In the Estate of Sally Hood Coyle v. the State of Texas

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
————————————
No. 08-25-00128-CV
————————————

In the Estate of Sally Hood Coyle, Deceased

On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Medina County, Texas
Trial Court No. 9856A

D I S S E NT I NG ME MO R AN D U M O PI NI O N
I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion. In my view, the evidence shows Ross

conclusively established his affirmative defense that Haukom voluntarily accepted benefits under

Coyle’s will, and because Haukom did not otherwise raise a fact issue that her acceptance of the

benefits was involuntary, I would affirm the trial court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of

Ross.1

1
See Amedisys, Inc. v. Kingwood Home Health Care, LLC, 437 S.W.3d 507, 511 (Tex. 2014) (“[A] party moving for
traditional summary judgment . . . ha[s] the burden to submit sufficient evidence that establishe[s] on its face that
‘there is no genuine issue as to any material fact’ and that [the movant] is ‘entitled to judgment as a matter of law.’”;
“When a movant meets that burden of establishing each element of the claim or defense on which it seeks summary
judgment, the burden then shifts to the non-movant to disprove or raise an issue of fact as to at least one of those
elements.”).
Haukom argues that she was coerced into signing an illegal release to obtain the benefits

bequeathed to her under Coyle’s will. But Haukom could simply have declined to sign the illegal

release. The only result would have been that she would not have immediately received benefits

under Coyle’s will and might have had to go to court to obtain them. In other words, release or no

release, the relevant point here is that Haukom was not coerced into taking benefits under the same

will she wishes now to contest. The question before us is whether Haukom can still challenge

Coyle’s will after accepting benefits under it. Under well-established law, she cannot. “Equity does

not permit the beneficiary of a will to grasp benefits under the will with one hand while attempting

to nullify it with the other.” Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 56, 61 (Tex. 2021); see also In re Estate

of McFatter, 94 S.W.3d 729, 734 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (“The doctrine of

election is based on the principle that a person may not take benefits under a will and, at the same

time, set up a right or claim of his own, even if well founded, which would defeat or in any way

prevent the full effect and operation of every part of the will.”) (quoting Smith v. Smith, 657 S.W.2d

457, 459 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1983, writ ref’d n.r.e.)). Thus, it is an affirmative defense to a

will contest that the contestant “voluntarily accepted” benefits under the will. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d

at 61. Unrebutted evidence that the contestant accepted such benefits is sufficient to establish the

defense. Id.

There is no dispute that Haukom accepted $50,000 and a set of china bequeathed to her in

Coyle’s will. Haukom presented no rebutting evidence that her acceptance of these items was

involuntary. For example, there is no evidence that Ross forced Haukom to accept these items or

that Haukom was compelled to accept them out of economic necessity. See Waite v. Waite, 150

S.W.3d 797, 803 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, pet. denied) (“There are . . . exceptions

to the acceptance of benefits doctrine. For example, one exception is based on economic necessity,

and it applies when the acceptance of benefits is not voluntary because of financial duress or other

2
economic circumstances.”).

Rather than cite evidence that her acceptance of the bequests was involuntary, Haukom

contends that her acceptance was “expressly conditioned on her signing a Receipt and Release

form, which improperly released [Ross] from any liability as Independent Executor.” The

unlawfulness of Ross’s requirement that Haukom sign such a release2 did not make her signing or

her acceptance of the bequests “involuntary.”

In her declaration, Haukom explains why she believes that, as a result of “coercive tactics,”

she faced a “forced electi[on]” that made her acceptance of the bequests involuntary:

Mr. Bain made it clear to Carl Green, my attorney at the time, that I could either
sign the Receipt and Release, return it, or I would receive nothing from Sally’s
Estate. Signature and return of the Receipt and Release was a forced condition of
delivery of the check and china. After months of attempting to negotiate the
language in the originally proposed Receipt and Release, it became clear that
Mr. Bain and Lloyd would not remove the release of liability language. Finally,
Mr. Bain threatened to take me to court if I did not sign and return the Receipt and
Release. Based on this forced electi[on], I signed and returned the Receipt and
Release on July 4, 2023.

