State v. Idrees

2014 UT App 76
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
IDREES ADAM IDREES,
Defendant and Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20120265-CA
Filed April 10, 2014
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Todd M. Shaughnessy
No. 111900662
Peter A. Daines and Nathalie S. Skibine, Attorneys
for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and Ryan D. Tenney, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN and JOHN A. PEARCE
concurred.
ORME, Judge:
¶1 Following a jury trial, Defendant Idrees Adam Idrees was
convicted of being an accomplice to murder, a first degree felony,
see Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 (LexisNexis 2012), and possession of
a firearm by a restricted person, a second degree felony, see id. § 76-
10-503(2)(a). Defendant appeals only the murder conviction,
arguing that there was insufficient evidence to convict him and that
he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. We affirm.

State v. Idrees
1. “On appeal, we recite the facts from the record in the light most
favorable to the jury’s verdict and present conflicting evidence only
as necessary to understand issues raised on appeal.” State v. Bluff,
2002 UT 66, ¶ 2, 52 P.3d 1210 (citations and internal quotation
marks omitted).
20120265-CA 2 2014 UT App 76
BACKGROUND1
¶2 During a party on January 20, 2012, Defendant and Akol
Joker got in a fight with the victim. At some point, both Defendant
and Joker called the victim a “snitch” and a “bitch.” Two nights
later, Joker and Defendant met up with the victim again. The two
men had a gun that night, and both of them carried it at various
times. While again confronting the victim about being a snitch,
Joker pointed the gun at the victim and pulled the trigger. The gun
did not go off, and Joker handed it to Defendant while complaining
about the malfunction. Defendant fixed the gun but did not
immediately give it back to Joker. Witnesses testified that at some
point that night, Defendant showed the victim the gun, which he
had tucked into his waistband, and mimicked the sound of gunfire
while pointing his finger at the victim.
¶3 Later, a group of nine people, including Defendant, Joker,
and the victim, all drove away in an SUV. Joker again started
arguing with the victim about being a snitch. As Joker became
increasingly enraged, everyone in the car, including Defendant,
tried to pacify him. Defendant repeatedly told Joker to “chill out”
and attempted to reason with him in an effort to diffuse the
situation. Despite these efforts, Joker continued to get angrier and
repeatedly asked Defendant, who was sitting in the front seat at the
time, to give him the gun. Defendant told Joker “no” and “not
here” and told him to stop arguing. At some point, however, Joker
did get the gun. Some witnesses testified that Defendant handed
Joker the gun, while others testified that Joker grabbed the gun
from the front seat where Defendant was sitting. Defendant then

State v. Idrees
2. Prior to Defendant’s trial, Joker pled guilty to murdering the
victim.
3. Defendant’s trial counsel consistently referred to the phrase as
“quash it” rather than “squash it.”
4. Trial counsel credited the Harvard School of
Public Health with coining the phrase “squash it” and
with attempting to integrate it into “African–American
street culture.” See Squash It!, The Free Dictionary,
(continued...)
20120265-CA 3 2014 UT App 76
told Joker to “squash it.” A few seconds later, Joker turned around
and shot the victim in the head.2
¶4 At Defendant’s trial, the definition of “squash it” became an
issue. The prosecution’s primary witness, who was in the car
during the murder, testified that “squash it” could have multiple
meanings but that she understood Defendant’s meaning to be to
“get it over with” or “finish it.” Defendant’s trial counsel failed to
introduce any evidence to rebut the State’s key witness’s
characterization of “squash it” but did attempt to address it in
closing arguments. Trial counsel stated:
Quash it. They get to choose their definition, but[3]
they admit there is two definitions. . . . They say
quash it could mean to injure somebody. Or if you
are from where I am from, I am from Houston,
Texas. I spent some time in a poor part of town. Let
me tell you what quash is. I can tell you what the
definition of quash is. And let me give it to you. This
is coming from me. Use your own definition of quash
it.
At that point, the prosecution objected. The objection was
overruled, and trial counsel continued to explain “quash it,”
arguing that it could mean to avoid a violent confrontation.4

