Price v. Labor Commission

2021 UT App 138
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
ZOLA MAE PRICE,
Petitioner,
v.
LABOR COMMISSION, DOUGLAS KNELL ENTERPRISES INC.,
AND WCF INSURANCE,
Respondents.
Opinion
No. 20210026-CA
Filed December 16, 2021
Original Proceeding in this Court
Virginius Dabney and Stony Olsen,
Attorneys for Petitioner
Eugene C. Miller Jr., Attorney for Respondents
Douglas Knell Enterprises Inc. and WCF Insurance
JUDGE RYAN M. HARRIS authored this Opinion, in which
JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and DAVID N. MORTENSEN concurred.
HARRIS, Judge:
¶1 In this case, we are asked to determine whether an injured
worker who settled her contested claim for permanent total
disability benefits can later seek additional compensation that
was not contemplated in the settlement agreement. The Labor
Commission rejected Zola Mae Price’s efforts to do so,
determining that she should be held to the benefits of her
bargain. We decline to disturb the Commission’s determination.

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BACKGROUND1
¶2 In 1995, Price worked for Douglas Knell Enterprises Inc.
(DKE), a company that owned a motel. One day, while carrying
heavy motel linens to launder, Price’s “spine gave out.” The
resultant injuries necessitated surgery, and DKE paid temporary
total disability benefits. Later, however, Price filed a claim for
permanent total disability (PTD) benefits. While DKE did not
contest Price’s claim that she had been injured on the job, and
did not contest its obligation to pay temporary total disability
benefits, it did contest Price’s claim that she was permanently
and totally disabled, and denied any obligation to pay PTD
benefits.
¶3 Rather than proceed to an evidentiary hearing on the
merits of Price’s PTD claim, the parties entered into a stipulated
settlement agreement resolving that claim. The agreement was
titled “Agreement for Permanent Total Disability and Order of
Approval Based upon Claim of Disputed Validity,” and it
purported to represent a “full and final settlement of any and all
claims for workers’ compensation benefits which [Price] has
against [DKE] arising out of [Price’s] industrial accident.”
¶4 In the agreement, the parties acknowledged that Price had
“sustained personal injuries as a result of an industrial accident
arising out of and in the course of her employment,” but the
agreement specifically recited that “the parties disagree as to
whether or not [Price] is permanently and totally disabled.” The
1. When reviewing the propriety of an administrative order
granting a motion to dismiss, “we accept the facts as alleged in
the complaint as true, and consider those facts and all reasonable
inferences therefrom, in a light most favorable to” the petitioner.
See Hobbs v. Labor Comm’n, 1999 UT App 308, ¶ 6, 991 P.2d 590
(quotation simplified).

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agreement also recited that Price had undergone a vocational
assessment in which the evaluator had noted Price’s “lack of
interest in a number of jobs” and that “motivation and attitude
are both important factors to success” in employment. Indeed,
Price “expressly acknowledge[d]” in the agreement that DKE
was “not admitting any liability whatsoever,” and the agreement
further recited that DKE was agreeing to make certain payments
only “to avoid further litigation between the parties.”
¶5 Finally, in the concluding paragraph, the agreement
recited that Price had “carefully read and [understood]” the
agreement and that she had “been advised by her own legal
counsel” in the matter. Price acknowledged that, by entering into
the agreement, she was “giving up the right to a hearing” in
which “an administrative law judge could give her more money,
the same amount, or less money than” she was to receive
pursuant to the agreement. And Price also acknowledged that
she could “never contest” or “re-open the terms” of the
settlement, and that it was “a final and binding agreement.”
Simply put, “except for . . . amounts to be paid pursuant” to the
settlement, the agreement provided that DKE would “have no
additional liability to [Price] as a result of the accident.” Price
and her attorney both executed the agreement in December 1997.
¶6 Under the settlement, Price was to receive weekly
monetary payments “for so long as [she should] live.” After
acknowledging that—if the matter proceeded to a hearing and
she were found to be permanently and totally disabled—Price
“could be” entitled to $167 per week in benefits, the parties
outlined the agreed-upon terms. Beginning in November 1997,
Price was to receive $95 per week for 312 weeks, then $80 per
week thereafter, subject to one condition: once Price began
receiving Social Security retirement benefits, the amount of her
weekly settlement payments would be “off-set in the amount of
50% of her Social Security retirement benefits.”

