Jamie Ray Barnes v. the State of Texas

In the
Court of Appeals
Sixth Appellate District of Texas at Texarkana

No. 06-25-00189-CR

JAMIE RAY BARNES, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Panola County, Texas
Trial Court No. 2022-C-005

Before Stevens, C.J., van Cleef and Rambin, JJ.
Memorandum Opinion by Justice van Cleef
MEMORANDUM OPINION

Appellant, Jamie Ray Barnes, pled guilty to terroristic threat against a peace officer. See

TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.07(c-1). The trial court sentenced Barnes to two years in a state-

jail facility but suspended the sentence in favor of placing him on community supervision for

four years.1 The State later moved to revoke Barnes’s community supervision, alleging that he

violated several of its terms. After a hearing, the trial court revoked Barnes’s community

supervision.

Via a single, consolidated brief, Barnes appeals his convictions, contending that the trial

court failed to conduct an informal inquiry regarding whether Barnes was competent to stand

trial at the revocation hearing. Because we conclude that the trial court conducted a sufficient

inquiry, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

I. Background

A month before his revocation hearing, Barnes filed a motion suggesting incompetency

and request for examination. In support of his motion, Barnes described a history of mental

illness and cited contemporaneous statements from others expressing concern about Barnes’s

mental state. Barnes’s counsel also stated within the motion that Barnes had refused to consult

with him. After reviewing the motion, the trial court ordered an evaluation by a medical doctor

to determine whether Barnes was competent to stand trial. In the same order, the trial court

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In his companion appellate cause number 06-25-00203-CR, Barnes appeals his conviction for harassment of a
public servant. See TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 22.11(b) (Supp.). In his companion appellate cause number 06-25-
00204-CR, Barnes appeals his conviction for evading arrest or detention with a previous conviction. See TEX.
PENAL CODE ANN. § 38.04(b)(1) (Supp.).
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indicated that it would decide at the revocation hearing if there was any evidence to support a

finding of incompetency.

At the start of the revocation hearing, Barnes’s counsel informed the trial court that the

medical evaluation found Barnes competent to stand trial, even though he had a mental illness.

Counsel added that he also believed Barnes was competent, stating that Barnes had been

“rational” and had begun consulting with him. Finally, counsel stated that the parties had signed

a stipulation that Barnes was competent.

During the revocation hearing, certain witnesses testified about Barnes’s mental health.

One of the State’s witnesses, Jamie Deville, Barnes’s community supervision officer, agreed on

cross-examination that Barnes had a history of mental illness, which made communicating with

him difficult. Barnes’s mother also testified about his mental health, stating that Barnes had

previously been committed to mental facilities and reported experiencing auditory hallucinations

while in jail. Moreover, Barnes took the stand in his own defense and acknowledged “a pattern

of not taking [his] medicine and getting arrested[.]”

At the conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found that Barnes had violated the terms

and conditions of his community supervision and revoked his community supervision.

A. Standard of Review

We review a trial court’s failure to conduct a competency inquiry under an abuse-of-

discretion standard. Moore v. State, 999 S.W.2d 385, 393 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). “A person is

incompetent to stand trial [when that] person does not have . . . (1) sufficient present ability to

consult with the person’s lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational understanding; or (2) a

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rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings against the person.” TEX. CODE

CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(a).

“Procedurally, a trial court employs two steps for making competency determinations

before it may ultimately conclude that a defendant is incompetent to stand trial.” Boyett v. State,

545 S.W.3d 556, 563 (Tex. Crim. App. 2018). “The first step is an informal inquiry; the second

step is a formal competency trial.” Id. The trial court’s duty to conduct an informal inquiry is

triggered “upon a ‘suggestion’ from any credible source that the defendant may be incompetent.”

Id. (quoting TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004(c-1)). At the informal-inquiry stage, the

trial court determines “whether there is some evidence from any source that would support a

finding that the defendant may be incompetent.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.004(c).

“The fact that a defendant is mentally ill does not by itself mean he is incompetent.” Turner v.

State, 422 S.W.3d 676, 691 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013). Instead, there must be evidence that the

mental illness is the cause of the defendant’s incompetence. Id.; Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 564.

B. Discussion

Barnes argues that the trial court failed to conduct an informal inquiry into his

competency to stand trial. In doing so, however, Barnes focuses on testimony elicited during the

revocation hearing while overlooking the trial court’s consideration of his competency at the

start of the proceeding.

Contrary to Barnes’s assertions, the record reflects that the trial court conducted an

informal inquiry into his competency. After Barnes filed his motion suggesting incompetency,

the trial court ordered that Barnes be evaluated by a medical professional. See TEX. CODE CRIM.

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PROC. ANN. art. 46B.021(a)(1); Clark v. State, 592 S.W.3d 919, 925 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2019, pet. ref’d). At the start of the hearing, the trial court discussed with the parties the results

of that examination, which found Barnes competent to stand trial despite his mental illness.

Barnes’s counsel then informed the trial court that Barnes had consulted with him about the

revocation hearing, that counsel believed Barnes was competent, and that the parties had signed a

stipulation to that effect. The record therefore demonstrates that the trial court conducted an

informal inquiry into Barnes’s competency. See Gray v. State, 257 S.W.3d 825, 828 (Tex.

App.—Texarkana 2008, pet. ref’d); Clark, 592 S.W.3d at 927 (citing Boyett, 545 S.W.3d at 563).

Even so, Barnes’s argument could be read as contending that testimony elicited later in

the revocation hearing required the trial court to conduct a second informal inquiry. A trial court

has a continuing duty to consider competency throughout the course of a proceeding and to

remain “vigilant for changes in circumstances.” Turner, 422 S.W.3d at 693. However, the

testimony Barnes identifies does not reveal any changed circumstance or otherwise suggest

present incompetency.

Instead, the testimony shows only that Barnes had experienced mental-health issues in

the past, without suggesting that Barnes lacked a “present ability to consult with [his] lawyer

with a reasonable degree of rational understanding” or “a rational as well as factual

understanding of the proceedings.” TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 46B.003(a)(1)–(2).

Indeed, the testimony merely reiterates what the trial court had already been advised of through

the medical examination—that Barnes suffered from mental illness. Moreover, Barnes himself

took the stand, confirmed that he understood his rights before testifying, and then gave rational

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and coherent testimony. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 46B.004(c-1), 46B.024(1)(E),

(F) (listing the defendant’s capacity to testify and exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior as

factors that should be considered when determining the need for an informal inquiry); Anthony v.

State, 531 S.W.3d 739, 743 n.3 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2016, no pet.) (noting the defendant’s

testimony at trial demonstrated his ability to “exhibit appropriate courtroom behavior”).

Accordingly, the trial court did not abuse its discretion by declining to conduct a second informal

inquiry during the revocation hearing. See Gray, 257 S.W.3d at 831. We overrule Barnes’s sole

point of error.

II. Conclusion

Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Charles van Cleef
Justice

Date Submitted: May 18, 2026
Date Decided: May 21, 2026

Do Not Publish

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