American National v. Sorensen

1. Judge William A. Thorne Jr. participated in and voted on this
case as a regular member of the Utah Court of Appeals. He retired
from the court before this decision issued.
2013 UT App 295
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
AMERICAN NATIONAL PROPERTY & CASUALTY COMPANY,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
CORY SORENSEN AND STEPHEN DANE OLSEN,
Defendants and Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20110221-CA
Filed December 12, 2013
Fourth District Court, Provo Department
The Honorable James R. Taylor
No. 080401768
Stuart H. Schultz, Peter H. Barlow, and
Sadé A. Turner, Attorneys for Appellant
D. David Lambert, Leslie W. Slaugh, and
Jacob S. Gunter, Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN authored this Opinion, in
which JUDGE J. FREDERIC VOROS JR. concurred, with opinion.
JUDGE WILLIAM A. THORNE JR. dissented, with opinion.1
CHRISTIANSEN, Judge:
¶1 This case involves a dispute over whether a homeowner’s
insurance policy excludes coverage for an all-terrain vehicle (ATV)
accident that occurred in a residential subdivision. American
National Property and Casualty Company (American National)
appeals the district court’s award of summary judgment in favor

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 2 2013 UT App 295
of the passenger in the ATV accident, Stephen Dane Olsen. We
affirm.
BACKGROUND
¶2 The ATV accident giving rise to this action occurred in
Highland, Utah on November 17, 2006. Karen Simmons had just
purchased the ATV on the date of the accident. Simmons’s
seventeen-year-old son, Corey Sorensen, was driving the new ATV
with two passengers, one of whom was Olsen, when it tipped over
and landed on Olsen, injuring his leg.
¶3 Sorensen was driving the ATV near Simmons’s residence in
a residential subdivision known as “the Highlands.” The Highlands
is a “planned unit development” and includes a park located to the
east of Simmons’s property. The park is defined in the Highlands
homeowners association’s covenants, conditions, and restrictions
(CC&Rs) as a “common area.” Specifically, the CC&Rs define
“common area” as “all the real property and improvements,
including without limitation, any recreation facilities, landscaped
areas and private roadways and walkways, which are owned by
the Association for the common use and enjoyment of all of the
Owners.” For purposes of summary judgment only, the parties
agreed that the accident occurred in the Highlands’ common area.
¶4 At the time of the ATV accident, Simmons’s residence was
covered by a homeowner’s insurance policy issued to her by
American National. Simmons’s homeowner’s policy provided
coverage up to the limits of liability for any claim for damages
brought against her as an insured because of bodily injuries. The
policy also covered medical expenses incurred by others injured
“on the insured location” or injured “off the insured location, if the
bodily injury . . . [was] caused by the activities of any insured.”
Section II of Simmons’s insurance policy also contained the
following exclusions:

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 3 2013 UT App 295
1. Coverage E – Personal Liability and Coverage F –
Medical Payments to Others do not apply to bodily
injury or property damage:
. . .
h. arising out of the ownership,
maintenance, use, loading, or
unloading of motor vehicles or all
other motorized land conveyances,
including any trailers, owned or
operated by or rented or loaned to any
insured.
This exclusion does not apply to a
motorized land conveyance designed
for assisting the handicapped or for the
m a i n t e n a n c e o f a n in s u r e d
location . . . :
. . .
k. arising out of the entrustment by
any insured to any person any of the
following:
. . .
(3) a motor vehicle or any other
motorized land conveyance;
l. arising out of statutorily imposed
vicarious parental liability for the
actions of a child or minor using:
. . .

