700, 702 (Tex. 2022) (per curiam) (quoting In re N.G., 577

S.W.3d at 232). Grounds D and E deal with child endangerment. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at

277.5 Termination on grounds D or E “has consequences for termination of parental rights as to

children in a future proceeding.” In re Z.M.M., 577 S.W.3d 541, 542 (Tex. 2019) (per curiam);

see TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(M) (Supp.). Therefore, “due process and due course

of law require that the court of appeals review the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence

supporting a trial court’s order of termination under Subsections 161.001(b)(1)(D) and (E) when

challenged on appeal.” In re M.P., 639 S.W.3d at 704; see In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d 726, 748

(Tex. 2022) (“[W]e may not bypass [Mother’s] evidentiary challenges to Subsections (D) and

(E), the so-called endangerment grounds.” (emphasis added)).

5
“A factfinder may infer endangerment from ‘a course of conduct’ that presents substantial risks to the child’s
physical or emotional well-being—the focus of grounds (D) and (E) . . . .” In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 277.

6
Appellate review of termination on endangerment grounds must be conducted in a

“holistic” fashion. In re A.V., 697 S.W.3d 657, 659 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam) (orig. proceeding)

(“holistic endangerment review set forth in [In re] R.R.A.”). The approach to endangerment

review set forth in In re R.R.A. is not limited to drug use. In re N.L.S., No. 23-0965, 2025 WL

1687924, at *3 (Tex. June 13, 2025) (per curiam) (“Father argues that [In re] R.R.A. is limited to

drug-use cases. That is incorrect.”).

Consequently, we review endangerment findings considering the “aggregate weight” of

factors supported by the evidence. In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 281 (finding that termination on

grounds D and E was supported by “the aggregate weight of Father’s ongoing drug use,

homelessness, employment instability, and near-complete abandonment of his children for the

six months preceding trial”).6

II. The Evidence at Trial

Mother failed to appear at the bench trial.7 The combined termination hearing was

relatively brief; the record of that hearing contains forty-one pages of testimony. The questions

concerning the effect of Mother’s drug use on her parenting ability take it as a given that Mother

has a history of methamphetamine use.

Mother’s sister, K.S., testified that it was her “understanding” that S.J. tested positive for

“drugs” at birth. K.S. described a longstanding pattern of drug abuse by Mother, stating that all

four of Mother’s children were born exposed to drugs or left in others’ care while Mother used
6
This appears to be a reference to the “aggregate weight” when conducting legal sufficiency review; In re R.R.A.
makes no mention of factual sufficiency. Id. at 281.

7
Father did not appear for trial either.

7
drugs. K.S. further testified that Mother had “consistently left her children with other persons to

raise them.” K.S. also stated that “[Mother had] been doing this most of [their] life.” Regarding

Mother’s pregnancy with S.J., though, K.S. testified that she did not have any conversations with

Mother regarding her drug use until “[a]fter the fact,” meaning “not while” Mother was pregnant

with S.J. K.S. testified that Mother told her the subject was “none of [her] business.”

Kim White, a caseworker with 4Kids4Families,8 testified that the trial court ordered

Mother to follow a service plan, which was reviewed with and signed by Mother, who

understood its requirements. Mother did not complete any required services under that service

plan. Mother never submitted to drug testing, despite being asked to do so every month. The

testimony on that point, though brief, was direct:

Q [(BY THE DEPARTMENT:)] . . . [O]ne of the primary reasons for
the removal was drugs in this case; is that correct?

A [(BY WHITE:)] That is correct.

Q Did the mother -- did the mother regularly drug test as you
required?

A She’s never drug tested.

Q Did you ask her to drug test?

A Yes, ma’am, every month.

Q And each month she declined to do drug testing?

A Yes, ma’am.

8
In accordance with a directive from the Texas Legislature, the Department contracted with 4Kids4Families to
manage the conservatorship involved with the court proceedings. See In re C.C., 720 S.W.3d at 61, n.26.