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¶7 After entering into the settlement agreement, the parties
asked a Labor Commission administrative law judge to approve
it, as they were required to do under then-applicable Labor
Commission regulations. See Utah Admin. Code R568-1-16
(1995) (“Settlement agreements involving claims of doubtful
compensability shall be subject to approval by the
Commission.”). The judge approved the settlement in a two-
page order in January 1998. The record before us does not reveal
whether the judge held a hearing to consider the matter, and
does not reveal what materials the judge considered before
signing the order. At the outset of his order, the judge
“recogniz[ed] the disputed nature of [Price’s] claim,” and
“ordered and acknowledged that this is a settlement of a
disputed claim.” The judge approved all the specific terms
agreed upon by the parties, including the weekly payment
amount and the condition reducing Price’s weekly payments
upon receiving Social Security retirement benefits.
¶8 The parties operated under the terms of the settlement
agreement, without apparent complaint or complication, for the
next twenty-two years: Price received settlement payments of
$95 per week for the first 312 weeks, then $80 per week until
2012, when Price became eligible to receive Social Security
retirement benefits; after that point, the payments were reduced
to $8 per week due to the agreed-upon offset.
¶9 In July 2020, however, Price filed a new claim with the
Commission requesting increased payments related to the 1995
accident. Price argued that her payments under the settlement
agreement were too low and should be adjusted accordingly.
Among other things, she asserted that the payments failed to
account for the statutory minimum weekly compensation rates
afforded for permanent total disability awards, and thus claimed
that her monthly payments should be “adjusted in accordance
with the” statutory guidelines. In addition, she asserted that the
Social Security offset was improper, in light of the Utah Supreme

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Court’s 2009 decisions declaring such offsets unconstitutional.
See Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm’n (Merrill I), 2009 UT 26, 223 P.3d
1089; Merrill v. Utah Labor Comm’n (Merrill II), 2009 UT 74, 223
P.3d 1099. Price claimed she was entitled to recoup the portion
reduced from past payments due to the offset, and receive
increased future payments by eliminating the offset.
¶10 DKE filed a motion to dismiss Price’s claim for increased
payments, asserting that Price agreed to settle her disputed PTD
claim for a specific amount and that she should be held to the
benefit of her bargain. An administrative law judge (the ALJ)
agreed with DKE and dismissed the claim with prejudice. Price
then asked the Commission to review the ALJ’s decision,
asserting that re-opening the terms of the settlement agreement
was proper because there had not been any bona fide dispute
about whether she was permanently and totally disabled. The
Commission rejected this argument and affirmed the ALJ’s
determination. Relying on a statutory subsection enacted in
2014, the Commission concluded that the parties’ settlement
agreement “extinguish[ed] . . . Price’s present claim for
additional benefits.” See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-420(5)
(LexisNexis 2019) (“A full and final settlement approved under
[the Workers’ Compensation Act] shall extinguish the
employer’s liability to the employee . . . except for an issue that is
expressly preserved.”). The Commission concluded that
“disregard[ing] the terms of the agreement and revisit[ing]
Price’s entitlement would be contrary to the parties’ intentions at
the time of the settlement and the purposes behind allowing
settlement agreements in the workers’ compensation context.”
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶11 Price now seeks judicial review of the Commission’s
dismissal of her 2020 claim. An agency’s decision to grant a
motion to dismiss presents a question of law, which we review
for correctness, affording no deference to the agency. Hobbs v.

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Labor Comm’n, 1999 UT App 308, ¶ 6, 991 P.2d 590; see also Baker
v. Labor Comm’n, 2015 UT App 127, ¶ 6, 351 P.3d 111.
ANALYSIS
¶12 We begin our analysis with an overview of the legal
principles governing settlement of claims in the workers’
compensation context, including a discussion of how those
principles operated in 1997 and 1998 when the settlement
agreement at issue here was entered into and approved. We then
turn to the three specific arguments Price raises in support of her
challenge to the Commission’s ruling.
I
¶13 Utah’s Workers’ Compensation Act (the Act) provides
“the exclusive remedy” for employees to gain redress from their
employers for “any accident, injury, or death” sustained or
incurred during employment. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-
105(1) (LexisNexis 2019); see also Stamper v. Johnson, 2010 UT 26,
¶ 12, 232 P.3d 514. Our workers’ compensation system “is a
mutual arrangement of reciprocal rights between an employer
and an employee whereby both parties give up and gain certain
advantages.” Bingham v. Lagoon Corp., 707 P.2d 678, 679 (Utah
1985). “The Act’s remedial scheme [is] a ‘quid pro quo’ in which
employees are able to recover for job-related injuries without
showing fault and employers are protected from tort suits by
virtue of the Act’s exclusive remedy provision.” Helf v. Chevron
U.S.A., Inc., 2009 UT 11, ¶ 16, 203 P.3d 962 (quotation simplified).
The “primary objective” of workers’ compensation statutes is to
remove industrial accidents “from the concept of the law of
tort,” Bryan v. Utah Int’l, 533 P.2d 892, 893 (Utah 1975), and
thereby provide employees “a measure of economic security for
themselves and their families . . . without the risks and
uncertainties involved in attempting to prove that it was
negligence on the part of the employer . . . which caused the

