Ronald Wayne Stivers, Jr. v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00096-CR

RONALD WAYNE STIVERS, JR., Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the 115th District Court
Upshur County, Texas
Trial Court No. 19993

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION

An Upshur County jury found Appellant, Ronald Wayne Stivers, Jr., guilty of failure to

register as a sex offender and assessed a sentence of life imprisonment. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

PROC. ANN. art. 62.102 (Supp.). On appeal, Stivers argues that the trial court abused its

discretion in admitting extraneous offense evidence because (1) the prior conviction did not fall

into any of the recognized exceptions under Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence and

(2) the probative value of the conviction was outweighed by the unfair prejudice it placed on

Stivers. Because we conclude that there was no abuse of discretion in admitting the evidence,

we overrule Stivers’s points of error. Even so, we modify the trial court’s judgment to reflect the

proper statute of offense. As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Background

Stivers has a prior conviction for a sexual offense requiring lifetime registration. In July

2024, a fugitive task force arrested Stivers in South Texas following an investigation into his

disappearance from Mississippi—the jurisdiction where he last registered—and his subsequent

resurfacing in Upshur County, Texas. After his arrest, an Upshur County Grand Jury indicted

Stivers for failure to register as a sex offender as required by Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure, enhanced to a first-degree felony based on a prior conviction. The case

proceeded to a jury trial.

Prior to trial, Stivers filed a motion in limine requesting the exclusion of extraneous-

offense evidence not relevant to a material issue in the case. In response, the State informed the

trial court of its intent to introduce a prior Illinois conviction for failure to register as a sex

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offender for non-character-propensity purposes. The State specifically argued that the evidence

demonstrated Stivers’s knowledge of his duty to register when changing addresses. Stivers

objected, asserting that it constituted “Rule 404(b) evidence that shouldn’t be allowed. More

importantly, under [Rule] 403 [of the Texas Rules of Evidence], any probative value would be

outweighed by the prejudice to [Stivers].” The trial court overruled Stivers’s objections.

The State then presented its case-in-chief by first offering and admitting a certified record

of Stivers’s prior Illinois conviction for failure to register as a sex offender. The prior conviction

contained a list of duties that Stivers acknowledged by signing his initials. The State highlighted

the following duty that Stivers had acknowledged: “If [Stivers] move[s] to another state,

[Stivers] must register with that state within [five] days.”

The State next established that Stivers resided in Upshur County with Barbara Bates from

May 20 to May 31, 2024. During that time, Stivers applied for Medicaid with the State of Texas,

listing Bates’s home as his residence and stating his intent to live in the state permanently.

Additional evidence shows that Stivers fled from Mississippi and never registered as a sex

offender in Texas.

After hearing the evidence, the jury found Stivers guilty of failing to register as a sex

offender within the time required by the law.

II. Extraneous-Offense Evidence

In his brief, Stivers contends that the admission of the prior conviction of failing to

register as a sex offender was unduly prejudicial under Rule 403 and did not meet any of the

exemptions under Rule 404(b) of the Texas Rules of Evidence. See TEX. R. EVID. 403, 404(b).

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As to Rule 404(b), Stivers argues that the State’s use of his prior conviction for failure to register

as a sex offender constituted improper character-witness evidence because “[t]here is no

knowledge requirement in the elements of the crime charged.” We reorder Stivers’s issues to

address Rule 404(b) first and then Rule 403.

A. Standard of Review

“We review a trial court’s decision to admit or exclude evidence for an abuse of

discretion.” Flowers v. State, 438 S.W.3d 96, 103 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2014, pet. ref’d)

(citing Martinez v. State, 327 S.W.3d 727, 736 (Tex. Crim. App. 2010)). “Abuse of discretion

occurs only if the decision is ‘so clearly wrong as to lie outside the zone within which reasonable

people might disagree.’” Id. (quoting Taylor v. State, 268 S.W.3d 571, 579 (Tex. Crim. App.

2008)) (citing Montgomery v. State, 810 S.W.2d 372, 391 (Tex. Crim. App. 1991) (op. on

reh’g)). “We may not substitute our own decision for that of the trial court.” Id. (citing Moses v.

State, 105 S.W.3d 622, 627 (Tex. Crim. App. 2003)). “We will uphold an evidentiary ruling if it

was correct on any theory of law applicable to the case.” Id. (citing De La Paz v. State, 279

S.W.3d 336, 344 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009)).

The admissibility of extraneous-offense evidence is evaluated under a two-pronged test:

(1) the extraneous-offense evidence must be “relevant to a fact of consequence in the case aside

from its tendency to show action in conformity with character,” and (2) “the probative value of

the evidence” must not be “substantially outweighed by [the danger of] unfair prejudice.” Page

v. State, 213 S.W.3d 332, 336 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006).

