Ethan Allen-Scott Mitchell v. Hayley Ellen Mitchell

In The
Court of Appeals
Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-26-00058-CV

ETHAN ALLEN-SCOTT MITCHELL, APPELLANT

V.

HAYLEY ELLEN MITCHELL, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 481st District Court
Denton County, Texas1
Trial Court No. 24-11035-481, Honorable Crystal Levonius, Presiding

May 19, 2026
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before PARKER, C.J., and DOSS and PRATT, JJ.

Appellant Ethan Allen-Scott Mitchell appeals a final decree of divorce from

Appellee Hayley Ellen Mitchell. As his sole issue, he complains the trial court abused its

discretion when it denied him an evidentiary hearing on his motion to set aside the

mediated settlement agreement (MSA). We affirm.

1 Because this matter was transferred from the Second Court of Appeals, we apply its precedent

when it conflicts with that of the Seventh Court of Appeals. TEX. R. APP. P. 41.3.
BACKGROUND

Ethan and Hayley were married in April 2013. They had three children during their

marriage. Ethan filed for divorce in November 2024. In May 2025, the parties signed an

MSA. Two months later, Ethan filed a motion to set aside the MSA, alleging fraud, duress,

and coercion.

Several motions were filed, and the court held a hearing on September 11, 2025.

The trial court heard Ethan’s motion to set aside the MSA during this hearing. After

considering the arguments of counsel, the court determined it was unnecessary to hear

additional evidence and denied Ethan’s motion to set aside the MSA. The trial court then

entered the Final Decree of Divorce and decided other issues, including attorney’s fees

and sanctions ordered against Ethan and his attorney.

On the same day, the trial court also struck the pleadings of Ethan’s counsel due

to counsel’s ineligibility to practice law at that time.2 Ethan, through a new attorney, later

filed a motion for new trial, raising, among things, his complaints that the MSA was

secured through fraud, duress, and coercion. That motion was overruled by operation of

law. On December 1, 2025, the court filed findings of fact and conclusions of law.

ANALYSIS

By his sole issue, Ethan argues the trial court abused its discretion by denying him

an evidentiary hearing on his motion to set aside the MSA. He claims the trial court

2 Another attorney represented Ethan at the time the MSA was signed. At the September 11, 2025
hearing, Ethan was represented by two attorneys, only one of whom was ineligible to practice at that time.

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erroneously reached this conclusion because it believed compliance with section 6.602

of the Texas Family Code foreclosed consideration of Ethan’s allegations that the

agreement was procured by fraud, duress, or coercion. We disagree.

Mediated settlement agreements are binding in suits affecting both the parent-child

relationship and marital property. Emami v. Emami, No. 02-21-00319-V, 2022 Tex. App.

LEXIS 5840, at *11–12 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth Aug. 11, 2022, no pet.) (mem. op.)

(citations omitted). If it does, then the parties are entitled to a judgment that conforms to

their agreement. Milner v. Milner, 361 S.W.3d 615, 618–19 (Tex. 2012). See also In re

Torres, 688 S.W.3d 359, 366 (Tex. App.— Dallas 2024, orig. proceeding). But, a court is

not required to enforce a mediated settlement agreement if it is “illegal in nature or

procured by fraud, duress, coercion, or other dishonest means.” Emami, 2022 Tex. App.

LEXIS 5840, at *12–13.

Generally, trial courts have discretion in determining whether to hold an evidentiary

hearing to set aside an MSA. Such hearings may be necessary when allegations of fraud,

duress, coercion, nondisclosure, or other misconduct are raised. Boyd v. Boyd, 67

S.W.3d 398, 403 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2002, no pet.). In short, the binding nature of

an MSA under section 6.602 does not completely prohibit challenges based on these

grounds, and courts must weigh the statutory framework with principles of due process

and fairness. Id. at 404–05; Morse v. Morse, 349 S.W.3d 55, 56 (Tex. App.—El Paso

2010, no pet.).

To preserve error for appellate review, a party must make a timely request to the

trial court that sets forth the grounds for the ruling sought “with sufficient specificity to

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make the trial court aware of the complaint, unless the specific grounds were apparent

from the context” and obtain a ruling. TEX. R. APP. P. 33.1; Thota v. Young, 366 S.W.3d

678, 689 (Tex. 2012).

Here, Ethan does not dispute that the MSA satisfied the requisites of section 6.602.

Rather, he argues the trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his

motion to set aside the MSA. He contends he raised and preserved the issue for our

review via his motions, attached affidavits, and the record. He claims he raised with the

trial court allegations that the MSA was procured through threats, coercion, extortion,

concealment, and fraudulent misrepresentations by Hayley’s counsel.

Hayley argues Ethan failed to raise and preserve this issue with the trial court. She

notes Ethan was not sworn as a witness, nor did his attorney argue the grounds set forth

in the motion to set aside the MSA. Rather, at the hearing, counsel argued the MSA

should be set aside in the children’s best interest and due to changing circumstances.

