Petrzelka v. Goodwin

2020 UT App 34
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
PEGGY PETRZELKA,
Appellee,
v.
JAMES E. GOODWIN ,
Appellant.
Opinion
No. 20180923-CA
Filed March 5, 2020
First District Court, Logan Department
The Honorable Thomas Willmore
No. 164100050
Ashley E. Bown, Attorney for Appellant
Tess A. Davis, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE JILL M. POHLMAN authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER and R YAN M. HARRIS
concurred.
POHLMAN, Judge:
¶1 	Peggy 	Petrzelka 	and 	James 	E. 	Goodwin 	married 	in
September 2004, separated in February 2015, and divorced in
February 	2018. 	Following 	a 	bench 	trial, 	the 	court 	entered
judgment on several issues, including alimony and the division
of the parties’ retirement accounts. The court declined to award
Goodwin alimony, finding that he was capable of meeting his
own needs. The court also determined that the marital portion of
Petrzelka’s retirement account would be valued as of March 1,
2015—the approximate date of the parties’ separation. Goodwin
challenges both determinations, asserting that the court erred by
declining to award him alimony and by declining to value

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Petrzelka’s account as of the time of the divorce decree or trial.
We affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	Petrzelka and Goodwin married in September 2004. At
the time, Petrzelka was forty-two years old, while Goodwin was
sixty-one. During the marriage, the parties lived in a home that
Petrzelka had purchased before their union. Both parties also
worked. Petrzelka continued in her established teaching career,
and Goodwin held jobs related to rural community development
and land conservancy. While married, the parties kept their
finances separate. They shared in some “very limited” joint
expenses, but otherwise maintained separate bank and credit
card accounts and spent their respective incomes how they
wished.
¶3 	Goodwin retired in 2012, and the parties separated in
February 	2015. 	After 	their 	separation, 	Goodwin 	moved 	to
California, while Petrzelka remained in Utah. At the conclusion
of a two-day trial in February 2018, the parties were granted a
divorce.
¶4 	Following the trial, the court entered judgment on several
issues, including Goodwin’s claim for alimony and the division
of the parties’ retirement accounts. Based on its assessment of
Goodwin’s needs and his ability to meet them, the court declined
to award alimony. It determined that Goodwin was able to meet
his needs through a combination of his Social Security and
retirement income, and income the court imputed to him at $15
per hour for twenty hours per week.
¶5 	The 	court 	also 	determined 	that 	a 	portion 	of 	one 	of
Petrzelka’s retirement accounts would be subject to division as
marital 	property. 	Rather 	than 	setting 	the 	end 	date 	of 	the

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valuation period as the date of trial or the divorce decree as
Goodwin 	requested, 	the 	court 	set 	the 	valuation 	period 	as
September 4, 2004—the date of the parties’ marriage—to March
1, 	2015—the 	month 	immediately 	following 	the 	parties’
separation.
ISSUES AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW
¶6 	On appeal, Goodwin challenges the trial court’s decision
not to award alimony. In general, trial courts in divorce actions
are “permitted considerable discretion in adjusting the financial
and property interests of the parties.” Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT
App 269, ¶ 4, 316 P.3d 455 (cleaned up). “Accordingly, we will
reverse 	only 	if 	(1) 	there 	was 	a 	misunderstanding 	or
misapplication of the law resulting in substantial and prejudicial
error; (2) the factual findings upon which the award was based
are clearly erroneous; or (3) the party challenging the award
shows that such a serious inequity has resulted as to manifest a
clear abuse of discretion.” Gardner v. Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18,
452 P.3d 1134 (cleaned up). “Because we can properly find abuse
only if no reasonable person would take the view adopted by the
trial court, appellants have a heavy burden to show that an
alleged error falls into any of these three categories.” Id. (cleaned
up).
¶7 	Goodwin 	also 	challenges 	the 	trial 	court’s 	division
of Petrzelka’s retirement account, arguing that the court erred
in setting the end date of the valuation period as March 1, 2015,
shortly after the parties’ separation, rather than the date of
trial or the divorce decree. “Generally, the marital estate is
valued at the time of the divorce decree or trial.” Jacobsen v.
Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ¶ 39, 257 P.3d 478 (cleaned up).
However, as with alimony, the court has broad discretion to use
a 	different 	date 	so 	long 	as 	its 	decision 	it 	supported 	by
“sufficiently detailed findings of fact explaining its deviation

