In re Estate of Morris

2018 UT App 158
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
I N THE MATTER OF THE ESTATE OF JOYCE L UTZ M ORRIS
M ARK L. M ORRIS AND DIANE M ORRIS,
Appellants,
v.
C AROLYN PERKINS, H. C ONWEY M ORRIS, PAUL M ORRIS
AND JOYCE M ORRIS,
Appellees.
Per Curiam Opinion
No. 20170330-CA
Filed August 23, 2018
Second District Court, Ogden Department
The Honorable W. Brent West
No. 123900002
Richard H. Reeve, Attorney for Appellants
Jack C. Helgesen and Erik S. Helgesen, Attorneys
for Appellees
Before JUDGES D AVID N. M ORTENSEN , JILL M. POHLMAN , and
R YAN M. HARRIS.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 	Mark 	L. 	Morris, 	individually 	and 	as 	personal
representative of the Estate of Joyce Lutz Morris, appeals the
district court’s order denying his request for attorney fees.1
¶2 	Morris initially argues that the district court erred by
failing to order the estate to reimburse him for attorney fees
1. Diane Morris was included in the notice of appeal; however,
all issues raised in this appeal concern only Mark L. Morris.

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incurred in defending the claims brought by his siblings. While
Morris is correct that Utah Code section 75-3-7192 allows a
personal representative of an estate to recover from the estate
all 	necessary 	expenses, 	including 	attorney 	fees, 	incurred
in 	defending 	or 	prosecuting 	any 	matter 	in 	good 	faith,
Morris never requested such fees from the estate. As a result,
the 	district 	court 	never 	ruled 	on 	the 	issue. 	In 	his 	motion
for 	attorney 	fees, 	Morris 	specifically 	requested 	attorney
fees 	from 	his 	siblings 	(who 	initiated 	the 	action 	against
him), 	claiming 	that 	the 	estate 	had 	insufficient 	funds 	to
reimburse him for the attorney fees he incurred. “[I]n order to
preserve an issue for appeal the issue must be presented to
the 	trial 	court 	in 	such 	a 	way 	that 	the 	trial 	court 	has 	an
opportunity 	to 	rule 	on 	that 	issue.” 	Brookside 	Mobile 	Home
Park, Ltd. v. Peebles, 2002 UT 48, ¶ 14, 48 P.3d 968. For a trial
court 	to 	be 	afforded 	an 	opportunity 	to 	correct 	the 	error,
“(1) 	the 	issue 	must 	be 	raised 	in 	a 	timely 	fashion; 	(2) 	the
issue 	must 	be 	specifically 	raised; 	and 	(3) 	the 	challenging
party must 	introduce supporting evidence 	or relevant legal
authority.” Id. (quotation simplified). Issues that are not raised at
trial are usually deemed waived. Id. Here, Morris never raised
the question of whether he should be reimbursed for attorney
fees from the estate because his motion specifically requested
that 	his 	siblings 	be 	required 	to 	pay 	his 	attorney 	fees.
Accordingly, 	Morris 	did 	not 	preserve 	the 	issue 	for 	appeal.
Further, 	he 	has 	failed 	to 	argue 	that 	any 	exception 	to 	the
2. 	Utah 	Code 	section 	75-3-719 	states: 	“If 	any 	personal
representative or person nominated as personal representative
defends or prosecutes any proceeding in good faith, whether
successful 	or 	not, 	the 	personal 	representative 	is 	entitled 	to
receive 	from 	the 	estate 	all 	necessary 	expenses 	and
disbursements, including reasonable attorney fees incurred.”
Utah Code Ann. § 75-3-719 (LexisNexis Supp. 2017).

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20170330-CA 	3 	2018 UT App 158
preservation requirement, such as plain error, applies.3 We,
therefore, do not address the issue.
¶3 	Morris next argues that the district court erred in failing
to order that his siblings be required to reimburse him for
attorney fees incurred in defending himself against the claims
asserted by the siblings. Morris concedes on appeal that Utah
Code 	section 	75-3-719 	is 	limited 	in 	its 	plain 	language 	to
reimbursement of attorney fees from the estate, not others.
However, 	Morris 	requests 	that 	we 	look 	beyond 	the 	plain
language of the statute to its supposed purpose, which Morris
opines is to “protect personal representatives from the burden of
paying, from their own pocket, for the prosecution of claims or
the defense against claims on behalf of the decedent’s estate.”
“‘[W]here the statutory language is plain and unambiguous, we
do not look beyond the language’s plain meaning to divine
legislative intent.’” State v. Tryba, 2000 UT App 230, ¶ 13, 8 P.3d
274 (quoting Horton v. Royal Order of the Sun, 821 P.2d 1167, 1168
(Utah 1991)). “Only when we find ambiguity in the statute’s
plain language need we seek guidance from the legislative
history and relevant policy considerations.” Nelson v. Salt Lake
County, 905 P.2d 872, 875 (Utah 1995) (quotation simplified).
Because the language of Utah Code section 75-3-719, by Morris’s
own admission, is not ambiguous, there is no need for this court
to look beyond the plain language of the statute to determine the
legislature’s intent. Further, Morris does not allege that a literal
reading of the statute creates an “absurd, unreasonable, or
inoperable result.” State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, ¶ 8, 217 P.3d 265
(“Where 	a 	statute’s 	plain 	language 	creates 	an 	absurd,
3. In their brief, the siblings acknowledge that Morris is entitled
to reimbursement of attorney fees from the estate and note that
Morris, as personal representative of the estate, may pay the fees
without the express order of the district court.

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unreasonable, or inoperable result, we assume the legislature did
not intend that result. To avoid an absurd result, we endeavor to
discover 	the 	underlying 	legislative 	intent 	and 	interpret 	the
statute accordingly.”). Accordingly, the district court correctly
concluded that Utah Code section 75-3-719 did not allow for the
imposition of an attorney fees award against the siblings.
¶4 	Affirmed.