Wadsworth v. Wadsworth

2022 UT App 28
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
H. C ANDI WADSWORTH ,
Appellant,
v.
GUY L. WADSWORTH ,
Appellee.
Amended Opinion1
No. 20190106-CA
No. 20200430-CA
Filed March 3, 2022
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Su Chon
No. 104904966
Michael D. Zimmerman, Troy L. Booher, and Julie J.
Nelson, Attorneys for Appellant
Clark W. Sessions, T. Mickell Jimenez, Marcy G.
Glenn, and Kristina R. Van Bockern, Attorneys
for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES R YAN M. HARRIS and R YAN D. TENNEY
concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	This appeal arises from the divorce and division of the
marital estate belonging to H. Candi Wadsworth and Guy L.
1. This Amended Opinion replaces the Opinion issued January
13, 2022, Wadsworth v. Wadsworth, 2022 UT App 5. Paragraphs 6,
76, and 83 and footnote 14 have been revised in response to the
parties’ petitions for rehearing.

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Wadsworth. Candi2 challenges various aspects of the district
court’s marital property valuation, its decision to defer the
payment of her share of the marital estate, its award of alimony,
and 	various 	other 	findings 	and 	orders. 	Guy 	cross-appeals,
raising challenges relating to terms of the deferred payment and
the alimony award. In a separate appeal, Candi also challenges
the district court’s decision not to grant her a security interest in
her portion of the marital estate, which she will not receive in
full until December 31, 2024. Because that issue is intertwined
with various issues raised in the first appeal, we address both
appeals in this consolidated opinion.
¶2 	We remand for the district court to add certain notes
receivable to the value of the marital estate, to adjust its alimony
award to account for Candi’s tax burden, to clarify its decision
on whether security is required for the alimony award, and to
grant Candi a security interest in her portion of the marital
estate. We otherwise affirm the district court’s decision.
BACKGROUND
¶3 	Candi and Guy married in 1979. Guy started Wadsworth
Brothers Construction (WBC) in 1991, and over the years, it grew
into 	a 	multimillion-dollar 	company. 	The 	parties 	also 	have
interests in numerous other business entities, including two
restaurants, a hotel, and various real estate holdings.
¶4 	In 2009, Candi filed for divorce, suspecting that Guy was
involved in an extramarital affair. Guy denied the infidelity, and
the couple reconciled. However, a year later, Guy confessed to
an affair, and Candi again filed for divorce.
2. As is our practice, because the parties share the same last
name, we refer to each by their first name, with no disrespect
intended by the apparent informality.

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Pre-Divorce Proceedings and Temporary Orders
¶5 	During the period between these two divorce filings, Guy
purchased two restaurants, a plane, a cabin, and a yacht. He did
not discuss any of these purchases with Candi, and she learned
about them from other people. The yacht cost $2,502,800, but by
the time of trial, the yacht was under water—Guy still owed
$1,175,399, but the yacht was worth only $790,500.
¶6 	Without consulting Candi, Guy also assigned fractional
shares of various marital entities to the Wadsworth Children’s
2007 Irrevocable Trust (the Trust) in 2009. Although Guy had
created the Trust two years before, he had originally funded it
with only $10. By the time of trial in 2017, the fractional shares
held by the Trust were worth approximately $4 million.
¶7 	While the divorce was pending, Guy maintained control
of the marital estate, apart from $1 million and two interest-
generating accounts that he transferred to Candi early in the
proceedings. In February 2012, the district court adopted the
parties’ stipulation regarding temporary orders (the Stipulation)
stating that, on a temporary basis, Guy “shall pay all of the
children’s expenses as he has in the past as well as all of
[Candi’s] expenses as he has in the past.” Because Guy was
paying these expenses, he was not ordered to pay temporary
child support or alimony at that time. The Stipulation also
addressed the use of marital assets during the pendency of the
divorce proceedings:
1. Based upon the parties’ stipulation, [Guy] shall
maintain, in the regular course of business, the
management and control of [WBC], as he has in the
past.
2. Based upon the parties’ stipulation, neither party
shall sell, gift, transfer, dissipate, encumber, secrete
or dispose of marital assets other than in the course
of their normal living expenditures, ordinary and

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necessary business expenses and to pay divorce
attorneys and expert fees and costs. [Guy] shall
have the right to conduct the business hereinabove
identified as he has in the past, which may include
incurring 	debt, 	paying 	expenses 	and 	acquiring
assets.
¶8 	During the divorce proceedings, Candi asked the court to
hold 	Guy 	in 	contempt 	based 	on 	alleged 	violations 	of 	the
Stipulation. 	She 	asserted 	that 	he 	made 	numerous 	financial
transactions that violated the Stipulation, including selling his
home, buying a new home, selling a hotel, creating a new
business entity and loaning it money, investing money in a
property development company (FDFM), purchasing a jet to
“flip,” and making an “undisclosed sale” of $697,448.72. The
court 	accepted 	Guy’s 	and 	his 	estate 	planning 	attorney’s
testimonies that “Guy had a history of setting up different
corporate entities for liability protection purposes” and that he
“did not create any entity or transfer any asset with the intention
of hiding it from Candi.” The court found that “the transactions
Candi 	complains 	of 	were 	consistent 	with 	Guy’s 	historical
practice of transferring assets from one entity to another or from
one form into another” and that those actions fell within the
Stipulation’s condition permitting Guy “to conduct the business
hereinabove identified as he has in the past, which may include
incurring debt, paying expenses and acquiring assets.” The court
also found that “[t]here is no indication that these transactions
were out of the ordinary or done with the intent to hide assets.”
¶9 	In September 2014, Guy sought to modify the Stipulation,
explaining that the parties’ last child had reached majority, that
he had paid off the mortgage on Candi’s house, and that he had
purchased Candi a new vehicle, thereby eliminating many of her
expenses. Guy asked the court to modify its order to require him
to pay Candi $20,000 per month rather than all her expenses
without limit. Following a hearing in January 2015, the court
ordered that Guy pay Candi $20,000 per month in temporary
alimony. It also ordered that Candi “keep an accounting of how

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the money is spent if she desires more funds.” During the first
month following the order, Candi exceeded the $20,000 budget
and “she had to repay Guy for amounts she had previously
spent as well as cancel planned travel with the children.” In
April 2015, the court issued a written order in which it clarified
that Guy should “reimburse” Candi “as to any payments beyond
the $20,000” unless he could show it was “an inappropriate or
excessive expense.” Candi never requested additional funds
from Guy after the court issued the written April 2015 order. She
claims this was because she elected to curtail her spending rather
than ask Guy for extra money; she maintains that she did not
believe he would comply with her requests and she did not want
to incur more attorney fees to collect the money. During this
period, Guy was spending approximately $60,000 per month.
¶10 	Guy represented that Candi continued to have access to
the 	parties’ 	boats 	and 	planes, 	a 	cabin, 	free 	dining 	at 	the
restaurants, and a country club and other exclusive resorts for
which Guy continued to pay the membership fees. However, to
use the planes and boats, Guy expected Candi to pay for the cost
of the pilot, captain, and other expenses out of her $20,000
monthly funds. Candi did not do so because she understood the
cost to be between $5,000 and $10,000 per trip. Candi also
alleged that Guy refused a number of requests she made to use
the parties’ shared assets.
Procedural History of the Divorce
¶11 	The 	parties 	spent 	more 	than 	six 	years 	conducting
discovery and other pretrial litigation before the matter finally
came before the district court for an eight-day bench trial in
February 2017. The court held a second four-day trial in May
2017 concerning Candi’s attempt to revoke the Trust. See infra
¶ 25.
¶12 	The court issued a Memorandum Decision, Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law in September 2017 (the 2017
Findings). Subsequently, Candi filed a Motion to Clarify, and

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both parties also filed Motions to Amend. The court issued an
order addressing those motions in May 2018 (the May 2018
Order). In response to that order, both parties filed additional
Motions to Amend, which the district court ruled on in a
Memorandum Decision and Order in October 2018 (the October
2018 	Order). 	The 	court 	then 	directed 	Guy 	to 	prepare
supplemental findings of fact to incorporate the various rulings
encapsulated in the May 2018 Order and the October 2018 Order.
¶13 	Following the October 2018 Order, Guy filed an Ex Parte
Motion for Expedited Entry of Decree of Divorce. Guy pointed
out that new federal tax law would change how alimony was
taxed for any divorce decrees entered on or after January 1, 2019.
Instead 	of 	alimony 	being 	taxable 	to the payee 	spouse 	and
deductible to the payor spouse, alimony would become taxable
to the payor and deductible to the payee. Since the trial had
occurred and the 2017 Findings had been entered over a year
before, “predicated on the application of the existing divorce
laws,” Guy asserted that it would be inequitable to enter the
divorce decree after December 31, 2018. Although the court
indicated that it believed “both parties are to blame” for the
delays 	in 	finalizing 	the 	decree, 	it 	ultimately 	did 	enter
Supplemental Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law (the 2018
Supplemental Findings), as well as the Decree of Divorce, on
December 31, 2018.
¶14 	The parties then filed a third set of cross-motions to
amend the findings 	and conclusions, 	and 	the court held a
hearing on those motions in early 2019. The court entered a
Memorandum 	Decision 	and 	Order 	in 	May 	2019, 	which 	it
subsequently amended in June 2019 (the 2019 Order). The court
directed Candi to prepare corrected Supplemental Findings of
Fact and Conclusions of Law and a Supplemental Decree of
Divorce. The court entered the Amended Supplemental Findings
of 	Fact 	and 	Conclusions 	of 	Law 	(the 	2019 	Supplemental
Findings) and the Amended Decree of Divorce on October 30,
2019.

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Expert Valuation of Marital Property
¶15 	Both parties hired experts to value the various business
entities. Three aspects of that valuation and the district court’s
findings 	are 	relevant 	on 	appeal: 	notes 	receivable, 	WBC’s
backlog, and WBC’s equipment.
Notes Receivable
¶16 	The balance sheets for three of the entities owned by Guy
included in their accounting of liabilities loans that they owed to
Guy—Immobiliare II, Ltd. owed Guy $252,861; Five Diamond
Hospitality, Inc. owed Guy $706,605; and FDFM owed Guy
$100,000. These liabilities were considered in the court’s final
calculation of these entities’ value. However, the notes receivable
on these loans—which belonged to Guy—were not counted as
marital assets.
¶17 	The court made no mention of the notes receivable in its
2017 Findings. Candi raised this matter in her Motion to Clarify.
Candi asked the court to add the value of the notes receivable to
the value of the estate. In response, Guy did not assert that the
notes had been included but nevertheless resisted their inclusion
as part of the marital estate, arguing that Candi had not made
the “request at trial and did not enter evidence of where the
funds remain and in which entities or whether the funds are
being used for business purposes.” The court found that “[t]he
parties agree that the Court did not consider the three notes
receivable” but observed that “[n]either party points to the
record 	regarding 	this 	issue.” 	The 	court 	did 	not 	adjust 	its
valuation of the estate based on the notes.
¶18 	Subsequently, Candi filed her second motion to amend, in
which she again raised the matter of the notes receivable, among
other things. In the October 2018 Order, the court found that
Candi “does not show that those notes were not considered in
the company valuations” and that it had “already addressed her
argument” in the previous order. Guy was then asked to prepare

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supplemental findings based on the court’s order, and that
version of the findings stated that “all Notes Receivable were
included in the valuation of the various marital entities by the
parties’ experts.”
WBC’s Backlog
¶19 	As of June 30, 2016, WBC had a backlog of work—
construction contracts that had been signed but for which the
work had yet to be completed—amounting to an estimated value
of approximately $75 million. Guy testified that WBC’s profit
margin on such projects was typically between 5% and 7%.
Candi’s expert estimated the projected net profit on the backlog
to be $3,441,733. Guy’s expert estimated that the projects would
realize a gross profit of $4,676,347, but he also opined that the
backlog ultimately had “no value” because “the backlog in its
current state” was not sufficient to sustain the company and
could therefore be expected to start “absorb[ing] cash flow.” Guy
also testified that WBC had struggled to make a profit since the
recession and had to lay off workers and use capital to continue
operating. He testified that WBC had failed to get some large
contracts it was hoping for and that its backlog was less than in
past years. Another witness, who advises large companies on
marketing 	and 	selling 	their 	businesses, 	testified 	that
“marketability” and “valuation methodologies” are “all centered
around current backlog.” He explained that “in a construction
company, they’re only as good as the backlog in front of them.”
¶20 	The court found that “the value of the projected backlog
profit is $4 million.” However, the court adopted Guy’s expert’s
valuation 	of 	WBC, 	which 	had 	assigned 	the 	backlog 	no
independent value. The parties addressed the inconsistency in
their motions to amend. Candi asked the court to adjust the
overall valuation of WBC upward by $4 million to reflect its
finding that the backlog profit was worth $4 million. Guy asked
the court to change its finding that the backlog was worth $4
million to conform to its adoption of his expert’s valuation of the
company, which assigned the backlog no value. In its May 2018

