Larsen v. Davis County

2014 UT App 74
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
TYLER JAMES LARSEN,
Petitioner and Appellee,
v.
DAVIS COUNTY AND DAVIS COUNTY CAREER SERVICE COUNCIL,
Respondents and Appellants.
Opinion
No. 20110875-CA
Filed April 3, 2014
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Deno G. Himonas
No. 110901099
Jesse C. Trentadue, Carl F. Huefner, and Britton R.
Butterfield, Attorneys for Appellant Davis County
Kristin A. Van Orman and Jeremy G. Knight,
Attorneys for Appellant Davis County Career
Service Council
Tyler James Larsen, Appellee Pro Se
JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGE GREGORY K. ORME concurred. JUDGE JAMES Z. DAVIS
concurred in the result.
VOROS, Judge:
¶1 Davis County terminated the employment of Tyler James
Larsen, an assistant county attorney, for misconduct in connection
with a 2010 aggravated-robbery trial. Larsen appealed to the Davis
County Career Service Council, which upheld his termination.
Larsen then appealed to the district court, which set aside his
termination on the ground that the County failed to provide Larsen

Larsen v. Davis County
1. The Davis County Career Service Council acted as the fact-finder
below. We therefore recite the facts in a light favorable to the
Council’s decision. See In re J.F.S., 803 P.2d 1254, 1254 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990); State v. One 1982 Silver Honda Motorcycle, 735 P.2d 392,
393 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). “We present conflicting evidence only
when necessary to understand issues raised on appeal.” State v.
Kruger, 2000 UT 60, ¶ 2, 6 P.3d 1116.
20110875-CA 2 2014 UT App 74
with adequate notice of all of the grounds for his termination. The
County appeals, and we reverse.
BACKGROUND1
The Apadaca Trial
¶2 The Davis County Attorney’s Office assigned Tyler Larsen
to an aggravated-robbery trial set for August 2010. The defendant
in that case, Joseph Apadaca, was already serving a prison term in
Idaho for an earlier conviction. While preparing for trial, Larsen
visited the site of the robbery, a Clearfield clothing store, to meet
with two eyewitnesses. Larsen later acknowledged that after
“having a hard time communicating” with one eyewitness, he
showed her a black-and-white photo of Apadaca. Larsen did not
remember showing a photo to the other eyewitness. But a
Clearfield police officer who accompanied Larsen to the clothing
store stated that Larsen showed a color photo to both eyewitnesses:
[The officer] said Mr. Larsen told him to show the
witnesses a larger, more recent color photograph of
Joseph Apadaca after one witness had difficulty
identifying Joseph Apadaca from the photo Mr.
Larsen showed him. [The officer] said that he asked
Mr. Larsen if he was sure he wanted to show the
photograph and that Mr. Larsen told him to go
ahead and show the photo.

Larsen v. Davis County
2. As the United States Supreme Court explained in Simmons v.
United States, the “improper employment of photographs by police
may sometimes cause witnesses to err in identifying criminals.” 390
U.S. 377, 383 (1968). The danger of misidentification increases “if
the police display to the witness only the picture of a single
individual” or “if the police indicate to the witness that they have
other evidence that one of the persons pictured committed the
crime.” Id. If an improperly administered photo lineup results in a
misidentification, “the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his
memory the image of the photograph rather than of the person
actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness of subsequent lineup or
courtroom identification.” Id. at 383–84.
Recognizing those dangers, the Utah Supreme Court has
“strongly discourage[d]” the practice of using “photo arrays as a
substitute for lineups” and has “encourage[d] law enforcement
officials . . . to curb the use of photo arrays as much as possible.”
State v. Lopez, 886 P.2d 1105, 1111 (Utah 1994). When used, photo
arrays “should not emphasize one photo more than another.” State
v. Thamer, 777 P.2d 432, 435 (Utah 1989). “Any manipulation
indicating that the police believe one of the photographs portrays
the accused could lead to a finding of suggestiveness.” Id. Single-
photo identifications, in particular, present a “serious danger of
suggestiveness.” Nassar v. Vinzant, 519 F.2d 798, 801 (1st Cir. 1975);
see also United States v. Montgomery, 150 F.3d 983, 992–93 (9th Cir.
1998) (holding that absent any indication that the government’s
(continued...)
20110875-CA 3 2014 UT App 74
¶3 At the Apadaca trial, Larsen called one of the clothing-store
eyewitnesses as his first witness. On cross-examination, defense
counsel asked the eyewitness if he had “been shown a photo or
seen . . . a photo ID” of the suspect. The eyewitness said no. Larsen
made no attempt to correct the record. When cross-examining the
second eyewitness, defense counsel asked her whether “she had
ever been shown a lineup or photo array,” and she answered yes.
As a result, Apadaca moved for a mistrial, and the district court
granted Apadaca’s motion.2