American National v. Olsen
2. Because exclusion (1)(h), exclusion (1)(k), and exclusion (1)(l) of
Section II all implicate the definition of “motor vehicle,” which is
critical to this analysis, we refer to the exclusions collectively as the
“motor vehicle exclusions.”
20110221-CA 4 2013 UT App 295
(3) a motor vehicle or any other
motorized land conveyance
. . . .[ ]2
Additionally, in subsection 8(c) of the insurance policy definitions,
“motor vehicle” is defined, in relevant part, as “a motorized golf
cart, snowmobile, or other motorized land vehicle owned by any
insured and designed for recreational use off public roads, while off
an insured location.” (Emphasis added.)
¶5 In 2007, as a result of the injuries he sustained in the ATV
accident, Olsen sued Simmons, Sorensen, and American National
in a personal injury action separate from the present action. After
Olsen filed the personal injury action, Simmons filed a claim
against her homeowner’s policy with American National.
Following an investigation into the accident, American National
denied Simmons’s claim for coverage. Then, in May 2008,
American National filed the present action against Sorensen and
Simmons and filed an amended complaint in March 2009 adding
Olsen as a defendant. American National sought a declaratory
judgment that it did not have a duty to defend Simmons and
Sorensen and that the insurance policy excluded coverage for
Olsen’s injuries resulting from the ATV accident.
¶6 American National and Olsen filed cross-motions for
summary judgment. In its motion for summary judgment,
American National asserted that the insurance policy
unambiguously excluded coverage pursuant to the motor vehicle
exclusions contained in the policy because an ATV falls within the
policy’s definition of a motor vehicle and the bodily injury suffered
by Olsen resulted from a motor vehicle accident. In his combined
cross-motion for summary judgment and opposition
memorandum, Olsen argued that the motor vehicle exclusions did

American National v. Olsen
3. The district court’s memorandum decision denying American
National’s motion for summary judgment was silent as to the
resolution of Olsen’s cross-motion for summary judgment, as was
the district court’s declaratory judgment. However, in this matter,
by denying plaintiff American National’s motion as a matter of
law, the district court necessarily granted Olsen’s cross-motion.
20110221-CA 5 2013 UT App 295
not apply to the ATV accident, because the accident occurred on an
“insured location.” Thus, Olsen argued that the policy’s exclusions
were not triggered because the ATV did not fall within the policy’s
definition of a motor vehicle, which only defined an ATV as a
vehicle “while off an insured location.”
¶7 The district court denied American National’s motion for
summary judgment, determining that the injuries suffered by
Olsen in the ATV accident were not excluded from coverage. The3
district court concluded that the undisputed material facts
establish that the common area where the accident
occurred is an “insured location” under Simmons’[s]
homeowner’s insurance policy. Even though the
vehicle was a motorized land vehicle designed [for]
recreational use off public roads, it was operated on
an insured location. Coverage is therefore not
excluded under the policy.
On January 27, 2011, the court entered a declaratory judgment
denying American National’s motion for summary judgment,
explaining, in relevant part,
1. The material facts pertaining to the issues raised in
the pleadings are undisputed, and based on those
facts, the Court concludes that the accident occurred
at an “insured location.”
2. The insurance policy’s exclusions from coverage
asserted by the plaintiff do not apply. . . .

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 6 2013 UT App 295
. . . .
4. Because the accident occurred at an “insured
location,” the policy of insurance issued by
[American National] to . . . Simmons provides
coverage for the accident in question, and [American
National] has a duty to defend Sorensen and
Simmons and to cover losses sustained by them as a
result of the accident in question to the extent of the
policy limits.
American National appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 American National argues that the district court erred in
denying its motion for summary judgment and in ruling that the
insurance policy unambiguously provides coverage for the ATV
accident. “A grant of summary judgment is proper when there are
no disputed issues of material fact and the moving party is entitled
to judgment as a matter of law.” American Nat’l Fire Ins. Co. v.
Farmers Ins. Exch., 927 P.2d 186, 188 (Utah 1996) (citing Utah R. Civ.
P. 56(c)). With respect to the district court’s interpretation of the
insurance policy, “[a]n insurance policy is merely a contract
between the insured and the insurer and is construed pursuant to
the same rules applied to ordinary contracts.” Alf v. State Farm Fire
& Cas. Co., 850 P.2d 1272, 1274 (Utah 1993). “The district court’s
construction of contract language is given no particular weight and
is reviewed for correctness as a matter of law.” Doctors' Co. v.
Drezga, 2009 UT 60, ¶ 9, 218 P.3d 598.
ANALYSIS
¶9 American National’s central argument is that the district
court erroneously determined that it had a duty to defend Sorensen
and Simmons and to provide coverage under the policy. Because
the accident occurred on the common area of the Highlands