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Order, the court found that Guy’s expert had “testified the
backlog had no value to a potential buyer, and the Court
adopted his valuation of WBC.” It also found that the other
witness had testified that “any potential purchaser would not
purchase the company based on a backlog.” Finally, it found that
“Candi did not provide counter-testimony to” the “statements of
no value in the backlog.” Accordingly, it concluded that “[t]he
evidence supports that the backlog has no value in the valuation
of the company” and amended its decision to state that “the
backlog 	has 	no 	value.” 	These 	amended 	findings 	were
incorporated into the 2018 Supplemental Findings.
WBC’s Equipment
¶21 	Both parties hired experts to assess the value of WBC’s
equipment. 	Guy’s 	expert 	had 	worked 	in 	the 	construction
industry for twenty-five years and had been an appraiser for
Ritchie 	Brothers 	Auctioneers 	for 	four 	years. 	To 	value 	the
equipment, the expert used “internal standards that [Ritchie
Brothers] has developed over time and experience” based on
“historical 	auctions, 	personal 	experiences 	of 	appraisers, 	and
knowledge of the world’s economic conditions.” Guy’s expert
testified that Ritchie Brothers’ “business is derived primarily
from 	stable 	operators 	exchanging 	equipment 	and 	updating
equipment inventories in the normal course of business,” rather
than wholesalers trying to resell and make additional profit, and
that “80 percent of [their] sales . . . represent fair market value.”
Guy’s expert and his team “personally inspected nearly all the
pieces of equipment at issue”; “[t]hey turned on the machines,
checked 	the 	miles 	and 	hours 	and 	verified 	the 	[vehicle
identification 	numbers].” 	They 	appraised 	569 	items 	and
estimated that “the entire package of equipment . . . would sell at
unreserved public auction in the range of $13,890,300.”
¶22 	Candi’s expert is a member of the American Society of
Appraisers and is an Accredited Senior Appraiser. He conducts
appraisals 	based 	on 	the 	Uniform 	Standards 	of 	Professional
Appraisal Practice (USPAP). He testified that “he evaluated the

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equipment 	at 	the 	fair 	market 	value 	of 	a 	‘going 	concern’
business” and that he believed using “auction values” was more
appropriate 	for 	a 	business 	that 	was 	trying 	to 	liquidate 	its
inventory. Candi’s expert received a list of approximately 400
pieces of equipment with the make, model, description, and
serial 	number. 	He 	“did 	not 	closely 	inspect 	each 	piece 	of
equipment,” “did not start any of the equipment, did not look at
the mileage or hours logged, and did not consider the condition
of each piece.” He “took photos of the equipment and researched
the values by contacting manufacturers, contractors, and dealers;
consulting 	other 	sales 	[online]; 	and 	considering 	his 	prior
appraisals and experience.” Ultimately, Candi’s expert valued
the equipment at $22,499,255.
¶23 	The court found that the method used by Guy’s expert
was “more accurate” and that his team was “more thorough in
assessing the individual pieces of equipment.” The court rejected
Candi’s assertion that selling equipment at “an auction house
has the same connotation as a fire sale,” relying on the expert’s
testimony 	that 	end 	users 	regularly 	buy 	heavy 	construction
equipment 	at 	auction. 	It 	therefore 	adopted 	Guy’s 	expert’s
$13,890,300 valuation of the equipment.
Dissipation
¶24 	Candi argued to the district court that Guy had dissipated
marital assets in anticipation of divorce, including spending
money on his girlfriend; purchasing the yacht, a jet, and a wine
collection; paying attorney fees for the Trust; and transferring
money out of the estate into the Trust. Except as to $814,000 Guy
spent on his girlfriend, for which it compensated Candi out of
the marital estate, the court found that “Guy did not dissipate
marital assets.” Although the court found that the legal fees
spent on the Trust were not dissipation, it nevertheless allocated
half of that value to Candi as part of the marital estate. As to the
purchase of the yacht, jet, and wine, the court reasoned that Guy
did not dissipate assets by purchasing these items because the
items were still in the marital estate, and Candi was awarded

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half their value. The court also found that “[i]t was Guy’s
historical practice to buy planes and boats” and that “[s]ome
depreciation of” such assets “is to be expected.” The court
rejected Candi’s argument that purchasing a depreciating asset
should, as a rule, be considered dissipation. However, the court
assigned 	the 	negative 	value 	on 	the 	yacht 	entirely 	to 	Guy,
reasoning that he “unilaterally purchased this boat” and limited
Candi’s access.
¶25 	The parties engaged in extensive litigation regarding the
Trust, even going through a separate trial to address the validity
of the transfers and to consider Candi’s attempt to revoke the
Trust. However, the court ultimately determined that “the Trust
was validly created,” that the parties intended for it to be
irrevocable, that the creation and funding of the Trust was “in
line with the parties’ history of gifting assets to the children as
part of their wealth management and estate planning strategy,”
that “there is no evidence that Guy was motivated by a desire to
divest Candi of marital assets,” and that the transfers were
completed before Candi filed for divorce so that the Trust
property was not part of the marital estate or subject to division.
Accordingly, the court rejected Candi’s argument that Guy’s
transfer of assets into the Trust constituted dissipation.
¶26 	Candi also took issue with Guy’s investment in FDFM, an
entity “created to develop land in [North] Dakota when the oil
rush was booming.” Although Guy’s interest in FDFM by the
time of trial was worth only $734,000, he had invested $1,129,000
into it. Candi asserted that the higher value should be used
because Guy did not disclose the investment to her. The district
court 	rejected 	this 	argument, 	explaining 	that 	Guy 	“never
consulted with Candi on any business decisions that he made”
throughout the marriage, so making business decisions without
disclosing 	them 	to 	her 	was 	“well 	within 	the 	scope 	of 	his
historical practices.”
¶27 	Candi also complained that Guy had used marital funds
to pay his attorney fees and that his spending on fees had not

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been credited to the marital estate. In examining the funds each
party had already received, the court recognized that Candi had
received $1,277,500 in marital funds to pay her attorney and
expert fees and costs. The court also estimated, based on Guy’s
testimony, 	that 	Guy 	had 	spent 	approximately 	$800,000 	in
attorney and expert fees and costs. The court equalized these
amounts in calculating the value of the marital estate.
Division of the Estate and Equalization Payment
¶28 	The district court found that the total value of the marital
estate was $43,886,329.85 and that each party should receive half
of that value ($21,943,164.93). The court awarded Candi various
liquid 	assets, 	real 	property, 	vehicles, 	retirement 	plans,
investments, and other property totaling just over $4.7 million. It
awarded the remainder of the marital property, including all
interest in the parties’ various businesses, to Guy and ordered
Guy to pay Candi $17,238,018.02 to compensate her for the value
of her portion of the estate. The court explained that “because of
the overlapping entities and the numerous assets placed in
various entities, it would be more appropriate to award Candi a
sum of money constituting her share of the marital estate.” The
court found that “shared ownership of the companies” was not
an option because “Candi does not have the business acumen
necessary to know how to run these companies” and that it
would 	be 	“a 	bad 	idea” 	for 	the 	parties 	to 	continue 	their
relationship by operating the companies together, “especially
given Candi’s distrust of Guy.” It also found that “[a] forced sale
of marital business assets is not in the best interest of either
party” because both parties benefit from “Guy’s continued work
for WBC and other businesses.”
¶29 	Although Candi had argued to the district court that she
should be given ownership of the two restaurants to help offset
the portion of the estate owed to her, the court rejected that
request because it found that “her limited business experience
would not help her in increasing the value of the business.” In its
May 2018 Order, the court further explained its refusal to award

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the restaurants to Candi by observing that the restaurants had
only 	just 	begun 	to 	be 	profitable 	due 	to 	Guy’s 	careful
management and that the restaurants were partially owned by a
third party.
¶30 	In the initial 2017 Findings, the court did not outline a
method for Candi to receive her share of the marital estate.
Candi proposed several options, including appointing a special
master to oversee the distribution, transferring some of the
assets to her directly, sharing ownership of the companies, or
forcing a sale of some of the assets. The court rejected each of
these proposals. Instead, in the 2018 Supplemental Findings, the
court ordered Guy to pay the amount owed to Candi “in such
equal 	monthly 	installments 	as 	he 	shall 	determine.” 	Any
remaining amount was to be paid in a balloon payment five
years from the date of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, which
made the final payment to Candi due December 31, 2023. The
court also ordered that Guy pay 10% annual interest on the
amount 	owed 	to 	Candi. 	Although 	Guy 	contested 	the 	high
interest rate, the court justified it because the court had given
him “substantial leeway in setting the payment schedule over
the next five years.” Because Guy would have “exclusive and
full access to the marital assets,” the court reasoned that the high
interest rate would give him a necessary incentive to make the
payments more quickly.
¶31 	In subsequent motions, the parties continued to dispute
the court’s equalization order. Thus, in its 2019 Supplemental
Findings, the court again modified the payment schedule. Guy
was to pay Candi (1) $30,000 per month, to be applied first
toward interest; (2) $500,000 per year, to be applied first toward
interest; and (3) a balloon payment of the outstanding principal
and interest by December 31, 2024.3 The court also modified the
3. Because of the various objections to the payment plan, the
court changed the commencement date from the date of the
entry of the Decree of Divorce to the date of entry of the
(continued…)

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interest rate to 5% per year. The court explained that the 10%
interest rate “was appropriate” when the court had “deferred to
Guy to come up with an appropriate payment plan” but that it
was excessive once the court “determined the payment plan.”
Instead, the court set the interest rate at 5% and explained that
rate was intended “to provide Guy with an incentive to pay the
Equalizing Balance quickly.”
¶32 	After the court issued its ruling, Candi filed a motion
asking the court to secure her unpaid share of the marital estate.
She explained that security was necessary to “protect her from
dissipation, economic uncertainties, or Guy’s death.” She also
asked for an injunction ordering Guy “not to alienate, waste,
dissipate, or diminish his share, ownership interest, or the value
of 	the 	entities” 	without 	“Candi’s 	express, 	prior, 	written
permission.” Candi proposed several methods for securing her
interest, including attaching a UCC-1 lien to the assets of WBC
or other marital entities or imposing other “conditions and
covenants” on Guy and WBC. But she also explained that “there
are a lot of different ways” to give her an effective security
interest, including placing a lien on the restaurants, WBC’s
equipment, or Guy’s interest in the businesses.
¶33 	The court refused to grant Candi any security, reasoning
that it could not award a lien against the businesses because
“[t]he 	businesses 	were 	not 	parties 	to 	this 	suit,” 	that 	the
equalization 	payments 	were 	not 	subject 	to 	the 	Uniform
Commercial Code because the division of the marital estate is
not a commercial transaction, and that Guy was unable to obtain
adequate life insurance to secure her interest due to his age and
health. The court did not provide any further rationale for its
(…continued)
Amended Decree of Divorce and changed the balloon payment
due date from December 31, 2023, to December 31, 2024. The
court found the change to be appropriate because it could not
“determine who has delayed the payment plan.”