Larsen v. Davis County
2. (...continued)
“suggestive identification procedures [were] imperative,” a single-
photo lineup used to refresh an eyewitness’s memory was
“unnecessarily suggestive”).
A single-photo lineup is more dangerous than a “showup,”
which “typically take[s] place soon after the crime is committed,
usually at the scene of the crime or where the suspect is
apprehended,” in order to allow “the victim or witness [to]
immediately identify whether the person the police has in custody
is actually the one who committed the crime.” See State v. Mincy,
838 P.2d 648, 655 (Utah Ct. App. 1992). In showups, the “elapsed
time” between the crime and the identification is typically minimal,
reducing the likelihood of a misidentification. State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774, 783 (Utah 1991). Here, more than three years passed
between the Clearfield robbery and the eyewitness identification
Larsen prompted with a single-photo lineup.
3. “[W]hen a prosecutor is aware that testimony is false, he or she
has a duty to correct the false impression.” State v. Gordon, 886 P.2d
112, 116 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). A prosecutor’s failure to
immediately correct testimony he knows to be false constitutes
misconduct. State v. Doyle, 2010 UT App 351, ¶ 3, 245 P.3d 206.
Utah’s Rules of Professional Conduct address this issue specifically:
if “a witness called by a lawyer has offered material evidence and
the lawyer comes to know of its falsity, the lawyer shall take
(continued...)
20110875-CA 4 2014 UT App 74
Larsen’s Termination and Appeals
¶4 After learning of Larsen’s conduct during the Apadaca trial,
the County Attorney signed a pretermination letter placing Larsen
on administrative leave. The letter described in detail Larsen’s
alleged misconduct. In effect, the letter accused Larsen of
attempting to obtain a criminal conviction by knowingly using
tainted eyewitness testimony and not correcting the record when
he had an opportunity to do so. Five days later, a second letter,3

Larsen v. Davis County
3. (...continued)
reasonable remedial measures, including, if necessary, disclosure
to the tribunal.” Utah R. Prof. Conduct 3.3(a)(3). Larsen denies that
he knowingly failed to correct the record after the first witness’s
false testimony, but his factual challenge is not an issue on appeal.
20110875-CA 5 2014 UT App 74
titled “Notice of Pre-Disciplinary Hearing,” restated those
allegations and invited Larsen to a meeting the following day in the
County Attorney’s office. The letter informed Larsen, “You will be
afforded an opportunity at this meeting to present a defense to the
above noted allegations” and “tell your side of the story.” The
letter also warned Larsen that termination was a possible outcome.
¶5 The meeting was recorded and transcribed. Larsen, the
County Attorney, and three other members of the Davis County
Attorney’s Office were present. The first twenty pages of the
transcript contain Larsen’s virtually uninterrupted explanation of
his handling of the case. The County Attorney then confronted
Larsen with the inconsistency between his earlier claims of
experience with his current claim that he was “in over his head”:
[County Attorney]: Tyler, one of the things you
talked about and were trying to sell me at that time
is that you had more experience than [another lawyer
in the office], [that] you were one of the senior
attorneys in the office, that you were a go-to guy,
that you were one of the best attorneys that we had.
Now you’re in here saying today just the opposite, “I
don’t know a damn thing.”
Mr. Larsen: Uh-huh.
[County Attorney]: That’s what I’m hearing from
you today. You know, I’m sorry this—I don’t know
anything. I don’t even [know] what freaking Rule 16

