State v. Beltran-Perez

2026 UT App 36
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH ,
Appellee,
v.
J OSE BELTRAN‐P EREZ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20231121‐CA
Filed March 19, 2026
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Vernice S. Trease
No. 191908322
Erick Grange, Attorney for Appellant
Derek E. Brown and Joshua J. Prince,
Attorneys for Appellee
J UDGE R YAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
J UDGES MICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN FORSTER and
D AVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.
HARRIS, Judge:
¶1 	The 	State 	charged 	Jose 	Beltran‐Perez 	with 	robbery,
stemming from events that occurred at a Maverik convenience
store on January 7, 2018. Beltran‐Perez moved to dismiss the
charge, 	asserting 	that 	it 	violated 	statutory 	double 	jeopardy
principles because he had already agreed, in an earlier federal case
that had charged him with committing a different robbery, to pay
restitution for the January 7 robbery. The district court denied the
motion to dismiss. Beltran‐Perez then pled guilty to the state
robbery charge, but did so conditionally, preserving his right to
appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss. Beltran‐Perez now

State v. Beltran‐Perez
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challenges that decision, but for the reasons discussed herein, we
reject Beltran‐Perez’s arguments and affirm his conviction.
BACKGROUND 1
¶2 	In January 2018, Beltran‐Perez committed two robberies.
First, on January 7, he entered a Maverik convenience store and
told the cashier to “give [him] all the money in [the] register.” The
cashier complied, and Beltran‐Perez took the money and left. In
this opinion, we refer to this robbery as “the Maverik robbery.”
¶3 	Approximately three weeks later, on January 27, Beltran‐
Perez was involved in a second robbery. On this occasion, Beltran‐
Perez’s friend contacted a man selling phones on Facebook and
set up a meeting, to take place in a parking lot, to inspect and
potentially purchase a phone. During the meeting, while the
friend was talking to the seller, Beltran‐Perez and another person
arrived in a car and approached the seller. Armed with a machete,
Beltran‐Perez and the other person took the seller’s wallet, keys,
and cellphone and then fled the scene, with one of them driving
away in the seller’s vehicle. We refer to this second robbery as “the
Facebook robbery.”
¶4 	A few days later, the United States charged Beltran‐Perez
in federal court with carjacking and robbery. All the events
described in the federal charging document were connected to the
Facebook robbery; indeed, that charging document made no
1. Because Beltran‐Perez entered into plea agreements with the
State and the United States, there was no trial or resulting
transcript. 	The 	facts 	recited 	here 	come 	from 	the 	charging
documents, the plea agreement forms, the motion to dismiss
hearing transcript, and the court’s findings from that hearing. See,
e.g., State v. Hintze, 2025 UT 3, n.1, 567 P.3d 506; State v. Mooers,
2018 UT App 74, ¶ 2 n.2, 424 P.3d 1126.

State v. Beltran‐Perez
20231121‐CA 	3 	2026 UT App 36
mention of the Maverik robbery. However, as the federal case
proceeded, 	federal 	prosecutors 	provided 	Beltran‐Perez 	with
discovery materials that concerned not only the Facebook robbery
but also the Maverik robbery, including a security camera video
recording of the Maverik robbery.
¶5 	Eventually, federal prosecutors and Beltran‐Perez reached
a plea agreement. Beltran‐Perez agreed to plead guilty to the
federal robbery charge and, as the factual basis for the plea,
Beltran‐Perez admitted that on January 27 he had gone to the
parking lot and robbed the phone seller. Beltran‐Perez also agreed
to pay restitution “arising out of” not only the Facebook robbery
but also the Maverik robbery. In exchange, federal prosecutors
agreed to drop the carjacking charge, and they also agreed to “not
seek an indictment against” Beltran‐Perez in connection with the
Maverik robbery. The federal government upheld its end of that
bargain, and it never formally charged Beltran‐Perez—whether
through indictment or other means—with any criminal activity
related to the Maverik robbery.
¶6 	About a year later, the State—which was not a party to, and
therefore not contractually bound by, the federal court plea
agreement—charged Beltran‐Perez with robbery. In the charging
document, the State alleged that on January 7, 2018, Beltran‐Perez
had robbed “a business” by asking the cashier to hand over “all
the money in [the] register.” All parties agree that the state case
concerns the Maverik robbery.
¶7 	Beltran‐Perez moved to dismiss the charge, arguing that
the prosecution violated the provisions of Utah’s double jeopardy
statute. 	Under 	that 	statute, 	a 	“prosecution 	in 	[another]
jurisdiction,” whether “federal or state,” acts as “a bar to a
subsequent prosecution in this state if,” as relevant here, “the
former 	prosecution 	resulted 	in 	an 	acquittal, 	conviction, 	or
termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined in Section
76‐1‐403.” Utah Code § 76‐1‐404. Among other things, Beltran‐