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determination that no security was warranted or explain why
other options for securing Candi’s unpaid interest in the marital
estate, such as a lien on Guy’s personal interest in the businesses,
could not be employed.
Alimony
¶34 	In its 2017 Findings, the district court found that Candi
testified “she had more than $20,000 in reasonable monthly
expenses.” However, the court found that Candi “could not
testify as to specific details” and “did not prepare a financial
declaration.” 	Nevertheless, 	the 	court 	examined 	standard
financial 	declaration 	items, 	Guy’s 	financial 	declaration, 	a
standard 	of 	living 	analysis 	of 	the 	parties’ 	pre-separation
spending prepared by one of Candi’s experts, and Guy’s record
of the expenses he paid on Candi’s behalf while the divorce was
pending to reach a determination regarding Candi’s monthly
need. The court included numerous categories of expenses in its
needs calculation and determined Candi’s reasonable monthly
expenses to be $27,693.90. However, the court did not include
taxes in its assessment of Candi’s needs, because Candi “failed to
provide evidence of her tax liability at trial.” The court imputed
minimum wage income to Candi at $1,257 per month. The court
subtracted 	the 	imputed 	income 	from 	Candi’s 	reasonable
monthly 	expenses 	to 	determine 	that 	her 	monthly 	need 	is
$26,436.90.
¶35 	The court found that Guy had a net income of $141,143
per 	month 	and 	reasonable 	monthly 	expenses 	of 	$50,138.
Accordingly, it found that Guy easily had the ability to pay
alimony in the amount of $26,436.90 per month to Candi. It
ordered Guy to pay that amount of alimony for a length of time
equal to the length of the marriage, effective as of the date of the
2017 Findings. Alimony was to terminate upon “the death of
either party” or “remarriage or cohabitation by” Candi. The
court also indicated that “Guy should provide a life insurance
policy for Candi to cover alimony for a period of time sufficient
to cover his obligation should he unexpectedly pass away.”

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20190106-CA 	16 	2022 UT App 28
¶36 	While 	the 	parties’ 	various 	motions 	were 	pending
following the entry of the 2017 Findings, Guy represented that
he was unable to get life insurance due to a health condition and
asked the court to remove that requirement. The court denied
Guy’s request and found in the May 2018 Order,
Although there was information regarding Guy’s
health, there was no information whether or not he
could or could not obtain a life insurance policy.
The Court wants to ensure that Candi will receive
the money awarded should he pass unexpectedly.
The parties may also work toward a mutually
agreeable solution that will protect Candi and her
ability to receive said money.
However, the 2018 Supplemental Findings, drafted by Guy,
stated simply that “there was no information as to whether or
not Guy could or could not obtain a life insurance policy for
such purpose nor the cost thereof.” Candi urged the court to be
more specific by making its life insurance order mandatory and
requiring Guy to provide an alternative means of security if he
could not get life insurance. However, the court declined to do
so, stating that “[t]he Court’s ruling in the [May 2018 Order] is
sufficient.”
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶37 	On appeal, Candi argues (1) that the operative dates of
the Decree of Divorce should be adjusted or, alternatively, that
the balloon payment should be due on December 31, 2023; (2)
that she received unequal access to the marital estate while the
divorce 	was 	pending 	and 	should 	be 	compensated 	for 	the
inequality; (3) that the court erred in its valuation of the marital
estate, namely, by failing to take into account the value of the
notes receivable, undervaluing WBC’s backlog and equipment,
and not crediting the estate for Guy’s alleged dissipation of

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	17 	2022 UT App 28
assets; (4) that the court erred in setting the terms of the marital
estate division and refusing to grant her a security; (5) that the
court should have included her tax burden in its calculation of
her need for alimony purposes and required Guy to secure his
alimony obligation with life insurance or by some other means;
and (6) that the court exceeded its discretion by not holding Guy
in contempt for violating the Stipulation.
¶38 	For his part, Guy argues, on cross-appeal, (1) that the
court set too high an interest rate on the balloon payment, (2)
that the court should have required Candi to share in transaction
costs that may be incurred if and when Guy liquidates assets to
make the balloon payment, and (3) that the court should not
have awarded any alimony to Candi at all.
¶39 	The court’s valuation of the marital property, the manner
in 	which 	it 	distributed 	that 	property, 	and 	its 	alimony
determination are all subject to the same standard of review. “In
divorce 	actions, 	a 	district 	court 	is 	permitted 	considerable
discretion in adjusting the financial and property interests of the
parties, and its actions are entitled to a presumption of validity.”
Gardner v. Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18, 452 P.3d 1134 (quotation
simplified). “We can properly find abuse [of the district court’s
discretion] only if no reasonable person would take the view
adopted by the [district] court.” Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16,
¶ 26, 299 P.3d 1079 (quotation simplified).
Accordingly, we will reverse only if (1) there was a
misunderstanding 	or 	misapplication 	of 	the 	law
resulting in substantial and prejudicial error; (2)
the factual findings upon which the award was
based 	are 	clearly 	erroneous; 	or 	(3) 	the 	party
challenging the award shows that such a serious
inequity has resulted as to manifest a clear abuse of
discretion.
Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18 (quotation simplified).

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20190106-CA 	18 	2022 UT App 28
¶40 	The court’s decision whether to hold Guy in contempt is
also entitled to deference. “The decision to hold a party in
contempt of court rests within the sound discretion of the trial
court and will not be disturbed on appeal unless the trial court’s
action is so unreasonable as to be classified as capricious and
arbitrary, or a clear abuse of discretion.” Barton v. Barton, 2001
UT App 199, ¶ 9, 29 P.3d 13 (quotation simplified).
ANALYSIS
I. Operative Dates
¶41 	Candi first argues that the court should make the entire
divorce 	decree 	effective 	on 	October 	30, 	2019, 	rather 	than
December 31, 2018, since that was the date the court entered the
final Amended Decree of Divorce. Alternatively, she asserts that
the balloon payment should be due on December 31, 2023,
consistent 	with 	the 	terms 	of 	the 	initial 	Decree 	of 	Divorce.
However, Candi has not presented us with any substantive
arguments 	in 	support 	of 	this 	contention. 	Her 	argument 	is
essentially that it was unfair to put the Decree of Divorce into
effect before the tax laws changed and yet delay the equalization
payments 	until 	after 	the 	Amended 	Decree 	of 	Divorce 	was
entered because both results “favored Guy.” But the fact that a
ruling favors one party or the other does not, by itself, make that
ruling an abuse of the court’s discretion. In fact, we cannot see
any meaningful link between these two rulings—one concerns
the effective date of the entire Decree, whereas one concerns the
commencement of the payment plan.
¶42 	Moreover, 	the 	district 	court 	had 	good 	reason 	for
both decisions. As Guy pointed out in his Ex Parte Motion
for 	Expedited 	Entry 	of 	Decree 	of 	Divorce, 	“[t]he 	trial 	of
this 	matter, 	and 	the 	evidence 	submitted 	at 	trial 	and
considered by the Court, were all predicated on the application
of the existing divorce laws.” Thus, entering the Decree of
Divorce 	after 	the 	first 	of 	the 	year 	would 	have, 	no 	doubt,

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	19 	2022 UT App 28
spurred 	even 	more 	objections 	and 	additional 	hearings
regarding alimony. Entering the Decree before the law changed
was consistent with the parties’ expectations throughout the
divorce proceedings.
¶43 	With respect to the equalization payments, the court’s
2019 	Supplemental 	Findings 	were 	drastically 	different 	from
its 	2018 	Supplemental 	Findings. 	The 	2018 	Supplemental
Findings 	left 	the 	equalization 	payment 	schedule 	in 	Guy’s
hands, whereas the 2019 Supplemental Findings required him
to 	pay 	a 	specified 	monthly 	amount. 	Leaving 	the 	effective
date for those payments on December 31, 2023, as outlined in
the 2018 Supplemental Findings, would have required Guy
to come up with the entire first year’s payments all at once, as
he was not required to make monthly or yearly payments
under 	the 	2018 	Supplemental 	Findings. 	The 	court 	found
it appropriate for the equalization payments to commence at
the same time it issued its 2019 Supplemental Findings because
it could not “determine who has delayed the payment plan”
and it “believe[d] that both parties share the responsibility
for 	the 	delay 	in 	this 	matter.” Candi has 	not 	demonstrated
that this was an abuse of the district court’s discretion.
II. Access to Marital Estate
¶44 	Candi next asserts that the district court should have
compensated 	her 	for 	“inequities 	[that] 	resulted 	from 	Guy’s
use 	of 	the 	marital 	estate” 	while 	the 	divorce 	was 	pending.
Candi 	raises 	three 	arguments 	concerning 	the 	allegedly
unequal access to the marital estate: (1) that Guy was ordered
to pay her only $20,000 per month in temporary alimony while
he continued to spend around $60,000 per month, (2) that
she did not have equal access to the parties’ tangible assets
and funds while the divorce was pending, and (3) that Guy
spent more on attorney fees out of the marital estate than the
$800,000 found by the district court.

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	20 	2022 UT App 28
A. 	Monthly Spending
¶45 	First, Candi contends that it was unfair for the district
court to grant her only $20,000 in temporary alimony while Guy
had an income of more than $141,000 per month and was
spending over $60,000 per month.
¶46 	“Prior to the entry of a divorce decree, all property
acquired by parties to a marriage is marital property, owned
equally by each party.” Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 126, 459 P.3d
276; accord Brown v. Brown, 2020 UT App 146, ¶ 23, 476 P.3d 554.
“For this reason, it is improper to allow one spouse access to
marital funds to pay for reasonable and ordinary living expenses
while the divorce is pending, while denying the other spouse the
same access.” Dahl, 2015 UT 79, ¶ 126.
¶47 	But this principle does not require that the parties account
for every dollar spent out of the marital funds and reimburse
one another for any disparity. Rather, it requires that each party
have equal access to use marital funds and assets “to pay for
reasonable and ordinary living expenses while the divorce is
pending.” Id. For this reason, Dahl and Brown are distinguishable
from the case at hand. In Dahl, the district court had ordered the
wife to repay $162,000 she had received from the husband to pay
for her living expenses while the divorce was pending without
requiring the husband to repay the marital funds he spent
during that time. Id. ¶ 125. The supreme court held that this was
an abuse of discretion because it “had the effect of allowing one
spouse to use marital funds to pay for living expenses during the
pendency of the divorce, while denying such use to the other
spouse.” Id. ¶ 129. In Brown, the district court ordered the
husband to pay for the wife’s “expenses insofar as they exceeded
the income she earned plus amounts [he] advanced while the
divorce was pending.” Brown, 2020 UT App 146, ¶ 24. This court
found that order to be appropriate because it gave the wife
“the benefit of the marital estate to help cover [her] living
expenses . . . up until the divorce decree was entered.” Id. ¶¶ 27–
28.

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20190106-CA 	21 	2022 UT App 28
¶48 	Here, the district court ordered Guy to “reimburse” Candi
for reasonable monthly expenses “beyond $20,000” unless they
were 	“inappropriate 	or 	excessive.” 	And 	although 	Candi
indicated that she voluntarily curtailed her spending to avoid
fighting for reimbursement, she did not present any evidence
that she incurred expenses in excess of the $20,000 Guy provided
each month. Since the court ordered Guy to pay for reasonable
expenses beyond $20,000, it established a mechanism for Candi
to have continued access to the marital estate to pay for her
living expenses. The fact that Candi found it too burdensome to
request additional funds and was skeptical about Guy honoring
her request does not mean she lacked meaningful access to the
marital estate.4 And the fact that Guy spent more each month
than Candi does not, by itself, indicate that Candi lacked equal
access to marital funds while the divorce was pending. Access is
not the same as use. And we are aware of no principle requiring
that district courts equalize the parties’ use of marital assets
during the pendency of a divorce as opposed to reimbursing a
party for expenses they incurred as a result of unequal access.
B. 	Tangible Assets
¶49 	Our analysis of Candi’s challenge to the unequal use of
the parties’ tangible assets is similar to our analysis of her
unequal use of funds: she has not demonstrated that she had
unequal access to the assets, as opposed to unequal use. It was
certainly easier for Guy to use the assets, since they were in his
control. And it is undisputed that Guy told Candi she would
have to pay the expensive costs associated with using the planes
4. Had Candi actually attempted to seek additional funds and
had Guy denied her request, then we may have been faced with
a different situation. However, the only time this occurred was
in the time period between the court’s January 2015 minute entry
and its April 2015 written order on the subject, and the minute
entry was not clear as to Guy’s obligation to reimburse Candi for
reasonable expenses in excess of $20,000 per month.