8
The service plan stated that a “failure to submit to [drug] testing, provide photo

identification[,] or have a dilute negative drug screen w[ould] constitute a presumed positive

drug test.” White testified that she provided all the necessary referrals for the court-ordered drug

assessment. White further testified that Mother’s failure to submit to drug testing indicated that

Mother was continuing to use, and therefore, S.J. would be in danger if she were returned to

Mother.

Throughout the case, Mother lacked stable housing. At the time of trial, Mother’s home

was not safe or appropriate because she lived in a “big bus” without a bathroom. Mother did not

have all the necessities for a baby. White testified that the bus could be dangerous for S.J.

White testified that she believed Mother was continuing to use “drugs,” and therefore there

“could” be items on the bus that would pose a danger to S.J. Although Mother was not

employed at the beginning of the case, White verified that Mother had worked since November

2024. Mother did not remain in contact with the Department. White testified that Mother’s

visitation was inconsistent with Mother canceling more than half of the visits. Mother never

offered to assist K.S. financially with S.J.

White also testified to the Department’s reasonable efforts for reunification, including

holding a permanency conference, preparing service plans, making referrals for services, and

setting up a visitation schedule.

Selena Tran, the Court Appointed Special Advocate (CASA) and the attorney ad litem for

S.J., agreed that reunification would not be safe for S.J. and that termination of Mother’s parental

rights was in S.J.’s best interest.

9
III. Findings Regarding the Statutory Termination Grounds

In her sole issue, Mother challenges the legal and factual sufficiency of the evidence to

support termination under all grounds because the evidence adduced at trial was conclusory.

Mother contends the outcome here is governed by cases such as In re A.H., 414 S.W.3d 802, 807

(Tex. App.—San Antonio 2013, no pet.) (“[C]onclusory testimony, such as the caseworker’s,

even if uncontradicted, does not amount to more than a scintilla of evidence.”). We conclude

that the trial court could reasonably form a firm belief or conviction that the Department had

carried its burden of proof regarding ground E, but not ground D.

A. Ground D

Ground D permits termination of parental rights “if the court finds by clear and

convincing evidence . . . that the parent has . . . knowingly placed or knowingly allowed the child

to remain in conditions or surroundings which endanger the physical or emotional well-being of

the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(D). “[T]ermination under (D) requires that

the child’s environment is a source of endangerment, and the parent’s conduct may create that

dangerous environment.” In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d 304, 310 (Tex. 2024) (per curiam). “[T]he

courts of appeals have held that the relevant time frame for evaluating this ground is before the

child’s removal ‘since conditions or surroundings cannot endanger a child unless that child is

exposed to them.’” In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 749 (quoting In re O.R.F., 417 S.W.3d 24, 37

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2013, pet. denied)).

Drug use during pregnancy can support termination. In re J.W., 645 S.W.3d at 733, 749

(holding a mother endangered her child when her child’s meconium tested positive for opiates,

10
amphetamines, benzodiazepine, barbiturates, and methadone).9 The type of drug used during

pregnancy is a consideration. See In re A.A., 670 S.W.3d 520, 530 (Tex. 2023) (noting that

parental use of methamphetamine poses “an immediate danger” to child’s physical health and

safety).10

1. Analysis

The trial court terminated Mother’s parental rights under ground D. Under the standard

of review articulated above, we reverse this finding.

Mother urges that the evidence that she used methamphetamine while pregnant with S.J.

is legally and factually insufficient because no actual drug tests were admitted into evidence at

the final hearing. On this, Mother has a point. No drug tests were admitted into evidence.

Mother further urges that the testimony at the final hearing about Mother’s drug use was generic,

using the catch-all term “drugs” without specifying whether Mother had used methamphetamine

while pregnant.