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from the general rule.” Id. (cleaned up); see also Rayner, 2013 UT
App 269, ¶ 19 (“A trial court has broad discretion to deviate
from [the] general rule when circumstances warrant.” (cleaned
up)).
ANALYSIS
I. Denial of Alimony
¶8 	Goodwin 	argues 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	exceeded 	its
discretion by declining to award alimony. Alimony awards are
generally aimed at “enabling the receiving spouse to maintain,
as nearly as possible, the standard of living enjoyed during the
marriage, and preventing the receiving spouse from becoming a
public charge.” Anderson v. Anderson, 2018 UT App 19, ¶ 29, 414
P.3d 1069 (cleaned up); Rule v. Rule, 2017 UT App 137, ¶ 14, 402
P.3d 153.
¶9 	To that end, in deciding whether to award alimony, a
court 	must 	consider 	several 	factors 	relevant 	to 	alimony’s
purposes, including the “financial condition and needs of the
recipient spouse,” “the recipient’s earning capacity or ability to
produce 	income,” 	and 	“the 	ability 	of 	the 	payor 	spouse 	to
provide 	support.” 	Utah 	Code 	Ann. 	§ 	30-3-5(8)(a)(i)–(iii)
(LexisNexis 2019); see also Jones v. Jones, 700 P.2d 1072, 1075 (Utah
1985) (same); Barrani v. Barrani, 2014 UT App 204, ¶ 21, 334 P.3d
994 (same). In assessing the parties’ needs and their respective
abilities to fulfill those needs, courts should generally look to the
marital standard of living. See Rule, 2017 UT App 137, ¶ 15; see
also Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(e) (instructing courts to, as a
general rule, “look to the standard of living, existing at the time
of separation,” in setting alimony awards). If a court determines
that the spouse requesting alimony is able to meet his or her own
needs, the court “should not award alimony.” Dobson v. Dobson,
2012 UT App 373, ¶ 22, 294 P.3d 591.

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¶10 	Further, courts in divorce cases may consider imputing
income to an unemployed spouse in assessing the spouse’s
ability to produce income. See Gardner v. Gardner, 2019 UT 61,
¶ 98, 452 P.3d 1134; Leppert v. Leppert, 2009 UT App 10, ¶ 12, 200
P.3d 223; see also Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-203(8)(b) (LexisNexis
2018) (setting out the considerations for imputing income to a
parent for child support).1 All else being equal, a spouse who is
capable of working ought to be “accountable for meeting [his or]
her own needs to the extent” of that capability. Hansen v. Hansen,
2014 UT App 96, ¶ 9, 325 P.3d 864 (explaining that imputing
income to a spouse “holds [that spouse] accountable for meeting
her own needs to the extent she is capable”).
A. 	The Court’s Alimony Findings
¶11 	Here, the court determined that, in light of the facts,
circumstances, and equities at play, Goodwin was capable of
meeting his own needs. It therefore declined to award alimony.
To that end, the court made extensive findings with respect to
both the facts it found relevant to the overall question of alimony
and the statutory factors described in Utah Code section 30-3-5.
¶12 	The court found relevant the fact that the marriage was
“entered into later in life for both parties,” and it considered the
parties’ respective situations before, and contributions to, the
marriage. For example, the court found that Goodwin “did not
give up anything by entering into the marriage” and brought no
“assets or 	real 	income 	into 	the 	marriage.” 	With 	respect 	to
Petrzelka, the court found that she brought “an established and
successful teaching career into the marriage” and that there was
1. “Although this section of the Utah Code addresses imputation
for 	the 	purposes 	of 	child 	support, 	it 	is 	also 	relevant 	to
imputation in the alimony context.” Hartvigsen v. Hartvigsen,
2018 UT App 238, ¶ 8 n.5, 437 P.3d 1257 (cleaned up).

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20180923-CA 	6 	2020 UT App 34
“no 	evidence 	that 	[Goodwin] 	did 	anything 	to 	improve
[Petrzelka’s] income or her education or her earning capacity.”
¶13 	The 	court 	also 	determined 	that 	the 	“most 	significant
factor” in its alimony calculus was the parties’ agreement to
share only a few joint living expenses during the marriage. The
court found that during the marriage “the parties agreed to
equally pay certain limited joint living expenses” and that those
shared expenses were “very, very limited.” In this respect, the
court noted and “place[d] great weight on the fact that the
parties essentially 	maintained 	separate 	standards of 	living,”
where each party kept “separate accounts and expenses during
the marriage,” which accordingly “allowed each party to spend
their respective income how they wished.”
¶14 	Regarding their separate living standards, the court also
found 	“very 	persuasive” 	that 	Goodwin 	had 	“always 	lived
beyond his means with his separate credit cards,” noting that he
entered the marriage with a credit card balance and that he
continued to carry one “after the date of separation due to his
continual over-spending.” The court found such facts as “strong
evidence of the parties’ standard of living during the marriage
and especially [Goodwin’s] standard of living.”
¶15 	As to Goodwin’s needs, the court accepted his stated
monthly expenses of $3,349, finding them, “for the most part,
reasonable,” though noting that his cable TV expenses, food
budget, and credit card bills were “too high.”
¶16 	With regard to Goodwin’s ability to meet his needs,
the court found that Goodwin had a gross income of $3,571
per month. It reached this figure by adding Goodwin’s Social
Security and retirement income, which it found was $2,271
per month, and imputing to Goodwin additional income of
$1,300 	per 	month 	based 	on 	a 	finding 	that 	Goodwin 	could
work part-time (i.e., twenty hours per week) at $15 per hour.