American National v. Olsen
4. On summary judgment, Olsen argued that even if the district
court ruled that the ATV accident occurred off an insured location,
and thus that the ATV was a motor vehicle, the exception to the
Section II(1)(h) motor vehicle exclusion—stating that the “exclusion
does not apply to a motorized land conveyance designed for
assisting the handicapped or for the maintenance of an insured
location”—applied because the ATV was used for the maintenance
of the insured location. On appeal, American National argues that
the district court erred in failing to rule that the undisputed
evidence established that Olsen’s use of the ATV did not qualify
under this exception. In light of our resolution of the insured
location issue, we need not reach this issue.
20110221-CA 7 2013 UT App 295
development, rather than on Simmons’s property, American
National contends that the ATV accident did not occur on an
“insured location.” And if the accident did not occur on an
“insured location,” the ATV falls within subsection 8(c)’s definition
of “motor vehicle” and Simmons’s claim is consequently barred by
the motor vehicle exclusions. American National argues, therefore,
that the district court erred in ruling that the accident occurred on
an “insured location” as defined under the homeowner’s policy.
¶10 In the alternative, American National argues that even if we
determine that the common area of Simmons’s residential
subdivision is an “insured location” under the policy, no coverage
exists pursuant to the motor vehicle exclusions because the ATV is
also a “motorized land conveyance” within the meaning of the
policy. American National contends that although the policy does
not define “motorized land conveyance,” according to a common-
sense definition, an ATV is clearly a motorized land conveyance.
And because the “while off an insured location” language appears
only in the definition of a “motor vehicle,” that limitation does not
apply to motorized land conveyances. Thus, American National
argues that the motor vehicle exclusions apply regardless of
whether the accident occurred on or off an insured location.4
¶11 Resolution of both arguments requires our interpretation of
the policy language. Although no Utah court has specifically

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 8 2013 UT App 295
analyzed the policy language at issue, we have the benefit of
several longstanding principles of law from which to analyze the
pertinent policy language. First, “[i]nsurance policies are generally
interpreted according to rules of contract interpretation.” Utah
Farm Bureau Ins. Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT 47, ¶ 5, 980 P.2d 685. As we
would for contract language, we “interpret words in insurance
policies according to their usually accepted meanings and in light
of the insurance policy as a whole” Id. Furthermore, “[p]olicy terms
are harmonized with the policy as a whole, and all provisions
should be given effect if possible.” Id.
¶12 Second, “‘insurance policies should be construed liberally in
favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and
not defeat the purposes of insurance.’” Fire Ins. Exch. v. Oltmanns,
2012 UT App 230, ¶ 6, 285 P.3d 802 (quoting United States Fid.
& Guar. Co. v. Sandt, 854 P.2d 519, 521–22 (Utah 1993)). “‘It follows
that ambiguous or uncertain language in an insurance contract that
is fairly susceptible to different interpretations should be construed
in favor of coverage’ and ‘provisions that limit or exclude coverage
should be strictly construed against the insurer.’” Id. (quoting
Sandt, 854 P.2d at 522–23); accord LDS Hosp. v. Capitol Life Ins. Co.,
765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988); Browning v. Equitable Life Assurance
Soc’y, 80 P.2d 348, 352 (Utah 1938). Further, “[i]n strictly construing
exclusions, we give them effect only when they use ‘language
which clearly and unmistakably communicates to the insured the
specific circumstances under which the expected coverage will not
be provided.’” Fire Ins. Exch., 2012 UT App 230, ¶ 6 (quoting Crook,
1999 UT 47, ¶ 5).
¶13 Additionally, once the insured has established the right of
coverage under the insuring clause and liability coverage is
triggered, the insurer has the burden to demonstrate that
exclusions exist under which it can deny coverage. As explained in
Browning,
When an insured claims a right to recover under the
accident provisions of the policy, all he need do is
bring himself within the field therein defined . . . . He