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injury or disability,” Buhler v. Gossner, 530 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah
1975). “In place of common law remedies, the Act creates an
administrative scheme that seeks to provide a simple, adequate,
and speedy remedy for workers injured on the job, while also
protecting employers from disruptive or vexatious lawsuits for
alleged negligence.” Helf, 2009 UT 11, ¶ 16 (quotation
simplified).
¶14 The Act mandates that individuals injured in workplace
accidents “shall be paid . . . compensation for loss sustained.” See
Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-401(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2019). In order to
facilitate such payments, an employer is required “to secure the
payment of workers’ compensation benefits for its employees,”
usually through insurance. See id. § 34A-2-201. Employers who
fail to secure payment for injured workers are subject to criminal
penalties, see id. § 34A-2-209(1), and in that event “the employee
has the option of seeking damages from the employer in a civil
action brought in the courts,” see Thomas A. Paulsen Co. v.
Industrial Comm’n, 770 P.2d 125, 127 (Utah 1989); see also Utah
Code Ann. § 34A-2-207(1)(a) (LexisNexis 2019). Our supreme
court has emphasized that Utah’s workers’ compensation
statutes should be construed “liberally in favor of finding
employee coverage.” See Olsen v. Samuel McIntyre Inv. Co., 956
P.2d 257, 260 (Utah 1998).
¶15 Outside the workers’ compensation context, litigants may
generally settle individual personal injury claims on any
mutually acceptable terms and conditions. But in the workers’
compensation context, Utah law has historically placed some
restrictions on parties’ ability to settle claims. Our supreme court
has long held that, at least in cases where the worker’s “right to
recover is quite doubtful,” settlement of workers’ compensation
claims “is not detrimental to the interest of the state or of the
public,” and that in such cases parties have the right to “settle
their own controversy and avoid litigation.” See Brigham Young
Univ. v. Industrial Comm’n, 279 P. 889, 893 (Utah 1929); see also

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Barber Asphalt Corp. v. Industrial Comm’n, 135 P.2d 266, 271 (Utah
1943) (stating that, “[w]here the facts to establish liability are in
dispute and there is reasonable doubt about the existence of any
liability,” settlement of workers’ compensation claims is
appropriate). But where the employer admits that “the injury
arose out of or in the course of the employment” and that the
employee is entitled to recover something on the claim, then “a
release or settlement agreement as for a partial disability does
not constitute a bar to a claim for compensation which . . . would
be payable on account of a subsequent change of condition or a
new development not contemplated at the time of the release or
settlement agreement.” See Barber Asphalt, 135 P.2d at 272; see also
Alvin G. Rhodes Pump Sales v. Industrial Comm’n, 681 P.2d 1244,
1246 (Utah 1984) (allowing the amount of benefits to be later
revisited, even though the worker’s impairment rating had been
arrived at by settlement, where there was no dispute that the
worker had sustained a “permanent back impairment” and
where the worker alleged that his medical condition had
worsened since the settlement).
¶16 More recently, we analyzed this case law and applicable
provisions of the Act and concluded that settlements in workers’
compensation cases “are appropriate only when the
compensable nature of the worker’s injury is disputed and the
worker’s right to recover is doubtful.” See Wilburn v. Interstate
Elec., 748 P.2d 582, 586 (Utah Ct. App. 1988). We stated that a
worker’s right to recover must be considered disputed if the
parties, at the time of the settlement, “in good faith, viewed [the]
claim as one of doubtful compensability.” Id. at 587 (quotation
simplified). And we stated that we will defer to an
administrative law judge’s determination that a claim is of
doubtful compensability. Id. We noted that allowing workers to
settle disputed workers’ compensation claims could have “harsh
consequences” in the event that a worker’s condition later
worsens, but stated that “compassion for [workers] does not
justify the erosion of a principle and policy pertaining to