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The court’s imputation determination was based on several
findings 	about 	Goodwin’s 	ability 	to 	produce 	income.
For 	example, 	the 	court 	found 	that 	Goodwin 	had 	“very
marketable” and “extensive job skills,” given his background
and work history, and that “nothing . . . limits him from doing
some sort of work.” In this respect, the court noted evidence
showing 	that 	Goodwin 	remained 	somewhat 	active 	in 	his
retirement—that he was able to travel, walk and hike with dogs,
carry 	his 	grandchildren, 	babysit, 	and 	volunteer. 	The 	court
additionally found that Goodwin would receive a “considerable
sum from [Petrzelka’s] retirement account, which he did not
contribute to or cause in any way to increase,” and that “such
funds can be used for his support and for the payment of his
debts.”
¶17 	The court also accepted Petrzelka’s assertion that there is
no right to retire, stating that there is no “legal right to quit
supporting oneself in a divorce situation such as this.” And the
court found that, under the circumstances, it was “not equitable
for [Goodwin] to choose not to work or take any action to
support himself.” The court then ultimately concluded, “[b]ased
on the foregoing facts, circumstances and equitable principles,”
that Goodwin was “capable of meeting his own needs” and that
therefore no alimony would be awarded.
B. 	Goodwin’s Challenges to the Court’s Alimony Decision
¶18 	In challenging the court’s denial of alimony, Goodwin
suggests that the court’s evaluation of the relevant alimony
factors was not proper, most significantly its decision to impute
income to him. He also raises various challenges to some of the
court’s alimony findings. Because the court’s decision to impute
income to Goodwin plays a significant role in its overall decision
not to award alimony, we first address Goodwin’s challenges to
that decision. We then address Goodwin’s remaining challenges.

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1. 	Imputation of Income
¶19 	Goodwin 	argues, 	relying 	heavily 	on 	the 	fact 	of 	his
retirement before the parties’ separation, that the trial court
exceeded its discretion by imputing income to him. As discussed
above, 	the 	court 	had 	“considerable 	discretion” 	to 	adjust
Petrzelka’s and Goodwin’s financial interests, and its “actions
are entitled to a presumption of validity.” Gardner v. Gardner,
2019 UT 61, ¶ 18, 452 P.3d 1134 (cleaned up). Accordingly, to
prevail on his challenge to the court’s imputation decision,
Goodwin must demonstrate that the court misunderstood or
misapplied 	our 	alimony 	laws, 	that 	the 	factual 	findings
supporting 	its 	decision 	were 	clearly 	erroneous, 	or 	that 	the
imputation has resulted in “such a serious inequity” so as to
“manifest a clear abuse of discretion.” Id. (cleaned up).
¶20 	Goodwin does not suggest that the court’s decision to
impute 	income 	to 	him 	arose 	from 	a 	misapplication 	or
misunderstanding of the law; indeed, while the fact of his
retirement is central to his imputation challenge, he concedes
that there is no statutory right to retire in Utah. Instead, he
suggests that the court’s decision to impute income to him
results in a serious inequity. He also challenges the evidentiary
basis for the court’s decision to impute income to him at the
amount of $15 per hour. We address each argument below.
a. 	The Decision to Impute Income
¶21 	As previously discussed, a court may consider imputing
income to an unemployed spouse in evaluating a request for
alimony. See Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 98; Leppert v. Leppert, 2009
UT App 10, ¶ 12, 200 P.3d 223. Utah Code section 78B-12-203
addresses 	imputation 	of 	income 	and 	provides 	that 	such
imputation 	“shall 	be 	based 	upon 	employment 	potential
and 	probable 	earnings” 	in 	tandem 	with 	consideration 	of 	a
variety 	of 	factors, 	to 	the 	extent 	they 	are 	known, 	such 	as