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 9 2013 UT App 295
then has brought himself within the policy, and the
terms thereof have been met. . . . When he brings
himself within the insuring clause he has made his
case . . . and any exceptions or conditions which
would then deny him relief, take him out of the
indemnity provisions, [or] render them inoperative
as to him, are matters of defense, and the burden
thereof rests upon the insurer. . . . [L]imitations,
exceptions or conditions which may relieve the
insurer from liability, which may be set forth in the
policy outside of the language of the insuring clause,
or which may exist outside of the policy entirely,
must be made and established by the insurer to
escape liability thereunder.
80 P.2d at 350–51. With these principles in mind, we first consider
whether the Highlands common area on which the accident
occurred was an insured location.
I. The Common Area Is an Insured Location.
¶14 American National argues that it can deny liability coverage
under any of the motor vehicle exclusions contained in the policy
because the accident occurred off an insured location and the ATV
therefore qualifies as a motor vehicle. As explained below, we do
not agree with American National’s interpretation of the term
“insured location.”
¶15 According to the policy, all three of the motor vehicle
exclusions are triggered by the insured’s use or entrustment of a
“motor vehicle.” The applicable definition of “motor vehicle” is
found in subsection 8(c) of the policy’s definitions and includes “a
motorized golf cart, snowmobile, or other motorized land vehicle
owned by any insured and designed for recreational use off public
roads, while off an insured location.” (Emphasis added.) The parties
do not dispute that the ATV is a “motorized land vehicle” “owned
by an insured” and “designed for recreational use off public

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 10 2013 UT App 295
roads.” Rather, they dispute only whether the ATV accident
occurred on or “off an insured location,” or in other words,
whether the common area where the ATV accident occurred is an
insured location.
¶16 Relevant to our inquiry, the policy defines the term “insured
location” as,
a. the residence premises;
b. the part of any other premises, other
structures, and grounds, used by you as a residence
and which is shown in the Declarations, or which is
acquired by you during the policy period for your
use as a residence;
c. any premises used by you in connection with
the premises included in [a or b above]; . . . .
No Utah appellate court has specifically addressed whether the
common area of a residential subdivision is an “insured location.”
But courts in several other jurisdictions have considered the
question of what constitutes an “insured location,” and we look to
their analyses and to the policy’s language and structure to guide
our determination. See Arndt v. First Interstate Bank of Utah, NA,
1999 UT 91, ¶ 17, 991 P.2d 584 (explaining that in the absence of
Utah precedent, appellate courts look to Utah statutes and “case
law from other jurisdictions for guidance”). Courts in other
jurisdictions have adopted several different tests to determine
whether a location is used in connection with the residence
premises. These tests include the “repeated use,” “integral use,”
“property ownership and legal right to use,” “foreseeable use,” and
“actual use” tests. In Arrowood Indemnity Co. v. King, 605 F.3d 62 (2d
Cir. 2010), the Second Circuit certified several questions relevant to
interpretation of an insurance policy to the Connecticut Supreme
Court, and in presenting its questions, surveyed the case law and
provided a helpful explanation of some of these tests. See id. at
71–77; see also Royal Indem. Co. v. King, 512 F. Supp. 2d 117, 126–27
(D. Conn. 2007); Arrowood Indem. Co. v. King, 39 A.3d 712, 719–23

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 11 2013 UT App 295
(Conn. 2012). We provide a summary of these tests to illustrate the
widely-varied interpretations of similar policy language.
¶17 One test that has been applied to determine if a motor
vehicle was located on an “insured location” and any premises
“used in connection with” the resident premises is whether the
insured repeatedly used the area where the accident occurred in
connection with the residence. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v.
Drumheller, 185 F. App’x 152, 160 (3d Cir. 2006) (holding that an
ATV accident that occurred 800 yards from the residence on a
sewer easement that was not the insured’s property, was covered
under the policy as occurring on an “insured location” because
“[the insured’s] regular recreational use of the property in question
was ‘in connection with’ his residence”); Farmers New Century Ins.
Co. v. Angerson, No. 4:04-CV-2608, 2008 WL 238622, at *14 (M.D. Pa.
Jan. 22, 2008) (concluding that an ATV accident that occurred on a
path near the insured’s residence was covered as occurring on an
insured location because the insured and his son “made frequent
use of the area in which the accident occurred,” “repeatedly
[riding] the ATV from their property into the adjacent woods and
back for recreational and home-improvement purposes”);
Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Prevatte, 423 S.E.2d 90, 92 (N.C. Ct. App.
1992) (holding that an ATV accident that occurred on the part of a
trail owned by the insureds’ neighbor was an insured location
because the insureds used the trail “in connection with [their]
residence” for several years and always started and ended using
the trail from their property); State Farm Fire & Cas. Co. v.
MacDonald, 850 A.2d 707, 710–11 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2004) (determining
that an ATV accident that occurred on adjacent land not owned by
the insured was covered because the insured “repeatedly rode his
ATV from his property onto the adjacent field and back” and had
therefore “used the adjacent field in connection with his residence
premises”).
¶18 Another test is whether the accident occurred in a location
that was integral to the insured’s use of the residence. See, e.g.,
Massachusetts Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass'n v. Wynn, 806 N.E.2d 447,
451–52 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004) (holding that the policy did not