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	22 	2022 UT App 28
and boats. However, Candi never attempted to use the yacht or
plane due to her concerns regarding the expense. Had she done
so, she could have requested that Guy reimburse her for these
costs in accordance with the court’s temporary alimony award.
Since Guy was using the marital assets to pay for the costs of the
yacht and plane in addition to meeting his monthly needs, such
a request would not have been “inappropriate or excessive.” It is
unfortunate that Candi was deterred from taking advantage of
this option by the conditions Guy placed on the use of these
assets. However, since she did not actually incur the expenses or
seek reimbursement for extra expenses from Guy, Candi does
not persuade us that the district court should have ordered an
increase in her alimony or awarded her more of the marital
estate under Dahl or Brown to make up for the disparity in access
to the tangible assets.
C. 	Attorney Fees
¶50 	Candi next contends that the district court improperly
assessed the attorney fees Guy paid out of the marital estate at
only $800,000. This number was taken from Guy’s testimony at
trial that he had paid between $700,000 and $800,000 in attorney
fees at that point. Candi argues that this estimate was made
before Guy paid for the twelve days of trial and post-trial
litigation and that “[t]he court should have ordered Guy to
disclose all his attorney fees and attributed the full amount to his
side.”
¶51 	However, although the Decree of Divorce did not go into
effect until the end of 2018, the court valued the parties’ marital
estate based on the information before it at trial in 2017. Because
this was the “snapshot in time,” see Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019
UT App 38, ¶ 24, 440 P.3d 757, on which the valuation of the
marital estate was based, spending that occurred after that date
could not have reduced the overall value of the estate. This
means that any funds Guy expended on attorney fees following
trial were necessarily post-division expenses. Even assuming
that Guy spent more than $800,000 on attorney fees in total—

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	23 	2022 UT App 28
which he likely did, given that the $800,000 accounted only for
what he had incurred as of trial—that does not necessarily mean
that he paid for those fees out of the marital estate as it existed at
the time of trial. He was obligated to pay Candi her share of the
estate’s value calculated based on the value proven at trial,
regardless of any later spending.
III. Valuation of the Marital Estate
¶52 	Candi argues that the district court made several errors in
assessing the overall value of the marital estate. Specifically, she
asserts that it failed 	to account for the value of the notes
receivable and that it used the wrong method to assess the value
of WBC’s backlog and equipment. She also asserts that Guy
dissipated assets and that the estate should have been credited
for the dissipation.
A. 	Notes Receivable
¶53 	The 	account 	ledgers for 	three 	of 	the 	parties’ 	entities
included line items for loans owed to Guy, totaling $1,059,466.
The district court deducted these amounts from the value of
those entities in calculating the overall value of the marital
estate. However, the notes receivable, owed to Guy, were not
counted as an asset of the marital estate. When Candi brought
the matter to the court’s attention, it found that “[t]he parties
agree that the Court did not consider the three notes receivable”
but rejected Candi’s argument on the ground that “[n]either
party points to the record regarding this issue.” However, when
the 2018 Supplemental Findings, drafted by Guy, addressed the
matter, the court’s finding evolved to “all Notes Receivable were
included in the valuation of the various marital entities by the
parties’ experts.”
¶54 	Candi 	asserts 	that 	the 	court’s 	findings 	are 	clearly
erroneous and that the court therefore erred in refusing to
include the notes receivable in the valuation of the marital estate.
We agree with Candi that the trial evidence memorializing the

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	24 	2022 UT App 28
accounts payable to Guy constituted record evidence of Guy’s
notes receivable with respect to those entities. Thus, the court
erred in finding that Candi had not “point[ed] to the record
regarding 	this 	issue.” 	Moreover, 	its 	finding 	in 	the 	2018
Supplemental Findings that “all Notes Receivable were included
in the valuation of the various marital entities by the parties’
experts” is not supported by the evidence.5 We are aware of
nothing in the record indicating that any experts added the notes
receivable to the valuation of the marital estate.
¶55 	It was unreasonable for the court to include the accounts
payable in its calculation of the other entities’ liabilities without
also crediting the notes receivable to Guy as an asset. The only
evidence before the court concerning the notes receivable is that
contained in the owing entities’ ledgers—that Guy was entitled
to receive the funds. Thus, it is necessary for the district court to
adjust the value of the marital estate to include the $1,059,466
owing to Guy from the other entities.
B. 	Backlog
¶56 	Candi next asserts that the district court erred in assessing
the value of WBC’s backlog. She asserts that because WBC is a
“viable business,” the court should have recognized that it “has
future work lined up and future work yet to come.” Specifically,
Candi takes issue with two of the court’s findings relating to the
backlog: (1) that “Candi did not provide counter-testimony to”
Guy’s witnesses’ “statements of no value in the backlog” and (2)
that one of Guy’s witness had “testified that any potential
5. This finding also appears to be inconsistent with the court’s
previous ruling, in which it found that the values were not
considered. Candi objected to the form of the findings prepared
by Guy, pointing out this inconsistency, but the court rejected
her objection, stating that it believed the notes were “considered
in the Court’s decision because the experts testified to the same.”

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	25 	2022 UT App 28
purchaser 	would 	not 	purchase 	the 	company 	based 	on 	a
backlog.”
¶57 	Candi points to the testimony of her own expert that the
backlog would generate a net profit of $3,441,733. She further
argues that Guy’s expert’s assertion that the profit would be
eaten up with administrative costs and capital expenditures
relies on a misguided “assumption that WBC would obtain no
new work.”6 She points out that such an assumption was faulty,
as “WBC had only one negative year in the . . . five-and-a-half
years” prior to trial.
¶58 	But Guy’s expert’s opinion that the backlog lacked value
did not rely on the assumption that WBC would never get new
work, as Candi asserts. Rather, it was based on his assessment
that 	the 	backlog 	was 	not 	large 	enough 	to 	keep 	up 	with
administrative expenses the company would need to incur, such
as 	equipment 	costs, 	salaries, 	insurance, 	etc. 	Guy’s 	expert
explained that in assessing the value of the backlog, he examined
“the 	general 	and 	administrative 	expenses 	in 	the 	current
environment that both a buyer and seller would look at when
they’re examining whether or not this backlog has any value.”
Based on this examination, he concluded that “the backlog in its
current state would start to absorb cash flow from a negative
performance during the next eleven months”—in other words,
6. Closely related to this argument, and similar to her argument
regarding the valuation of WBC’s equipment, see infra Part III.C,
Candi asserts that the court’s determination that the backlog
lacked value was erroneous “because it reflects a liquidation
value for WBC rather than its value as a going concern.” But this
argument rests on Candi’s assertion that Guy’s witness and the
court assumed WBC would obtain no new work. And as we
discuss infra ¶ 58, neither the testimony nor the court’s findings
relied on such an assumption. Thus, we do not agree with Candi
that either Guy’s expert or the court relied on WBC’s liquidation
value to conclude that the backlog lacked value.

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20190106-CA 	26 	2022 UT App 28
although WBC could expect to earn a gross profit from the
backlog, it would have to dip into that profit to make up for its
negative cash flow and would therefore not earn a net profit.
This concept was further addressed by Guy in his testimony,
where he explained that although WBC had a backlog, at the
time of the evaluation it did not have as many contracts as it
needed, had to lay off workers, and had to rely on capital to
continue operating.
¶59 	While Candi’s expert testified that the backlog would
generate a net profit of $3,441,733, he did not address the details
about anticipated administrative costs or the state of the industry
that Guy and his expert addressed in their testimonies, and this
seems to be the absent “counter-testimony” to which the court
was referring in its finding. Indeed, the court was clearly aware
of and considered Candi’s expert’s testimony and valuation, as it
included that information in its findings. But it nevertheless
concluded that “Candi presented no other evidence or expert
testimony in that industry regarding the backlog.” Thus, the
court’s finding was not in error. And in any event, it was the
court’s prerogative to credit the testimony of Guy’s expert over
the testimony of Candi’s expert. See Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012
UT App 56, ¶ 11, 271 P.3d 837 (“It is within the province of the
trial court, as the finder of fact, to resolve issues of credibility.”);
see also Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, ¶ 4, 334 P.3d 994
(“Courts are not bound to accept the testimony of an expert and
are free to judge the expert testimony as to its credibility and its
persuasive influence in light of all of the other evidence in the
case.” (quotation simplified)).
¶60 	As 	to 	the 	court’s 	finding 	regarding 	Guy’s 	witness’s
testimony about a potential buyer, while that finding could have
been more precise—the witness actually testified that a buyer
cares only about a “sustainable backlog” and that a buyer would
rely on “the backlog in front” of the company rather than its
historic backlog—the imprecision ultimately does not convince
us that the court relied on an erroneous assumption. The witness
did not testify specifically regarding WBC’s backlog, and his

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	27 	2022 UT App 28
actual statement ultimately supports the district court’s finding
regarding the value of the backlog. If the court applied the
principle stated by the witness—that only the backlog in front of
WBC was relevant—to the testimony it relied on that the backlog
would 	not 	generate 	a 	net 	profit, 	the 	testimony 	was 	not
inconsistent with the court’s finding that the backlog lacked
value.
¶61 	Ultimately, it was within the court’s discretion to accord
each party’s expert testimony the weight it deemed proper. And
the testimonial evidence presented by Guy and his expert and
witness supports the court’s conclusion that the backlog lacked
value. Even assuming that WBC was a viable company that
would continue to generate contracts, the evidence supported a
determination that its current contracts were not sufficient for
the company to expect to generate a net profit.
C. 	Equipment
¶62 	Next, Candi challenges the district court’s valuation of
WBC’s 	equipment. 	Her 	argument 	rests 	primarily 	on 	her
assertion that the court erroneously used “liquidation value” to
calculate the value of the equipment rather than valuing WBC as
a “going concern.”7
7. Candi also challenges two of the court’s findings regarding the
equipment and asserts that misstatements in those findings
undermine the court’s determination regarding the value of the
equipment.
First, 	Candi 	challenges 	the 	court’s 	finding 	that 	Guy
“testified that auctions are the most common way that heavy
equipment is bought and sold in the construction business” and
“that if he needed a particular piece of equipment he would
check Ritchie Bros. to see what was available.” As Candi points
out, this finding most closely reflects Guy’s counsel’s recap of
the evidence, not testimony actually provided by Guy. In fact,
(continued…)

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	28 	2022 UT App 28
¶63 	First, we agree with Guy that Utah law does not support
Candi’s contention that the court was required to evaluate WBC
as a going concern. In fact, our case law is clear that courts have
broad 	discretion 	in 	determining 	the 	proper 	method 	for
calculating the value of marital property. See DeAvila v. DeAvila,
2017 UT App 146, ¶ 12, 402 P.3d 184 (“District courts generally
have considerable discretion concerning property distribution
(…continued)
Guy testified that although Ritchie Brothers had made him an
offer for his equipment, he had not actually done business with
Ritchie Brothers in the past. Nevertheless, we are not convinced
that this misstatement undermines the court’s conclusion. Ample
additional 	findings 	supported 	the 	court’s 	determination,
including its opinion that Guy’s expert had provided a more
thorough appraisal than Candi’s expert and its reliance on the
expert’s testimony that auctions are commonly used to buy and
sell 	heavy 	construction 	equipment 	and 	that 	his 	appraisal
represented the fair market value of the equipment.
Second, Candi challenges the court’s finding that there are
“no approved standards” for appraising equipment. She asserts
that her expert’s testimony that the USPAP “provides a standard
of value” and Guy’s expert’s testimony that “the majority of the
equipment people use” USPAP demonstrates that there are
approved 	standards 	for 	appraising 	equipment. 	But 	Candi’s
expert also testified that no specific qualifications are required to
appraise heavy construction equipment. The fact that the USPAP
“provides a standard of value” and that many appraisers use it
does not mean that it is the approved standard that must be
followed. 	(Emphasis 	added.) 	Ritchie 	Brothers 	described 	its
valuation method as a “market approach” that took into account
historical 	auction 	sales; 	“usage, 	attachments, 	options, 	and
condition”; personal experience over the course of fifty years;
and knowledge of world economic conditions. The court found
this method to be reliable, and Candi has failed to point to any
rule mandating that the USPAP standards be followed in this
context.