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“employment opportunities,” “work history,” “age,” “health,”
“other 	employment 	barriers 	and 	background 	factors,” 	and
“prevailing earnings and job availability for persons of similar
backgrounds in the community.” Utah Code Ann. § 78B-12-
203(8)(b) (LexisNexis 2018).
¶22 	Here, 	the 	court’s 	findings 	indicate 	that, 	despite
Goodwin’s age and the fact of his retirement, the court was
persuaded that the overall facts, circumstances, and equities
surrounding the question of alimony supported the decision to
impute income to him. Goodwin has not demonstrated that,
given the whole host of considerations at play, this decision
resulted in a serious inequity.
¶23 	To begin with, the court found that Goodwin was capable
of “some sort of work.” During the parties’ marriage, Goodwin
had worked and had been able to produce income at a rate of
over $50,000 per year—well exceeding the income the court
imputed at $15 per hour on a part-time basis. The court also
found that Goodwin had “very marketable skills” in light of his
“background and work history,” which the evidence at trial
suggested included experience in various employment sectors
such as the Air Force, the solar power industry, pesticide sales,
real estate, rural community development, land conservancy,
and 	the 	financial 	industry. 	And 	in 	terms 	of 	his 	physical
capabilities, the court found that, post-retirement, Goodwin had
demonstrated an ability to pursue various activities, such as
traveling, volunteering, walking and hiking with dogs, and
interacting with and babysitting his grandchildren. Goodwin
does not challenge these findings.
¶24 	The court further found that the circumstances at play
made it inequitable for Goodwin not to expend some effort to
support 	himself. 	This 	was 	a 	later-in-life 	marriage 	for 	both
parties, and the court found that the parties’ contributions to it at
the outset differed. Petrzelka brought an established career, and

Petrzelka v. Goodwin
20180923-CA 	10 	2020 UT App 34
the parties lived in the home she had purchased before the
marriage. 	In 	contrast, 	Goodwin 	brought 	no 	“assets 	or 	real
income” with him into the marriage, and the court found that
there was no evidence that Goodwin “did anything to improve”
Petrzelka’s income, education, or earning capacity.2
¶25 	Most importantly, central to the court’s overall alimony
decision was its determination that, for all intents and purposes,
the parties lived separate financial lives during the marriage,
with the result that the parties “essentially maintained separate
standards of living.” While the parties may have contributed to
certain shared monthly expenses, the court found that those
shared expenses were “very, very limited” and were only ones
to which both parties agreed. Significantly, the court also noted
that Goodwin had consistently lived beyond his means, “with
his separate credit cards,” before and during the marriage, as
2. Goodwin briefly challenges the court’s findings with respect
to his contributions to the marriage by characterizing them as
findings that he “gave up nothing and brought nothing to this
marriage” and by contending that such findings were “pure
speculation.” However, Goodwin supports this argument by
pointing to evidence that supports only his own position. He
does not identify or address the evidence that might support the
court’s findings on these points. To properly challenge the
court’s findings, Goodwin must demonstrate that they do not
follow logically from the evidence, or, stated another way, that
they are against the clear weight of it. See Gardner v. Gardner,
2019 UT 61, ¶ 32, 452 P.3d 1134; Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135,
¶ 16, 379 P.3d 890 (“A trial court’s factual determinations are
clearly erroneous only if they are in conflict with the clear weight
of 	the 	evidence, 	or 	if 	[this] 	court 	has 	a 	definite 	and 	firm
conviction 	that 	a 	mistake 	has 	been 	made.” 	(cleaned 	up)).
Goodwin has not met that burden.

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well as after the parties’ separation. Goodwin has not challenged
these findings.
¶26 	Given 	the 	full 	picture 	of 	the 	considerations 	and
circumstances 	surrounding 	the 	court’s 	decision 	to 	impute
income, we cannot say that imputing income to Goodwin on a
part-time 	basis 	exceeded 	the 	bounds 	of 	the 	court’s 	broad
discretion. Goodwin suggests his retirement during the parties’
marriage 	should 	have 	precluded 	the 	court 	from 	imputing
income to him, but he has not demonstrated that this premise is
at 	all 	sound. 	Because 	income 	imputation 	itself 	is primarily
focused on a spouse’s ability to produce income, it is not unusual
for courts to impute income to a spouse who has not worked
during the marriage (or who has not worked for a number of
years preceding the divorce) but who is nevertheless capable of
producing income. E.g., Hartvigsen v. Hartvigsen, 2018 UT App
238, 	¶¶ 	6–22, 	437 	P.3d 	1257 	(affirming 	the 	trial 	court’s
imputation of income, despite the fact that the spouse had not
earned such an income for nineteen years, where the evidence
showed she was capable of doing so); Hansen v. Hansen, 2014 UT
App 96, ¶¶ 2–3, 8–9, 15 & n.4, 325 P.3d 864 (imputing income at
minimum wage to a nonworking spouse, and “in spite of her
advancing age,” even where, at the time of the divorce, the
parties were living on retirement benefits); Leppert, 2009 UT App
10, ¶¶ 11–12 (affirming the imputation of income to a recipient
spouse who had not worked for more than two decades where
the court found that she was “capable of generating employment
income at the minimum wage level”).
¶27 	Thus, 	in 	the 	unique 	circumstances 	surrounding 	the
parties’ marriage, and pursuant to the numerous unchallenged
findings with respect to Goodwin’s ability to produce income
and the equities in play, the court’s decision to impute income to
Goodwin on a part-time basis at twenty hours a week did not
result in “such a serious inequity” so as to “manifest a clear
abuse of discretion.” See Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18 (cleaned up).

