In Re Matthew Flowers, Relator v. the State of Texas

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-25-00112-CR

IN RE MATTHEW LEE FLOWERS, RELATOR

ORIGINAL PROCEEDING

April 8, 2025
Before QUINN, C.J., and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Pending before the court is the pro se petition for writ of mandamus filed by relator,

Matthew Lee Flowers. Through it, he asks us to direct the Honorable Steven Emmert,

presiding judge of the 31st District Court (trial court), to release the results of DNA testing

or to provide relator with 1) where the evidence was sent for testing, 2) when the evidence

was sent for testing, and 3) the projected release of the results of the testing. Allegedly,

the trial court was obliged to provide such information under article 64.03(d)(3) of the

Code of Criminal Procedure. We deny the petition.

Mandamus is an extraordinary remedy. In re Sw. Bell Tel. Co., L.P., 235 S.W.3d

619, 623 (Tex. 2007) (orig. proceeding). A writ of mandamus will issue only when the

relator has no adequate remedy by appeal and the trial court committed a clear abuse of
discretion. In re Cerberus Capital Mgmt., L.P., 164 S.W.3d 379, 382 (Tex. 2005) (orig.

proceeding). The relator has the burden of establishing both prerequisites. In re

Fitzgerald, 429 S.W.3d 886, 891 (Tex. App.—Tyler 2014, orig. proceeding.).

To establish an abuse of discretion, a relator must demonstrate the trial court acted

unreasonably, arbitrarily, or without reference to any guiding rules or principles. In re

Dunn, No. 07-24-00372-CV, 2024 Tex. App. LEXIS 8885, at *2 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Dec.

19, 2024, orig. proceeding.). To establish no adequate remedy by appeal, a relator must

show there is no adequate remedy at law to address the alleged harm and the act

requested is a ministerial act, not involving a discretionary or judicial decision. Id. (citing

State ex rel. Young v. Sixth Judicial Dist. Court of Appeals, 236 S.W.3d 207, 210 (Tex.

Crim. App. 2007) (orig. proceeding)). To establish a ministerial act, a relator must also

show 1) a legal duty to perform, 2) a demand for performance, and 3) a refusal to act. Id.

The relator can satisfy the requirement of a ministerial act if he can show a clear right to

the relief sought. In re State ex rel. Weeks, 391 S.W.3d 117, 122 (Tex. Crim. App. 2013)

(orig. proceeding).

It is true that a convicting court may order forensic DNA testing upon compliance

with the conditions of article 64.03 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. See TEX.

CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(a) (so stating). That testing may be conducted by either

1) the Department of Public Safety (DPS), 2) a laboratory operating under contract with

the DPS, or 3) another laboratory if so requested by the applicant and the said laboratory

meets certain accreditation measures. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 64.03(c)(1-3).

Where the third option is ordered, the trial court must also order that, “on completion of

the DNA testing, the results of the testing and all data related to” it “be immediately filed

2
with the court and copies of the results and data be served on the convicted person and

the attorney representing the state.” Id. at 64.03(d)(3); see also Booker v. State, 155

S.W.3d 259, 264 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2004, no pet.) (holding that “Article 64.03(d)(3)

requires the trial court to make such an order if the testing was not performed by a

Department of Public Safety laboratory or a laboratory under contract with the

department” and “[i]n this case, the testing was performed by a Department of Public

Safety laboratory, so article 64.03(d)(3) does not apply”).

Yet, relator provided no evidence indicating that the DNA testing purportedly

ordered by the trial court has been completed. Simply put, we cannot order the release

of non-existent data.

More importantly, though, relator also failed to accompany his petition with a copy

of the trial court’s order purporting to grant his request for and mandate DNA testing. This

is of concern because the authority he relies on as basis for a writ directing disclosure of

the testing results, i.e., article 64.03(d)(3), applies only when an entity other than the DPS

or one in contract with the DPS performs the testing. See Booker, supra. So, without a

copy of the order mandating testing, relator did not prove the trial court had an obligation

to comply with article 64.03(d)(3).

Finally, and to the extent relator asks in the alternative that we direct the trial court

to provide: 1) where the evidence was sent for testing, 2) when the evidence was sent

for testing, and 3) the projected release of the results of the testing, he cites no authority

establishing said court had a ministerial duty to provide such information.

3
Relator’s petition for a writ of mandamus is denied. The Clerk of this Court is

directed to serve Judge Emmert with a copy of this order and the petition for writ of

mandamus in a manner affording Judge Emmert actual notice of same.

Brian Quinn
Chief Justice

Do not publish.

4