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	29 	2022 UT App 28
and valuation in a divorce proceeding and their determinations
enjoy a presumption of validity.” (quotation simplified)); cf.
Griffith v. Griffith, 1999 UT 78, ¶ 19, 985 P.2d 255 (“[T]rial courts
have broad discretion in selecting an appropriate method of
assessing a spouse’s income and will not be overturned absent
an abuse of discretion.”). Moreover, courts may even reject all
valuation methods presented by experts and elect to simply split
the difference between multiple appraisals. See Newmeyer v.
Newmeyer, 745 P.2d 1276, 1278–79 (Utah 1987) (upholding a
court’s decision to fix the value of a marital home by splitting the
difference between the values presented by two experts); Andrus
v. Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶¶ 12–13, 169 P.3d 754 (upholding a
district court’s decision to average the value of stock on nine
different relevant dates to reach the fair value of stock in the
marital 	estate); 	Barber 	v. 	Barber, 	No. 	961783-CA, 	1998 	WL
1758305, at *1 & n.1 (Utah Ct. App. Oct. 8, 1998) (holding that the
district court acted within its discretion when it valuated a
business 	by 	averaging 	four 	appraisals 	provided 	by 	expert
witnesses).
¶64 	Generally, we will uphold a district court’s valuation of
marital assets as long as the value is “within the range of values
established by all the testimony,” and as long as the court’s
findings 	are 	“sufficiently 	detailed 	and 	include 	enough
subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion 	on 	each 	factual 	issue 	was 	reached.” 	Morgan 	v.
Morgan, 795 P.2d 684, 691–92 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quotation
simplified); see also Weston v. Weston, 773 P.2d 408, 410 (Utah Ct.
App. 	1989) 	(upholding 	a 	court’s 	election 	not 	to 	apply 	a
marketability discount to the value of stock in a closely held
corporation, despite several experts recommending that such a
discount be applied, because the value the court found was
“within the range of values established by all the testimony”).8
8. The only case Candi cites in support of her contention that the
court was required to value WBC as a going concern is Hogle v.
(continued…)

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20190106-CA 	30 	2022 UT App 28
¶65 	Thus, even assuming that Guy’s expert’s valuation was
“liquidation 	value,” 	it 	would 	have 	been 	within 	the 	court’s
discretion to use that valuation, which was “within the range of
values established by all the testimony,” so long as the court
adequately 	supported 	its 	decision 	with 	factual 	findings
explaining its decision. See Morgan, 795 P.2d at 691–92. Here, not
only 	did 	the 	court 	support 	its 	determination 	with 	detailed
factual findings, but those factual findings make clear that it
considered the auction value to represent the fair market value
of the equipment, not the liquidation value.
¶66 	In accepting Guy’s expert’s valuation over that of Candi’s
expert, the court explained that Guy’s expert was more thorough
because he examined each individual piece of equipment and
took 	into 	account 	its 	condition, 	mileage, 	and 	hours.
Additionally, the court found it relevant that 80% of Ritchie
Brothers’ “sales are directly to end users” and credited the
expert’s testimony that their appraisal was based on fair market
value, specifically rejecting Candi’s assertion that auction value
was equivalent to the value in a “fire sale.” The court also
pointed out that even Candi’s expert had used some sales data
from auction houses to assess values. Based on this evidence, the
court found that “[t]here is no indication that [Guy’s expert’s]
evaluation does not reflect the actual marketplace price the
parties could expect to receive upon sale” and adopted the
(…continued)
Zinetics Medical, Inc., 2002 UT 121, 63 P.3d 80. See id. ¶ 20
(pointing out in dicta the general rule that “in the absence of
actual liquidation a corporation must be valued as a going
concern”). But that case involved the valuation of stock shares in
the context of a forced purchase, not the equitable division of a
marital estate. The rule articulated in Hogle has not been applied
in the context of marital property division, and Candi has not
convinced us that it should overcome the general rule granting
courts wide discretion to assign value to marital assets.

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20190106-CA 	31 	2022 UT App 28
$13,890,300 value provided by Guy’s expert. We will not disturb
the court’s well-supported decision on this issue.9
D. 	Dissipation
¶67 	Candi next contends that “Guy dissipated assets at a time
he understood that divorce was likely” and that the district court
should 	have 	included 	the 	value 	of 	additional 	allegedly
dissipated assets—over and above the money Guy spent on his
girlfriend, which the court considered dissipation and accounted
for as such—in its valuation of the marital estate.
¶68 	“Where one party has dissipated an asset, hidden its
value or otherwise acted obstructively, the trial court may, in the
exercise of its equitable powers, value a marital asset at some
time other than the time the decree is entered . . . .” Goggin v.
Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 49, 299 P.3d 1079 (quotation simplified). In
other words, “when a court finds that a spouse has dissipated
marital assets, the court should calculate the value of the marital
property as though the assets remained” and give “the other
spouse . . . a credit for his or her share of the assets that were
dissipated.” Id.
9. We note that with respect to both the backlog and the
equipment, 	our 	decision 	should 	not 	be 	construed 	as 	a
determination 	that 	the 	court’s 	findings 	were 	a 	foregone
conclusion. Indeed, Candi also presented evidence that could
have supported different findings regarding the value of both
assets. However, because the court’s findings fell within the
wide range of its discretion, we are not in a position to disturb
those findings. See Gardner v. Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18, 452 P.3d
1134; Goggin v. Goggin, 2013 UT 16, ¶ 26, 299 P.3d 1079; see also
Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, ¶ 4, 334 P.3d 994 (“A trial
court is free to accept or reject an expert’s opinion and may
accord 	that 	opinion 	whatever 	weight 	it 	deems 	proper.”
(quotation simplified)).

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¶69 	A number of factors may be relevant to this inquiry,
including
(1) how the money was spent, including whether
funds were used to pay legitimate marital expenses
or individual expenses; (2) the parties’ historical
practices; (3) the magnitude of any depletion; (4)
the timing of the challenged actions in relation to
the separation and divorce; and (5) any obstructive
efforts that hinder the valuation of the assets.
Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 33, 440 P.3d 757
(quotation simplified). Candi’s dissipation argument concerns
three transactions: (1) Guy’s purchase of the yacht, (2) Guy’s
investment in FDFM, and (3) Guy’s transfer of assets into the
Trust.
1. 	Yacht
¶70 	Candi 	first 	argues 	that 	the 	district 	court 	erred 	in
concluding that the purchase of the yacht was not dissipation.
Candi asserts that although the yacht itself remained in the
estate, its rapid depreciation meant that it was “cash going out
the door for no benefit.” She also argues that because Guy used
the yacht and she did not, any benefit from the use of the yacht
was individual to Guy rather than to the marital estate.
¶71 	Candi acknowledges that Utah law has not held that the
purchase of a depreciating asset constitutes dissipation. But she
nevertheless urges us to adopt such a rule, relying on case law
from Illinois. However, even if we were inclined to find these
cases persuasive, most of them appear to be distinguishable
from the case at hand. For example, in In re Marriage of Thomas,
608 N.E.2d 585 (Ill. App. Ct. 1993), the court held that the
devaluation of the parties’ business constituted dissipation not
simply 	because 	it 	had 	decreased 	in 	value 	but 	because 	the
husband 	had 	directly 	undermined 	the 	business 	through
“inattention” and “his failure to solicit additional clients or

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	33 	2022 UT App 28
through his outright stealing of clients for his new business.” Id.
at 587. In In re Marriage of Schneeweis, 2016 IL App (2d) 140147, 55
N.E.3d 1280, the court upheld a finding of dissipation where the
husband had begun making “secretive, risky and progressively
more destructive” financial decisions that were “inconsistent
with the parties’ prior practices.” Id. ¶ 28 (internal quotation
marks omitted). And in In re Marriage of Block, 441 N.E.2d 1283
(Ill. App. Ct. 1982), where the husband had purchased a racing
boat that was financially under water, the court held that it could
be considered “a debt in dissipation” but clarified that “there
would be no net effect on the marital estate” if “the value of the
boat is approximately the same as the amount of indebtedness.”
Id. at 1288–89.10
¶72 	Here, the court found that the purchase of the yacht was
consistent with “Guy’s historical practice” of buying “planes and
boats” 	and 	that 	there 	was 	no 	evidence 	“that 	Guy 	caused
excessive diminution in value.” Additionally, the court assigned
to Guy all responsibility for the outstanding debt on the yacht, so
any “debt in dissipation” caused by the yacht’s purchase was
resolved, see id. at 1288. While the yacht was used primarily by
Guy, he did make it available to Candi, and he never transferred
it 	out 	of 	the 	marital 	estate. 	We 	agree 	with 	Guy 	that 	the
depreciated value of 	the yacht, alone, does not mandate a
finding 	of 	dissipation, 	particularly 	where 	its 	purchase 	was
consistent with purchases made during the marriage and there is
10. In re Marriage of Hubbs, 843 N.E.2d 478 (Ill. App. Ct. 2006),
does support the argument that a district court may treat money
as a dissipated asset when it is used to purchase a depreciating
asset used primarily by one party. Id. at 485–86. But the case
does not mandate that a court treat the asset this way, and
therefore, even if we were to adopt its reasoning, it would not
support 	a 	determination 	that 	the 	district 	court 	abused 	its
discretion in this case by declining to treat the money used to
purchase the yacht as a dissipated asset.

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20190106-CA 	34 	2022 UT App 28
no 	indication 	that 	Guy’s 	actions 	contributed 	to 	the
depreciation.11
2. 	North Dakota Investment
¶73 	Candi next claims that the district court should have
valued FDFM based on the $1,129,000 Guy invested in it rather
than its $734,000 value at the time of trial. She asserts that “had
Guy not unilaterally made that poor investment, more money
would 	have 	remained 	in 	the 	estate.” 	According 	to 	Candi,
because Guy did not consult her regarding the investment, he
“acted obstructively” and should therefore be held accountable
for the diminished value of the asset. See Goggin v. Goggin, 2013
UT 16, ¶ 49, 299 P.3d 1079 (quotation simplified).
¶74 	However, the mere failure to disclose the investment did
not mandate a finding that Guy acted obstructively. In fact, the
evidence here supported the court’s finding that Guy “never
consulted with Candi on any business decisions that he made”
throughout the marriage and that making business decisions
without disclosing them to her was “well within the scope of his
historical practices.” Moreover, even where a party has acted
obstructively, the decision whether to “value a marital asset at
some time other than the time the decree is entered” is a matter
within the court’s discretion in its “exercise of its equitable
powers.” Id. (quotation simplified). We are not convinced that
11. Indeed, the rule suggested by Candi—that the purchase of a
depreciating asset constitutes dissipation per se—is unworkable.
The practical effect of this rule would be that every purchase of a
vehicle, 	furniture, 	appliances, 	or 	essentially 	any 	personal
property that does not retain its full value after purchase during
the pendency of a divorce could subject the purchaser to a
dissipation claim. We note that the case-by-case factor-based test
outlined in Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, 440 P.3d
757, is a much more practical approach to assessing dissipation.
See id. ¶ 33.

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20190106-CA 	35 	2022 UT App 28
the court abused its discretion here. To the contrary, though we
can sympathize with Candi’s desire to be included in financial
decision-making, the evidence clearly suggests to us, as it did to
the district court, that the diminution of FDFM’s value resulted
from changes in the market, and there is nothing to indicate that
the loss of value resulted from any deceptive or obstructive
actions by Guy.
3. 	Transfers to the Trust
¶75 	Finally, Candi asserts that the district court should have
considered the transfers to the Trust to constitute dissipation.
She asserts that the timing of the transfers—after she filed for
divorce the first time and before Guy confessed his affair—
suggests that Guy transferred the funds in anticipation of the
divorce. See Finan v. Finan, 949 A.2d 468, 475–76 (Conn. 2008)
(collecting cases and explaining that the “majority” of “states
allow trial courts to consider a spouse’s dissipation of marital
assets, that occurs prior to the spouses’ physical separation, in
determining the allocation of assets to each respective spouse”).
She argues that even though the money is now beyond the reach
of the district court, it should have ordered Guy to compensate
her for the loss in value under a dissipation theory. See Jefferies v.
Jefferies, 895 P.2d 835, 838 (Utah Ct. App. 1995).
¶76 	While we agree with Candi that the court could have
compensated her for the marital assets put into the Trust had it
found dissipation, we do not agree that the court exceeded its
discretion 	in 	finding 	that 	the 	transfers 	did 	not 	constitute
dissipation. The court found that the transfers did not amount to
dissipation because transferring assets to their children was
consistent 	with 	the 	parties’ 	practices 	during 	the 	marriage,
beginning as early as 1993, and Candi had deferred to Guy to
“run the parties’ finances and estate” throughout the marriage.
The court found “no evidence that Guy attempted to withhold
information or cut Candi out from the estate planning process.”
And 	while 	the 	timing 	of 	the 	transfers 	could 	provide
circumstantial evidence of dissipation, the 	parties’ historical