State v. Beltran‐Perez
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Perez asserted that, because federal prosecutors as part of the
earlier plea agreement had agreed not to “seek an indictment
against” 	him 	for 	the 	Maverik 	robbery, 	the 	earlier 	federal
prosecution 	had 	resulted 	in 	a 	“termination 	of 	prosecution”
regarding the Maverik robbery.
¶8 	After hearing oral argument on the matter, the district
court denied the motion to dismiss, concluding that Beltran‐Perez
“was never federally indicted for” the Maverik robbery and that,
therefore, “there was no formal federal prosecution of that
offense.” 	Moreover, 	the 	court 	determined 	that 	the 	federal
prosecutors’ agreement “to not prosecute” Beltran‐Perez for the
Maverik robbery did “not establish that there ha[d] been a
termination of prosecution under” Utah law. Accordingly, the
court determined that Beltran‐Perez’s case did not qualify for
dismissal under Utah’s double jeopardy statute.
¶9 	Later, Beltran‐Perez pled guilty to the state robbery charge,
but in so doing he reserved his right to appeal the denial of his
motion to dismiss.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶10 	Beltran‐Perez now appeals, and he exercises his reserved
right to challenge the district court’s order denying his motion to
dismiss. Because this appeal concerns the interpretation of a
statute, our review here is for correctness. See State v. Robertson,
2017 UT 27, ¶ 14, 438 P.3d 491 (“The proper interpretation and
application 	of 	a 	statute 	is 	a 	question 	of 	law 	reviewed 	for
correctness.” (cleaned up)).

State v. Beltran‐Perez
20231121‐CA 	5 	2026 UT App 36
ANALYSIS
¶11 	“The double jeopardy clauses of both the Utah and federal
constitutions limit the government’s ability to prosecute or punish
an individual multiple times for the same conduct.” Id. ¶ 15; see
also U.S. Const. amend. V (stating that no person shall “be subject
for the same offence to be twice put in jeopardy of life or limb”);
Utah Const. art. I, § 12 (stating that no person shall “be twice put
in jeopardy for the same offense”). But these constitutional double
jeopardy 	principles 	have 	certain 	limitations. 	For 	instance,
constitutional double jeopardy protections do not apply early in
criminal cases, but instead “attach only when an accused is put on
trial and a jury has been sworn and impaneled.” See State v. Cheek,
2015 UT App 243, ¶ 59, 361 P.3d 679 (cleaned up). Additionally,
constitutional double jeopardy principles include the so‐called
dual 	sovereignty 	doctrine, 	which 	permits 	successive
“prosecutions by separate sovereigns.” State v. Morris, 2017 UT
App 112, ¶ 16, 400 P.3d 1183; see also Robertson, 2017 UT 27, ¶ 2
(stating that the “dual sovereignty doctrine” is “a principle of
double jeopardy law that permits subsequent prosecutions by
different sovereigns, even for the same offense” (cleaned up)).
¶12 	Utah, by statute, provides criminal defendants with double
jeopardy protections that are, in at least one respect, broader than
those provided by constitutional doctrine. See State v. Sisneros,
2022 UT 7, ¶ 1, 506 P.3d 564 (stating that “Utah extends [double
jeopardy] 	protection 	even 	further” 	than 	the 	United 	States
Constitution does). In particular, and as relevant here, Utah
statutory law rejects the dual sovereignty doctrine. See Robertson,
2017 	UT 	27, 	¶ 	33 	(noting 	that 	Utah’s 	statute 	manifests 	a
“legislative rejection of” the dual sovereignty doctrine). The
governing statute reads as follows:
If a defendant’s conduct establishes the commission
of one or more offenses within the concurrent
jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction,

