Keller v. Martinez

2014 UT App 2
_________________________________________________________
THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
LARRY KELLER,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
v.
GERARDO J. MARTINEZ,
Defendant and Appellee.
Memorandum Decision
No. 20121064-CA
Filed January 3, 2014
Third District Court, Salt Lake Department
The Honorable Keith A. Kelly
No. 100911940
Daniel O. Duffin and Cameron B. Dibb, Attorneys
for Appellant
Mark T. Ethington, Attorney for Appellee
JUDGE STEPHEN L. ROTH authored this Memorandum
Decision, in which JUDGES GREGORY K. ORME and
CAROLYN B. MCHUGH concurred.
ROTH, Judge:
¶1 This case stems from a collision between two vehicles in a
signal-controlled intersection. Larry Keller argues that Gerardo J.
Martinez, who was turning left, had a duty under the Utah Traffic
Code to yield to Keller, who was in the oncoming travel lane, even
if Keller had run a red light. Keller asserts that the district court
erred when it dismissed his case, having concluded that because
Keller had failed to show that Martinez did not have a green left-
turn arrow at the time of the collision, he had not borne his burden

Keller v. Martinez
20121064-CA 2 2014 UT App 2
of showing that Martinez violated any duty to Keller. We affirm
the district court’s decision.
¶2 Keller and Martinez were involved in a two-car accident on
Redwood Road in Taylorsville, Utah, in early 2008. Keller was
traveling northbound through a signal-controlled intersection near
Taylorsville High School. Martinez was turning left from the
southbound lane into the school’s parking lot when he collided
with Keller’s car in the intersection. Keller sued Martinez in
negligence for damages to his vehicle, and Martinez raised a
negligence counterclaim in response.
¶3 During a bench trial, both drivers claimed to have had the
right-of-way. Keller testified that he stopped at a red light and then
proceeded through the intersection after the signal turned green.
In contrast, Martinez testified that he stopped at a red light and
then turned left after he saw a green left-turn arrow. Martinez’s
wife corroborated his testimony that the left-turn arrow was green
as Martinez turned left through the intersection. Neither party
presented any other evidence on the color of the light.
¶4 After hearing the conflicting testimony, the district court
found, with regard to Keller’s case, that “Mr. Martinez and his wife
have given reasonably credible testimony that Mr. Martinez”
turned left “when he had a green left turn arrow on the signal.”
Martinez’s testimony therefore “suggest[ed], strongly, that Mr.
Keller was running a red light.” As a result, the court concluded
that Keller “did not meet his burden of proof to show that
[Martinez] did not have a green traffic light.” The court reasoned
that Keller needed to show that Martinez did not have a green light
in order to establish that Martinez owed Keller a duty. Because
negligence cannot exist without a duty, the court dismissed Keller’s
claim. The district court then dismissed Martinez’s counterclaim on
the same basis, concluding on the conflicting testimony that
Martinez failed to prove that Keller did not have a green light.
Martinez did not appeal from the decision on his counterclaim.

Keller v. Martinez
1. Keller asserts in his statement of the issues that “[n]o judgment,
order or finding was made regarding the ‘right of way,’” indicating
that he is challenging the adequacy of the findings. Keller’s analysis
section, however, is dedicated fully to the merits of the court’s
decision to dismiss his case. We therefore do not consider the
adequacy argument.
2. All pertinent sections of the Utah Traffic Code existed in the
same form at the time of the accident in 2008.
20121064-CA 3 2014 UT App 2
¶5 On appeal, Keller addresses only one point concerning the
merits of the district court’s decision. He claims that “Martinez1
admitted that he was turning left in the intersection and that Keller
was going straight through,” which he contends is enough by itself
to “establish[] a duty for Martinez.” Thus, Keller implicitly argues
that the color of his light was irrelevant, an argument that he also
raised at trial: “Even if [Keller] ran a red light[, Martinez] has the
duty to yield the right-of-way to somebody . . . going straight
through” the intersection. According to Keller, left-turning drivers
must always yield to through traffic and therefore Keller’s only
burden was to prove that he was going straight through the
intersection and that Martinez was turning left, which were both
undisputed. Thus, according to Keller, Martinez owed Keller a
duty based simply on the fact that Martinez was making a left turn
and the district court erred when it dismissed Keller’s case without
addressing the other three elements of negligence—breach,
causation, and damages, see Webb v. University of Utah, 2005 UT 80,
¶ 9, 125 P.3d 906 (explaining that the “four essential elements” are
duty, breach, proximate cause, and damages (citation and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
¶6 In support of his theory, Keller cites section 903 of the Utah
Traffic Code, which he argues imposes a duty on all left-turning
drivers to yield the right-of-way to “any vehicle approaching from
the opposite direction” that constitutes an immediate hazard. See
Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-903(1) (LexisNexis 2010) (emphasis
added). He also directs us to French v. Utah Oil Refining Co., 2162
P.2d 1002 (Utah 1950), in which the Utah Supreme Court explained
the purpose of an older but substantially similar version of section