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 12 2013 UT App 295
provide coverage for an ATV accident that occurred on a beach, not
owned by the insured, which was located across a stream and a
parking lot, thus rejecting the repeated use test and stating, “the
term ‘insured location’ is intended and appropriately understood
to be limited to the residence and premises integral to its use as a
residence”); Illinois Farmers Ins. Co. v. Coppa, 494 N.W.2d 503, 506
(Minn. Ct. App. 1993) (concluding that where the ATV accident
occurred in an adjacent hayfield not owned by the insured,
“‘insured location’ was not meant to describe adjacent, non-owned
land on which an ATV might be used”). A related approach to
consider is the foreseeability of the use of the site of the accident.
See, e.g., Utica Mut. Ins. Co. v. Fontneau, 875 N.E.2d 508, 514 (Mass.
App. Ct. 2007) (analyzing the character of use of a dirt track
between two owned properties as well as the distance between the
residence and the accident site to conclude that the risk associated
with that activity and site was reasonably foreseeable to the
insurance company and was, therefore, a covered location and a
connected activity).
¶19 Another common determination in an “insured location”
analysis is the ownership or legal right to use the area where the
accident occurred. Courts using this approach generally conclude
that ownership or the legal right to use an area weighs in favor of
determining that the area is an insured location. See, e.g., Uguccioni
v. United States Fid. & Guar. Co., 597 A.2d 149, 150 (Pa. Super. Ct.
1991) (holding that a private street used to access the insured
residence in a private residential development was an insured
location for coverage of an ATV accident occurring on the street);
Northern Sec. Ins. Co. v. Rossitto, 762 A.2d 861, 864–65 (Vt. 2000)
(holding that an ATV accident that occurred on the insureds’ right-
of-way easement leading to their insured “camp” was covered
because “the term ‘insured location’ encompasse[d] [the insureds’]
right-of-way”).
¶20 Related to the question of whether the insured has a legal
right to the site of the accident, is a determination of whether the
site was owned publicly, or privately by someone other than the
insured. This issue often arises in conjunction with homeowners
associations. See, e.g., United Servs. Auto. Ass’n v. Parry, 761 P.2d

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 13 2013 UT App 295
157, 158–60 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1988) (concluding that the insurance
policy did not cover a go-cart accident that occurred when a boy
landed in a private residential development’s water retention basin;
even though that area was a “common area” of the development,
it was not an insured location because it was designed for “run-off”
and, as such, was not a “premise” and because it was some distance
from the insured’s residence); Arrowood Indem. Co. v. King, 39 A.3d
712, 719–23 (Conn. 2012) (holding that the dead-end road where the
ATV accident occurred was not an insured location because
according to the warranty deed for the insured’s homeowners
association, the dead-end road was not one of the roads on which
the insured had a right to travel, because it was not a private road
within the private residential development between the insured’s
residence and the public road); Elliott v. State Farm Fla. Ins. Co., 61
So. 3d 502, 505 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011) (concluding that the
insurance policy did not cover a golf cart accident that occurred a
few blocks from the residence on a private road in a gated
community); Shelter Mut. Ins. Co. v. Davis, No. 05-0456, 2006 WL
929239, at *5 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 12, 2006) (holding that a road
within a homeowners association on which an ATV accident
occurred was the “functional equivalent” of a public road).
¶21 In determining whether the common area in the Highlands
development is an “insured location,” we are guided by the cases
set forth above and agree that an ownership interest in the area on
which the accident occurred is determinative here. We are also
bound by the directive in Utah law to construe the policy “liberally
in favor of the insured and their beneficiaries so as to promote and
not defeat the purposes of insurance.” Fire Ins. Exch. v. Oltmanns,
2012 UT App 230, ¶ 6, 285 P.3d 802 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted). The policy definition of “insured location” has no
contiguity requirement, and therefore, there is no clear language in
the policy that excludes the common area from the definition of an
insured location simply because it is not contiguous with the
residence premises. Also, even though the policy defines “insured
location” as “any premises used by [the insured] in connection
with” “the residence premises” or “the part of any other premises,”
this definition is not contingent upon repeated use by the insured