Larsen v. Davis County
20110875-CA 6 2014 UT App 74
of the Utah Rules of Criminal Procedure is. I’m
having a tough time buying that, man.
Mr. Larsen: I’m trying to think what it is. I don’t
know it [inaudible] I mean, I can’t quote it.
¶6 The incongruity between Larsen’s claimed experience level
and his pure-heart/empty-head defense put his credibility at issue,
and one deputy county attorney explored the incongruity. He
explained to Larsen that he was having a hard time “giving
[Larsen] the benefit of the doubt” in light of “something similar
happening in the past,” in particular an instance where Larsen
misled a judge and the County Attorney. Larsen replied, “I think
we’re here today to talk about the Apadaca trial and what was in
the past I thought was put in the past and that was part of our
agreement—.” The Deputy County Attorney agreed but stressed
that he was “struggling with believing” Larsen’s explanations of
what happened: “I’ve given you sort of the benefit in the past and
we really worked through it and we really wanted to see you do
well. That’s why I’m struggling. So help me understand why this
would be different than the other time.” The County Attorney
added that Larsen’s history came up only because it shed light on
the mistakes he made prosecuting Apadaca:
[E]chos from the past ring louder and louder and
louder the longer we sit in here in this meeting
today. . . . [T]he answers and the explanations today
are similar to what we were given in the past, you
know, “I didn’t know,” “I didn’t remember.” . . . You
know, it’s here we go again. This is what we heard
last time, too.
The County Attorney emphasized that the office’s termination
decision would not be “because of” or “driven by” Larsen’s prior
errors but that the Attorney’s Office may consider those errors
when determining whether Larsen’s most recent violations were
“intentional or not.”

Larsen v. Davis County
20110875-CA 7 2014 UT App 74
¶7 The informal hearing resulted in Larsen’s termination. The
County Attorney sent Larsen a four-and-a-half-page termination
letter. The letter devotes well over three pages to describing in
detail the misconduct for which Larsen was being terminated. The
letter also asserts that Larsen’s explanation that he had acted in
ignorance lacked credibility in light of his history of
misrepresentations to a judge and to the County Attorney himself.
In the course of this explanation, the letter refers to and then
discounts Larsen’s prior missteps:
I have put accounts from the relevant parties
involved in the Joseph Apadaca case specifically in
context with . . . my observations of your patterns of
behavior while employed here. . . . We tried, but we
cannot ignore the past in assessing the current
Apadaca situation (even though your misconduct
during this trial and preparation are self-evident and
alone require this termination action).
¶8 Larsen filed a grievance with the County, arguing that the
County Attorney’s pretermination letter had not given Larsen
notice of all the allegations discussed at the pretermination hearing
and cited in the termination letter. The County denied Larsen’s
grievance, and Larsen appealed to the Davis County Career Service
Council. The Council affirmed the County’s termination and
grievance decisions. Larsen next appealed to the district court,
which set aside the Council’s decision to deny Larsen’s grievance,
ruling that there was “no question that the County
took . . . additional allegations into account in determining to
terminate Larsen’s employment.” The County and the Council
(collectively, the County) now appeal the district court’s decision.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶9 The County contends that the district court erred by ruling
that the Attorney’s Office failed to give Larsen adequate

Larsen v. Davis County
20110875-CA 8 2014 UT App 74
predisciplinary notice of the allegations against him. When
reviewing the Council’s decision, the district court relied on the
same record we rely on here. See Utah Code Ann. § 17-33-4(d)(iii)
(LexisNexis 2009). We therefore “do not accord any particular
deference to the district court’s decision.” Patterson v. Utah County
Bd. of Adjustment, 893 P.2d 602, 603 (Utah Ct. App. 1995); Kline v.
Utah Dep’t of Health, 776 P.2d 57, 60 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (“We
accord no presumption of correctness to the [district court’s
judgment] since its review of the administrative record is not more
advantaged than our own.”). Rather, we presume the validity of
the Council’s decision and review that decision only to determine
“whether the decision is arbitrary or capricious.” Utah Code Ann.
§ 17-33-4(d)(iv). “However, to the extent that the [Council’s]
decision implicates due process, we review it for correctness.”
Taylorsville City v. Taylorsville City Emp. Appeal Bd., 2013 UT App 69,
¶ 16, 298 P.3d 1270.
ANALYSIS
¶10 The County contends that Larsen received adequate notice
of the allegations that led to his termination and thus received due
process. The County argues that rather than asking whether the
County Attorney’s Office considered violations not included in
Larsen’s pretermination notice, this court should ask whether the
allegations stated in Larsen’s pretermination notice were sufficient
to support his termination. Larsen responds that the County
terminated him based on “allegations that it had never put in any
notice” prior to the pretermination hearing. The County’s failure to
inform him of those allegations in advance, Larsen argues, denied
him “notice and an opportunity to respond”—the “essential
requirements of due process.” See Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v.
Loudermill, 470 U.S. 532, 546 (1985).
¶11 We conclude that the County accorded Larsen all the
process he was due in view of the circumstances of this case. “Due
process is not a technical conception with a fixed content unrelated