While Haukom’s declaration uses the phrases “forced condition” and “forced electi[on],”

it states no facts to support their applicability.3 Instead, the declaration explains that when Ross

refused to remove the release language from the receipt, Haukom decided to sign the document

anyway, knowing the release was improper.4 As an alternative to signing the release, Haukom

2
See Tex. Est. Code § 405.002(b) (“An independent executor may not require a waiver or release from the distributee
as a condition of delivery of property to a distributee.”).
3
An act that is coerced or obtained by duress, as distinguished from a voluntary act, is one that is performed under a
threat “of such character as to destroy the free agency of the party to whom it is directed.” Matter of Marriage of
Lehman, No. 14-17-00042-CV, 2018 WL 3151172, at *3 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] June 28, 2018, no pet.);
see also id. (holding that such a threat “must overcome [the party’s] will and cause him to do that which he would not
otherwise do, and which he was not legally bound to do,” “must be imminent,” and “must be such that the person to
whom it is directed has no present means of protection.”); see also Richard D. Davis, L.L.P. v. Knott, No. 14-17-
00257-CV, 2019 WL 438788, at *10–11 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Feb. 5, 2019, pet. denied) (“[T]he elements
of economic duress or business coercion are: (1) the defendant threatened to do some act that it had no legal right to
do; (2) the threat was of such a character as to destroy the plaintiff’s free agency; (3) the threat overcame the plaintiff’s
free will and caused it to do what it otherwise would not have done and that it was not legally bound to do; (4) the
restraint was imminent; and (5) the plaintiff had no means of protection.”).
4
As to Haukom’s knowledge that the release was improper, during the negotiations over the release, Haukom’s

3
could have requested relief in the probate case, i.e., asked for an order that her bequests be

distributed without a release.5 Haukom’s decision to forego this more expensive and time-

consuming option and instead sign the receipt and release form to obtain her bequests immediately

does not make her acceptance of the bequests “involuntary.”

Further, the “threat” by Ross’s attorney to “take [Haukom] to court if [she] did not sign and

return [the release]” was not evidence of coercion, as Haukom contends, but rather evidence of an

offer to resolve the issue in a proper, if less convenient, way. See Vonocom, Inc. v. AdvoCare Int’l,

LP, No. 05-19-00610-CV, 2020 WL 1528496, at *7 (Tex. App.—Dallas Mar. 31, 2020, no pet.)

(“[T]he threat to institute a civil suit or even the actual institution of a civil lawsuit does not

constitute duress, as a matter of law[.]”).

Finally, if Haukom wished to challenge Coyle’s will after accepting benefits under it, she

had the option to return the benefits and then proceed with a will contest. See Matter of Estate of

McDaniel, 935 S.W.2d 827, 829 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 1996, writ denied) (“An offer to return

the property and its proceeds to Wheatley prior to initiating this [will] contest would constitute

some evidence that McDaniel did not accept benefits under the will.”) (citing Trevino v. Turcotte,

564 S.W.2d 682, 686 (Tex. 1978)). Instead, Haukom did something she was not entitled to do: both

keep the benefits under the will and challenge the will. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d at 61 (“Equity does

not permit the beneficiary of a will to grasp benefits under the will with one hand while attempting

to nullify it with the other.”).

attorney sent Ross’s attorney an email expressly complaining that it was improper:
The Receipt and Release document you prepared provided a general release of Lloyd E. Ross, Jr.
“of any liability as to his management of the Estate.” That language is not acceptable to Ms. Haukom
or Ms. Yi. Section 405.002(b) of the Texas Probate Code provides: “An independent executor may
not require a waiver or release from the distributee as a condition of delivery of property to a
distributee.” Ms. Haukom and [Ms. Yi] want that language removed.
5
In fact, the record reflects that Ross’s attorney offered to “deliver the property . . . in the courtroom at a distribution
hearing in the Medina County Courthouse.”

4
For these reasons, I do not agree with the majority opinion’s conclusion that Haukom raised

a fact issue as to whether she was subjected to “coercive tactics” that made her acceptance of the

bequests involuntary. However, I do agree with the majority opinion that Haukom did not

otherwise show that her acceptance was involuntary.6 Because I would affirm the trial court’s

summary judgment in favor of Ross, I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion.