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 14 2013 UT App 295
and we see no other basis in the policy language to impose such a
requirement here. The policy does not further define “premises”
apart from residence premises or require that the premises be
subject to a particular property right. Instead, the policy provides
only that an insured location is “any premises used by [the insured]
in connection with” the “residence premises” or “the part of any
other premises, other structures, and grounds, used by [the
insured] as a residence.”
¶22 Accordingly, the policy language defining “insured
location” and “any premises used . . . in connection with” the
residence premises “is fairly susceptible to different
interpretations.” See id. (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted). We therefore liberally construe the provisions in favor of
the insured. See id. Moreover, because the insured location
provision arises in the definition of “motor vehicle,” which itself
arises in the motor vehicle exclusions from liability coverage, we
strictly construe these exclusions against the insurer. See id.
(“[P]rovisions that limit or exclude coverage should be strictly
construed against the insurer.” (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted)). We give effect to the motor vehicle exclusions,
and thus to the motor vehicle definition, only to the extent “they
use ‘language which clearly and unmistakably communicates to the
insured the specific circumstances under which the expected
coverage will not be provided.’” See id. (quoting Utah Farm Bureau
Ins. Co. v. Crook, 1999 UT 47, ¶ 5, 980 P.2d 685).
¶23 Therefore, after considering the language of the policy in
this case, the policy as a whole, the undisputed facts, and the above
factors, we interpret “any premises used by [the insured] in
connection with” “the residence premises” or “the part of any other
premises, other structures, and grounds, used by [the insured] as
a residence” in favor of coverage. Based on the CC&Rs, “Every
owner shall have a right and easement of ingress and egress and of
enjoyment in, to and over the Common Area which shall be
appurtenant to and shall pass with title to every Lot . . . .” Further,
although “lot” is limited to a residential lot and specifically
excludes the common area, every lot owner is a member of the

American National v. Olsen
5. On appeal, Olsen argues that American National did not
preserve this issue. However, American National clearly presented
this argument below.
20110221-CA 15 2013 UT App 295
homeowners association, and that membership “shall be pertinent
to and may not be separated from the fee Ownership of such Lot,”
which means that every lot owner has a right of enjoyment to the
common area. Homeowners within the association therefore have
at least some type of ownership interest in and right to use the
common area in connection with their residential premises. These
factors weigh in favor of the common area being an insured
location. To the extent it is a close question, we construe the policy
in favor of coverage.
¶24 We therefore conclude that the insured in this planned
development would have reasonably expected that an ATV
accident in the common area would be covered under the policy
because based on the CC&Rs, it was a premises used in connection
with the residence premises. We recognize that resolution of this
issue presents a close question, but given the connection between
the residential premises and the common area for a homeowner’s
use and enjoyment of the property, we determine that the common
area is an insured location for purposes of coverage.
II. The Motor Vehicle Exclusions Do Not Exclude Coverage
Under the Circumstances of this Case.
¶25 American National alternatively argues that even if the court
determines that the common area is an insured location, it must
still deny coverage for the accident under the motor vehicle
exclusions. American National asserts that the ATV is not only a5
“motor vehicle” but also a “motorized land conveyance.” The
policy does not separately define motorized land conveyance, but
the term is included in the motor vehicle exclusions. Exclusion
(1)(h) states that coverage is excluded for bodily injury “arising out
of the ownership, maintenance, use, loading, or unloading of motor
vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances.” Exclusions (1)(k)