Keller v. Martinez
20121064-CA 4 2014 UT App 2
903: “When a statute prescribes that a turning vehicle must yield
the right-of-way . . . a burden is placed on the driver making the
turn as he has control of the situation.” Id. at 1004. According to
Keller, section 903 and French render the color of Martinez’s traffic
light irrelevant—Martinez, as the person turning left, should have
yielded to “any vehicle approaching,” Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-
903(1), even if that vehicle was running a red light, because he was
in a better position to control the situation.
¶7 Martinez counters that section 903 does not apply to this
case. Instead, he contends that section 305 of the Utah Traffic Code,
which addresses rights-of-way at signal-controlled intersections,
applies. See id. § 41-6a-305 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). According to
section 305, a vehicle facing a left-turn arrow “may cautiously enter
the intersection . . . to make the movement indicated by the arrow”
but must yield to “other traffic lawfully using the intersection.” Id.
§ 41-6a-305(2)(b) (emphasis added). Therefore, Martinez claims, the
color of his light is very much at issue—a driver turning left on a
green arrow need not yield to a driver running a red light because
the vehicle running the red light is not “lawfully using the
intersection.” See id. § 41-6a-305(2)(b), (4)(a) (“[T]he operator of a
vehicle facing a steady circular red . . . (i) may not enter the
intersection . . . and (ii) shall stop at a clearly marked stop line . . .
and shall remain stopped until an indication to proceed is
shown.”). Because each party relies on a different provision of the
traffic code, we must first determine which one applies under the
facts of this case.
¶8 Section 903 falls within part 9 of the traffic code that
regulates rights-of-way when at least one vehicle’s action is not
subject to more specific regulation. See, e.g., id. § 41-6a-901
(LexisNexis 2010) (right-of-way in unregulated intersection); id.
§ 41-6a-902 (right-of-way at stop or yield signs); id. §§ 41-6a-904,
-905 (LexisNexis 2010 & Supp. 2013) (right-of-way in presence of
emergency vehicles, highway construction vehicles, and
pedestrians). Thus, the right-of-way rule described in section 903
exists as a baseline; it controls the duty of left-turners generally. For
example, section 903 applies to cars turning left from an arterial
road onto a collector or local road because no signals or signs

Keller v. Martinez
20121064-CA 5 2014 UT App 2
supersede the general rights-of-way. In such situations, turning
cars must yield to any approaching vehicle that constitutes a
hazard because, as stated in French, the turning driver holds
superior control over the situation.
¶9 Part 3, on the other hand, regulates the use and effect of
“traffic-control devices used on a highway.” Id. § 41-6a-301(1). In
particular, section 305 governs signal-controlled intersections and
the rights-of-way that apply to any given signal combination. Id.
§ 41-6a-305 (LexisNexis Supp. 2013). A basic rule of statutory
construction provides that statutes that address specific
circumstances “control over more general ones” where those
circumstances are present. Peak Alarm Co. v. Werner, 2013 UT 8,
¶ 19, 297 P.3d 592 (citation and internal quotation marks omitted).
The accident in this case occurred while Martinez was turning left
and Keller was proceeding straight through a signal-controlled
intersection. Therefore, the right-of-way rules identified in section
305 apply here, not the more general rule described in section 903
that Keller has relied on both in the district court and on appeal.
¶10 Having determined that section 305 applies, we examine its
effect on Keller’s appeal. Because Martinez has not appealed from
the dismissal of his claim against Keller, we review the evidence
from the perspective of the court’s resolution of Keller’s claim.
ProMax Dev. Corp. v. Mattson, 943 P.2d 247, 250 n.1 (Utah Ct. App.
1997) (“On appeal from a bench trial, we view the evidence in a
light most favorable to the trial court’s findings . . . .”). Martinez
presented evidence that he was proceeding through a green left-
turn arrow when he struck Keller. The district court found
Martinez’s testimony credible and determined that this testimony
“suggest[ed], strongly, that Mr. Keller was running a red light.”
From those findings, the most reasonable inference that can be
drawn—indeed, the basis for Keller’s argument—is that Keller had
entered the intersection on a red light.
¶11 Under section 305, the operator of a vehicle facing a red light
must yield the intersection while the operator of a vehicle facing a
green turn arrow “may cautiously enter the intersection . . . to
make the [turn] indicated by the arrow” and is required to “yield

Keller v. Martinez
20121064-CA 6 2014 UT App 2
the right-of-way” only to pedestrians and “other traffic lawfully
using the intersection,” Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-305(2)(b), (4)(a)
(LexisNexis Supp. 2013). Therefore, Keller was required to yield the
intersection to Martinez, whose green arrow gave him the right-of-
way. Certainly, even with the green arrow, Martinez could proceed
into the intersection so long as he did so “cautiously.” See id. § 41-
6a-305(2)(b)(i). That is, a green arrow never permits a driver to
proceed carelessly, oblivious to the conditions at hand; the driver
must take reasonable precautions to avoid a collision.
¶12 We acknowledge that if Martinez failed to “cautiously enter
the intersection,” then he and Keller could both be in breach of
their respective duties. In such cases, courts typically compare the
negligence of each actor. See id. § 78B-5-818(4) (LexisNexis 2012)
(“The fact finder may, and when requested by a party shall,
allocate the percentage or proportion of fault attributable to each
person seeking recovery . . . .”). Although Keller sometimes alludes
to Martinez’s failure to keep a proper lookout in his briefing, he has
not made any analysis of the parties’ relative duties and breaches
under a theory of comparative negligence; rather, he argues simply
that he had a superior right-of-way to Martinez, who, because he
was making a left turn, was required to yield to Keller, even if
Keller was running a red light. See generally Allen v. Friel, 2008 UT
56, ¶ 7, 194 P.3d 903. Under section 305, however, assuming that
Martinez had a green arrow, as we must, Martinez had the
superior right-of-way because Keller was not “lawfully using the
intersection.” See Utah Code Ann. § 41-6a-305(2)(b)(ii) (LexisNexis
Supp. 2013). Nor did Keller argue comparative negligence to the
trial court. See generally Main St. v. Easy Heat, Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 51,
99 P.3d 801. Thus, because section 305 applies here, rather than
section 903, Keller has failed to persuade us that the district court
erred in ruling against him.
¶13 In sum, we affirm the district court’s conclusion that Keller
failed to meet his burden of proof that Martinez was negligent
because section 305 applies and Keller failed to demonstrate that
Martinez did not have a green light or that Keller did.