LISA J. SOTO, Justice

May 13, 2026

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
Soto, J., dissenting

6
Haukom contends her acceptance of benefits under her mother’s will was involuntary for a second reason, namely,
she “lacked critical information when she accepted [the] benefits,” i.e., “[a]t the time she signed the Receipt and
Release, she was unaware of material facts regarding her mother’s deteriorated mental state and the extent of [Ross’s]
abuse and undue influence.” The majority opinion concludes that Haukom raised no fact issue as to whether she
“lacked [knowledge of] material facts of the circumstances at the time of acceptance.” I agree.

5

COURT OF APPEALS
EIGHTH DISTRICT OF TEXAS
EL PASO, TEXAS
————————————
No. 08-25-00128-CV
————————————

In the Estate of Sally Hood Coyle, Deceased

On Appeal from the County Court at Law
Medina County, Texas
Trial Court No. 9856A

M E MO RA N D UM O PI NI O N 1

In two issues, Appellant challenges the trial court’s grant of summary judgment against her

and its evidentiary rulings in the underlying will contest between her and Appellee, the executor

of her mother’s will. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand.

I. FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

This appeal concerns the estate of Sally Hood Coyle. Coyle died on July 23, 2022, at the

age of 68 and was survived by her two daughters, Appellant Lisa E. Haukom and Sarah Jane Yi.

1
This case was transferred pursuant to the Texas Supreme Court’s docket equalization efforts. Tex. Gov’t Code
§ 73.001. We follow the precedent of the Fourth Court of Appeals to the extent it might conflict with our own. See
Tex. R. App. P. 41.3.
Appellee Lloyd E. Ross, Jr., who was Coyle’s partner and caretaker, later became the executor of

her estate.

Before Coyle’s death, Haukom and Yi had concerns about Coyle’s condition and Ross’s

treatment of her. During an August 3, 2019 phone call, Coyle told her daughters that Ross was

abusing her, including depriving her of water, that she wanted to leave him, and that she wanted

to contact her attorney to change her estate planning documents. According to Haukom, Ross

allegedly isolated Coyle from family and friends and prevented access to her medical care.

After Coyle’s death on July 23, 2022, Ross applied to probate her will in the County Court

at Law of Medina County, Texas. The trial court admitted the will to probate and appointed Ross

executor of Coyle’s estate. Ross and Haukom were both beneficiaries under the will. The will left

the majority of Coyle’s estate to Ross, including four real properties, funds from her financial

accounts and policies, all vehicles, and all personal property, except for minor bequests to others.

As for Haukom, she was entitled to $50,000 and a china set under the will.

According to Haukom, Ross sent her a letter on March 3, 2023, stating that he was ready

to distribute the assets of Coyle’s estate and informing her that she was entitled to $50,000 and a

china set. Ross also enclosed a “Receipt and Release” and directed Haukom to sign it before he

would send her the $50,000 check. The Receipt and Release contained a provision releasing Ross

from liability for his management of the estate as executor. Haukom objected to this provision,

and her attorney and Ross’s attorney exchanged emails over the months that followed regarding

the language of the Receipt and Release. Haukom executed the Receipt and Release on July 4,

2023, after what Haukom described as Ross’s threatening conduct and his conditioning delivery

of her benefits under the will on execution of the Receipt and Release.

2
Haukom later discovered evidence that she claims indicated Coyle lacked testamentary

capacity and that Ross exerted undue influence over her, including unknown medical diagnoses

and the audio recording of the August 3, 2019 phone call. Haukom filed suit against Ross on

August 14, 2024, contesting the will on grounds of lack of capacity and undue influence. Ross

generally denied the allegations and filed a traditional motion for summary judgment, asserting as

an affirmative defense that Haukom lacked standing to contest the will based on her acceptance of

benefits under it. In response, Haukom argued she did not voluntarily accept the benefits, did not

accept them with full knowledge of facts surrounding the will’s execution, and that equity barred

summary judgment. She attached her declaration and six supporting exhibits. Ross filed a reply

and objections to Haukom’s declaration and exhibits.