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b. 	Imputing Income at $15 per Hour
¶28 	Goodwin also challenges the evidentiary support for the
court’s decision to impute income to him at a rate of $15 per
hour. He claims that figure was based on a finding that $15 per
hour was California’s minimum wage. He asserts that the wage
was suggested by Petrzelka only during closing argument and
that there was no evidence introduced at trial to support it.
¶29 	We do not agree with Goodwin’s characterization of the
court’s 	findings. 	During 	its 	oral 	ruling, 	when 	asked 	by
Goodwin’s counsel what the basis was for its decision to impute
income at $15 per hour, the court initially responded that the
minimum wage in “California is at $15 or right close to $15 per
hour.” But when pressed by Goodwin’s counsel about whether
the court would reconsider if that figure was not correct, the
court 	stated 	that, 	“even 	if 	that 	is 	not 	minimum 	wage 	[in
California], [Goodwin] could go out and find a $15 per hour [job]
with his background and his ability to work.” The court’s later
written findings of 	fact and conclusions of law reflect this
reasoning; the court did not find that $15 was California’s
minimum wage or suggest that its decision to impute that figure
was 	so 	based. 	Rather, 	the 	court 	relied 	entirely 	on 	its
determination that Goodwin’s “extensive job skills, training and
work history allows him to find work earning at least $15 per
hour.”3
3. Following the court’s oral ruling, Goodwin objected to the
proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law on several
grounds, one of them being the proposed basis of the court’s
decision 	to 	impute 	income 	at 	$15 	per 	hour. 	The 	proposed
findings of fact, like the final written findings, made no mention
of 	California’s 	minimum 	wage. 	In 	his 	objections, 	Goodwin
argued 	that 	language should 	be 	added 	to 	reflect a 	further
(continued…)

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¶30 	By 	narrowing 	his 	challenge 	to 	the 	evidence 	(or 	lack
thereof) supporting the proposition that California’s minimum
wage is $15 per hour, Goodwin has made no attempt to deal
with the stated basis for the court’s finding, as evidenced by its
written findings. See generally M.F. v. J.F., 2013 UT App 247, ¶ 6,
312 P.3d 946 (“Our case law is clear that where a court’s oral
ruling differs from a final written order, the latter controls.”). See
also Living Rivers v. Executive Dir. of the Utah Dep’t of Envtl.
Quality, 2017 UT 64, ¶¶ 36–51, 417 P.3d 57 (declining to reach the
merits of the appeal where the petitioner “utterly fail[ed] to
engage with the substance of the [lower tribunal’s] ruling”);
Duchesne Land, LC v. Division of Consumer Prot., 2011 UT App 153,
¶ 8, 257 P.3d 441 (“Because [the appellants] have not addressed
the actual basis for the district court’s ruling, they have failed to
persuade 	us 	that 	the 	district 	court’s 	ruling 	constituted
error . . . .”). 	Nor 	has Goodwin 	identified 	or 	dealt 	with 	the
evidence supporting the court’s finding that his “job skills,
training and work history” would allow him to find work at that
amount per hour. Accordingly, Goodwin cannot persuade us
that the court’s decision to impute income at that amount is
against the clear weight of the evidence, and his challenge fails.
See Taft v. Taft, 2016 UT App 135, ¶ 19, 379 P.3d 890.
¶31 	In short, we affirm the court’s decision to impute income
to Goodwin at $15 per hour on a part-time basis. Goodwin has
not demonstrated that the court’s decision to impute results in a
serious inequity. He has also not adequately challenged the
(…continued)
finding by the court that “California’s minimum wage” is $15
per hour “or close thereto.” He suggested that such language
was necessary because it “was the Court’s actual finding about
why $15 per hour was being imputed” to him. By declining to
include 	such 	language 	in 	its 	findings 	of 	fact, 	the 	court
necessarily rejected Goodwin’s position.