State v. Idrees
(...continued)
http://medical-dictionary.thefreedictionary.com/squash+it
(last visited March 21, 2014). This explanation appears to be
factually inaccurate. The Harvard School of Public Health does not
claim to have coined the phrase but describes its “Squash It!”
Campaign as building on a phrase already “used by inner-city
youth,” meaning to “walk away from confrontations . . . without
losing face.” See “Squash It!” Campaign, Harvard School of Public
Health, http://www.hsph.harvard.edu/chc/squash-it-campaign/
(last visited March 21, 2014). Furthermore, Defendant’s rule 23B
motion is accompanied by an affidavit from an expert witness who
avers that the phrase has been in use for at least forty years and
means to “stand down from a confrontation to avoid violence.”
20120265-CA 4 2014 UT App 76
¶5 The prosecution also focused on the phrase “squash it”
during its closing argument:
Akol Joker tells [Defendant], Give me your gun.
[Defendant] says no. Akol Joker says, Give me your
gun. He says no. Akol Joker says, Give me your gun.
[Defendant] hands Akol Joker [Defendant’s] gun that
he has fixed and he says, Squash it.
Now, there are two definitions of squash. I am
not choosing which definition to use. [The witness] is.
. . . I don’t think she consulted with whatever
handbook or help definition that [Defendant’s trial
counsel] is referring to . . . .
She says when they are in the car [Defendant]
wasn’t saying calm down, he instigated, it stirred
things up. . . . She says she sees Joker reach up, and
she hears [Defendant] say, Squash it, and as soon as
that happens [she] is saying, I’m a girl. I’m a girl. I’m
a girl. Don’t shoot. And she is cowering now, because
she knows what he meant when he said, Squash it.

State v. Idrees
20120265-CA 5 2014 UT App 76
¶6 After hearing all the evidence, the jury convicted Defendant
of murder as an accomplice. Defendant appeals from that verdict.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶7 Defendant argues that there was insufficient evidence to
support his conviction. In considering an insufficiency of the
evidence claim, “we review the evidence and all inferences which
may reasonably be drawn from it in the light most favorable to the
verdict of the jury.” State v. Shumway, 2002 UT 124, ¶ 15, 63 P.3d 94.
We will only reverse a jury verdict for insufficient evidence “when
the evidence is sufficiently inconclusive or inherently improbable
that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt
that the defendant committed the crime of which he was
convicted.” Id.
¶8 Defendant also argues that he received ineffective assistance
from his trial counsel. Ineffective assistance of counsel claims, when
raised for the first time on appeal, present questions of law. See
State v. Clark, 2004 UT 25, ¶ 6, 89 P.3d 162.
ANALYSIS
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
¶9 Defendant argues that the State failed to produce enough
evidence to prove Defendant’s guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. To
hold a defendant criminally liable for another person’s conduct, the
State must prove (1) that the defendant had the “mental state
required” for the crime and (2) that the defendant “solicit[ed],
request[ed], command[ed], encourag[ed], or intentionally aid[ed]”
the person who committed the crime. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-2-
202 (LexisNexis 2012). See also State v. Briggs, 2008 UT 75, ¶ 14, 197
P.3d 628 (“An accomplice must . . . have the intent that the
underlying offense be committed.”). For murder, the requisite

State v. Idrees
20120265-CA 6 2014 UT App 76
mental states include acting with “depraved indifference to human
life” in a way that “creates a grave risk of death to another.” See
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203(2)(c). The jury heard evidence that
Defendant attempted several times to dissuade Joker from killing
the victim and that he tried to keep the gun away from Joker. But
the jury also heard evidence that Defendant called the victim a
snitch, threatened the victim, flashed the gun at the victim while
pointing his finger at the victim and mimicking the sound of
gunfire, fixed the gun for Joker, and later gave the gun back to
Joker in the car just before Joker fired it at the victim.
¶10 It is not our role to “reassess credibility or reweigh the
evidence.” State v. Workman, 852 P.2d 981, 984 (Utah 1993).
Reviewing “the evidence and all reasonable inferences drawn
therefrom in a light most favorable to the verdict,” we conclude
that “some evidence exists from which a reasonable jury could find
that the elements of the crime had been proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” See State v. Maestas, 2012 UT 46, ¶ 177, 299 P.3d
892 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted).
II. Ineffective Assistance of Counsel
¶11 Defendant also claims that his trial counsel was ineffective
for failing to present expert testimony at trial on the appropriate
interpretation of the phrase “squash it.” To prevail on this claim,
Defendant must show that his trial “counsel’s representation fell
below an objective standard of reasonableness,” Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984), and that Defendant “was
prejudiced thereby,” id. at 702.
¶12 To support his ineffectiveness claim, Defendant filed,
through his current counsel, a commendably detailed and
otherwise credible rule 23B motion asking us to remand for further
findings. See Utah R. App. P. 23B. In the motion, Defendant
presents nonspeculative facts, including affidavits from experts,
which convincingly show that the settled meaning of “squash it” is
“to resolve a situation without violence.” Courts and lawyers