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	36 	2022 UT App 28
practices 	and 	the 	lack 	of 	additional 	evidence 	suggesting
obstructive 	intent 	on 	Guy’s 	part 	support 	the 	court’s
determination that the transfers were not dissipation.
IV. Division of the Estate and Equalization Payments
¶77 	The parties raise various challenges to the district court’s
division of the estate and its order regarding the equalization
payments. 	First, 	Candi 	asserts 	that 	the 	court 	erred 	by 	not
awarding her a greater share of the marital estate directly.
Second, she argues that the court erred by refusing to grant her
security to help ensure that she actually receives her unpaid
share of the estate. Third, both parties challenge the 5% interest
rate set by the district court. Finally, Guy argues that the court
should have ordered Candi to share in any transaction costs that
may be incurred should he be required to liquidate assets to
make the equalization payment.
A. 	Estate Division
¶78 	Candi argues that the district court abused its discretion
by—at least temporarily—awarding Guy the bulk of the estate
and giving him five years to pay Candi her share. She argues
that instead, the court should have done one or more of the
following: (1) ordered Guy to pay Candi her share immediately;
(2) awarded her a greater share of cash and retirement accounts;
(3) awarded her the restaurants; (4) ordered Guy to liquidate
investments, yachts, planes or spare equipment to pay Candi
more cash up front; or (5) ordered larger annual payments in
implementing the equalization payment schedule.
¶79 	“When the district court assigns a value to an item of
marital property, the court must equitably distribute it with a
view toward allowing each party to go forward with his or her
separate life.” Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 27, 440
P.3d 757 (quotation simplified). In situations where the marital
estate 	consists 	primarily 	of 	a 	single 	large 	asset, 	such 	as 	a
business or stock, a common acceptable approach for the court to

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	37 	2022 UT App 28
take is to award the asset to one party and make a cash award to
the other party. See Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 56, 379 P.3d
890; Argyle v. Argyle, 688 P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1984). This avoids
the 	necessity 	for 	the 	parties 	“to 	be 	in 	a 	close 	economic
relationship which has every potential for further contention,
friction, 	and 	litigation.” 	Argyle, 	688 	P.2d 	at 	471 	(quotation
simplified).
¶80 	In fashioning this type of marital property division, “a
court has the ability to make equitable provisions for deferred
compensation”—the keyword being “equitable.” Taft, 2016 UT
App 	135, 	¶ 	60. 	One 	way 	to 	assess 	the 	equitability 	of 	the
provisions is to examine whether the award affords one party
“significantly more latitude to go forward with his [or her]
separate life” than the other. Id. ¶ 61 (quotation simplified). It is
also relevant whether the party required to pay the deferred
compensation will be able to use the property to their unfair
advantage 	at 	the 	expense 	of 	the 	person 	to 	whom 	the
compensation is owed. Id. ¶¶ 59–60.
¶81 	We agree with Guy that the specific division scheme
selected by the district court—Guy receiving, on a temporary
basis, a larger share of the estate, but with the obligation to make
equalization payments to Candi—is not inequitable, so long as
adequate 	security 	for 	the 	unpaid 	equalization 	payments 	is
included. See infra Part IV.B. While the court may have been
within its discretion to employ one or more of the other methods
recommended by Candi, its numerous factual findings support
its ultimate determination, and the deferred payment provisions,
coupled with security, are sufficiently equitable to fall within its
discretion.12
12. There were certainly some smaller liquid assets and business
assets, such as the restaurants, that the district court could have
awarded Candi to decrease the overall amount of the balloon
payment. And had we been in the court’s shoes, we might have
(continued…)

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20190106-CA 	38 	2022 UT App 28
¶82 	Candi 	asserts 	that 	the 	court’s 	distribution 	of 	marital
assets 	and 	its 	use 	of 	the 	equalization 	payment 	plan
impermissibly 	gives 	Guy 	disproportionate 	access 	to 	the
estate. She compares the facts of this case to those in Taft v.
Taft, 	2016 	UT 	App 	135, 	379 	P.3d 	890, 	in 	which 	this
court 	determined 	that 	a 	deferred 	payment 	plan 	that 	gave
the 	husband 	discretion 	to 	dictate 	the 	amount 	of 	monthly
(…continued)
employed some of these methods. We are troubled by the
district 	court’s 	adoption 	of 	the 	paternalistic 	argument 	that
merely because Candi had little business experience, she was not
capable and should not be awarded any of the business assets.
Not every business owner has extensive business experience,
and even inexperienced business owners can succeed, often by
hiring experienced managers to help run the business. Indeed,
courts 	should 	be 	cautious 	about 	perpetuating 	inequalities
established in the course of a marriage—perhaps due to an
imbalance of power in the parties’ relationship—as the parties
move forward with their separate lives simply because such
inequality had been established as the status quo. For example,
in this case, it appears that Candi’s inability to present evidence
about 	what 	she 	“could 	or 	couldn’t 	do 	with 	respect 	to
employment” was based on the parties’ practices while they
were married. Candi testified that it was Guy who wanted her to
be a stay-at-home mom and that he “insisted on taking care of all
the finances.” Although Candi wanted to be more involved in
financial decisions, “it just wasn’t worth the fight.” While we
understand the court’s desire not to penalize Guy for continuing
to act in a manner consistent with the parties’ historic practices,
see supra Part III.D; infra Part VI, we caution against perpetuating
apparent 	inequalities 	in 	marital 	relationships 	by 	relying 	on
parties’ historic practices to divide and distribute the marital
estate. Nevertheless, we are ultimately unpersuaded that the
estate division structure chosen by the district court in this case
was outside its wide discretion in such matters, as long as
sufficient security for the unpaid portion is provided.

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	39 	2022 UT App 28
installments over ten years at a 2.13% interest rate was not
equitable. See id. ¶¶ 59–60. Candi argues that just like in Taft,
“the overall dynamics of the court’s award more readily allow
[Guy], with his immediate ability to use and enjoy the property
awarded to him[,] . . . significantly more latitude to go forward
with his separate life than [Candi] is afforded.” See id. ¶ 61
(quotation simplified).
¶83 	But Taft is distinguishable from the case at hand. First,
the husband in Taft was permitted to decide the amount of
the monthly payments to his ex-wife over the course of ten
years between the time of the divorce decree and the time
the balloon payment was due. See id. ¶ 59. His discretion was
so absolute that the court observed he “could conceivably make
. 	. 	. 	equal 	monthly 	payments 	of 	$1 	for 	nine 	years 	and
eleven months before making the final balloon payment . . . ,
thereby forcing [his wife] to wait ten years before realizing
any real benefit from her property award.” Id. Here, on the
other hand, the district court set the terms of the payment
plan, 	ultimately 	requiring 	Guy 	to 	pay 	Candi 	$30,000 	per
month 	plus 	an 	additional 	$500,000 	per 	year. 	Although 	the
court certainly could have ordered Guy to pay more, we are
not convinced that the amount ordered was so inequitable as
to fall outside the bounds of the court’s discretion. Unlike
the 	wife 	in 	Taft, 	Candi 	will 	not 	have 	to 	wait 	until 	the
balloon 	payment 	is 	due 	to 	realize 	any 	benefit 	from 	her
property award. Rather, she will receive $860,000 each year in
addition to the money she has already received. While this
leaves 	Guy 	in 	control 	of 	a 	substantial 	portion 	of 	Candi’s
property, she is at least able to benefit from her property award
in the meantime.
¶84 	Second, the interest applied to the property distribution in
Taft was only 2.13%, an amount this court observed “provides
very little incentive for [the husband] to substantially pay it prior
to the expiration of the ten-year period, much less for him to pay
[the wife] sizeable monthly installments.” Id. ¶ 60. In fact, the
low interest rate “would almost certainly allow [the husband] to

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	40 	2022 UT App 28
invest [the wife’s] money elsewhere and reap the benefit of any
additional 	increment 	of 	interest—a 	benefit 	that 	in 	fairness
should accrue to [the wife].” Id. In this case, on the other hand,
the 	district 	court 	applied 	a 	5% 	interest 	rate, 	which 	it
acknowledged 	was 	higher 	than 	the 	statutory 	postjudgment
interest rate, to incentivize Guy to pay Candi sooner. See supra
¶ 31; 	see 	also 	infra 	Part 	IV.C. 	By 	setting 	interest 	at 	a 	rate
calculated to discourage any delays in paying Candi, the court
avoided the type of inequitable deferred payment plan at issue
in Taft.
¶85 	We acknowledge that granting Guy a five-year period
in which to continue using the bulk of Candi’s property award
to grow his business does afford him a benefit that may, to
some degree, come at Candi’s expense. But we are convinced
that it is not inequitable in light of the entire landscape of
the 	marital 	estate 	and 	property 	division. 	First, 	the 	size 	of
the parties’ estate and the fact that the bulk of it is wrapped
up 	in 	WBC 	means that 	gathering 	the 	liquid 	funds to 	pay
Candi’s 	property 	award 	is 	not 	something 	that 	can 	be
accomplished 	overnight, 	at 	least 	not 	without 	substantially
decreasing the overall value of the marital estate. Thus, it was
reasonable for the court to allow Guy some period of time to
gather the funds necessary to pay Candi. Second, this time
period may allow Guy to keep his larger businesses intact and
find other ways to pay Candi. Keeping the businesses intact will
ultimately benefit both parties, as it will allow Guy to maintain
his income and continue paying alimony to Candi. Finally, we
take Guy’s point that he may incur substantial transaction costs
if he ultimately does need to liquidate assets to pay Candi. See
infra Part IV.D. Thus, it seems to us that the hypothetical benefit
Guy may incur by using Candi’s share of the property to
increase the value of the estate will be offset by the hypothetical
detriment he could incur if he has to liquidate the assets. Since
the court did not order Candi to share in any of these transaction
costs, the court’s decision to give Guy the use of Candi’s portion
of the property during the five-year forbearance period does not

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20190106-CA 	41 	2022 UT App 28
strike us as inequitable, at least so long as adequate security is
afforded to Candi.13
B. 	Security
¶86 	And this brings us to Candi’s next argument: that the
district court abused its discretion by imposing this specific
deferred-payment 	arrangement 	without 	requiring 	Guy 	to
provide 	adequate 	security. 	Candi 	asserts 	that 	the 	court’s
arrangement 	put 	her 	in 	the 	position—involuntarily—of 	an
unsecured creditor and posits that no lender would agree to
make a $15 million loan without some sort of security interest.
Without any type of security, Candi argues, she stands to lose
her ability to collect her share of the marital estate in the event
Guy passes away before the balloon payment is due or he moves
his assets into irrevocable trusts. We agree with Candi and
emphasize that the district court’s chosen arrangement passes
13. 	We 	observe 	that 	arrangements 	such 	as 	this 	should 	be
reserved for only the most unusual cases. As we have already
emphasized, in distributing marital property, courts should act
“with a view toward allowing each party to go forward with his
or her separate life,” Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 27 (quotation
simplified), and avoiding the necessity of parties continuing “in
a close economic relationship which has every potential for
further contention, friction, and litigation,” Argyle v. Argyle, 688
P.2d 468, 471 (Utah 1984) (quotation simplified). The estate
division 	and 	equalization 	payments 	in 	this 	case 	have 	the
unfortunate result of keeping the parties tied together long after
their divorce and depriving Candi of immediate access to her
share of the estate. However, though we have reservations,
because of the unusual circumstances of this case—i.e., the size
of the estate coupled with the concentration of the estate’s value
in 	various 	non-liquid 	business 	entities 	that 	are 	difficult 	to
divide—we cannot ultimately fault the court’s resolution, so
long as it secures Candi’s interest in her share of the marital
estate.

