Wood v. World Wide Association of Speciality Programs and Schools

2014 UT App 106
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
WILLIAM CHASE WOOD, ET AL.,
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
WORLD WIDE ASSOCIATION OF SPECIALITY PROGRAMS AND
SCHOOLS, INC.; ET AL.,
Defendants and Appellees.
Per Curiam Decision
No. 20140099-CA
Filed May 8, 2014
Fifth District Court, St. George Department
The Honorable James L. Shumate
No. 120500380
James R. Hasenyager and Peter W. Summerill,
Attorneys for Appellants
Terry M. Plant, Stewart B. Harman, Fred R.
Silvester, and Spencer C. Siebers, Attorneys
for Appellees
Before JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME, STEPHEN L. ROTH, and
MICHELE M. CHRISTIANSEN.
PER CURIAM:
¶1 William Chase Wood appeals the district court’s January 17,
2014 decision. This matter is before the court on a sua sponte
motion for summary disposition. We dismiss the appeal for lack of
jurisdiction.
¶2 Generally, “[a]n appeal is improper if it is taken from
an order or judgment that is not final.” Bradbury v. Valencia, 2000
UT 50, ¶ 9, 5 P.3d 649. Indeed, this court lacks jurisdiction to

Wood v. World Wide Association
20140099-CA 2 2014 UT App 106
consider an appeal unless it is taken from a final, appealable order.
See id. ¶ 8. For an order to be considered final and appealable, the
order must dispose of all parties or claims to an action. See id. ¶ 9.
The only exceptions to the final judgment rule are where: (1) an
appeal is permitted under the circumstances by statute, (2) the
appellate court grants interlocutory appeal under rule 5 of the Utah
Rules of Appellate Procedure, or (3) the district court properly
certifies the order as final under rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of
Civil Procedure. See id. ¶ 12.
¶3 During the January 17, 2014 hearing, the district court
granted several of the defendants’ motions to dismiss. However,
the court’s January 17, 2014 oral ruling did not dispose of all claims
and parties. Thus, in order to appeal the order implementing the
January 17, 2014 oral ruling, Wood was required to have the
district court’s decision certified as final and appealable pursuant
to rule 54(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. See Shaw v.
Layton Const. Co., Inc., 854 P.2d 1033, 1035 (Utah Ct. App. 1993).
When claims or parties remain pending before the district court
after the district court’s decision, that decision is not appealable
unless the district court makes an “express determination... that
there is no just reason for delay” and gives “an express direction
for entry of judgment” in accordance with rule 54(b). See Shaw, 854
P.2d at 1035. “Rule 54(b) unequivocally declares that the [district]
court’s nonfinal order is not appealable without a manifest
determination by the trial court that a ruling on one of the multiple
claims should proceed to appeal without the remainder of the case,
and an express direction of judgment to that effect.” Id.
¶4 On January 31, 2014, Wood filed his notice of appeal.
However, the notice of appeal was not taken from a final,
appealable order as a written order had not been prepared in
compliance with rule 7(f)(2) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure,
much less had it been certified as final in accordance with rule
54(b). See Utah R. Civ. P. 7(f)(2); see also Utah R. Civ. P. 54(b). Two
weeks later, on February 14, 2014, the district court entered a
written order incorporating its prior oral ruling as the judgment of

Wood v. World Wide Association
1. We acknowledge that the district court expressed a desire at the
January 17, 2014 hearing that its oral ruling be appealable. But,
what the trial court states -- that “[Plaintiffs] have an absolute right,
a due process constitutional right to have this kind of a case and
this kind of a pleading reviewed by an appellate court if I grant the
motion to dismiss”-- did not fulfill rule 54(b)’s requirement that the
court make an express determination that there is no just reason for
delay and give “an express direction for entry of judgment.” See
Shaw, 854 P.2d at 1035.
20140099-CA 3 2014 UT App 106
the court and certifying the judgment as final pursuant to rule
54(b). Wood did not file a subsequent notice of appeal within thirty
days of the February 14, 2014 final order.
¶5 Wood now asserts that his January 31, 2014 appeal was
perfected as of the entry of the February 14, 2014 order by
operation of rule 4(c) of the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure.
Rule 4(c) provides that in situations where a notice of appeal is filed
after the district court’s announcement of its decision, but before
entry of a final judgment or order, the notice of appeal shall be
treated as filed after the entry of the judgment or order and on the
day thereof. See Utah R. App. P. 4(c). However, the record does not
show that the district court announced its intention to certify its
ruling in accordance with rule 54(b) during the January 17, 2014
hearing.
¶6 Rule 4(c) only operates when there is an announcement of
a decision that, once reduced to writing and signed by the court,
will become final and appealable. The district court did not
announce, either by its own terms or with an expressed intention
to certify finality under rule 54(b), during the January 17, 2014
hearing. Because the rule 54(b) certification was not part of the1
announced decision, but came only after the notice of appeal was
filed, the notice of appeal followed the announcement of a nonfinal
decision. Thus, the notice of appeal was ineffective as a notice of
appeal from the final judgment later entered by the court because

Wood v. World Wide Association
20140099-CA 4 2014 UT App 106
the rule 54(b) certification making it final and appealable had not
been part of the oral decision announced by the court and appealed
by Wood on January 31, 2014.
¶7 Therefore, Wood was required to file a new notice of appeal
within thirty days following the entry of the February 14, 2014
order, which was certified as final and appealable pursuant to rule
54(b). See Utah R. App. P. 4(a). Wood failed to file his notice of
appeal within thirty days after the February 14, 2014 final order as
required by rule 4(a). As a consequence, this court lacks jurisdiction
to consider the appeal and we are required to dismiss it. See
Varian-Eimac, Inc. v. Lamoreaux, 767 P.2d 569, 570 (Utah Ct. App.
1989).
¶8 Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the appeal is
dismissed.