Ex Parte Miguel Angel Melo Sanchez v. the State of Texas

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
————————————

No. 08-23-00301-CR
————————————

Ex Parte Miguel Angel Melo-Sanchez, Appellant

On Appeal from the County Court
Kinney County, Texas
Trial Court No. 11676CR

MEMORANDUM OPINION
This matter comes before us on remand from the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals to

determine whether Appellant Miguel Angel Melo-Sanchez, who sought a pretrial writ of habeas

corpus based on his claim that he was the subject of selective prosecution, made a prima facie

showing that he was unlawfully arrested and prosecuted for criminal trespass because of his

gender. We conclude that he did not, and we therefore affirm the trial court’s order denying his

pretrial application for a writ of habeas corpus.

I. BACKGROUND

Melo-Sanchez, a noncitizen, was arrested for allegedly trespassing on private property in

Kinney County, Texas in November 2021 as part of the State’s Operation Lonestar (OLS) policy
to address the influx of illegal border crossings from Mexico to Texas. 1 He filed a pretrial

application for a writ of habeas corpus in the county court, arguiprng the State was selectively

prosecuting him in violation of his equal protection rights because the State was only arresting

male noncitizens for alleged trespassing in a five-county area near the border during the same

timeframe pursuant to the OLS policy. The county court denied relief, and Melo-Sanchez appealed

to the Fourth Court of Appeals. The appeal was transferred to this Court pursuant to a Texas

Supreme Court docket equalization order.2

This Court reversed the county court’s judgment and remanded the matter to the county

court with instructions to grant Melo-Sanchez’s habeas petition and dismiss his case, relying on

the Fourth Court of Appeals’ opinion in Ex parte Aparicio.3 In Aparicio, the Fourth Court of

Appeals held that Aparicio, another male noncitizen who was arrested for allegedly trespassing

pursuant to the OLS policy, was the subject of selective prosecution and was therefore entitled to

habeas relief. 4 We concluded that because Melo-Sanchez relied on substantially the same

evidence and the same arguments in bringing his selective prosecution claim, he was also entitled

to habeas relief in accordance with the court’s opinion in Aparicio.5

The State filed a petition for discretionary review of our decision with the Court of Criminal

Appeals, contending Melo-Sanchez’s claim was not cognizable in a pretrial writ of habeas corpus

proceeding without addressing the merits of Melo-Sanchez’s gender discrimination claim. While

1
See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 30.05(a).
2
See Tex. R. App. P. 41.3 (requiring a transferee court to apply the precedent of the transferor court).
3
Ex parte Melo-Sanchez, No. 08-23-00301-CR, 2024 WL 150234, at *6 (Tex. App.—El Paso Jan. 12, 2024), petition
for discretionary review granted, judgment vacated sub nom. Ex parte Ramos-Morales, No. PD-0413-24, 2024 WL
5074598 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 2024) (not designated for publication) (citing Ex parte Aparicio, 672 S.W.3d 696,
701 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2023) rev’d, 707 S.W.3d 189 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio
v. Texas, No. 24-6057, 2025 WL 1787753 (U.S. June 30, 2025)).
4
Ex parte Aparicio, 672 S.W.3d at 701.
5
Ex parte Melo-Sanchez, 2024 WL 150234, at *6.

2
the State’s petition was pending in Melo-Sanchez’s case, the Court of Criminal Appeals reversed

the Fourth Court of Appeals’ decision in Aparicio, holding that, although Aparicio’s claim was

cognizable in a pretrial habeas petition, he did not meet his burden of establishing a prima facie

case that he was unlawfully arrested and prosecuted because of his gender, and he was therefore

not entitled to habeas relief.6 Specifically, it held that Aparicio failed to present clear evidence to

establish that the OLS policy of arresting only men for criminal trespass at the border was

motivated by a discriminatory purpose.7 Instead, the high court held, the State’s motivation was

one of practical necessity stemming from the unprecedented influx of immigrants crossing the

border in the five-county region, the majority of which were male, and the limited jail facilities in

the region.8 The court therefore determined that the OLS policy or “mindset” of arresting only

men for trespass was “more likely” motivated by the “limited resources” the State had to address

the “ongoing emergency” at the border “rather than gender discrimination.”9 Accordingly, the

court concluded that Aparicio failed to meet his burden of “demonstrating a prima facie case that

he [was] arrested and prosecuted because of his gender,” and as such, he did not meet the

