In re D.G. (A.G. v. State)

2014 UT App 22
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH, IN THE INTEREST OF D.G. AND D.G., PERSONS
UNDER EIGHTEEN YEARS OF AGE.
A.G.,
Appellant,
v.
STATE OF UTAH,
Appellee.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20131006-CA
Filed January 24, 2014
Eighth District Juvenile Court, Vernal Department
The Honorable Larry A. Steele
No. 1061146
Colleen K. Coebergh and Jeffry K. Ross, Attorneys
for Appellant
Sean D. Reyes and John M. Peterson, Attorneys
for Appellee
Martha Pierce, Guardian ad Litem
Before JUDGES STEPHEN L. ROTH, MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN, and
JOHN A. PEARCE.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 A.G. (Mother) appeals the juvenile court’s order terminating
her parental rights in D.G. and D.G. We affirm.
¶2 Mother asserts that she was deprived of counsel at some
stages of the proceedings, in violation of her statutory right to
counsel. See Utah Code Ann. § 78A-6-1111 (LexisNexis 2012).

In re D.G.
20131006-CA 2 2014 UT App 22
Mother did not have counsel at the adjudication hearing on the
petition filed by the Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS).
She asserts in her petition on appeal that she was not informed of
her right to counsel and that she did not waive her right. Her
assertion is contradicted by the record.
¶3 The transcript of the hearing establishes that the juvenile
court informed Mother of her right to counsel. The juvenile court
also offered multiple times to postpone the hearing so Mother
would not feel rushed into a decision and so she could obtain
counsel before moving forward on the petition. Mother declined
the offers to postpone the hearing, waived her right to counsel, and
admitted to an amended petition after negotiating changes.
¶4 Additionally, the formal order memorializing the outcome
of the hearing clearly stated that Mother had been informed of her
right to counsel and had waived that right. Mother did not object
to the order, and it was entered by the juvenile court in January
2012. Adjudication orders are final and appealable orders separate
from the termination order appealed here. In re M.W., 2000 UT 79,
¶ 26, 12 P.3d 80. Mother did not appeal the adjudication order.
Accordingly, this court lacks jurisdiction over issues related to the
adjudication order. Serrato v. Utah Transit Auth., 2000 UT App 299,
¶ 7, 13 P.3d 616 (noting that the failure to file a timely appeal
deprives this court of jurisdiction). Because no appeal was taken
from the adjudication order, Mother’s waiver of counsel as stated
in the order is established.
¶5 Mother also asserts that the juvenile court erred in imputing
her husband’s income to her for purposes of determining her
indigency status. The juvenile court addressed the issue of income
at the adjudication hearing. And, as stated above, matters relating

In re D.G.
1. The record shows that once Mother separated from her husband
permanently, the juvenile court appointed counsel for Mother. She
had counsel for the remainder of the proceedings, including trial.
20131006-CA 3 2014 UT App 22
to the adjudication hearing are barred because Mother did not
appeal the adjudication order.1
¶6 Finally, Mother contends that her due process rights were
violated when findings made when Mother was “improperly
denied” counsel were used against her at the termination trial.
However, the adjudication order establishes that Mother waived
counsel. Furthermore, because the right to counsel in child welfare
proceedings is a statutory right, prejudice must be shown. In re
J.R.G.F., 2011 UT App 97, ¶ 3, 250 P.3d 1016. “The denial of the
constitutional right to counsel requires reversal. Reversal is not
warranted, however, for the denial of a merely statutory right to
counsel unless the appellant demonstrates the likelihood of a
different result.” Id. (citation omitted). There was ample evidence
presented at trial for the juvenile court to determine that even
though Mother had made some progress, Mother was not capable
of parenting her children at the time of trial. It is mere speculation
that having an attorney at hearings earlier in the proceedings
would have had any effect on the outcome of the trial at which
Mother’s continued instability was established.
¶7 Affirmed.