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evidentiary basis supporting the decision to impute income in
the amount of $15 per hour.
2. 	The Remaining Challenges to the Alimony Denial
¶32 	Because we have affirmed the trial court’s decision to
impute income as well as the hourly rate at which it did so, to
persuade us that reversal is appropriate on the issue of alimony
Goodwin must raise supportable challenges to other aspects of
the court’s decision to deny alimony. Goodwin raises several
distinct challenges to the court’s overall alimony denial, but
none are ultimately persuasive.
a. 	Consequences of Imputing Income
¶33 	First, 	Goodwin 	claims 	that 	the 	alimony 	denial 	is
improper, even if the imputation decision is affirmed, because
the court erred in dealing with the consequences attendant to
imputing income to him. He claims that the court failed to
properly 	account 	for 	the 	tax 	consequences 	of 	the 	imputed
income, where it used his gross rather than net imputed income
to calculate his ability to meet his needs. And he claims that the
court should have increased his monthly expenses to reflect the
costs of returning to the workforce, such as car-related costs,
“increased food costs for eating outside the home, increased
clothing costs, and increased health expenses.”
¶34 	The tax issue is not properly before us. “A party seeking
appellate review must provide a citation to the record showing
that the issue was preserved in the trial court or a statement of
grounds for seeking review of an issue not preserved in the trial
court.” Shuman v. Shuman, 2017 UT App 192, ¶ 28, 406 P.3d 258
(cleaned up); Gowe v. Intermountain Healthcare, Inc., 2015 UT App
105, 	¶ 	7, 	356 	P.3d 	683 	(“We 	generally 	do 	not 	address
unpreserved arguments raised for the first time on appeal. To
preserve an argument for appellate review, the appellant must

Petrzelka v. Goodwin
20180923-CA 	15 	2020 UT App 34
first present the argument to the district court in such a way that
the court has an opportunity to rule on it.” (cleaned up)); see also
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(B). Goodwin fails to demonstrate where
in the record he preserved the request that the court impute net
rather than gross income to him.4 And based on our review of
the record, we have found no request by Goodwin that the court
consider the tax consequences of the imputed income. Thus, this
issue has not been properly preserved for appeal.5
¶35 	Moreover, even had Goodwin properly preserved the tax
issue, he fails to demonstrate that this potential error affected the
court’s alimony determination. Instead, he simply suggests that
the court import the tax rate applicable to Petrzelka—someone
employed full-time as a teacher, who is not retired and not
receiving 	Social 	Security 	benefits 	as 	income—rather 	than
explaining “what the actual tax consequences of the court’s error
are or what they would have been had the court considered the
tax implications” of his imputed income. See Gardner, 2019 UT
61, ¶ 105.
¶36 	Similarly, Goodwin fails to carry his burden of persuasion
with respect to the increased expenses related to working. While
he argues that the court should have increased his expenses in
various 	categories, 	at 	trial 	he 	did 	not 	present 	evidence 	of
amounts to be added to give the court an evidentiary basis to do
4. Instead, in his objections to the proposed findings of fact and
conclusions of law, Goodwin specifically asked the court to
“include the word ‘gross’ in describing the amount of income the
Court is imputing to [him].”
5. Ordinarily, parties’ respective tax obligations ought to be
taken into consideration in making an alimony determination.
See McPherson v. McPherson, 2011 UT App 382, ¶¶ 13–16, 265
P.3d 839.

Petrzelka v. Goodwin
20180923-CA 	16 	2020 UT App 34
so. Likewise, on appeal, he fails to suggest any amount to be
added for the various expenses or otherwise demonstrate how
such 	increases 	might 	have 	affected 	the 	trial 	court’s 	overall
alimony 	determination. 	See 	Pulham 	v. 	Kirsling, 	2019 	UT 	18,
¶¶ 33–39, 443 P.3d 1217 (declining to reverse for a new trial on
the 	issue 	of 	monthly 	income 	where 	the 	appellant 	had 	not
demonstrated that, even if the court erred in its income finding,
the error was harmful).
¶37 	Thus, Goodwin has not shown that reversal is warranted
on either point.
b. 	Marital Standard of Living Finding
¶38 	Next, Goodwin disagrees with the court’s assessment of
the effect the parties’ separate standards of living during the
marriage ought to have on the question of alimony. He contends
that if the parties indeed had separate standards of living as the
court found, then, based on Petrzelka’s contributions to some of
his living expenses during the marriage, the “only conclusion for
the trial court to make is that [he] was and is still in need of
alimony.”
¶39 	However, alimony determinations are not made by rote,
where there may be only one right conclusion. Instead, they are
made in light of the range of unique circumstances in play. A
trial court accordingly has considerable discretion in adjusting
the parties’ financial and property interests post-divorce, and its
adjustments to those interests are entitled to a presumption of
validity. See Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(8)(a) (LexisNexis 2019)
(setting forth a list of factors courts must consider in determining
alimony); Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18. To persuade us that reversal
is appropriate, Goodwin must demonstrate something more
than 	mere 	disagreement 	with 	the 	court’s 	evaluation 	of
the evidence. See Gardner, 2019 UT 61, ¶ 18; Taft, 2016 UT App
135, ¶ 19.