State v. Beltran‐Perez
20231121‐CA 	6 	2026 UT App 36
federal 	or 	state, 	the 	prosecution 	in 	the 	other
jurisdiction is a bar to a subsequent prosecution in
this state if:
(1) the former prosecution resulted in an acquittal,
conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those
terms are defined in Section 76‐1‐403; and
(2) the subsequent prosecution is for the same
offense or offenses.
Utah Code § 76‐1‐404. Here, Beltran‐Perez invokes this statute,
and he asserts that the State’s prosecution of him for the Maverik
robbery violates the terms of this statute.2
¶13 	All parties agree that the second statutory element is met
because the “subsequent prosecution”—the State’s prosecution in
this case—was “for the same offense or offenses” that were at
issue in the federal case. See id. § 76‐1‐404(2). As the State puts it
in its brief, “all agree that the Maverik robbery for which Beltran‐
Perez agreed to pay restitution as part of his federal plea
agreement and the Maverik robbery to which he pleaded guilty
in state court is the ‘same offense.’”
¶14 	But the State resists Beltran‐Perez’s assertion that the first
statutory element is met. On this point, the State makes two
arguments. First, it asserts that no federal prosecution was ever
commenced because no federal indictment was ever issued
regarding the Maverik robbery. Second, it asserts that even if a
federal prosecution was somehow commenced, that prosecution
did not “result[] in an acquittal, conviction, or termination of
2. Beltran‐Perez’s claims in this appeal are entirely statutory; that
is, he does not assert that any constitutional double jeopardy
principles were violated by the State’s prosecution of him for the
Maverik robbery.

State v. Beltran‐Perez
20231121‐CA 	7 	2026 UT App 36
prosecution,” as those terms are used in Utah’s statute. We find
the State’s second point persuasive and dispositive of this appeal:
even if we assume, for purposes of the discussion, that a federal
prosecution regarding the Maverik robbery commenced, that
prosecution 	did 	not 	result 	in 	an 	acquittal, 	conviction, 	or
termination of prosecution.
¶15 	To be clear, Beltran‐Perez does not assert that any federal
prosecution 	regarding 	the 	Maverik 	robbery 	resulted 	in 	an
acquittal or conviction. Instead, he asserts that there was a federal
prosecution that, through the plea bargain process, resulted in a
“termination of prosecution.” The relevant statute instructs us to
apply the definition of “termination of prosecution” that is
provided “in Section 76‐1‐403” of the Utah Code (Section 403). Id.
§ 76‐1‐404(1). When we examine the way that term is used and
discussed in Section 403, we find no support for Beltran‐Perez’s
argument that there was a “termination of prosecution” in federal
court regarding the Maverik robbery.
¶16 	While 	Section 	403 	provides 	relatively 	straightforward
definitions of “acquittal” and “conviction,” see id. § 76‐1‐403(2),
(3), its definition of “termination of prosecution” is somewhat less
precise. In discussing that term, Section 403 indicates that double
jeopardy protections apply in either of two situations:
 	when 	“the 	former 	prosecution 	. 	. 	. 	was
improperly 	terminated,” 	id. 	§ 	76‐1‐
403(1)(b)(iii), 	a 	term 	for 	which 	further
clarification is offered in subsection (4), see id.
§ 76‐1‐403(4); or
 	when 	“the 	former 	prosecution 	. 	. 	. 	was
terminated by a final order or judgment for
the defendant that has not been reversed, set
aside, 	or 	vacated 	and 	that 	necessarily
required a determination inconsistent with a

State v. Beltran‐Perez
20231121‐CA 	8 	2026 UT App 36
fact 	that 	must 	be 	established 	to 	secure
conviction in the subsequent prosecution,”
id. § 76‐1‐403(1)(b)(iv).
Thus, 	by 	invoking 	Section 	403’s 	discussion 	of 	the 	term
“termination of prosecution,” the relevant statute indicates that,
to 	trigger 	double 	jeopardy 	protections, 	a 	“termination 	of
prosecution” must fall within one of the two specific definitional
categories included in Section 403. See id. § 76‐1‐404(1). We must
therefore examine each of the two statutory categories to see
whether either one applies here.
¶17 	We can quickly dispense with the second option. The
federal case was simply never terminated by a final order or
judgment in favor of Beltran‐Perez that “necessarily required a
determination inconsistent with a fact that must be established to
secure conviction in the subsequent prosecution.” See id. Indeed,
Beltran‐Perez does not argue to the contrary.
¶18 	So that leaves the first option: that the federal case “was
improperly terminated.” Id. § 76‐1‐403(1)(b)(iii). And here, the
additional clarification provided in subsection (4) of Section 403
makes 	clear 	that 	this 	category 	doesn’t 	apply 	either. 	That
subsection provides the definitional requirements of “improper
termination,” as follows:
There is an improper termination of prosecution if
the termination takes place before the verdict, is for
reasons not amounting to an acquittal, and takes place
after a jury has been impaneled and sworn to try the
defendant, or, if the jury trial is waived, after the first
witness is sworn.
Id. § 76‐1‐403(4) (emphasis added). But some exceptions apply.
For instance, “termination of prosecution is not improper,” even