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 16 2013 UT App 295
and (1)(l) provide that coverage is excluded for bodily injury
“arising out of the entrustment by any insured to any person” of a
motor vehicle or motorized land conveyance or “arising out of
statutorily imposed vicarious parental liability for the actions of a
child or minor using” “a motor vehicle or any other motorized land
conveyance.”
¶26 According to American National, because an ATV is
commonly defined as a motorized land conveyance, it does not fall
within subsection 8(c)’s definition of “motor vehicle.” Subsection
8(c)’s definition of “motor vehicle” hinges on whether the vehicle
is used “while off an insured location.” American National
contends, therefore, that regardless of whether the common area is
an insured location, because the ATV is a motorized land
conveyance, it is not subject to the “insured location” limitation of
the motor vehicle definition.
¶27 As previously noted, “[i]n strictly construing exclusions, we
give them effect only when they use language which clearly and
unmistakably communicates to the insured the specific
circumstances under which the expected coverage will not be
provided.” Fire Ins. Exch. v. Oltmanns, 2012 UT App 230, ¶ 6, 285
P.3d 802 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted). An ATV
may intuitively be a “motorized land conveyance.” However, that
term is not defined in the policy. Nor does the policy clearly and
unmistakably communicate that use of a motorized land
conveyance excludes coverage even when operated on an insured
location. Due to this ambiguity and the similarity of the terms, the
policyholder may believe that a motorized land conveyance is also
a motor vehicle, subject to the “motor vehicle” definition providing
that “a motorized golf cart, snowmobile, or other motorized land
vehicle owned by any insured and designed for recreational use off
public roads, while off an insured location,” and may believe the
corollary that a “motorized land vehicle owned by an insured and
designed for recreational use off public roads, while [on] an insured
location” is not a motor vehicle. Accordingly, we construe this
“ambiguous or uncertain language . . . that is fairly susceptible to
different interpretations . . . in favor of coverage.” See id. (citation
and internal quotation marks omitted). We therefore conclude that

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 17 2013 UT App 295
the motor vehicle exclusions do not exclude coverage under the
circumstances of this case.
CONCLUSION
¶28 Pursuant to our interpretation of the insurance policy, the
common area on which the ATV accident occurred is an insured
location. Therefore, American National has a duty to defend
Sorensen and Simmons and to provide coverage to them up to the
policy limits for any losses arising from the ATV accident in
accordance with the insurance policy. Accordingly, we affirm the
district court’s denial of American National’s motion for summary
judgment.
VOROS, Judge (concurring specially):
¶29 I concur in the result reached by the lead opinion and concur
in that opinion except as to Part II. I would not reach the merits of
American National’s “motorized land conveyance” argument.
American National contends (1) that the ATV is a “motorized land
conveyance” and (2) that harms arising from use of a “motorized
land conveyance” are excluded even if the use occurred on the
insured location. The dissent accepts this argument. The lead
opinion seems to accept the first step of the argument but rejects
the second. I would not reach the argument, because any district
court error on this point was invited.
¶30 Under the invited error doctrine, “a party cannot take
advantage of an error committed at trial when that party led the
trial court into committing the error.” State v. Geukgeuzian, 2004 UT
16, ¶ 9, 86 P.3d 742 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
That happened here. In arguing the summary judgment motions,
American National agreed with the district court that “the question
is whether this common area is premises”; that “this kind of
vehicle” is covered “when it’s on the premises”; that if “the
[Highlands] common area is part of the premises, there’s liability”;
and that if “the common area is premises, . . . those other exclusions

American National v. Olsen
6. While denying generally that it invited error, American National
did not address these statements in its briefs or in oral argument
before this court.
20110221-CA 18 2013 UT App 295
don’t apply.” Having assured the district court that coverage is6
excluded only if the accident occurred off the insured premises,
American National may not be heard on appeal to argue that
coverage is excluded even if the accident occurred on the insured
premises.
THORNE, Judge (dissenting):
¶31 I respectfully dissent from the majority opinion because I
disagree with its conclusion that the definition of an “insured
location” under Simmons’s homeowner’s policy is broad enough
to include the common area where Olsen was injured in this case.
Further, I agree with American National’s argument that coverage
is excluded under the policy because the ATV in this case is either
a “motor vehicle,” a “motorized land conveyance,” or both.
Accordingly, I would reverse the judgment of the district court and
remand this matter for the entry of judgment in favor of American
National.
¶32 The policy language, as it applies to this case, defines an
“insured location” to include any premises “used by [Simmons] in
connection with” the residence premises. The majority opinion
concludes that this definition is “fairly susceptible to different
interpretations,” see supra ¶ 28 (citation and internal quotation
marks omitted), and must therefore be construed to include the
location where Olsen was injured. I disagree.
¶33 I find the reasoning of Massachusetts Property Insurance
Underwriting Association v. Wynn, 806 N.E.2d 447 (Mass. App. Ct.
2004), to be persuasivfe on this issue. In Wynn, the party seeking
coverage argued that a beach was an insured location because it
was used “in connection with” an insured residence. See id. at 451.
The beach was owned by the insured’s homeowners association