Larsen v. Davis County
20110875-CA 9 2014 UT App 74
to time, place, and circumstances; it is flexible and requires such
procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”
Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep’t, 616 P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980)
(citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 334–35 (1970)). “[T]he root
requirement” of the Due Process Clause is “that an individual be
given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any
significant property interest.” Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 542 (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). For a career employee like
Larsen, who enjoys a constitutionally protected property interest
in his employment, this principle requires “some form of
pretermination hearing,” that is, “some opportunity for the
employee to present his side of the case.” Id. at 542–43.
¶12 This “pretermination ‘hearing,’ though necessary, need not
be elaborate.” Id. at 545. Indeed, “the pretermination hearing need
not definitively resolve the propriety of the discharge”; rather, it
serves as “an initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially,
a determination of whether there are reasonable grounds to believe
that the charges against the employee are true and support the
proposed action.” Id. at 545–46. Thus, the “essential requirements”
are “notice and an opportunity to respond”—“[t]he opportunity to
present reasons, either in person or in writing, why proposed
action should not be taken.” Id. at 546. To secure this right, “[t]he
tenured public employee is entitled to oral or written notice of the
charges against him, an explanation of the employer’s evidence,
and an opportunity to present his side of the story.” Id. “To require
more than this prior to termination would intrude to an
unwarranted extent on the government’s interest in quickly
removing an unsatisfactory employee.” Id.
¶13 To successfully challenge a termination, an employee must
identify procedural errors and “establish how these procedural
errors were harmful”—that is, how compliance with these
procedures “would have resulted in a different outcome absent
such errors.” Lucas v. Murray City Civil Serv. Comm’n, 949 P.2d 746,
755 (Utah Ct. App. 1997) (citing Loudermill, 470 U.S. at 547).

Larsen v. Davis County
20110875-CA 10 2014 UT App 74
¶14 In Hugoe v. Woods Cross City, we addressed the level of
specificity Loudermill requires in the “notice of the charges” and
“explanation of the employer’s evidence.” 2013 UT App 278,
¶ 9, 316 P.3d 979. Woods Cross City provided its employee Hugoe
with notice that it was considering discipline “as a result of
incidents which, if substantiated, [were] in violation of City policy,
including threatening, intimidating or interfering with fellow
employees on the job, insubordination, misusing City property,
and using vulgar language.” Id. ¶ 8 (internal quotation marks
omitted). Hugoe claimed that this notice was too vague to inform
him of the fact that the City based its discipline on a particular
incident that occurred on July 17, 2012. Id. He also argued that, in
reviewing his termination, the Board improperly considered a prior
act of misconduct that the City had not cited in its termination
letter. Id. ¶ 10.
¶15 We rejected Hugoe’s challenges. We acknowledged that “the
notice [did] not specifically reference the July 17 incident or identify
the specific evidence that would be used against him.” Id. ¶ 9.
Nevertheless, we observed that Hugoe had “failed to adequately
explain how the deficiencies in the notice inhibited his ability to
respond to the allegations against him.” Id. And we rejected
Hugoe’s challenge to the board’s consideration of prior evidence in
light of the board’s statement that “[n]otwithstanding the evidence
of prior discipline,” Hugoe’s actions on July 17, 2012, “standing
alone, were so grievous as to justify termination of employment.”
Id. ¶ 10 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
¶16 As in Hugoe, Larsen’s pretermination hearing served as “an
initial check against mistaken decisions—essentially, a
determination of whether there [were] reasonable grounds to
believe that the charges against the employee are true and support
the proposed action.” Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. Loudermill, 470 U.S.
532, 545–46 (1985). And like Hugoe, Larsen received notice and an
opportunity “to present reasons, either in person or in writing, why
proposed action should not be taken.” Id. at 546.