After hearing argument, the trial court reset the summary judgment hearing and granted

Haukom leave to file a written response to Ross’s objections limited to addressing “matter as to

form only.” Haukom then filed an amended declaration with additional exhibits. Her summary

judgment evidence included her declaration, witness statements, text messages, legal documents,

medical records, the letter from Ross and the enclosed Receipt and Release, and the transcript of

the August 3, 2019 phone call. Ross objected to the evidence on grounds of untimely production,

failure to disclose witnesses, lack of authentication, improper hearsay, and that Haukom’s

declaration contained legal and factual conclusions from an interested witness.

The trial court heard the summary judgment motion and the parties’ arguments regarding

the evidentiary objections and signed its Order on Defendant’s Objections to the Amended

Declaration of Lisa Haukom, sustaining some objections and overruling others. A few days later,

the trial court signed its Order Granting Defendant’s Motion for Traditional Summary Judgment.

This appeal followed.

3
II. APPLICABLE LAW AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
A beneficiary in a will contest “does not seek to enforce the terms of the will; she charges

that the will in invalid.” Estate of Johnson, 631 S.W.3d 56, 64 (Tex. 2021). Under the Texas

Estates Code, “a person interested is an estate” may contest it in probate court. Tex. Est. Code

§ 55.001 (“A person interested in an estate may, at any time before the court decides an issue in a

[probate] proceeding, file written opposition regarding the issue.”). Whether a person has standing

to contest a will is a threshold consideration for a probate court. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d at 60. Once

the contestant establishes her interest in the estate, the burden shifts to the will’s proponent to

produce evidence of an affirmative defense that precludes the contestant from proceeding with her

claim. Id. at 60–61.

The acceptance-of-benefits doctrine is an affirmative defense based on estoppel and bars a

party from contesting the validity of a will while enjoying its benefits. Id. at 61; see Rowling v.

Rowling, 528 S.W.3d 116, 117–18 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2017, no pet.). “Equity does not permit

the beneficiary of a will to grasp benefits under the will with one hand while attempting to nullify

it with the other.” Johnson, 631 S.W.3d at 61. The doctrine requires that a beneficiary voluntarily

accept benefits under the will. Id. at 65. It is the will’s proponent who bears the burden to establish

that the contestant voluntarily accepted the benefits. Id. at 61. Absent any evidence rebutting the

doctrine, competent evidence showing acceptance of benefits under the will bars the contestant

from reaching the merits of her claim. Id. A contestant may rebut the doctrine by showing she did

not voluntarily accept the benefits. Id.

To prevail on a traditional summary judgment motion, the movant must show that no

genuine issue of material fact exists and that he is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Tex. R.

Civ. P. 166a(c); Provident Life & Acc. Ins. Co. v. Knott, 128 S.W.3d 211, 216 (Tex. 2003). We

4
view the evidence in the light most favorable to the nonmovant, crediting evidence favorable to

the nonmovant if reasonable jurors could, and disregarding evidence contrary to the nonmovant

unless reasonable jurors could not. Mann Frankfort Stein & Lipp Advisors, Inc. v. Fielding, 289

S.W.3d 844, 848 (Tex. 2009). We indulge every reasonable inference and resolve any doubts in

the nonmovant’s favor. 20801, Inc. v. Parker, 249 S.W.3d 392, 399 (Tex. 2008). Once the movant

produces sufficient evidence to establish entitlement to summary judgment as a matter of law on

each element, the burden shifts to the nonmovant to produce evidence raising a genuine issue of

material fact to defeat summary judgment. Van v. Peña, 990 S.W.2d 751, 753 (Tex. 1999). A

genuine issue of material fact exists when more than a scintilla of evidence is produced. Ford

Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 600 (Tex. 2004). More than a scintilla of evidence exists

if the evidence “rises to a level that would enable reasonable and fair-minded people to differ in

their conclusions.” Id. at 601. Because the trial court’s order does not specify the grounds for its

summary judgment, we must affirm the summary judgment if any theory presented to the trial

court and preserved for appellate review is meritorious. Provident Life, 128 S.W.3d at 216.