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B. Rule 404(b) Analysis

Rule 404(b)(1) provides, “Evidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is not admissible to

prove a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in

accordance with the character.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). However, evidence of “other crime[s],

wrong[s] or other act[s]” may be admissible if it has relevance apart from its tendency “to prove

a person’s character in order to show that on a particular occasion the person acted in accordance

with the character.” Id. The permissible “purpose[s]” to which evidence of “crime[s], wrong[s],

or other act[s]” may be put include “proving motive, opportunity, intent, preparation, plan,

knowledge, identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.” TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(2).

Extraneous-offense evidence that logically serves any of these purposes is “relevant,” TEX. R.

EVID. 403, beyond its tendency “to prove a person’s character in order to show that on a

particular occasion the person acted in accordance with the character” provided its probative

value substantially outweighs the danger of unfair prejudice, TEX. R. EVID. 404(b)(1). Thus, the

rule only excludes evidence offered solely to prove bad character and conformity with that

character. De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343.

Stivers argues that the State improperly relied on Rule 404(b) evidence to prove

knowledge because knowledge is not an element of the charged crime. According to Stivers,

“[t]he prior conviction . . . did not serve to prove or disprove any element of the crime” and was

therefore “irrelevant to the State’s case.” In making this argument, however, Stivers

misconstrues the State’s burden of proof.

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“Because Article 62.102(a) [neither provides] a culpable mental state” nor “dispense[s]

with one,” Section 6.02(c) of the Texas Penal Code requires that one be read into the statute.

Robinson v. State, 466 S.W.3d 166, 170 (Tex. Crim. App. 2015); see TEX. PENAL CODE ANN.

§ 6.02(c). To this end, the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals has determined “that the culpable

mental states of knowledge and recklessness apply only to the duty-to-register element of” an

offense under Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. Id. at 172. Further, the

indictment under which Stivers was tried alleged that he

then and there, while knowing that he was required to register under
Chapter 62 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure because of a reportable
conviction based upon Aggravated Sexual Assault, fail to comply with a
requirement of Chapter 62, by failing to register with the local law
enforcement authority in the county where the defendant resided or intended
to reside for more than seven days, namely, Upshur County Sheriff’s Office,
and [Stivers] did not register by the seventh day after [Stivers’s] arrival in
said jurisdiction.

Therefore, the State was required to prove that Stivers knew of his duty to register with Upshur

County authorities.

“Evidence of extraneous misconduct is admissible to show an individual’s culpable

mental state at the time of the offense if such mental state cannot be inferred from the conduct

itself.” Crews v. State, 06-09-00080-CR, 2009 WL 4907423, at *7, (Tex. App.—Texarkana

Dec. 22, 2009, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (citing Morgan v. State, 692

S.W.2d 877, 880 (Tex. Crim. App. 1985)). In this case, a culpable mental state could not be

inferred from Stivers’s conduct. See Robinson, 466 S.W.3d at 170; see also Varnes v. State, 63

S.W.3d 824, 831 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2001, no pet.) (“[D]ue process requires

actual notice or the reasonable probability of actual notice before violation of a registration
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statute can be prosecuted against an individual.”). In such an instance, the prior Illinois

conviction was relevant for a purpose other than character conformity because it showed

Stivers’s awareness of his duty to register. See Montgomery, 810 S.W.2d at 387 (op on reh’g).

Therefore, we overrule Stivers’s Rule 404(b) point of error.

C. Rule 403 Analysis

“Evidence that is admissible under Rule 404(b) may nonetheless ‘be excluded if its

probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the

issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, or needless presentation of

cumulative evidence.’” James v. State, 555 S.W.3d 254, 260 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2018, pet.

dism’d, untimely filed) (quoting TEX. R. EVID. 403). Accordingly, in performing a Rule 403

analysis, we

must balance (1) the inherent probative force of the proffered item of evidence
along with (2) the proponent’s need for that evidence against (3) any tendency of
the evidence to suggest decision on an improper basis, (4) any tendency of the
evidence to confuse or distract the jury from the main issues, (5) any tendency of
the evidence to be given undue weight by a jury that has not been equipped to
evaluate the probative force of the evidence, and (6) the likelihood that
presentation of the evidence will consume an inordinate amount of time or merely
repeat evidence already admitted.

Gigliobianco v. State, 210 S.W.3d 637, 641–42 (Tex. Crim. App. 2006). “As with Rule 404, a

trial court does not abuse its discretion when it admits or excludes evidence pursuant to Rule 403

so long as its decision is within the zone of reasonable disagreement.” James, 555 S.W.3d at 260

(citing De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 343–44).