Petrzelka v. Goodwin
20180923-CA 	17 	2020 UT App 34
¶40 	And in suggesting that he should have been awarded
alimony based on Petrzelka’s contributions to the few monthly
expenses shared during the marriage, Goodwin fails to engage
with the court’s reasoning or findings on their own terms or
adequately account for the evidence supporting the decision
not 	to 	award 	alimony. 	Among 	other 	things, 	he 	does
not acknowledge the numerous findings that the evidence, as the
court found it, suggested that Goodwin was capable of meeting
his 	needs 	through 	his 	own 	income 	and 	that 	the 	parties’
deliberate 	separation 	of 	their 	finances 	during 	marriage
was germane to the equities surrounding the alimony request.
See Duchesne Land, 2011 UT App 153, ¶ 8; see also Rule v. Rule,
2017 UT App 137, ¶ 19, 402 P.3d 153 (“If the court determines
that the receiving spouse is able to meet all her needs with
her own income, then it should not award alimony.” (cleaned
up)). Instead, Goodwin merely points to evidence he believes
supports 	his 	position 	that 	the 	only 	appropriate 	conclusion
was that he was in need of alimony at least in the minimum
amount 	Petrzelka 	contributed 	to 	the 	parties’ 	joint
expenses during the marriage. He cannot persuade us that
reversal is appropriate on such a showing. See Taft, 2016 UT App
135, ¶ 19.
c. 	Material Omissions in the Findings
¶41 	Finally, Goodwin claims that the court failed to make
findings on certain “material” issues related to the alimony
determination 	and 	that 	we 	should 	reverse 	on 	that 	basis.
He 	contends that the court failed to account for $68.50 in
monthly funeral costs and bank fees, which were not in his
financial declaration but to which he testified. He also argues
that “[t]here is no clear basis to determine what amount the trial
court had in mind for [his] cable tv expenses, food expenses,
and 	the 	credit 	card 	monthly 	payments,” 	where 	the 	court
found that they were too high but made no specific findings on
those expenses.

Petrzelka v. Goodwin
20180923-CA 	18 	2020 UT App 34
¶42 	Even assuming there is merit to Goodwin’s complaints on
these 	points, 	Goodwin 	must 	demonstrate 	that 	there 	is 	a
“reasonable 	likelihood” 	that 	the 	omissions 	and 	errors 	he
identifies affected (or, if 	in error, would affect) the court’s
alimony denial. See Pulham, 2019 UT 18, ¶¶ 33–39 (declining to
reverse for a new trial on the issue of monthly income where the
appellant had not demonstrated that, even if the court erred in
its income finding, the error was harmful); see also Gardner, 2019
UT 61, ¶ 103 (concluding that the appellant failed to meet her
burden on appeal where she made no attempt to show that the
court’s error resulted in harm). See generally Utah R. Civ. P. 61
(“The court at every stage of the proceeding must disregard any
error or defect in the proceeding which does not affect the
substantial rights of the parties.”). In arguing that the court’s
decision ought to be reversed for failure to make findings on this
handful of expenses, Goodwin does not address all the reasons
why alimony was denied or whether the court would have made
a different decision had it considered the additional issues.
¶43 	As discussed above, the court’s ultimate decision to deny
alimony was based on more than mathematics. The court sought
to 	reach 	what 	it 	considered 	to 	be 	an 	appropriate 	alimony
determination 	in 	light 	of 	all 	the 	“facts, 	circumstances 	and
equitable principles” uniquely at play. Thus, the court’s decision
to deny alimony took into consideration more than simply the
numbers the parties attached to their respective expenses and
incomes. And because this is so, to persuade us that reversal is
appropriate, Goodwin must demonstrate that even if the court’s
omissions were in error, it is reasonably likely that the court
would not have denied alimony in light of all the relevant facts,
circumstances, and equities. See Pulham, 2019 UT 18, ¶¶ 33–39.
Goodwin does not attempt to make any such showing.
¶44 	Further, even on the numbers alone, we question whether
Goodwin could demonstrate harm. If the court were to enter
additional findings on Goodwin’s cable TV, food, and credit card