9
“[D]rug use during pregnancy constitutes conduct that endangers a child.” In re A.B.R., No. 04-19-00631-CV,
2020 WL 1159043, at *4 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Mar. 11, 2020, pet. denied) (mem. op.); In re S.Q.-M.B., No. 04-
24-00296-CV, 2024 WL 3882144, at *2 (Tex. App.—San Antonio Aug. 21, 2024, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re
A.B.R., 2020 WL 1159043, at *4); see In re B.F., No. 14-17-00421-CV, 2017 WL 5505821, at *7 (Tex. App.—
Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 16, 2017, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“It appears [the baby] has not suffered further medical
effects. But the drug’s mere presence in [the baby’s] system harmed her, and the apparent lack of more damage
does not diminish that harm.”); In re A.R., No. 06-20-00013-CV, 2020 WL 3865372, at *4 (Tex. App.—Texarkana
July 9, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (quoting In re E.J.P., No. 06-04-00131-CV, 2005 WL 2138573, at *3 (Tex.
App.—Texarkana Sept. 7, 2005, no pet.) (mem. op.)); In re J.S., 675 S.W.3d 120, 129 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2023, op.
on remand) (Mother’s use of illegal drugs during pregnancy “endangers the physical and emotional well-being of
the child.”).
10
See In re E.D., 682 S.W.3d 595, 608–10 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2023, pet. denied) (“[Mother]’s drug use
involves so-called hard drugs—cocaine and methamphetamine in particular—rather than less destructive ones.”); In
re V.L.F., No. 14-18-00588-CV, 2018 WL 6614168, at *10 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2018, no pet.) (mem.
op.) (“Illegal drug use creates the possibility that the parent will be impaired or imprisoned and thus incapable of
parenting. . . . Drug use and the imprisonments relating to it harm the physical and emotional well-being of a child.”
(citation omitted)).

11
K.S. testified to her “understanding” that S.J. was born positive for drugs. When K.S.

raised the subject with Mother “[a]fter the fact,” Mother told K.S. that it was “none of [her]

business.” White took the stand but did not testify directly to S.J. testing positive for

methamphetamine at birth.

On appeal, the Department points to the removal petition and White’s supporting

affidavit to fill in the gaps of its brief and imprecise testimony. The Department, however, does

not provide caselaw to support the use of the petition and removal affidavit in the manner the

Department urges given the circumstances of this case.

Given scant testimony at trial, we find that it would not be reasonable to form a firm

conviction or belief regarding the truth of the Department’s allegations regarding ground D.

Accordingly, we reverse the ground D finding.

B. Ground E

Ground E permits termination of parental rights “if the court finds by clear and

convincing evidence . . . that the parent has . . . engaged in conduct or knowingly placed the

child with persons who engaged in conduct which endangers the physical or emotional well-

being of the child.” TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 161.001(b)(1)(E). Ground E examines endangering

conduct by the parent or others. Id. “[T]ermination under (E) requires that a parent’s conduct

endanger the child’s physical or emotional well-being.” In re C.E., 687 S.W.3d at 310.

“[I]llegal drug use by a parent . . . supports the conclusion that the children’s

surroundings endanger their physical or emotional well-being.” In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d 915,

925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2015, no pet.) (citing In re J.T.G., 121 S.W.3d 117, 125 (Tex.

12
App.—Fort Worth 2003, no pet.)); see In re N.B., No. 06-12-00007-CV, 2012 WL 1605457, at

*9 (Tex. App.—Texarkana May 8, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.). “[C]ontinued illegal drug use after

a child’s removal is conduct that jeopardizes parental rights and may be considered as

establishing an endangering course of conduct.” In re J.S., 675 S.W.3d at 129. “‘Drug addiction

and its effect on a parent’s life and ability to parent may establish an endangering course of

conduct’ by a parent sufficient to support a petition to terminate parental rights.” In re O.R.F.,

417 S.W.3d at 38 (quoting Perez v. Tex. Dep’t of Protective & Regul. Servs., 148 S.W.3d 427,

436 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2004, no pet.)).

A parent’s failure to remain drug-free while under the Department’s
supervision will support a finding of endangering conduct under subsection (E)
even if there is no direct evidence that the parent’s drug use actually injured the
child” “[b]ecause it exposes the child to the possibility that the parent may be
impaired or imprisoned.

Id. (alteration in original) (quoting Walker v. Tex. Dep’t of Fam. & Protective Servs., 312

S.W.3d 608, 617 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied)). “A factfinder may

reasonably attach greater significance to the use of more destructive narcotics.” In re E.D., 682

S.W.3d at 608; see In re A.A., 670 S.W.3d at 530.