We first consider the probative value of the extraneous-offense evidence. “‘[P]robative

value’ refers to the inherent probative force of an item of evidence—that is, how strongly it
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serves to make more or less probable the existence of a fact of consequence to the litigation . . .

with the proponent’s need for that item of evidence.” Gigliobianco, 210 S.W.3d at 641.

Stivers contends that “[t]he prior conviction held no probative force for the offense

charged.” However, as discussed above, the prior conviction had substantial probative force

because it made it more likely that Stivers knew of his duty to register as a sex offender with

authorities in Upshur County. Moreover, the extraneous-offense evidence was central to the

State’s case, as it bore the burden of proving knowledge beyond a reasonable doubt. Stivers does

not identify how the State could have met that burden without the prior conviction, and our

independent review of the record indicates it could not.

The record instead reflects mixed conduct bearing on Stivers’s mental state. Bates

testified that Stivers lied to her about his prior criminal history and disappeared when law

enforcement came to her home in connection with her ongoing divorce. However, Stivers also

applied for Medicaid, stating that he resided in Upshur County and intended to live in Texas

permanently—conduct that could be viewed as inconsistent with guilty knowledge of a duty to

register as a sex offender. Under those circumstances, the trial court could have reasonably

concluded that the prior conviction was necessary to prove Stivers’s knowledge of his duty to

register as a sex offender in Upshur County. Therefore, we find that the first two Gigliobianco

factors weigh in favor of admission of Stivers’s prior conviction.

As for the remaining factors, Stivers argues that the inflammatory nature of the

extraneous-offense evidence improperly swayed the jury to find him guilty. When the

extraneous offense is “no more heinous” than the charged offense, evidence of the extraneous

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offense is not likely to cause unfair prejudice. Taylor v. State, 920 S.W.2d 319, 323 (Tex. Crim.

App. 1996); see also Robisheaux v. State, 483 S.W.3d 205, 220 (Tex. App.—Austin 2016,

pet. ref’d) (tendency to suggest decision on improper basis is “ameliorated somewhat by the fact

that the . . . [extraneous] actions were no more serious than the allegations forming the basis for

the indictment”). Moreover, even “[w]hen evidence does tend to suggest a decision on an

improper basis, . . . a limiting instruction can minimize the risk of the jury improperly relying on

it.” James v. State, 623 S.W.3d 533, 549 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2021, no pet.).

Here, the extraneous offense is the same as Stivers’s charged offense, and the trial court

gave limiting instructions concerning it. In the jury charge, the trial court instructed the jury that

it could only consider the extraneous offense after finding beyond a reasonable doubt that Stivers

committed it, and then only for the limited purpose of determining “motive, opportunity, intent,

plan, knowledge or absence of mistake or accident.” The presentation of the extraneous-offense

evidence also did not consume an inordinate amount of time, as Stivers admits, making it

unlikely to have confused or distracted the jury. In light of the above, the trial court could have

reasonably concluded that the prior conviction did not tend to suggest a decision on an improper

or emotional basis. As such, we find that the remaining Gigliobianco factors weigh in favor of

admission of the prior conviction.

We conclude that the trial court’s ruling was within the “zone of reasonable

disagreement” that is protected from appellate reversal by the abuse of discretion standard of

review. See De La Paz, 279 S.W.3d at 344. Therefore, we overrule Stivers’s Rule 403 point of

error.

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III. Modification of the Judgment

Though we have overruled Stivers’s points of error, we find, sua sponte, that the trial

court’s judgment requires modification. “This Court has the power to correct and modify the

judgment of the trial court for accuracy when the necessary data and information are part of the

record.” Anthony v. State, 531 S.W.3d 739, 743 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (citing

TEX. R. APP. P. 43.2(b); Bigley v. State, 865 S.W.2d 26, 27 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)). “The

authority of an appellate court to reform incorrect judgments is not dependent upon the request

of any party, nor does it turn on the question of whether a party has or has not objected in the

trial court.” Id. (quoting Asberry v. State, 813 S.W.2d 526, 529–30 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1991,

pet. ref’d) (en banc)).

In this case, the trial court’s judgment mistakenly states that the statute of offense is

found at “62.102 Penal Code” instead of Article 62.102 of the Texas Code of Criminal

Procedure. As a result, we modify the trial court’s judgment by deleting the incorrect statute of

offense of “62.102 Penal Code” and changing it to “62.102 Code of Criminal Procedure.”

IV. Conclusion

As modified, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Charles van Cleef
Justice

Date Submitted: January 20, 2026
Date Decided: April 23, 2026

Do Not Publish
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