Larsen v. Davis County
20110875-CA 11 2014 UT App 74
¶17 Accordingly, as in Hugoe, we must ask whether Larsen’s
misconduct before and during the Apadaca trial, “standing alone,”
was “so grievous as to justify” his termination. 2013 UT App 278,
¶ 10. The County’s appeal thus ultimately turns on a single
sentence in Larsen’s termination letter:
We tried, but we cannot ignore the past in assessing
the current Apadaca situation (even though your
misconduct during this trial and preparation are self-
evident and alone require this termination action).
(Emphasis added.) In affirming Larsen’s termination, the Council
impliedly accepted the County Attorney’s assertion that Larsen’s
conduct during the Apadaca trial “alone requires this termination
action.” The central issue before us is whether this finding “exceeds
the bounds of reasonableness and rationality.” See Harmon v. Ogden
City Civil Serv. Comm’n, 2007 UT App 336, ¶ 6, 171 P.3d 474
(citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
¶18 We see no principled basis to distinguish the present case
from Hugoe. There we stated, “[E]ven accepting Hugoe’s assertion
that the Board’s reliance on the November 2011 incident would
have violated his due process rights, such a violation did not occur
because the Board did not rely on the previous discipline in
reaching its decision.” Hugoe, 2013 UT App 278, ¶ 10. We based our
conclusion on the fact that the city employment appeal board
“explicitly stated that ‘[n]otwithstanding the evidence of prior
discipline, . . . the July 17, 2012 statements and actions of Mr.
Hugoe, standing alone, were so grievous as to justify termination
of employment.’” See id. (alteration in original). Likewise here, even
accepting Larsen’s assertion that the County Attorney’s reliance on
his prior job history would have violated his due process rights, the
County Attorney asserted, and the Council accepted, that Larsen’s
acts of misconduct in connection with the Apadaca trial, “standing
alone, were so grievous as to justify termination of employment.”
Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).

Larsen v. Davis County
20110875-CA 12 2014 UT App 74
¶19 And what actions of Hugoe did we conclude, “standing
alone, were so grievous as to justify termination” of his city
employment? “[U]sing ‘vulgar and profane language in a
threatening and insubordinate manner towards’ the operations
manager.” Hugoe v. Woods Cross City, 2013 UT App 278, ¶ 3, 316
P.3d 979. Hugoe’s insubordinate language doubtless justified his
termination. But cursing out your boss pales in comparison to
knowingly using tainted eyewitness testimony in an attempt to
convict someone of a crime likely to result in a sentence of five
years to life. See Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-302(2) (LexisNexis Supp.
2003) (making aggravated robbery a first degree felony); id. § 76-3-
203 (setting sentences for first degree felonies at five years to life).
¶20 We thus conclude that the Council did not exceed the
bounds of reasonableness and rationality in determining that
Larsen’s misconduct in the Apadaca trial alone required his
termination. Indeed, we agree that Larsen’s Apadaca trial
misconduct as described in the pretermination and termination
letters, without more, supports termination.
¶21 In addition, like Hugoe, Larsen has “failed to adequately
explain how the deficiencies in the notice inhibited his ability to
respond to the allegations against him.” Hugoe, 2013 UT App 278,
¶ 9. And where, as here, the noticed conduct alone warrants
termination, how Larsen could have been harmed by a few
references to unrelated misconduct would require considerable
explanation, which Larsen has not offered.
¶22 Moreover, unlike in Hugoe, Larsen opened the door to the
County Attorney’s consideration of his prior misconduct. That
misconduct became relevant only when Larsen, in the
pretermination hearing itself, claimed, in the County Attorney’s
phrase, that he didn’t “know a damn thing.” Had Larsen’s
explanation been credible in context—if, say, he had been a rookie
prosecutor—it might have altered the hearing’s outcome. Instead,
it backfired, for two reasons: first, Larsen had previously sold
himself as an experienced “go-to guy,” and second, Larsen