“‘demanding’ standard required for judicial interference in the State’s discretion in administering

criminal justice policy and priorities (emphasis in original).”10

Aparicio thereafter filed a petition for writ of certiorari with the Supreme Court of the

United States. After the Supreme Court denied review in Aparicio, the Court of Criminal Appeals

issued its opinion in Melo-Sanchez’s case, in which the court refused review of the State’s petition

6
Ex parte Aparicio, 707 S.W.3d 189, 210 (Tex. Crim. App. 2024), cert. denied sub nom. Aparicio v. Texas, No. 24-
6057, 2025 WL 1787753 (U.S. June 30, 2025).
7
Id. at 208–10.
8
Id. at 209–10.
9
Id. at 210.
10
Id.

3
on the issue of cognizability but granted review on its own motion on the issue of whether Melo-

Sanchez “ma[d]e a prima facie showing that he was arrested and prosecuted because of his

gender.”11 The court then vacated our judgment in Melo-Sanchez’s case and remanded his case

to this Court for resolution of his appeal from the trial court’s denial of his pretrial habeas petition

“in light of [its] opinion in Aparicio.”12

II. DECISION ON REMAND

On remand, the State filed a supplemental brief asserting that Melo-Sanchez’s claim for

habeas relief was identical to Aparicio’s, and that there are no factual distinctions that would

warrant a different finding.13 We agree.14

As we recognized in our first opinion in this matter, Melo-Sanchez was arrested for

criminal trespass under the same OLS policy that was in effect in the same five-county region in

which Aparicio was arrested and detained.15 And Melo-Sanchez relied on substantially the same

evidence and arguments that Aparicio did in attempting to establish that the OLS policy of only

arresting males for criminal trespass in that region was motivated by gender discrimination. 16 In

fact, Melo-Sanchez relied heavily on the Fourth Court of Appeals’ opinion in Aparicio, in which

the court found that the OLS policy at issue was constitutionally unlawful, in making his claim for

relief.17

11
See Ex parte Ramos-Morales, et al., Nos. PD-0107-24, PD-0411-24, PD-0412-24 & PD-0413-24, 2024 WL
5074598 (Tex. Crim. App. Dec. 11, 2024) (not designated for publication). The opinion also addressed three other
cases in a similar procedural posture that were still pending in our Court at the time.
12
Id.
13
Melo-Sanchez has not filed a supplemental brief.
14
Because we agree with the State that Melo-Sanchez did not meet his burden of establishing a prima facie case of
gender discrimination, we do not address the State’s alternative argument that Melo-Sanchez’s claim was not
cognizable in an application for a pretrial writ of habeas corpus.
15
Ex parte Melo-Sanchez, 2024 WL 150234, at *6.
16
Id. at *1, *6.
17
Id.

4
Accordingly, because the Court of Criminal Appeals found in Aparicio’s case that this

same OLS policy or “mindset” was justified in light of the emergency situation at the border, and

because there are no facts that would distinguish Melo-Sanchez’s situation from Aparicio’s, we

conclude that, like Aparicio, Melo-Sanchez has failed to establish a prima facie case that he was

unlawfully arrested and prosecuted with criminal trespass because of his gender. We therefore

conclude that the trial court acted properly in denying Melo-Sanchez’s application for a pretrial

writ of habeas corpus.

III. CONCLUSION

We affirm the trial court’s judgment denying Melo-Sanchez’s application for a pretrial writ

of habeas corpus, and we remand this matter to the trial court for further proceedings in accordance

with our opinion.

LISA J. SOTO, Justice

September 29, 2025

Before Salas Mendoza C.J., Palafox and Soto, JJ.

(Do Not Publish)

5