We review a summary judgment in a will contest de novo, just as in any other case. Estate

of Grogan, 595 S.W.3d 807, 812 (Tex. App.—Texarkana 2020, no pet.). Our review also

encompasses the trial court’s evidentiary rulings, which we assess for an abuse of discretion. Nat’l

Liab. & Fire Ins. v. Allen, 15 S.W.3d 525, 527–28 (Tex. 2000).

III. ANALYSIS

A. The trial court’s summary judgment ruling

In her first issue, Haukom argues the trial court erred by granting summary judgment

because she produced “competent summary judgment evidence raising genuine fact issues

regarding key exceptions to the acceptance of benefits doctrine under Estate of Johnson—

5
voluntariness and lack of knowledge.” Ross responds that Haukom failed to satisfy her burden

because “[t]here is no competent summary judgment evidence produced by [Haukom] to create a

fact issue on her conclusory allegations that her acceptance of the items bequeathed to her was

involuntary[,]” or “that she lacked knowledge of material facts at the time of the acceptance of the

items bequeathed to her under the will.” We disagree.

Haukom contends that her acceptance of benefits under the will was involuntary because

it “was expressly conditioned on her signing a Receipt and Release form, which improperly

released [Ross] from any liability as Independent Executor” and which “violated Texas law and

his fiduciary duties.” She relies on her amended declaration.2 In that declaration, Haukom states

that after Ross probated the will, he, through his attorney, sent her a letter stating she was entitled

to $50,000 and a china set. The declaration further states that the letter enclosed a copy of a $50,000

check and a Receipt and Release to be signed and returned before Ross would forward the original

check. The Receipt and Release, admitted as summary judgment evidence, and to which Ross did

not object, states:

A copy of [the check], from the Estate of SALLY HOOD COYLE, Deceased,
in the amount of $50,000.00 is enclosed. Upon receipt of the original of said check,
and the [china set], I agree and confirm that I am not due any further funds or assets
of this Estate.
This is also a RELEASE of LLOYD E. ROSS, JR., Executor of the Estate of
SALLY HOOD COYLE, Deceased, of any liability as to his management of this
Estate.

Haukom asserts that through her attorney, she objected to the inclusion of the release of liability

provision. On March 15, 2023, her attorney emailed Ross’s attorney objecting to the provision:

Mr. Bain: I have had an opportunity to speak with Ms. Haukom on the Receipt and
Release issues. And I have also received information about Sarah Yi’s

2
Haukom’s unsworn amended declaration contains the statutorily required jurat stating her full name, date of birth,
address, and “declare[s] under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct.” See Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem.
Code § 132.001(c)(1), (2) (requiring an unsworn declaration to “be in writing” and “subscribed by the person making
the declaration as true under penalty of perjury”).

6
circumstances relating to the Receipt and Release. The Receipt and Release
document you prepared provided a general release of Lloyd E. Ross, Jr. “of any
liability as to his management of the Estate.” That language is not acceptable to
Ms. Haukom or Ms. Yi. Section 405.002(b) of the Texas Probate Code provides:
“An independent executor may not require a waiver or release from the distributee
as a condition of delivery of property to a distributee”. Ms. Haukom and [Ms. Yi]
want that language removed . . . So, I think we can work on the language to satisfy
Ms. Haukom and Ms. Yi. But, they will not provide Mr. Ross a general release in
return for the property bequested to them by Ms. Coyle.

A few months later in May, the attorneys exchanged the following correspondence:

• May 5, 2023, from Haukom’s attorney to Ross’s:

Cecil: I am preparing the suggested modifications for review by Lisa Haukom and
the other persons involved. We still have a problem with the notary requirement:
Lisa and her sister will not be present at the exchange as they live outside of Texas.
Texas and I believe most states forbid the [] execution of any certificate containing
a statement known by the notary public to be false. Ms. Haukom and the others do
not want to provide a statement to the notary that they have received property before
they have received it. This was the problem confronted by Ms. Yi. May I suggest
that we initially go with the documents without a notary, but once Mr. Jellerson
receives the property, I will obtain a notarized version of the documents from all
involved and send them to you. Another suggestion: we can just have the notary
attest to the release language rather than the receipt of property. Let me know your
position on this and any suggestions you may have. Thank you for your
consideration.