Larsen v. Davis County
20110875-CA 13 2014 UT App 74
apparently had a history of dishonesty. The County officials could
have said nothing to Larsen about these concerns, given him no
opportunity to address them, and saved themselves a lawsuit.
Instead, they took what we believe was the better course—they
candidly disclosed their reasons for skepticism and afforded Larsen
an opportunity to rebut them.
¶23 The district court expressed concern with the Council’s
findings, and we agree that those findings are, as the County
Attorney acknowledged, “a little scant.” But they are sufficient.
Agency findings must be “‘adequately detailed so as to permit
meaningful appellate review.’” Id. ¶ 12 (quoting Adams v. Board of
Review of the Indus. Comm’n, 821 P.2d 1, 4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)). “In
order for us to meaningfully review the findings [an administrative
board], the findings must be ‘sufficiently detailed and include
enough subsidiary facts to disclose the steps by which the ultimate
conclusion on each factual issue was reached.’” Nyrehn v. Industrial
Comm’n, 800 P.2d 330, 335 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Acton v.
Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah 1987)). Finally, “the failure of an
agency to make adequate findings of fact on material issues renders
its findings ‘arbitrary and capricious’ unless the evidence is ‘clear,
uncontroverted and capable of only one conclusion.’” Id. (quoting
Kinkella v. Baugh, 660 P.2d 233, 236 (Utah 1983)).
¶24 Here, in two sets of findings, the Council found that Larsen
conceded showing witnesses photographs of Apadaca before trial
but that he “could not recall” showing them a recent color photo;
that a police officer confirmed that he was with Larsen during the
conversations with some of the witnesses and that Larsen told him
to show one witness the recent color photo notwithstanding the
officer’s expressed trepidation; that Larsen did not deny that he
failed to disclose to the court and defense counsel the fact that he
had shown the photos to the witnesses; that public defenders
involved with the trial testified without contradiction that well-
established rules of criminal procedure prohibit what Larsen did;
that the trial defense attorney was “stunned” when he learned that
the witness had seen the photos; and that Larsen’s conduct resulted

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20110875-CA 14 2014 UT App 74
in a mistrial and a loss of trust between him and the County
Attorney. The Council concluded that this “indisputable evidence”
demonstrated that Larsen’s conduct violated both the law and rules
of professional conduct governing attorneys and that Larsen had
received proper notice and an opportunity to be heard on the
issues that led to his termination.
¶25 The Council made no reference to unrelated misconduct by
Larsen except to refer to the County Attorney’s statement that
Larsen’s conduct relative to the Apadaca trial “alone requires this
termination action.” This reference, together with the absence of
any mention of unrelated misconduct and the conclusion that
Larsen received proper notice, clearly signals that the Council
accepted the County Attorney’s assessment of the seriousness of
Larsen’s core misconduct. These findings leave no doubt about “the
steps by which the ultimate conclusion on each factual issue was
reached.” Adams, 821 P.2d at 4 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted).
¶26 As stated above, “[d]ue process is not a technical conception
with a fixed content unrelated to time, place, and circumstances; it
is flexible and requires such procedural protections as the
particular situation demands.” Worrall v. Ogden City Fire Dep’t, 616
P.2d 598, 602 (Utah 1980) (citing Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319,
334–35 (1970)). Here, Larsen was terminated for knowingly using
tainted testimony in an attempt to obtain a robbery conviction and
then not fully disclosing the facts once his gambit came to light.
This misconduct warrants termination of a prosecutor.
¶27 True enough, Larsen’s explanations in the pretermination
hearing prompted County officials to briefly explore unrelated
(and unnoticed) misconduct, and the County Attorney even
referenced that misconduct in the termination letter. But Larsen’s
misconduct relative to the Apadaca trial was the clear focus of
Larsen’s pretermination hearing, his termination letter, and his
hearing before the Davis County Career Service Council. The
Council held an appropriate hearing and concluded, in brief but

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20110875-CA 15 2014 UT App 74
unmistakable findings, that the charged misconduct alone
warranted termination. In light of the foregoing, Larsen received
all the process he was due.
CONCLUSION
¶28 We reverse the judgment of the district court and reinstate
the orders of the Council.