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compensation agreements generally.” Id. And at the end of our
opinion, we acknowledged the parties’ representation that the
Commission had a policy of “encourag[ing] the settlement of
claims,” as well as a “practice . . . to approve settlement
agreements before their execution,” and urged the Commission
to “implement a process” to “formalize its long-standing practice
of getting involved in the settlement of claims” in order “to
safeguard against abuses that might otherwise occur.” Id.
¶17 Following our suggestion in Wilburn, the Commission
enacted an administrative rule intended to govern the settlement
of claims in the workers’ compensation context. Those rules—as
they existed in 1995, at the time of Price’s industrial accident2—
stated that “[s]ettlement agreements are appropriate . . . when
the parties, in good faith, view the claim as one of doubtful
compensability.” See Utah Admin. Code R568-1-16 (1995). Any
such settlement was “subject to approval by the Commission,”
which was tasked with “determining if [the] claim is of doubtful
compensability.” Id. In doing so, the Commission was to “look to
the facts of the matter” and was not to consider itself “bound by
2. When adjudicating workers’ compensation claims, “we apply
the law as it exist[ed] at the time of the event regulated by the
law in question.” O’Connor v. Labor Comm’n, 2020 UT App 49,
¶ 11, 463 P.3d 85 (quotation simplified). Thus, because the
industrial accident in this case occurred in 1995, we apply the
law as it existed in 1995; we note that the Commission
improperly relied on Utah Code section 34A-2-420(5)—enacted
in 2014—to dismiss Price’s present claim for benefits. See
Workers’ Compensation Amendments, ch. 82, § 1, 2014 Utah
Laws 383, 383–84 (providing that “a full and final settlement” of
a workers’ compensation claim “shall extinguish the employer’s
liability to the employee”). However, as we explain herein,
Price’s arguments fail even under the law as it existed at the time
of the accident.

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mere recitations in the settlement agreement.” Id. Any settlement
agreement approved by the Commission was to “be final and
not subject to further review upon the same facts merely because
of subsequent dissatisfaction.” Id.
¶18 The settlement agreement that the parties reached in this
case appears to have been drafted with this administrative rule
in mind. The agreement’s very title proclaims that it is “based
upon [a] claim of disputed validity,” and it recites that “[t]he
parties disagree as to whether or not [Price] is permanently and
totally disabled” and were settling only “to avoid further
litigation.” Indeed, Price “expressly acknowledge[d]” that DKE
was “not admitting any liability whatsoever.” And the
agreement even contained a reference to some of the evidence
that DKE would have introduced, at a hearing, to rebut Price’s
claims of permanent total disability: it mentioned “an
assessment evaluation” of Price that questioned her “motivation
and attitude” and indicated that she had a “lack of interest in a
number of jobs.”
¶19 The agreement also delineated the compromises made by
both parties in settling, thereby indicating that the parties
genuinely disputed liability. DKE recognized that it “could be
responsible” to Price for $167 per week for the remainder of her
life but instead was paying only $95 per week, with reductions
over time. Price recognized that, if the matter went to a hearing,
a judge “could give her more money, the same amount, or less
money than she is receiving for the settlement.” Moreover, she
acknowledged that, by entering into the agreement, she was
giving up the right to contest the amount of compensation she
would receive in the future, and that the sums to be paid
pursuant to the agreement would resolve “any and all claims,
past, present or future for temporary total disability, temporary
partial disability, permanent partial disability, permanent total
disability or death benefits in connection with” the workplace

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accident. And she confirmed that she understood she could
never “re-open the terms of [the] settlement.”
¶20 In addition, the parties saw to it that the agreement was
approved by an administrative law judge. They filed the
agreement with the Commission, and therein “requested” that
the Commission “review and approve” it. Soon thereafter, an
administrative law judge did in fact review and approve the
agreement, memorializing that approval in a two-page order. In
the order, the judge “ordered and acknowledged that this is a
settlement of a disputed claim,” and “recogniz[ed] the disputed
nature of [Price’s] claim.” At the time, and for more than two
decades thereafter, Price raised no challenge to that approval.
II
¶21 Now, some twenty-two years after administrative
approval of the settlement, Price seeks additional compensation
not contemplated in the agreement, and advances three grounds
for her position. First, she contends that the agreement should
not have been approved, and should not be binding now,
because there was never a “bona fide dispute” about whether
she was entitled to PTD benefits. Second, Price asserts that the
agreement did not constitute a valid waiver of her right to
receive at least the statutory minimum amount of PTD benefits.
And finally, Price asserts that—in light of our supreme court’s
determination in 2009 that any offset for Social Security
retirement benefits was unconstitutional—she is entitled to $80
per week rather than $8 per week. We discuss each of these
arguments in turn.
A
¶22 Price’s first argument is that the agreement should never
have been approved in the first place, because there was not a
bona fide dispute about her entitlement to PTD benefits. In
support of this argument, Price asserts that, prior to the