However, an MSA may not be set aside on these grounds. See In re Lee, 411 S.W.3d

445,450 (Tex. 2013) (setting aside an MSA based on a best-interest determination, when

the MSA meets the statutory requirement is improper). See TEX. FAM. CODE. § 156.101

(providing for modification of order if circumstances have materially and substantially

changed but not providing for same to be grounds upon which an MSA may be set aside).

The court held a hearing on September 11, 2025, to address the motion to set

aside the MSA as well as other motions. Regarding the motion to set aside the MSA, the

court stated it would “begin with argument, and then [it] will make a determination as to

whether or not we need to move with testimony.” Therefore, despite Ethan’s assertions

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to the contrary, this statement indicates the trial court clearly understood that an

evidentiary hearing concerning a section 6.602 agreement could be held under some

circumstances.

Then, the court heard argument, which included allegations that could require an

evidentiary hearing on the motion to set aside the MSA. The court then asked whether

the requirements of section 6.602 were met. Counsel conceded that they were “at the

time [the MSA] was signed.” Counsel went on to argue that there were subsequent

material and substantial changes that could result in modification of orders in place. The

court noted, however, that those changes did not affect the MSA, concluding it was not

necessary to conduct an evidentiary hearing on the motion to set aside the MSA.

Ethan did not object at that time, nor did he seek the trial court’s permission to call

witnesses or offer other evidence to show his entitlement to an evidentiary hearing

concerning his motion to set aside the MSA. Dinkins v. Calhoun, No. 02-17-00081-CV,

2018 Tex. App. LEXIS 3519, at *11 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth May 17, 2018, no pet.) (mem.

op.) (citing D Design Holdings, L.P. v. MMP Corp., 339 S.W.3d 195, 204 (Tex. App.—

Dallas 2011, no pet.)). He certainly did not illustrate to the trial court what evidence he

had establishing fraud, duress, coercion, or the like. In sum, Ethan failed to produce any

evidence or make an offer of proof establishing that the MSA was procured through

means such that an evidentiary hearing was required.

Furthermore, after the trial court made its decision on the evidentiary hearing, it

moved to discussion of the final decree of divorce. Hayley requested entry of the MSA

into evidence. Ethan again did not raise any complaint concerning the MSA. And, when

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the trial court asked whether anyone objected to releasing witnesses, Ethan’s counsel

answered, “No, Your Honor” and did not object or otherwise bring to the attention of the

trial court his complaints concerning duress, fraud, or coercion in securing the MSA such

that an evidentiary hearing was necessary. Nor did Ethan raise any objection on this

point for the remaining portions of the hearing.

While Ethan argues he preserved error concerning the trial court’s denial of his

request for a hearing by filing his motion to set aside the MSA along with attachments,

we disagree. Simply “[s]howing that a motion was filed with the court clerk does not

constitute proof that the motion was brought to the trial court’s attention or presented to

the trial court with a request for a ruling.” In re Davidson, 153 S.W.3d 490, 491 (Tex.

App.—Amarillo 2004, no pet.); accord In re Purported Lien or Claim Against Collin Cty.

Clerk Taylor, 219 S.W.3d 620, 623 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2007, pet. denied); In re

Expunction of J.A.L., 630 S.W.3d 249, 251–52 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2020, no pet.)

(“Merely filing a document that raises a complaint, however, does not preserve error; the

party must bring the complaint to the trial court’s attention during court proceedings and

request a ruling.”). Ethan did not do so here.3 We overrule Ethan’s sole issue.

3 We do note Ethan filed a motion for new trial with his affidavit attached, arguing the MSA should

have been set aside due to fraud, duress, or coercion. He did not, however, argue in that motion that the
trial court erred in failing to hold an evidentiary hearing on his motion to set aside the MSA. He only argued
that there was sufficient evidence that required the trial court to set aside the MSA. Even if he had, the only
evidence he had of the alleged duress, fraud, or coercion was his own affidavit. An affidavit is generally
inadmissible hearsay and incompetent evidence unless the affiant testifies and is subject to cross-
examination. TEX. R. EVID. 801, 802. The trial court would have been within its discretion to conclude that
affidavit did not raise evidence sufficient to warrant holding an evidentiary hearing. Moreover, he did not
request a hearing on his motion for new trial. “When a hearing is required to delve into a question of fact,
it is the movant’s burden to request the hearing and to not allow the motion to be overruled by operation of
law.” Goesling v. Am. Arlines, Inc., No. 02-22-00338-CV, 2023 Tex. App. LEXIS 8178, at *35–36 (Tex.
App.—Fort Worth Oct. 26, 2023, pet. denied) (mem. op.). Therefore, Ethan did not explicitly complain of
the trial court’s conclusion that an evidentiary hearing was unnecessary.

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CONCLUSION

Having overruled Appellant’s sole issue, we affirm the trial court’s judgment.

Because we have disposed of the merits of his appeal, we also deny Appellant’s pending

motion for emergency relief.

Laura A. W. Pratt
Justice

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