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20190106-CA 	42 	2022 UT App 28
discretionary 	muster 	only 	if 	it 	comes 	accompanied 	by 	an
adequate security mechanism.
¶87 	The court’s only justification for declining to grant Candi
any type of security was its determination that it could not
award 	a 	lien 	against 	the 	businesses, 	that 	the 	Uniform
Commercial Code did not apply, and that life insurance was not
an option due to Guy’s health. But the court did not explain why
these limitations prevented it from granting Candi any type of
security. Candi’s request was broad: she asserted that “there
needs to be some kind of order or security or lien or whatever
form it takes . . . that will ensure that those former marital assets
are there at the time that . . . the balloon payment needs to be
made.” “So all we’re asking for is some kind of order to ensure
that there’s going to be payment down the road.”
¶88 	Guy maintains that no security is necessary because he
has shown himself to be reliable in making payments and does
not have a history of hiding assets. But we agree with Candi that,
regardless of Guy’s history, character, or intentions, she should
not be required to rely solely on Guy’s continued health and
goodwill to ensure her ability to collect what she is owed.
Whether Candi’s mistrust of Guy is warranted or not, it was
unreasonable for the court not to grant her any type of security
in her half of the marital estate.
¶89 	Moreover, Candi has even greater cause for concern in
light of Guy’s age and poor health. In fact, Guy expressed
concern that he might pass away before the divorce decree was
finalized and relied on that possibility to argue that the divorce
action should be bifurcated. Should Guy pass away before the
balloon payment is due, Candi would no longer have even the
benefit of Guy’s goodwill. Instead, she would have to further
litigate with his heirs (including her own children) to fight for
her share of the marital estate. It is hard to reconcile why the
district court considered this to be an adequate legal remedy.
Candi should not have to take her chances as an unsecured
creditor should Guy pass away before she can receive her share

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20190106-CA 	43 	2022 UT App 28
of the marital estate. No reasonable creditor would agree to a
forbearance on such terms, and it was therefore inequitable to
impose such terms on Candi.
¶90 	Accordingly, we remand this case for the court to fashion
an 	equitable 	security 	interest 	that 	will 	adequately 	protect
Candi’s ability to collect her remaining share of the marital estate
at the end of the five-year forbearance period.
C. 	Interest Rate
¶91 	Both Guy and Candi take issue with the 5% interest rate
the district court imposed on the equalization payments. Guy
asserts that the interest rate should have been set at the statutory
postjudgment interest rate, which was 4.58% at the time the
court entered the 2019 Supplemental Findings. Candi argues that
the court should have imposed the 10% interest rate originally
set in its 2018 Supplemental Findings. We reject both parties’
arguments and affirm the district court’s imposition of the 5%
interest rate.
¶92 	Guy 	asserts 	that 	the 	court 	was 	bound 	by 	the
postjudgment interest rate established by section 15-1-4 of the
Utah Code, which provides that “final civil . . . judgments of the
district court . . . shall bear interest at the federal postjudgment
interest rate as of January 1 of each year, plus 2%.” Utah Code
Ann. § 15-1-4(3)(a) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021). Section 15-1-4 does
apply to orders in a divorce case “in relation to the children,
property and parties.” See Marchant v. Marchant, 743 P.2d 199,
207 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(1)
(1984) (current version at id. (LexisNexis Supp. 2021) (stating that
the district court “may include in the decree of divorce equitable
orders relating to the children, property, debts or obligations,
and parties”))). However, section 15-1-4 provides the “minimum
interest allowable.” Id. (emphasis added). The statute “does not
preclude a District Court, under [section 30-3-5] from imposing
an interest rate of more than [the statutory postjudgment rate]
where, under the circumstances, that award is reasonable and

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20190106-CA 	44 	2022 UT App 28
equitable.” Stroud v. Stroud, 738 P.2d 649, 650 (Utah Ct. App.
1987) (quoting Pope v. Pope, 589 P.2d 752, 754 (Utah 1978)). And,
in 	fact, 	setting 	equalization 	payments 	at 	the 	postjudgment
interest rate, rather than a higher rate, may be an abuse of
discretion if doing so is inequitable under the circumstances. See
Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶¶ 56, 60, 379 P.3d 890 (finding a
2.13% interest rate, which was the rate provided by Utah Code
section 15-1-4 at the time, to be insufficient where the husband
was granted discretion to determine the amount of payments
over the course of ten years because it incentivized the husband
to invest the wife’s money elsewhere rather than paying her
sooner). Thus, we find no merit to Guy’s contention that the
court was bound to apply the default postjudgment interest rate
to the equalization payments.
¶93 	Candi argues that an interest rate higher than the 5%
ordered by the court is necessary to “compensate Candi for her
unwilling 	forbearance 	to 	Guy 	and 	incentivize 	Guy 	to 	pay
quicker.” She argues that 10% is an appropriate interest rate
because it is consistent with the Utah Code’s default interest rate
for a “forbearance of any money, goods, or services.” Utah Code
Ann. § 15-1-1(2) (LexisNexis Supp. 2021). However, Candi has
not provided us with any authority suggesting that the court
was required to impose this specific interest rate.
¶94 	The court’s decision to impose the 5% interest rate was
reasoned and supported by sufficient factual findings. The court
explained that it had considered the 10% interest rate to be
“appropriate” when the court had “deferred to Guy to come up
with an appropriate payment plan.” The court opined that had
Guy been permitted to set the payment schedule, as the husband
in Taft was, the 10% interest rate would have been needed to
avoid giving Guy “an incentive to invest the money and reap the
return instead of paying off” Candi. The court explained that
once it set the payment plan, rather than leaving it to Guy’s
discretion, it did not believe the 10% interest would be valid
under Taft. Nevertheless, it also explained that the interest rate
was not a postjudgment rate because the deferred payment was

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20190106-CA 	45 	2022 UT App 28
more akin to a forbearance, and it still wanted to give Guy “an
incentive to pay the Equalizing Balance quickly.”
¶95 	Our 	case 	law 	is 	clear 	that 	as 	with 	other 	aspects 	of
property division, equitability is the standard for evaluating the
appropriateness of an interest rate set by the district court for
deferred payments in a divorce. See Olsen v. Olsen, 2007 UT App
296, ¶ 25, 169 P.3d 765 (“The overriding consideration is that the
ultimate division be equitable . . . .” (quotation simplified)). We
are not convinced that the 5% interest rate fell outside the
reasonable range of equitable interest rates the court could have
selected. Moreover, the court clearly explained its reasoning.
Thus, we will not disturb the 5% interest rate the court set.
D. 	Transaction Costs
¶96 	Finally, Guy asserts that the district court should have
required Candi to share in any transaction costs that he may
incur in the event he needs to liquidate assets to pay off Candi’s
share of the marital estate. He points out that taxes and other
transaction costs associated with liquidating the businesses or
any other large assets could be significant and that if the court
does not require Candi to pay her portion of those transaction
costs, it could substantially eat into his portion of the marital
estate.
¶97 	We do not disagree with Guy that if he is forced to
liquidate assets, doing so may result in significant taxes and
transaction costs to him. But it is by no means certain that such
costs will be incurred. We do not generally expect courts to
“speculate about hypothetical future [tax] consequences.” See
Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 224 (Utah 1987) (refusing to
reduce the value of a “stock-price-tied profit-sharing plan to
account for tax liability” because the imposition of taxes was not
certain); see also Sellers v. Sellers, 2010 UT App 393, ¶ 7, 246 P.3d
173 (holding that the district court was not required to consider
potential tax obligations associated with a retirement account
because the tax consequences were “speculative” and assumed

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20190106-CA 	46 	2022 UT App 28
“massive withdrawals” from the account); Howell v. Howell, 806
P.2d 1209, 1213–14 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (holding that the district
court “did not err in refusing to adjust property distribution
because of . . . theoretical [tax] consequences” of selling a second
home). 	The 	valuation 	of 	marital 	property 	“is 	necessarily 	a
snapshot in time,” Marroquin v. Marroquin, 2019 UT App 38, ¶ 24,
440 P.3d 757, and such a moment does not consider “the myriad
situations in which the value of [the parties’] property might be
positively or negatively affected in the future,” Sellers, 2010 UT
App 393, ¶ 7.
¶98 	Moreover, excessive transaction costs were the very thing
the equalization payments were intended to prevent. The court
acknowledged that forcing the parties to immediately liquidate
assets 	would 	significantly 	cut 	into 	the 	pie 	that 	would 	be
available to divide between both parties. That is why the court
awarded the bulk of the estate to Guy and gave him five years to
pay Candi her portion. The court gave him unfettered discretion
to determine how to gather the funds necessary to pay Candi. In
doing so, it gave Guy free rein over the bulk of Candi’s share of
the estate, which he may use to continue building his businesses
and wealth over the next five years. The benefit he may derive
from using Candi’s share of the estate may very well amount to
much more than the interest Candi will receive at the 5% rate,
which is all she will have access to until the balloon payment is
due, yet she will not share in that benefit any more than she will
share in any transaction costs Guy may incur.14 See supra ¶ 85.
The entire principal of Candi’s portion will remain in Guy’s
control until he makes the balloon payment at the end of 2024.
14. The $30,000 monthly and $500,000 annual payments will
provide 	her 	with 	$860,000 	per 	year—less 	than 	the 	amount
needed to cover the interest. Thus, Guy will maintain complete
control 	over 	the 	principal 	of 	Candi’s 	share 	of 	the 	estate
throughout 	the 	five-year 	period 	and 	will 	actually 	owe 	her
approximately the same amount as the original judgment by the
time the balloon payment is due.

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20190106-CA 	47 	2022 UT App 28
Furthermore, because the assets are in Guy’s control, Candi will
have no role in deciding how to liquidate the assets or which
transaction costs to incur.15
¶99 	Given the speculative nature of the potential taxes and
transaction costs, as well as the full discretion Guy was given to
determine whether and how to liquidate assets, it was not an
abuse of discretion for the court not to order that Candi share in
those costs.
V. Alimony
¶100 	The next set of challenges the parties raise concerns the
district court’s award of alimony to Candi. Guy asserts that the
court 	exceeded 	its 	discretion 	in 	awarding 	any 	alimony
whatsoever. Candi, on the other hand, asserts that the court
should have increased the alimony award to account for her tax
burden. She also argues that the court should have required Guy
to either obtain life insurance or provide some other security to
15. Imagine, for example, that Guy found it necessary to sell one
of the restaurants to satisfy Candi’s deferred judgment. There
may be any number of reasons, apart from transaction costs, to
choose 	one 	restaurant 	over 	the 	other. 	Maybe 	one 	of 	the
restaurants is more convenient for Guy to travel to, or maybe he
feels that one will be more successful than the other down the
road and bring him more income. Factors like this may make it
reasonable for Guy to sell one of the two restaurants even
though selling the other might result in fewer transaction costs.
Because Candi will have no input on that decision, she would be
stuck paying the higher transaction costs even though she would
have been better off if Guy had sold the other restaurant. And of
course, it should go without saying that Guy would 	incur
minimal or no transaction costs if he decided simply to transfer
the restaurants (or any of the other businesses) to Candi in
partial payment of his obligation.

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20190106-CA 	48 	2022 UT App 28
ensure that she would receive her alimony payments if he were
to pass away.
A. 	Alimony Award
¶101 	Guy 	argues 	that 	the 	district 	court 	should 	not 	have
awarded alimony to Candi because (1) she did not provide the
court with sufficient evidence from which it could calculate her
monthly 	needs 	and 	(2) 	Candi’s 	property 	settlement 	was
sufficient to allow her to support herself. In support of both
arguments, Guy primarily relies on our supreme court’s holding
in Dahl v. Dahl, 2015 UT 79, 459 P.3d 276. But Dahl neither
automatically requires a court to deny a request for alimony in
the 	absence 	of 	documentation 	nor 	prevents the 	court 	from
awarding alimony to a spouse who receives a large property
settlement.
¶102 	With 	respect 	to 	documentation 	of 	need, 	the 	Dahl
court 	held 	only 	that 	the 	district 	court 	“acted 	within 	its
discretion 	in 	denying” 	the 	wife’s 	alimony 	request 	when
she failed to provide evidence supporting her claimed need,
not that the district court was required to deny her request. Id.
¶ 	117. 	In 	fact, 	the 	court 	explicitly 	acknowledged 	that 	“the
district court could have . . . imputed a figure to determine
[the 	wife’s] 	financial 	need 	based 	either 	on 	[the 	husband’s]
records of the parties’ predivorce expenses or a reasonable
estimate of [the wife’s] needs.” Id. ¶ 116 (emphasis added).
Furthermore, 	we 	have 	previously 	considered 	and 	rejected
the 	“assertion 	that 	failure 	to 	file 	financial 	documentation
automatically precludes an award of alimony.” Munoz-Madrid
v. 	Carlos-Moran, 	2018 	UT 	App 	95, 	¶¶ 	8–9, 	427 	P.3d
420. “[A]lthough [Candi’s] expenses may have been difficult
to 	discern 	because 	she 	failed 	to 	provide 	supporting
documentation . . . , there was not a complete lack of evidence
to support their existence.” See id. ¶ 10. Indeed, the court
explained that it relied on the list of items in the standard
financial 	declaration, 	Guy’s 	financial 	declaration, 	evidence
concerning 	the 	parties’ 	spending 	during 	the 	marriage, 	and