1. Analysis

Mother did not complete any court-ordered services under the service plan. In re L.G.,

No. 06-18-00099-CV, 2020 WL 4229330, at *10 (Tex. App.—Texarkana July 24, 2020, no pet.)

(mem. op.) (“We agree that failure to complete a court-ordered service plan may be relevant to

an endangerment analysis under statutory ground (E), particularly when it is evidence of a

continuing pattern of neglect or abuse that has endangered a child.”). Even though the family

13
service plan ordered Mother to obtain safe and stable housing, Mother failed to obtain stable

housing for the duration of the proceedings. Mother lived with Father in “a big bus” without

bathrooms, consistent heat, or the necessities for a baby. White testified that those conditions

were not safe and stable for a newborn—rather, those conditions would be dangerous for a

newborn. Mother only attended less than half of her visitations. See D.L.G. v. Tex. Dep’t of

Fam. & Protective Servs., Nos. 03-20-00314-CV & 03-20-00315-CV, 2020 WL 6789208, at *5

(Tex. App.—Austin Nov. 19, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A] parent’s inconsistent participation

in visitation can emotionally endanger a child’s well-being, supporting termination under

subsection (E) . . . .”); In re S.I.H., No. 02-11-00489-CV, 2012 WL 858643, at *6 (Tex. App.—

Fort Worth Mar. 15, 2012, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“[A]ppellant’s failure to attempt to visit [the

child] for several months during the pendency of this case supports the trial court’s finding of

endangerment of [the child]’s emotional well-being.”).

Further, Mother never complied with the Department’s requests for drug testing or drug

assessment—despite being requested to do so monthly. Mother had notice that remaining drug-

free was required to get her child back because the family service plan required drug tests.

White said that the family service plan included the provision that failure to submit to a drug test

would be taken as a positive drug test.

It is apparent from those circumstances that Mother’s continued drug use presented a risk

to her “ability to parent.” See In re R.R.A., 687 S.W.3d at 278 (quoting In re J.O.A., 283 S.W.3d

at 345). “There was no disputed fact of significance to weigh against this proof that supported

the fact finder’s firm belief or conviction that Mother would have known her conduct

14
jeopardized reunification.” In re E.A.D., No. 14-22-00025-CV, 2022 WL 2663981, at *6 (Tex.

App.—Houston [14th Dist.] July 11, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.).

After an exacting review of the entire record, we find that the trial court could reasonably

have formed a firm belief or conviction that the ground E finding was true under the legal,

factual, and holistic review principles set forth above. After viewing all the evidence in the light

most favorable to ground E findings, we conclude that the trial court could have formed a firm

belief or conviction that the Department met its burden for terminating Mother’s parental rights

under statutory ground E. See In re Z.N., 602 S.W.3d 541, 545 (Tex. 2020) (per curiam). After

performing an exacting review of the entire record, we determine that the record is factually

sufficient to support the trial court’s finding. See In re A.B., 437 S.W.3d at 500.

Because we conclude that the evidence is legally and factually sufficient to support

ground E, we do not address Mother’s arguments that the evidence is legally and factually

insufficient to support the trial court’s finding on the remaining grounds. See In re T.M.T., No.

14-18-00442-CV, 2018 WL 6053667, at *11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Nov. 20, 2018,

no pet.) (mem. op.); In re L.E.S., 471 S.W.3d at 923; In re N.G., 577 S.W.3d at 237; In re C.E.,

687 S.W.3d at 314.

Therefore, we overrule Mother’s sole issue.

15
IV. Conclusion

We affirm the trial court’s order terminating Mother’s parental rights under ground E.11

However, we reverse the trial court’s order under ground D and modify the judgment

accordingly.

Jeff Rambin
Justice

Date Submitted: July 8, 2025
Date Decided: January 21, 2026

11
Because Mother does not challenge the trial court’s best-interests finding, that finding is binding on appeal. See In
re A.V., 113 S.W.3d 355, 362 (Tex. 2003) (“Because . . . [Appellant] does not challenge the . . . finding that
termination was in [her] [child]’s best interest, we need not reach any other issues raised by [Appellant].”).

16