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settlement agreement, the Social Security Administration had
already found her to be disabled, and contends that the
Commission could have relied upon that finding to determine
that she was permanently and totally disabled. Without making
any determination regarding the merits of this argument,3 we
reject it here on procedural grounds: Price’s challenge to the
administrative law judge’s 1998 determination comes far too
late.
¶23 Generally, a decision made by an administrative law
judge becomes final thirty days after its issuance, unless that
decision is appealed to the Commission within that time frame.
3. The argument may well have substantive infirmities too. The
administrative rules then in effect stated that the Commission
“may use” a disability finding by the Social Security
Administration in making its own determination as to disability.
See Utah Admin. Code R568-1-17(B) (1995). That is, the
Commission was not required to defer to a disability
determination made by the Social Security Administration,
although it could elect to rely upon one. In this case, there is no
indication—at least not in the record before us—that the judge
who approved the settlement agreement was ever made aware
of the Social Security Administration’s disability finding. And in
any event, in entering its order approving the settlement
agreement, the judge relied on the parties’ own
representations—made notwithstanding the Social Security
Administration’s determination—that Price’s entitlement to PTD
benefits was very much in dispute. That determination is one to
which we would have deferred, had the matter been challenged
at the time. See Wilburn v. Interstate Elec., 748 P.2d 582, 586–87
(Utah Ct. App. 1988) (deferring to an administrative law judge’s
determination that a claim was “of doubtful compensability,”
largely because the parties “in good faith” viewed it that way).

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See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(3), (4) (LexisNexis 2019)4. As
noted, Price did not appeal from the administrative law judge’s
1998 order approving the settlement agreement, so that order is
final.
¶24 However, the Commission retains continuing jurisdiction
over workers’ compensation cases, and may “from time to time
modify or change a former finding or order,” even after the
thirty-day appeal window has passed. See id. § 34A-2-420(1)(b);
see also Waite v. Labor Comm’n, 2017 UT 86, ¶¶ 9–10, 416 P.3d 635
(explaining that the statutory grant of continuing jurisdiction
authorizes the Commission to reexamine a claim, for twelve
years, if “the employee’s physical condition worsened”
(quotation simplified)); Frito-Lay v. Utah Labor Comm’n, 2009 UT
71, ¶ 24, 222 P.3d 55 (clarifying that the statutory grant of
continuing jurisdiction extends beyond the thirty-day appeal
window). This “grant of continuing jurisdiction” is broader than,
but “encompasses, the authority that district courts have under
rule 60” of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, and provides the
Commission with the “ability to protect the substantive rights of
its parties” and “to prevent inadequate or excessive awards.”
Frito-Lay, 2009 UT 71, ¶¶ 25, 26, 28 (quotation simplified).
Should a party request late review due to “clerical or other
error[s]” in an administrative decision, see id. ¶ 24, or file a new
application for benefits “where a claimant’s medical condition
deviates from its anticipated course,” the Commission may
provide relief under this authority, see Waite, 2017 UT 86, ¶ 9
4. In 1998, when the settlement was approved, the same thirty-
day appeal period applied. See Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-801(2),
(3)(a) (1997) (stating that a party “may appeal the decision of an
administrative law judge by filing a motion for review within 30
days of the date the decision is issued,” and that, unless an
appeal is filed, “the decision of an administrative law judge” is
“final”). We cite the current statute only for convenience.

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(quotation simplified) (recognizing “two appropriate bases” for
invoking the Commission’s continuing jurisdiction: “(1) a change
in condition or new development or (2) the inadequacy of a
previous award” (quotation simplified)); see also Thomas A.
Paulsen Co. v. Industrial Comm’n, 770 P.2d 125, 129–30 (Utah
1989).
¶25 But this authority is not as broad as Price imagines. Our
supreme court has recognized “a justified need for finality in
administrative decisions.” Merrill II, 2009 UT 74, ¶ 17, 223 P.3d
1099 (quotation simplified). While the Commission has
continuing jurisdiction, “it lacks the authority to reopen workers’
compensation proceedings to consider legal arguments not
previously made.” Id.; see also Spencer v. Industrial Comm’n, 290
P.2d 692, 694–95 (Utah 1955) (explaining that the Commission’s
continuing jurisdiction gives it the “authority to entertain further
proceedings to deal with any substantial changes or unexpected
developments that may arise as a result of the injury,” but that it
is “inconceivable . . . that a party could file a new application
and have the Commission redetermine his cause on identical
facts” and “[i]f such were the case, the proceedings themselves
would be but a sham”). Challenges to previous factual
determinations related to a claimant’s changed medical
condition fit squarely within the Commission’s statutory grant of
continuing jurisdiction, and may be asserted by bringing a new
application for benefits. See Waite, 2017 UT 86, ¶ 9. But
challenges to the propriety of final legal determinations made by
the Commission (or by an administrative law judge) must be
brought through “direct review and not by bringing another
action upon the same cause,” see Merrill II, 2009 UT 74, ¶ 17
(quotation simplified), or otherwise must be justified for reasons
similar to those set forth in rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, see Frito-Lay, 2009 UT 71, ¶ 37 (stating that, although
“rule 60 is inapplicable to” Commission cases, “the Commission