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20190106-CA 	49 	2022 UT App 28
evidence 	of 	Candi’s 	expenses 	during 	the 	pendency 	of 	the
divorce to calculate Candi’s reasonable monthly needs.
¶103 	Dahl 	also 	does 	not 	stand 	for 	the 	proposition 	that
alimony 	should 	never 	be 	awarded 	to 	those 	who 	receive 	a
large 	property 	settlement. 	Rather, 	Dahl 	merely 	states 	that
receiving 	“a 	sufficiently 	large 	property 	award 	to 	support
a 	comfortable 	standard 	of 	living” 	prevented 	“any 	serious
inequity” 	from 	arising 	due 	to 	the 	court’s 	decision 	not 	to
impute the wife’s need in the face of her lack of evidence.
See 2015 UT 79, ¶ 116 (quotation simplified). We acknowledge
that 	if 	the 	payee 	spouse 	has 	income-producing 	property,
the income from that property “may properly be considered
as 	eliminating 	or 	reducing 	the 	need 	for 	alimony 	by 	that
spouse.” 	Mortensen 	v. 	Mortensen, 	760 	P.2d 	304, 	308 	(Utah
1988); see also Batty v. Batty, 2006 UT App 506, ¶ 5, 153 P.3d
827 (holding that the evaluation of a payee spouse’s ability
to meet his or her own needs “properly takes into account
the 	result 	of 	the 	property 	division, 	particularly 	any
income-generating property [the payee spouse] is awarded”);
Burt v. Burt, 799 P.2d 1166, 1170 n.3 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)
(explaining 	that 	courts 	should 	distribute 	property 	before
fashioning 	an 	alimony 	award, 	so 	they 	can 	take 	into
account 	income 	generated 	from 	property 	interests).
Nevertheless, 	the 	court 	in 	this 	case 	did 	not 	abuse 	its
discretion by awarding alimony despite Candi’s large property
settlement.
¶104 	Although Candi was entitled to receive a large settlement
eventually, Guy continued to control the bulk of the parties’
marital estate and would do so for the next five years. The court
noted this in its determination regarding alimony, observing that
“alimony was needed” because “Guy was unable to pay Candi
the full value of the marital estate at this time.” The court
refused to take into account income Candi may derive from her
portion of the marital assets in the future because that analysis

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20190106-CA 	50 	2022 UT App 28
was “too speculative for the Court to consider.”16 However, it
observed that “at such time as . . . Candi . . . receives income or
other assets from her share of the marital estate, or from other
sources, the Court will evaluate the amount, if any, by which
those 	amounts 	may 	reduce 	her 	unmet 	financial 	needs 	and
thereby reduce or eliminate Guy’s alimony obligation.” Thus,
the 	court 	did 	not 	abuse 	its 	discretion 	in 	awarding 	Candi
alimony, 	and 	any 	income 	she 	derives 	from 	the 	property
settlement may be considered when she actually has control of
that property.
B. 	Taxes
¶105 	On the other hand, Candi argues that the district court
should 	have 	included 	her 	tax 	liability 	on 	alimony 	in 	its
calculation of her needs. In calculating both a payor spouse’s
ability to pay and a payee spouse’s needs, courts are generally
expected to consider the person’s tax liability. See McPherson v.
McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, ¶ 14, 265 P.3d 839; Andrus v.
Andrus, 2007 UT App 291, ¶¶ 17–18, 169 P.3d 754. In particular,
it is plain error for a court to consider the tax consequences for
one party in assessing their income and expenses but not for the
16. Although Candi was to receive interest payments on the
property settlement, we do not think it an abuse of the district
court’s 	discretion 	not 	to 	include 	those 	payments 	in 	its
assessment of Candi’s ability to meet her own needs. The court
classified these interest payments as compensation for Candi’s
forbearance on collecting her property settlement. To allow Guy
to offset his alimony obligation with these interest payments
strikes 	us 	as 	inequitable. 	Moreover, 	although 	Guy 	raised
arguments asserting that his alimony should be reduced by
future income once Candi receives her property, he does not
appear to have specifically asked the court to include the interest
payments 	in 	its 	calculation 	of 	Candi’s 	current 	income 	and
therefore failed to preserve any such argument for appellate
review.

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20190106-CA 	51 	2022 UT App 28
other party. Vanderzon v. Vanderzon, 2017 UT App 150, ¶¶ 45, 58,
402 P.3d 219.
¶106 	In its findings, the court used Guy’s net income to assess
his ability to pay alimony. However, because Candi did not
present evidence of her tax burden on any alimony award, the
court did not consider her tax burden in assessing her need. We
acknowledge that the court’s ability to estimate Candi’s taxes
was hampered by Candi’s failure to provide evidence of her
anticipated tax liability. Nevertheless, it is certain that she will
incur some tax burden, particularly in light of the fact that she
will be taxed on any alimony payments she receives.17 And we
agree with Candi that it was inequitable for the court to consider
Guy’s tax burden when calculating his ability to pay without
considering Candi’s tax burden in assessing her needs. Thus, we
remand the court’s alimony award for the limited purpose of
having the court make findings as to Candi’s projected tax
burden and adjust the alimony award accordingly.
C. 	Life Insurance
¶107 	Next, Candi asserts that the district court should require
Guy to either obtain life insurance or provide a substitute for life
insurance to secure his alimony payments. She points out that
the court initially stated in its 2017 Findings that “Guy should
provide a life insurance policy for Candi to cover alimony for a
period 	of 	time 	sufficient 	to 	cover his obligation 	should 	he
unexpectedly pass away.” Although the court initially rejected
Guy’s argument that he should be required only to “use his best
efforts to obtain life insurance,” the court ultimately adopted
Guy’s proposed language in its 2018 Supplemental Findings
17. This especially should have been taken into account given the
district court’s entry of the Decree of Divorce on December 31,
2018, the day before a change in the tax laws, to allow Guy to
receive the benefit of a tax deduction on the amount of alimony
he pays to Candi.

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20190106-CA 	52 	2022 UT App 28
stating that “there was no information as to whether or not Guy
could 	or 	could 	not obtain 	a 	life 	insurance 	policy 	for 	such
purpose 	nor 	the 	cost 	thereof.” 	Candi 	asked 	the 	court 	to
reconsider that finding and make the life insurance requirement
mandatory. However, the court rejected that request and stated
that its finding in the May 2018 Order was “sufficient.” But
while that finding indicated the court’s intent “to ensure that
Candi 	will 	receive 	the 	money 	awarded 	should 	[Guy] 	pass
unexpectedly,” it did not definitively decide the issue of whether
Guy was required to obtain life insurance to secure his alimony
obligation or if he was able to demonstrate an inability to
comply 	with 	the 	court’s 	direction. 	We 	are 	left 	wondering
whether the court did, or did not, order Guy to obtain life
insurance and are unable to ascertain the answer to this question
from the court’s rulings. Accordingly, we remand this issue to
the district court to clarify its order.18
VI. Contempt
¶108 	Finally, Candi argues that the district court erred in
declining to hold Guy in contempt for violating the Stipulation,
18. We note that this decision falls within the district court’s
discretion. Although it is not uncommon for a divorce decree to
include provisions requiring a party subject to an alimony or
child support order to obtain life insurance, see, e.g., Kartchner v.
Kartchner, 2014 UT App 195, ¶ 36, 334 P.3d 1; Robinson v. Baggett,
2011 UT App 250, ¶ 17, 263 P.3d 411, we acknowledge that such
security is not mandatory. While Guy indicated to the court that
he is unable to get new life insurance due to a health condition, it
does not appear that Candi had the opportunity to challenge
Guy’s assertion or present evidence to the contrary. Moreover,
the 	court 	ordered 	that 	Guy’s 	alimony 	obligation 	would
terminate upon “the death of either party.” Unlike the property
award, which belongs to Candi regardless of any circumstances
that may change in the future, she is entitled to receive alimony
from Guy only so long as he is living.

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20190106-CA 	53 	2022 UT App 28
which the parties reached early on in the proceedings, that they
would not “sell, gift, transfer, dissipate, encumber, secrete or
dispose 	of 	marital 	assets” 	but 	that 	Guy 	could 	continue 	to
manage WBC and conduct business “as he has in the past, which
may include incurring debt, paying expenses and acquiring
assets.” “As a general rule, in order to prove contempt for failure
to comply with a court order it must be shown that the person
cited for contempt knew what was required, had the ability to
comply, and intentionally failed or refused to do so.” Von Hake v.
Thomas, 759 P.2d 1162, 1172 (Utah 1988). In a civil contempt
proceeding, 	these 	elements 	must 	be 	proven 	“by 	clear 	and
convincing evidence.” Id.
¶109 	Candi asserts that the Stipulation’s language allowed Guy
to 	engage 	in 	business 	transactions 	only 	insofar 	as 	those
transactions related to WBC. She argues that the “business
hereinabove identified” language in the Stipulation is limited to
“the management and control of” WBC and that the court
therefore 	misread 	the 	Stipulation 	by 	not 	holding 	Guy 	in
contempt for any transactions that were not directly related to
WBC. But as Guy observes, the Stipulation also allowed the
parties to engage in transactions “in the course of their normal
living expenditures, ordinary and necessary business expenses
and to pay divorce attorneys and expert fees and costs.”
¶110 	“We interpret language in judicial documents in the same
way we interpret contract language,” that is, “we look to the
language of the [document] to determine its meaning.” Cook
Martin Poulson PC v. Smith, 2020 UT App 57, ¶ 24, 464 P.3d 541
(quotation 	simplified). 	We 	consider 	Guy’s 	reading 	of 	the
Stipulation to be more consistent with the plain language of that
document. The provision giving Guy “the right to conduct the
business hereinabove identified as he has in the past, which may
include incurring debt, paying expenses and acquiring assets,”
properly refers to both the operation of WBC and normal living
and business expenses.

Wadsworth v. Wadsworth
20190106-CA 	54 	2022 UT App 28
¶111 	Moreover, because contempt requires that the party knew
what was required and intentionally refused to comply, see Von
Hake, 759 P.2d at 1172, “for a violation of an order to justify
sanctions, the order must be sufficiently specific and definite as
to leave no reasonable basis for doubt regarding its meaning,”
Cook, 2020 UT App 57, ¶ 26 (quotation simplified). Even were we
inclined to agree with Candi’s more limited interpretation, we
could not say that the language is so clearly limited to WBC that
there could be “no reasonable basis for doubt regarding its
meaning.” See id. (quotation simplified).
¶112 	The 	Stipulation 	allowed 	Guy 	to 	continue 	conducting
normal transactions as he had in the past, and the district court
found that “the transactions Candi complains of were consistent
with Guy’s historical practice of transferring assets from one
entity to another or from one form into another” and that there
was “no indication that [they] . . . were out of the ordinary.”
Candi does not challenge this finding. Thus, we conclude that
the court did not exceed its discretion in declining to find Guy in
contempt.
CONCLUSION
¶113 	We conclude that the district court erred in failing to
credit the value of the notes receivable to the marital estate. We
also conclude that it erred in refusing to grant Candi a security
interest to protect her right to receive her unpaid share of the
marital estate. However, we affirm the district court’s property
valuation and distribution in all other respects.
¶114 	As to the alimony award, we conclude that the district
court erred in failing to account for Candi’s tax obligation in its
calculation of her need and remand for clarification of whether
the court intended to order Guy to obtain security on Candi’s
alimony award. We affirm the alimony award in all other
respects.

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20190106-CA 	55 	2022 UT App 28
¶115 	We 	also 	affirm 	the 	remaining 	orders 	and 	findings
challenged on appeal, including the operative date of the Decree
of 	Divorce, 	the 	equalization 	payment 	schedule, 	the 	court’s
finding that Guy did not dissipate marital assets apart from the
money he spent on his girlfriend, and its decision not to hold
him in contempt.
¶116 	Consistent 	with 	our 	discussion 	in 	this 	opinion, 	we
remand to the district court to adjust the marital property
valuation, to make findings regarding Candi’s tax liability and
adjust the alimony award, to clarify whether Guy must obtain
security 	on 	Candi’s 	alimony 	award, 	and 	to 	enter 	orders
necessary to adequately secure Candi’s interest in her unpaid
share of the marital estate.