American National v. Olsen
7. In Wynn, the court expressly noted that the injured party had
presented no evidence that the insured had easement rights to the
(continued...)
20110221-CA 19 2013 UT App 295
and was located less than 500 feet from the residence, and the
insured regularly used the beach. See id. The court concluded that
the beach was not used in connection with the residence premises,
stating,
We think that Wynn’s proffered interpretation
proves too much and, if adopted, would render the
definition of “insured location” meaningless and
provide no discernible geographical limit to
coverage. The term “insured location” and its
accompanying reference to “[a]ny premises used . . .
in connection with” the residence premises is
circumscribed by an obvious and necessary
geographic limitation. The definition is not meant to
encompass adjacent, nonowned land on which an
ATV might be used any more than it is intended to
include parks or recreational facilities in proximity to
the residence that the insured may enjoy and use
regularly. Such locations are neither intended nor
reasonably understood to be “insured locations”
under a homeowner’s policy.
Id. (alteration and omission in original). The court concluded that
“the term ‘insured location’ is intended and appropriately
understood to be limited to the residence and premises integral to
its use as a residence.” Id. at 452.
¶34 I agree with this analysis and would hold that, for purposes
of the definition of an insured location under the policy, premises
are used in connection with a residence only when their use is
“integral to [the residence’s] use as a residence.” See id. Nothing in
the record before us suggests that Simmons’s use of the common
area where Olsen was injured could be characterized as integral to
Simmons’s use of her residence. I would therefore conclude, as a7

American National v. Olsen
7. (...continued)
beach under his deed. Massachusetts Prop. Ins. Underwriting Ass’n
v. Wynn, 806 N.E.2d 447, 451 n.6 (Mass. App. Ct. 2004). Here, it is
undisputed that Simmons did possess an easement to use the
common areas, including the area where Olsen was injured.
However, the policy defines insured premises in terms of how the
premises are used, not whether the use is under a legal right. For
this reason, I would not distinguish this case from Wynn on the
basis of Simmons’s easement.
8. The policy does not provide a definition for the term “motorized
land conveyance.” However, looking at its plain language, the term
clearly encompasses the ATV in this case: the ATV has a motor, it
conveys persons, and it is used on land.
20110221-CA 20 2013 UT App 295
matter of law, that the common area was not an insured location
under the policy.
¶35 I also agree with American National’s argument that,
regardless of whether the common area is an insured location, the
policy excludes coverage for Olsen’s injuries. The policy provides
that coverage is excluded for bodily injuries “arising out of the
ownership, maintenance, use, loading, or unloading of motor
vehicles or all other motorized land conveyances, including any trailers,
owned or operated by or rented or loaned to any insured.”
(Emphasis added.) It is undisputed in this case that Olsen’s injuries
arose from the use of an ATV and that the ATV was owned by
Simmons, an insured. Thus, coverage is excluded if the ATV is
either a motor vehicle or a motorized land conveyance.
¶36 I would conclude that the ATV meets the policy’s definition
of a motor vehicle because, at the time of the accident, it was a
“motorized land vehicle owned by any insured and designed for
recreational use off public roads, while off an insured location.”
However, even if the ATV does not meet this definition because it
was on an insured location at the time of the accident, it clearly falls
within the category of “all other motorized land conveyances.”8

American National v. Olsen
20110221-CA 21 2013 UT App 295
Thus, the policy clearly excludes coverage for Olsen’s injuries
regardless of whether the common area is an insured location.
¶37 For these reasons, I respectfully dissent from the majority
opinion.