• May 8, 2023, Ross’s attorney’s response:

Mr. Green: We are again disappointed that your clients and/or you have changed
your minds again about this distribution. See Section 405.002 Texas Estate[s] Code.
Or we can deliver the property to the distributees in the courtroom at a distribution
hearing in the Medina County Courthouse.

Haukom ultimately signed the Receipt and Release a few months later in July. Her declaration

states:

11. . . . Mr. Bain made it clear to Carl Green, my attorney at the time, that I could
either sign the Receipt and Release, return it, or I would receive nothing from
Sally’s Estate. Signature and return of the Receipt and Release was a forced
condition of delivery of the check and china. After months of attempting to
negotiate the language in the originally proposed Receipt and Release, it
became clear that Mr. Bain and Lloyd would not remove the release of liability
language. Finally, Mr. Bain threatened to take me to court if I did not sign and

7
return the Receipt and Release. Based on this forced elective, I signed and
returned the Receipt and Release on July 4, 2023.3

Attached as Haukom’s evidence in opposition of summary judgment was the executed Receipt

Release and the emails between the attorneys.4

Texas Estates Code 405.002(b) provides that “[a]n independent executor may not require

a waiver of release from the distributee as a condition of delivery of property to a distribute.”

Tex. Est. Code. § 405.002(b). Haukom complains of the violation of the Estates Code and Ross’s

conduct, arguing that “such coercive tactics directly undermine any claim that [her] acceptance of

benefits was voluntary.” Ross responds that Haukom’s arguments concerning the Receipt and

Release are “irrelevant” and “unsupported” because her own summary judgment evidence shows

that she was represented by counsel before accepting the benefits, her attorney negotiated with his

attorney, and his attorney offered to set a distribution hearing if requested. However, our role at

this juncture is not to determine the weight of the evidence, but instead, whether a genuine issue

of material fact existed as to whether Haukom’s acceptance of benefits was voluntary. See Hall v.

F.A. Halamicek Enters., Inc., 669 S.W.2d 368, 371 (Tex. App.—Corpus Christi 1984, no writ)

(“The trial court is not required to ascertain the credibility of affiants or to determine the weight

of evidence in the affidavits, depositions, exhibits and other summary judgment proof. The only

question is whether or not an issue of material fact is presented.”). Because the parties advance

competing interpretations of the Receipt and Release and the effect of the email exchanges between

their attorneys, and because the record contains evidence supporting both readings, the issue

cannot be resolved as a matter of law on this record. We find that Haukom’s amended declaration,

3
Ross objected to this paragraph and moved for the trial court to strike it on grounds that it included legal conclusions
and factual conclusions from an interested witness. The trial court overruled Ross’s objections.
4
Ross did not object to these exhibits.

8
the release of liability provision in the Receipt and Release, and the objections raised in the email

exchanges, collectively create a fact issue. Taken together, the summary judgment record is

sufficient that reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions as to whether

acceptance was voluntary. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. v. Mayes, 236 S.W.3d 754, 755

(Tex. 2007) (“An appellate court reviewing a summary judgment must consider whether

reasonable and fair-minded jurors could differ in their conclusions in light of all of the evidence

presented.”).

We also recognize that the Texas Supreme Court has stated that case law suggests a

contestant “may overcome an acceptance-of-benefits defense by returning the benefit.” Johnson,

631 S.W.3d at 61 n.17 (emphasis added); see Trevino v. Turcotte, 564 S.W.2d 682, 686

(Tex. 1978) (considering whether a beneficiary “returned or tendered a return” of accepted benefits

as part of determining whether beneficiary’s acceptance was voluntary). Although it is undisputed

that Haukom has not returned the benefits, that fact is not dispositive, and a fact issue nevertheless

remains as to whether her acceptance was voluntary. Cf. Johnson, 631 S.W.3d at 65 (considering

that beneficiary “did not attempt to return the mutual fund account to the estate or assert in this

case that her acceptance of the account was involuntary.”) (emphasis added). Haukom has asserted

that her acceptance was involuntary, and that issue remains in dispute.