Petrzelka v. Goodwin
20180923-CA 	19 	2020 UT App 34
expenses, the amount of Goodwin’s expenses would presumably
decrease since the court found that those expenses were “too
high.” And given that the court determined that Goodwin’s
income—$3,571 per month—already exceeded the entirety of the
expenses he claimed—$3,349 per month—we find it difficult to
conclude that adding an additional $68.50 to his expenses would
likely tip the balance in favor of an alimony award, particularly
where 	other 	equities 	factored 	into 	the 	court’s 	decision.
Accordingly, he has not demonstrated that, even assuming it
was error not to make additional findings on the expenses to
which he points, the error was harmful to him. Goodwin is
therefore not entitled to reversal on this issue.
¶45 	In sum, we conclude that Goodwin has not shown that
the court exceeded its discretion in either its decision to impute
income to him or in its overall decision to deny alimony. We
therefore affirm the court’s denial of alimony.
II. Retirement Division
¶46 	Goodwin argues that the trial court erred by valuing
the marital retirement assets as of March 1, 2015 (following
the 	parties’ 	separation), 	rather 	than 	the 	time 	of 	the
divorce decree or trial in 2018. He claims that the circumstances
in this case “did not warrant deviating from the standard of
valuing the marital estate at the time of the divorce decree or
trial.” 	He 	also 	generally 	contends 	that 	this 	decision 	was
inequitable.
¶47 	While a court should generally value the marital estate “at
the time of the divorce decree or trial,” a court has broad
discretion to value the parties’ marital assets at a different time,
such as that of separation, if it determines that the circumstances
so warrant. Rayner v. Rayner, 2013 UT App 269, ¶ 19, 316 P.3d
455 (cleaned up); see also Jacobsen v. Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161,
¶ 39, 257 P.3d 478.

Petrzelka v. Goodwin
20180923-CA 	20 	2020 UT App 34
¶48 	Here, the court had a reasoned basis for concluding that
circumstances warranted deviation from the general rule. The
court found that, around the time the parties separated in
February 2015, Petrzelka “stopped personally contributing to her
retirement account” but that “she maintained such account and
it continued to grow.” As to Goodwin, the court found that
“once 	[the 	parties] 	separated,” 	Goodwin 	“continued 	to
overspend and live beyond his means” and “started dissipating
his retirement accounts, rather than maintaining those.” For
these reasons, the court determined that it would be “inequitable
to use a later date,” and therefore determined that the marital
period for valuing both parties’ retirement accounts would be
from the date of the marriage in September 2004 to March 1,
2015.
¶49 	Goodwin has not shown that the court’s decision to value
the 	parties’ 	retirement 	accounts 	as 	of 	March 	1, 	2015, 	was
inequitable or otherwise exceeded the court’s broad discretion.
The trial court’s choice of March 1 as the relevant valuation date
was 	thoughtfully 	made 	based 	on 	the 	parties’ 	respective
treatment of their retirement accounts at the time of separation.
Specifically, Petrzelka stopped contributing to her account, while
Goodwin began drawing from his accounts to supplement his
income. 	March 	1, 	2015, 	therefore 	fairly 	represents 	the
approximate date that both parties’ treatment of their retirement
accounts, 	in 	light 	of 	their 	separation, 	changed. 	In 	these
circumstances, we cannot say that the trial court’s decision was
inequitable or that it otherwise exceeded its broad discretion in
deviating from the general rule. See Rayner, 2013 UT App 269,
¶ 19; Jacobsen, 2011 UT App 161, ¶ 39.
III. Attorney Fees
¶50 	Both parties request attorney fees on appeal. Goodwin
asks for fees because he was awarded them below. Petrzelka
asks for her attorney fees on appeal, invoking rule 33 of the Utah

Petrzelka v. Goodwin
20180923-CA 	21 	2020 UT App 34
Rules 	of 	Appellate 	Procedure 	and 	this 	court’s 	“inherent
equitable power” to award fees “in the interest of justice and
equity.”
¶51 	As a general rule, a prevailing party on appeal who was
awarded 	attorney 	fees 	below 	will 	also 	be 	awarded 	their
appellate fees. See Stonehocker v. Stonehocker, 2008 UT App 11,
¶ 52, 176 P.3d 476. Because Goodwin has not prevailed on
appeal, we decline to award him his fees.
¶52 	As for Petrzelka’s request, because she was not awarded
attorney fees below, she is not entitled to fees simply by virtue of
prevailing on appeal. See id. And while attorney fees under rule
33 of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure may be awarded if a
reviewing court determines that the appeal “is either frivolous or
for delay,” Utah R. App. P. 33(a), “the imposition of such a
sanction is only to be used in egregious cases,” Pyper v. Reil, 2018
UT App 200, ¶ 28 n.3, 437 P.3d 493 (cleaned up). We conclude
that this is not such a case. For similar reasons, we are not
inclined to otherwise exercise our equitable powers to award
fees. We therefore decline Petrzelka’s request for attorney fees.
CONCLUSION
¶53 	We affirm. Goodwin has not demonstrated that the trial
court exceeded its discretion by imputing income to him at its
chosen hourly rate or by determining that alimony was not
warranted 	under 	the 	circumstances. 	Goodwin 	also 	has 	not
demonstrated that the court’s decision to value the parties’
retirement accounts as of March 1, 2015, was inequitable or
constituted an abuse of discretion. Finally, we decline to award
either party their attorney fees.