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has authority under the grant of continuing jurisdiction . . . to
address claims that state courts would address under rule 60”).5
Simple invocation of “continuing jurisdiction” is not sufficient to
justify any late challenge to all rulings rendered by the
Commission.
¶26 In 1998, an administrative law judge determined that
these parties had a genuine dispute as to whether Price was
entitled to PTD benefits as a result of the 1995 industrial
accident. The judge expressly “[r]ecogniz[ed] the disputed
nature” of Price’s claim, and twice more referred to her claim as
“disputed.” Both parties asked the judge to make this
determination, and neither party appealed that determination to
the Commission; thus, that determination became final in 1998.
And the question of whether Price’s claim to PTD benefits was—
at the time—the subject of a bona fide dispute between the
parties is not the sort of thing (unlike a claimant’s potentially
changing medical condition) that is subject to alteration by
future events. Whatever evidence existed regarding the
genuineness of the dispute should have been brought to the
attention of the judge at the time, and any challenge to the
judge’s decision should have been brought within the thirty-day
period. Any exceptional situations (involving the post-order
discovery of additional unknown evidence, for instance) should
be handled through invocation of principles similar to those
animating rule 60.
¶27 Moreover, the administrative record before us now does
not contain any materials from that time period, other than the
settlement agreement as submitted to the judge and the judge’s
5. Price does not invoke rule 60 of the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure, and does not argue that any of the substantive
grounds that might motivate a district court to grant relief under
that rule would apply here.

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order. We do not know, for instance, what universe of materials
the judge considered in making this determination, or whether
the judge held a hearing on the matter. Due to the passage of
time and the scant record before us, we are ill-equipped, twenty-
three years later, to assess whether that determination was
sound.
¶28 Price had the right to challenge the judge’s 1998
determination within thirty days, but she didn’t. And the
statutory grant of continuing jurisdiction, while broad, is not
broad enough to allow Price to challenge that determination
now. We therefore accept as settled the judge’s determination
that, at the time of the settlement agreement, there was in fact a
genuine dispute regarding Price’s entitlement to PTD benefits.
B
¶29 Next, Price argues that the settlement does not reflect a
waiver, on her part, of her right to recover at least the statutory
minimum amount of PTD benefits. This argument is
unpersuasive; indeed, the plain language of the agreement
expresses an intent to waive any right to receive the statutory
minimum payment.
¶30 Under the Act, a worker who is determined to be
permanently and totally disabled is entitled to receive a
minimum weekly amount of benefits. See Utah Code Ann.
§ 34A-2-413(2) (LexisNexis 2019). For the first 312 weeks, the
amount is (subject to certain exceptions) two-thirds “of the
employee’s average weekly wage at the time of the injury.” Id.
Thereafter, the amount is “36% of the current state average
weekly wage, rounded to the nearest dollar,” id. § 34A-2-
413(2)(c), a figure that is recalculated each year, see O’Connor v.
Labor Comm’n, 2020 UT App 49, ¶ 4, 463 P.3d 85. This statutory
minimum entitlement, available to those who are adjudicated as
permanently and totally disabled, furthers the policies behind
the Act, which are to “provide[] economic support for injured

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workers and their families . . . thereby relieving society of the
care and support of the unfortunate victims of industrial
accidents.” See Touchard v. La-Z-Boy Inc., 2006 UT 71, ¶ 14, 148
P.3d 945 (quotation simplified).
¶31 The first problem with Price’s argument is that she was
never determined to be permanently and totally disabled;
indeed, her status as such was the subject of a bona fide dispute
between the parties at the time of the settlement. The statutory
minimum entitlement, as noted, is available only to workers
who have been so adjudicated. Until such an adjudication
occurs, a worker has no right to receive the statutory minimum
amount; because Price had not been so adjudicated, she
possessed no statutory right that was subject to waiver.
¶32 Second, and more to the point, Price did waive any right
she might have acquired, at some point in the future, to receive
the statutory minimum amount of PTD benefits. We
acknowledge Price’s assertion that, under Utah law, waiver of a
statutory right “must be clear and unmistakable,” and that
courts “will not infer from a general contractual provision that
the parties intended to waive a statutorily protected right unless
the undertaking is explicitly stated.” See Pioneer Builders Co. of
Nevada v. K D A Corp., 2018 UT App 206, ¶ 15, 437 P.3d 539
(quotation simplified). But here, Price’s waiver of any right to
receive the statutory minimum amount was clearly and
unmistakably made.
¶33 In the settlement agreement, the parties recited that, in the
event that Price was determined to be permanently and totally
disabled, DKE “could be responsible for compensation benefits
to [Price] for the remainder of [her] life at a rate of $167.00 per
week.” The agreement itself does not contain any information
about where this $167 figure came from, but Price asserts in her
briefing that the minimum PTD award at the time of the
settlement was “no less than $167 a week” after the “first 312

