Michael Zachary Howard-Dale v. the State of Texas

In The

Court of Appeals

Ninth District of Texas at Beaumont

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NO. 09-23-00349-CR
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MICHAEL ZACHARY HOWARD-DALE, Appellant

V.

THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee

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On Appeal from the 9th District Court
Montgomery County, Texas
Trial Cause No. 21-07-09331-CR
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MEMORANDUM OPINION

Michael Zachary Howard-Dale appeals from his conviction for aggravated

assault against a public servant. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(b)(2)(B). After

Howard-Dale pleaded guilty, the trial court held a sentencing hearing, found him

guilty, and sentenced him to twenty-five years in prison. In one issue, Howard-Dale

contends that the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support his

conviction as required under article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure.

We affirm.

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Procedural Background

The State filed an indictment charging Howard-Dale with two separate counts

of aggravated assault against a public servant. Count I alleged that

on or about July 05, 2021, and before the presentment of this
indictment, in the County and State aforesaid, [Howard-Dale] did then
and there, while using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm,
intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly cause bodily injury to Samuel
Cleveland, a public servant lawfully discharging an official duty, and
the defendant knew that Samuel Cleveland was a public servant[.]

Count II of the indictment alleged that

on or about July 05, 2021, and before the presentment of this
indictment, in the County and State aforesaid, [Howard-Dale] did then
and there, while using or exhibiting a deadly weapon, to-wit: a firearm,
intentionally or knowingly threaten Christopher McCain, a public
servant lawfully discharging an official duty, with imminent bodily
injury, and the defendant knew Christopher McCain was a public
servant[.]

Howard-Dale pleaded guilty to Count I of the indictment in writing on April

11, 2023, concurrently waiving his rights to a jury, to confront and cross-examine

witnesses, and against self-incrimination. The caption of the Admonitions to the

Defendant for Plea to Court indicates that the admonitions apply to Count I of case

number 21-07-09331-CR. The record reflects in that same document that Howard-

Dale signed “Waivers, Consent, Judicial Confession & Plea Agreement” whereby

Howard-Dale swore that:

I JUDICIALLY CONFESSES [sic] to committing the offense of:
AGG ASSAULT AGAINST PUBLIC SERVANT as charged by the
indictment or information or as a lesser-included offense to the offense
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charged in the indictment or information. If the information or
indictment is amended, I further waive my notice requirements.

On the same day the written plea agreement was signed, a plea hearing was

held before the district court. After the trial court reviewed the charge, range of

punishment, competency, citizenship status, and waiver of jury trial with Howard-

Dale, the trial court received Howard-Dale’s guilty plea as follows:

THE COURT: All right. Understanding all that, how do you plea to that first-

degree felony offense of aggravated assault against a public servant?

THE DEFENDANT: I plead guilty, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Do you plead guilty because you’re actually guilty and for no

other reason?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Are you pleading guilty freely and voluntarily?

THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.

The trial court accepted Howard-Dale’s plea of guilty to the first-degree

felony offense of aggravated assault against a public servant, deferred any finding

of guilt, and reset his case for sentencing.

The trial court held a sentencing hearing on October 30, 2023. At the

conclusion of the hearing, the trial court found Howard-Dale guilty and sentenced

him to confinement in the Institutional Division of the Texas Department of Criminal

Justice for a term of twenty-five years. That same day, the trial court signed a Motion
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to Dismiss in Count II of case number 21-07-09331-CR. The trial court stated it was

dismissing Count II because “[t]he Defendant pled guilty in cause number(s) – 21-

07-09331 Count I[.]”

In his sole issue on appeal, Howard-Dale complains that for several reasons

the State failed to introduce sufficient evidence to support his conviction as required

under article 1.15 of the Texas Code of Criminal Procedure. First, Howard-Dale

contends that his oral statements during the plea hearing are insufficient because

they were not under oath and constituted merely an additional admonishment.

Second, Howard-Dale argues his written judicial confession is insufficient because

it does not identify which of the two counts in the indictment he pleaded guilty to.

Third, Howard-Dale argues the judicial confession is insufficient because he did not

swear that each of the elements of the offense was “true and correct.”

Analysis

When a defendant pleads guilty to a felony, article 1.15 of the Texas Code of

Criminal Procedure requires the State “to introduce evidence into the record showing

the guilt of the defendant and said evidence shall be accepted by the court as the

basis for its judgment and in no event shall a person charged be convicted upon his

plea without sufficient evidence to support the same.” Tex. Code Crim. Proc. Ann.

art. 1.15. “Article 1.15 requires substantiation of a guilty plea. By its plain terms it

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requires evidence in addition to, and independent of, the plea itself to establish the

defendant’s guilt.” Menefee v. State, 287 S.W.3d 9, 14 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009).

“Evidence offered in support of a guilty plea may take many forms.” Id. at 13.