State v. Beltran‐Perez
20231121‐CA 	9 	2026 UT App 36
if the basic definitional requirements are met, if “the defendant
consents to the termination.” Id. § 76‐1‐403(4)(a).
¶19 	It is evident that the basic definitional requirements of
“improper termination of prosecution” are not met here. While
the termination certainly took place before any verdict and was
for reasons not amounting to an acquittal, it did not take place
“after a jury ha[d] been impaneled and sworn . . . or, if the jury
trial [had been] waived, after the first witness [had been] sworn.”3
Id. § 76‐1‐403(4). Indeed, our supreme court, interpreting this
same statute, has indicated that “Utah’s statutory double jeopardy
protection . . . does not attach at pretrial proceedings.” State v.
Cahoon, 2009 UT 9, ¶ 16, 203 P.3d 957. The federal case against
Beltran‐Perez regarding the Maverik robbery, such as it was,
concluded with a plea agreement reached prior to the start of any
trial. No jury was impaneled, and no witness was sworn. Thus,
there was no “improper termination of prosecution,” as that term
is used in Utah’s double jeopardy statute.
¶20 	Beltran‐Perez resists this conclusion by pointing out that,
by 	signing 	on 	to 	the 	plea 	agreement, 	he 	consented 	to 	the
termination of the federal prosecution, and by directing our
3. This conclusion is not only compelled by the text of the relevant
statutory provisions, read together in harmony, see Vineyard Props.
of Utah LLC v. RLS Constr. LLC, 2021 UT App 144, ¶ 26, 505 P.3d
65 (“We consider the relevant statute in its entirety, construing
each part or section in connection with every other part or section
so as to produce a harmonious whole.” (cleaned up)), but it also
aligns neatly with constitutional double jeopardy principles,
which (as noted) kick in only late in a criminal case’s prosecution,
“when an accused is put on trial . . . and a jury has been sworn
and impaneled,” see State v. Cheek, 2015 UT App 243, ¶ 59, 361 P.3d
679 (cleaned up); see also State v. Cahoon, 2009 UT 9, ¶ 15, 203 P.3d
957 (noting that constitutional double jeopardy protections “do[]
not attach until a trial begins”).

State v. Beltran‐Perez
20231121‐CA 	10 	2026 UT App 36
attention to the statutory language stating that “termination of
prosecution is not improper if . . . the defendant consents to the
termination.” See Utah Code § 76‐1‐403(4)(a). It is certainly true
that Beltran‐Perez consented to the termination of any federal
prosecution for the Maverik robbery. But this fact is irrelevant
here, where the basic definitional prerequisites of “improper
termination of prosecution” are not met. Whether Beltran‐Perez
consented to the termination of the prosecution is a factor relevant
to one of the statutory exceptions to “improper termination of
prosecution,” 	and 	that 	factor 	becomes 	relevant 	only 	if 	the
underlying prerequisites are first met. See id. Because those
prerequisites are not met, there was no improper termination of
prosecution, even though Beltran‐Perez consented to termination.
¶21 	Thus, 	neither 	of 	the 	two 	situations 	that 	constitute 	a
“termination of prosecution”—as that term is defined in Utah’s
double jeopardy statute—is present on the facts of this case. As a
result, the federal prosecution did not result “in an acquittal,
conviction, or termination of prosecution,” and therefore the first
element of Utah’s statute is not satisfied here. On this basis, we
reject Beltran‐Perez’s assertion that, with regard to the Maverik
robbery, the double jeopardy protections of Utah’s statute were
triggered by the events that occurred in the federal case.
CONCLUSION
¶22 	For the foregoing reasons, Beltran‐Perez’s statutory right
to be free from double jeopardy was not violated by the State’s
prosecution of him for his involvement in the Maverik robbery.
Accordingly, the district court did not err when it denied Beltran‐
Perez’s motion to dismiss. We therefore reject his appellate
arguments and affirm his conviction.