Haukom also argues that at the time she signed the Receipt and Release, “she was unaware

of material facts regarding her mother’s mental state and the extent of [Ross’s] abuse and undue

influence.” In her response opposing summary judgment, Haukom alleged that after she filed suit

to contest the will, she learned through discovery about her mother’s diagnoses, her mother’s

desire to remove Ross from her care, and of Ross’s legal scheme to isolate Coyle from her loved

9
ones and change her estate plan to his benefit.5 She states in her declaration that she was denied

access to her mother’s health information after August 2019, and that before signing the Receipt

and Release, she did not know her mother had been diagnosed with vascular dementia in August

2019. She further states in her declaration that on June 11, 2024—after she signed the Receipt and

Release and accepted the benefits—her sister discovered the August 3, 2019 audio recording of

her mother detailing Ross’s abuse, which Haukom believed she needed in order to contest the will.

The recording is of a phone call between Coyle and her daughters—including Haukom—

and reveals that Coyle intended to change her estate plans to exclude Ross, reported being abused

by Ross, and expressed fear of him. The transcript of this recording was included as summary

judgment evidence.6 In the transcript, Coyle states that Ross was “denying [her] water” because

she would “wet the bed” and that Ross had “cut the water off in the house.” Coyle also states that

he was verbally and emotionally abusive towards her and monitored her calls and text messages.

Coyle pleaded to her daughters, “You guys get me out of this mess. It’s driving me crazy.” Coyle

also discussed wanting to change her estate plans to exclude Ross.

Though Coyle’s allegations of Ross’s treatment of her are deeply disturbing, Haukom

participated in this phone call—a fact she acknowledges in her declaration. Haukom’s declaration

and the phone call transcript reflect that she was aware of these circumstances before signing the

Receipt and Release and accepting the benefits under the will. Haukom further states in her

declaration that in August 2019, Ross had “strategically arranged” for a new attorney to execute

new estate planning documents that revoked Haukom and her sister’s appointments as durable and

5
In support, Haukom produced hundreds of pages of legal documents, text messages, medical records, and
declarations—Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, and 7—to which Ross lodged multiple objections as to each on grounds
of untimely production, failure to disclose witnesses, unauthentication, and improper hearsay. The trial court sustained
Ross’s objections as to these exhibits.
6
Ross objected to the transcript of the recording on grounds that it was not timely produced and lacked authentication.
The trial court overruled these objections.

10
medical powers of attorney and as guardians and appointed himself. She also states that before

signing the Receipt and Release and accepting the benefits, her mother’s prior attorney had

“expressed numerous concerns . . . regarding [Ross’s] undue influence over [Coyle] and his

abusive behavior, which she believed impacted [her] mother’s decision regarding the disposition

of her property and assets.” Haukom additionally provides that she and her sister made multiple

reports to authorities and that, in response, Ross sent multiple cease and desist letters, which

Haukom alleged further isolated Coyle from others. We cannot conclude that a fact issue exists as

to whether Haukom lacked material facts of the circumstances at the time of acceptance.

Viewing the summary judgment evidence in the light most favorable to Haukom, as we are

required to do, we conclude Ross did not conclusively establish Haukom’s voluntary acceptance.

Instead, the summary judgment record creates a genuine issue of material fact on whether

Haukom’s acceptance was voluntary. Goodyear Tire, 236 S.W.3d at 756 (“An appellate court

reviewing a summary judgment must consider all the evidence in the light most favorable to the

nonmovant, indulging every reasonable inference in favor of the nonmovant and resolving any

doubts against the motion.”). Accordingly, the trial court erred in granting summary judgment.

Issue One is sustained.

B. The trial court’s evidentiary rulings

In her second issue, Haukom challenges the trial court’s exclusion of summary judgment

evidence. We begin by noting that although Haukom asserts that “[t]he trial court abused its

discretion by excluding exhibits attached to [her] Amended Declaration—evidence it had

previously granted her leave to file in response to [Ross’s] objections[,]” the trial court’s order

granting leave was narrow and allowed Haukom “to file and serve a response . . . limited to

addressing matter as to form only[.]”