For instance, a judicial confession, standing alone, is sufficient to support a guilty

plea so long as it covers all the elements of the charged offense. Id.; Dinnery v. State,

592 S.W.2d 343, 353 (Tex. Crim. App. [Panel Op.] 1979) (op. on reh’g). A

deficiency in one form of proof may be compensated for by other competent

evidence in the record. Menefee, 287 S.W.3d at 14; Jones v. State, 373 S.W.3d 790,

793 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2012, no pet.). Evidence adduced at a

sentencing hearing may also suffice to substantiate a guilty plea. Jones, 373 S.W.3d

at 793; Stewart v. State, 12 S.W.3d 146, 148 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2000,

no pet.) (“article 1.15 does not distinguish between evidence offered at the

guilt/innocence phase and the punishment phase of the trial[]”); see also Menefee,

287 S.W.3d at 18-19 (remanding in part for determination of whether evidence at

sentencing hearing may also suffice to substantiate a guilty plea); Menefee v. State,

No. 12-07-00001-CR, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 6665, at *20-21 (Tex. App.—Tyler

Aug. 18, 2010, pet. ref’d) (mem. op., not designated for publication) (holding on

remand that evidence at sentencing hearing was sufficient under article 1.15).

The State argues Howard-Dale’s written judicial confession along with

evidence admitted during the sentencing hearing was sufficient to support the trial

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court’s judgment that Howard-Dale is guilty of aggravated assault against a public

servant. We agree. The Admonitions admitted into evidence as State’s Exhibit 1

contain a paragraph wherein Howard-Dale “JUDICIALLY CONFESSES to

committing the offense of: AGG ASSAULT AGAINST PUBLIC SERVANT as

charged by the indictment[.]” The caption on the Admonitions clearly indicates it

applies to Count I of the indictment. Count I of the indictment, in turn, correctly

identifies each element of the offense, including identifying Samuel Cleveland as

the victim. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(b)(2)(B) (listing elements of the

offense of aggravated assault on public servant). The trial court subsequently entered

a judgment of conviction as to Count I of the indictment and signed an order

dismissing Count II because he pleaded guilty to Count I. Therefore, we reject

Howard-Dale’s argument that his judicial confession fails to identify the victim.

Citing the Court of Criminal Appeals opinion in Menefee, Howard-Dale

complains that his judicial confession does not include language that the allegations

in the indictment were “true and correct.” 287 S.W.3d 9. We find Menefee

distinguishable. The only evidence admitted during the plea hearing in that case was

a “plea packet” which contained a written stipulation of evidence. Menefee v. State,

No. 12-07-00001-CR, 2008 Tex. App. LEXIS 7089, at *4 (Tex. App.—Tyler Sept.

24, 2008), vacated, 287 S.W.3d 9 (Tex. Crim. App. 2009). The stipulation was

defective because it omitted an element of the offense, and unlike the judicial

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confession in the case before us, the stipulation made no reference to the indictment

which contained the elements of the offense. Menefee, 287 S.W.3d at 11. The

question was whether the omitted element could be supplied by a sworn colloquy

during the plea hearing in which the defendant confirmed he was pleading guilty but

did not testify that each of the elements of the offense was “true and correct.” The

Court of Criminal Appeals answered this question in the negative. Id.

We do not read Menefee to require a defendant to swear that each element of

the offense is “true and correct” as if that were magic language that must be included

in every judicial confession. Instead, the Court held that a guilty plea, even if

confirmed by the defendant under oath in a colloquy during a plea hearing, is not the

same as “confessing to the truth and correctness of the indictment or otherwise

providing substance to the plea.” Id. at 15. Here, Howard-Dale judicially confessed

he committed the offense “as charged by the indictment[,]” and we need not

determine whether his oral statements during the plea hearing are sufficient to supply

a missing element, because no element is missing from the indictment’s description

of the offense to which he judicially confessed. See Jones v. State, 600 S.W.3d 94,

99–100 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2020, pet. ref’d) (Admonitions in which defendant

confessed he “committed the offense . . . exactly as alleged in the charging

instrument,” standing alone, was sufficient under article 1.15.).

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During the sentencing hearing, the State introduced evidence in the form of

Cleveland’s and McCain’s body-camera videos as well as testimony from

Cleveland. In the videos, Cleveland and McCain identify themselves and are in full

uniform as they stand outside Howard-Dale’s apartment. When Cleveland enters

Howard-Dale’s apartment, Howard-Dale shoots Cleveland four times. This is

evidence that Howard-Dale intentionally, knowingly, or recklessly caused bodily

injury to Samuel Cleveland, a public servant lawfully discharging an official duty,

who the defendant knew was a public servant, and that Howard-Dale used or

exhibited a firearm. See Tex. Penal Code Ann. § 22.02(a)(2), (b)(2)(B). In addition

to Howard-Dale’s judicial confession, the evidence during the sentencing hearing

serves as a “basis for [the court’s] judgment” thereby satisfying article 1.15. See Tex.

Code Crim. Proc. Ann. art. 1.15; Jones, 373 S.W.3d at 793.

We overrule Howard-Dale’s sole issue and affirm the trial court’s judgment.

AFFIRMED.

KENT CHAMBERS
Justice

Submitted on May 22, 2025
Opinion Delivered August 20, 2025
Do Not Publish

Before Golemon, C.J., Wright and Chambers, JJ.

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