State v. Idrees
20120265-CA 7 2014 UT App 76
typically exert considerable effort to discern the proper meaning of
words in legislative enactments and contracts, and it seems no less
important here to make similar efforts to ensure that a jury has the
benefit of the true meaning of Defendant’s words. See, e.g., Smith v.
United States, 508 U.S. 223 (1993) (devoting entire opinion to
ascertaining the meaning of the word “use”); James J. Brudney &
Lawrence Baum, Oasis or Mirage: The Supreme Court's Thirst for
Dictionaries in the Rehnquist and Roberts Eras, 55 Wm. & Mary L.
Rev. 483, 483–84 (2013) (discussing the Supreme Court’s reliance on
dictionaries and noting that the increase in dictionary use “is linked
to the rise of textualism and its intense focus on ordinary
meaning”). Accordingly, the rule 23B motion’s focus on the
importance in this case of understanding the correct meaning of
“squash it” was perceptive, and it is persuasive.
¶13 The State recognizes the potential significance of the
evidence proffered in Defendant’s rule 23B motion but argues that
even if we assume that “squash it” can only mean to resolve a
conflict without violence, it would not have changed the jury’s
verdict. We will assume then, for purposes of this appeal, that the
phrase “squash it” can only mean to resolve a situation without
violence. We further assume, for purposes of this appeal, that
defense counsel was remiss in not doing more with this important
information. Failing to introduce evidence about the meaning of
the phrase “squash it” and then attempting to testify from personal
experience during closing arguments about the meaning of “quash
it” was not an objectively reasonable trial strategy. Nor could it
have been an objectively reasonable strategy, as the State attempts
to argue, to intentionally exclude exculpatory evidence available
from an expert witness about the meaning of a phrase for fear of
opening the door to otherwise forbidden character evidence about
Defendant. See Utah R. Evid. 404(a).
¶14 But even assuming that trial counsel’s performance was
objectively deficient, Defendant must also demonstrate that the
deficient performance adversely affected the outcome of the trial.
See State v. Charles, 2011 UT App 291, ¶ 28, 263 P.3d 469. And the

State v. Idrees
20120265-CA 8 2014 UT App 76
United States Supreme Court stated in Strickland that “[i]f it is
easier to dispose of an ineffectiveness claim on the ground of lack
of sufficient prejudice . . . that course should be followed.” 466 U.S.
at 697. As a result, we will simply assume the deficiency of trial
counsel’s performance and look to whether trial counsel’s
performance prejudiced Defendant.
¶15 “To demonstrate prejudice, a defendant must show that ‘but
for counsel’s deficient performance there is a reasonable probability
that the outcome of the trial would have been different.’” Charles,
2011 UT App 291, ¶ 28 (quoting State v. Lee, 2006 UT 5, ¶ 37, 128
P.3d 1179). “A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to
undermine confidence in the outcome.” Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.
¶16 In this case, Defendant has failed to show he was prejudiced
by any deficiency in trial counsel’s performance. The jury, which
we have already concluded acted upon sufficient evidence, see
supra ¶ 10, weighed and considered an abundance of exculpatory
and inculpatory evidence. The jury heard testimony that Defendant
repeatedly told Joker that he would not give him the gun and that
Defendant tried to reason with Joker not to shoot. Despite all this,
the jury still found Defendant guilty on the weight of the
inculpatory evidence, such as Defendant’s making threats, fixing
the gun, and giving the gun to Joker. It is not reasonably probable
that evidence of one more exculpatory protestation from Defendant
would have had any effect upon the jury’s final decision. The
“evidentiary picture” and the inferences drawn therefrom would
not have been significantly different. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 696.
Therefore, our confidence in the outcome is not undermined.
However deficient trial counsel’s performance may have been in
this one respect, it did not prejudice Defendant.
CONCLUSION
¶17 There was sufficient evidence before the jury to sustain
Defendant’s conviction. Even assuming Defendant’s trial counsel

State v. Idrees
20120265-CA 9 2014 UT App 76
performed deficiently in not doing more to establish the meaning
of the phrase “squash it,” Defendant has failed to demonstrate that
he was prejudiced as a result. Accordingly, Defendant’s conviction
is affirmed.