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20210026-CA 18 2021 UT App 138
weeks.” Thus, according to Price, this amount was a reference to
a statutory minimum amount DKE might have been obligated to
pay if Price had been adjudicated permanently and totally
disabled.
¶34 Despite her knowledge that she might be entitled to $167
per week if her claim turned out to be successful, Price clearly
waived any right she might have later acquired to receive that
amount. Immediately after the reference to the possible $167
weekly amount, the agreement states that, “rather than litigate
the issue of permanent total disability, the parties have agreed to
settle this case on a disputed basis.” The agreement later recited
that “[t]he above sums”—$95 per week for 312 weeks, then $80
per week, until the Social Security offset—“are being paid and
accepted in order to avoid further litigation” and are “in
settlement of any and all claims for . . . permanent total
disability” benefits. Finally, Price acknowledged that, by
entering into the agreement, she was “giving up the right to a
hearing before the Labor Commission wherein an administrative
law judge could give her more money, the same amount, or less
money than she is receiving for the settlement.” DKE knew that
it could be liable for at least $167 per week if it lost at a hearing;
Price knew that she could end up with nothing if she lost at a
hearing. By agreeing on a sum in the middle, “both parties
undertook a risk that the resolution of the uncertainty might be
unfavorable.” See Blackhurst v. Transamerica Ins. Co., 699 P.2d 688,
692 (Utah 1985).
¶35 Our supreme court has recognized that “parties to a
settlement each bear . . . risk[s] that could cut either way.” Merrill
II, 2009 UT 74, ¶ 18, 223 P.3d 1099. Parties to a settlement “are
entitled to contract on their own terms,” and courts will not step
in “to relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain.” Hal
Taylor Assocs. v. Unionamerica, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982).
In view of her litigation risks, Price agreed to accept a monthly
settlement payment that was significantly lower than the

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20210026-CA 19 2021 UT App 138
minimum statutory amount that she would have been entitled to
receive had she prevailed at a hearing. Price’s waiver of her
potential right to receive the statutory minimum amount was
“clear and unmistakable,” see Pioneer Builders, 2018 UT App 206,
¶ 15 (quotation simplified), and we are bound to enforce the
agreed-upon terms, see Monaco Apartment Homes v. Figueroa, 2021
UT App 50, ¶¶ 9–10, 489 P.3d 1132 (explaining that courts are
not “empowered to rewrite the settlement agreed upon by the
parties” (quotation simplified)).
C
¶36 Finally, Price challenges a provision in the agreement that
operates to lower her weekly benefits by half of the amount of
Social Security retirement benefits she receives. In the settlement
agreement, Price quite clearly agreed to an offset equal to “50%
of her Social Security retirement benefits.” This agreement
reflected the requirements of a then-applicable statutory
provision, contained in the Act, which mandated that the
minimum weekly amount to which permanently and totally
disabled workers were otherwise entitled “‘shall be reduced, to
the extent allowable by law, by the dollar amount of 50% of the
Social Security retirement benefits received by the employee
during the same period.’” See Merrill I, 2009 UT 26, ¶ 2, 223 P.3d
1089 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 34A-2-413(5) (2005)). But at the
time, Price did not challenge the constitutionality of this
statutory provision; instead, she agreed to a settlement that
incorporated its limitations. Now, Price points out that—eleven
years after she entered into the agreement—our supreme court
declared that statutory provision unconstitutional, and she
claims that she is entitled to receive the full agreed-upon $80 per
week, both prospectively and dating back to 2012.
¶37 In two related opinions, our supreme court addressed the
constitutionality of the Social Security offset provision in the Act.
See generally id.; Merrill II, 2009 UT 74. In Merrill I, the court held