11
However, we do not reach the merits of this issue because Haukom did not adequately brief

it. Texas Rule of Appellate Procedure 38.1(i) requires that a “brief must contain a clear and concise

argument for the contentions made, with appropriate citations to authorities and to the record.”

Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(i). Although reviewing courts construe briefing requirements reasonably and

liberally, a party asserting error on appeal must still provide specific argument and analysis

showing that the record and the law support the claimed error. In re A.B., 646 S.W.3d 83, 96

(Tex. App.—Texarkana 2022, pet. denied). “Bare assertions of error, without argument or

authority, waive error.” McKellar v. Cervantes, 367 S.W.3d 478, 484 n.5 (Tex. App.—Texarkana

2012, no pet.).

Haukom states that Ross “asserted objections to Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8, arguing they

were untimely under Texas Rule of Civil Procedure 193.6, not served at fourteen days before the

hearing in violation of Texas Rule of Evidence 902(10)(a), lacked predicate, or inadmissible

hearsay.” In arguing that “[t]he trial court abused its discretion by excluding some of [her]

evidence,” Haukom generally refers to “exhibits,” “evidence that was supplemented,” and “the

supporting exhibits.”7 Ross lodged the following objections to Haukom’s summary judgment

evidence: untimely production to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5, 7, and 8; failure to disclose

7
In her alternative argument, Haukom contends that “the exhibits fell within both the good-cause and no-unfair-
surprise exceptions under Rule 193.6(a)(1)–(2)” and includes a table listing Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7 with the trial
court’s ruling of “SUSTAINED” as to each. But multiple objections were made to each exhibit, the trial court sustained
several objections on different grounds, and Haukom does not identify which specific objections she claims were
sustained. She further argues that “many of the exhibits . . . were already in [Ross’s] possession, had been produced
by him, or involved communications he or his attorney authored[,]” but again fails to specify which exhibits. Even
assuming she intended to challenge rulings as to Exhibits 1, 2, 4, 5 and 7, we again emphasize that multiple objections
were made to each exhibit, and she does not identify which specific rulings she complains of, or provide grounds,
analysis, or legal authority in support. Without identification of the specific exhibits and challenged rulings, she has
waived her argument. As a reviewing court, we have no duty to brief issues for an appellant or search the record
without guidance from an appellant. NexPoint Advisors, L.P. v. United Dev. Funding IV, 674 S.W.3d 437, 446
(Tex. App.—Fort Worth 2023, pet. denied) (“The appellate court has no duty to brief issues for an appellant.”);
Mullendore v. Muehlstein, 441 S.W.3d 426, 430 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2014, pet. denied) (“We construe the Rules of
Appellate Procedure liberally, but an appellate court has no duty to search the record without guidance from an
appellant to determine whether its assertion of reversible error is valid.”).

12
witnesses to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 4 and 7; lack of authentication to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 1, 4, and 8;

and improper hearsay to Plaintiff’s Exhibits 2 and 5. Ross also objected to paragraphs 3, 4, 6, 7,

11, 12, 15–18 in Haukom’s declaration. The trial court made 25 evidentiary rulings in its order.

Haukom does not state which exhibits she challenges, identify which rulings she challenges

on appeal, specify the objections or the grounds made to each exhibit, or explain or provide

analysis as to how the trial court abused its discretion in sustaining the objections. Nor does she

provide applicable legal authority in support. Haukom has not complied with the briefing rules to

adequately brief her complaints. Accordingly, she has presented nothing for our review. See

Tex. R. App. P. 38.1(f); see Day v. Fed’n of State Med. Boards of the United States, Inc., 579

S.W.3d 810, 826 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2019, pet. denied) (“Without the required analysis and

citation to legal authorities, an appellant’s brief presents nothing for appellate review.”). Issue Two

is overruled.

IV. CONCLUSION
Having found that a genuine issue of material fact exists as to whether Haukom’s

acceptance of the benefits under the will was voluntary, we reverse the trial court’s grant of

summary judgment and remand to the trial court for further proceedings consistent with this

opinion.

MARIA SALAS MENDOZA, Chief Justice

May 13, 2026

Before Salas Mendoza, C.J., Palafox, and Soto, JJ.
Soto, J., dissenting

13