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20210026-CA 20 2021 UT App 138
that this provision violated constitutional equal protection
principles because it “singl[ed] out and reduc[ed] workers’
compensation benefits of injured individuals over the age of
sixty-five who qualify for social security retirement benefits.” See
2009 UT 26, ¶ 38.
¶38 In a second opinion issued a few months later, the court
discussed whether its decision in Merrill I was to be applied
retroactively, or prospectively only. See Merrill II, 2009 UT 74,
¶¶ 12–20. As applied to this case, Merrill II’s instructions are not
entirely clear. On the one hand, in addressing whether Merrill I
applied to “future payments,” the court held—without apparent
exception—that “[n]o one may take offsets for payments made
after the date” of the ruling in Merrill I, and stated that, “[i]f an
ongoing stream of future payments exists from and after” the
date of Merrill I, “our ruling applies to them.” See Merrill II, 2009
UT 74, ¶ 14. But later in the opinion, in addressing the extent to
which Merrill I applied to settled cases, the court stated as
follows:
[W]e believe that waiver and finality are most
applicable to settled cases. Settlements, we believe,
should not be upset, even because of a change in
the law; the process of compromise they represent
is too multifaceted and context-driven to permit
unwinding. The parties to a settlement each bear
the risk of a subsequent change in or clarification of
the law—a risk that could cut either way.
Accordingly, for claimants who actively negotiated
and settled their claims, and thus chose not to
challenge the offset, our ruling will have no
retroactive effect.
Id. ¶¶ 18–19. And the court went on to state that, due to
principles of “waiver and finality,” claimants “who disputed
claims but settled without obtaining an express designation of

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20210026-CA 21 2021 UT App 138
permanent total disability . . . have, for whatever reason,
foregone the ability to recoup payments.” Id. ¶ 20.
¶39 Price directs our attention to the statement made in
paragraph 14 of Merrill II, and asserts that “[n]o one,” without
exception and including DKE, “may take offsets for payments
made after” issuance of Merrill I. DKE, by contrast, directs our
attention to the statements made in paragraphs 18–20 of Merrill
II, and asserts that, “for claimants who actively negotiated and
settled their claims, and thus chose not to challenge the offset,
our ruling will have no retroactive effect.”
¶40 We acknowledge Price’s citation to our supreme court’s
unquestionably broad language in paragraph 14 of Merrill II. Her
argument that “[n]o one may take offsets for payments made
after” the issuance of Merrill I is not without force. Read in
isolation, this statement could be construed to mean that even
payments made pursuant to a settlement agreement come within
Merrill I’s ambit. But in our view, the best contextual reading of
Merrill II gives force to the more specific language—dealing
particularly with settlement agreements—that appears later in
the opinion, where the court stated that “[s]ettlements . . . should
not be upset, even because of a change in the law,” and that for
“claimants who actively negotiated and settled their claims, and
who thus chose not to challenge the offset, our ruling will have
no retroactive effect.” See id. ¶¶ 18–19. At least in interpreting
statutes, courts give specific provisions more weight than
general provisions. See, e.g., Thomas v. Color Country Mgmt., 2004
UT 12, ¶ 9, 84 P.3d 1201 (“When two statutory provisions
conflict in their operation, the provision more specific in
application governs over the more general provision.”
(quotation simplified)). We see no reason not to apply that same
interpretive principle to examination of a judicial opinion. Cf.
Iota LLC v. Davco Mgmt. Co., 2016 UT App 231, ¶ 33, 391 P.3d 239
(“Generally, we interpret language in judicial documents in the
same way we interpret contract language.”).

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20210026-CA 22 2021 UT App 138
¶41 Accordingly, we conclude that the series of payments to
which these parties agreed, in their settlement of Price’s
disputed claim to PTD benefits, is not subject to the rule
established in Merrill I. Price could have challenged the
constitutionality of the Social Security offset provision back in
1997. She decided not to and, instead, voluntarily entered into a
settlement agreement that expressly reduced her weekly
payments by half of her Social Security retirement benefits. In
entering into that agreement, the parties assumed “the risk of a
subsequent change in the clarification of the law—a risk that
could [have] cut either way.” See Merrill II, 2009 UT 74, ¶ 18.
Other factors went into that agreement too; as the supreme court
noted, “the process of compromise” that happens prior to a
settlement “is too multifaceted and context-driven to permit
unwinding” the settlement due to a subsequent change in the
law. Id. Price agreed to the Social Security offset as part of the
settlement, and the Merrill opinions do not operate to relieve her
of that bargain.
CONCLUSION
¶42 More than two decades ago, Price settled a disputed claim
for PTD benefits with her employer. In doing so, she agreed to
accept monthly settlement payments that were less than the
established statutory minimum weekly compensation rate for
workers adjudicated as permanently and totally disabled, and
she agreed to offset the payments by half of her Social Security
benefits. For the reasons stated, Price should be held to the
benefits of her bargain, and we decline to disturb the
Commission’s order dismissing Price’s later-filed claim for
additional benefits.