Oldroyd v. Oldroyd

2022 UT App 145
THE UTAH C OURT OF APPEALS
R OBBEN A NN O LDROYD,
Appellant,
v.
F ARRELL LYNN O LDROYD,
Appellee.
Opinion
No. 20210073-CA
Filed December 22, 2022
Second District Court, Morgan Department
The Honorable Noel S. Hyde
No. 134500028
Brent D. Wride, Attorney for Appellant
Brian E. Arnold and Lauren Schultz,
Attorneys for Appellee
JUDGE M ICHELE M. C HRISTIANSEN F ORSTER authored this Opinion,
in which J UDGES GREGORY K. O RME and DAVID N. M ORTENSEN
concurred.
CHRISTIANSEN FORSTER, Judge:
¶1 	Prior to their marriage, Robben Ann Oldroyd (Ann) and
Farrell Lynn Oldroyd (Farrell) built a home on property owned
by Ann. Ann paid for the materials and contractors used in the
construction of the home, and Farrell contributed his skills and
labor to build the specialty log home. When the parties divorced
many years later, a dispute arose regarding their relative interests
in the home. This is the third time questions relating to their
dispute have come before this court. In the current appeal, we are
asked to consider whether the district court erred in awarding
Farrell a share of Ann’s premarital equity in the home based on
its application of the contribution and extraordinary situation
exceptions to the separate-property presumption. We conclude

Oldroyd v. Oldroyd
20210073-CA 	2 	2022 UT App 145
that the contribution exception does not apply to premarital
contributions and that the extraordinary situation exception does
not apply because Farrell had other means of protecting his
alleged interest in the home. Accordingly, we reverse the district
court’s ruling and remand with instructions for the court to award
the disputed equity to Ann.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	This is the third time this matter has come before this court.
See Oldroyd v. Oldroyd (Oldroyd I), 2017 UT App 45, 397 P.3d 645;
Oldroyd v. Oldroyd (Oldroyd II), 2019 UT App 155, 474 P.3d 467.
Each appeal has concerned the parties’ home. Ann purchased the
land on which the home was built before the parties were married.
Oldroyd I, 2017 UT App 45, ¶ 2. While Ann and Farrell were
dating, Ann arranged to have the home built. Id. Ann paid for the
costs 	of 	materials 	and 	construction, 	but 	Farrell 	contributed
“supervision, labor, work, expertise, and conceptual direction”
for 	the 	construction. 	Id. 	¶¶ 	2, 	4 	(quotation 	simplified).
Subsequently, the parties married and lived together in the home,
but the land and home remained in Ann’s name alone. Id. ¶ 2.
¶3 	While both parties agree that Ann should receive a credit
for what she spent on the land on which the home was built, the
parties disagree about how the remaining equity in the home
should be distributed. Farrell argues that all remaining equity
should be shared equally between the parties. Ann, on the other
hand, maintains that she should receive a credit for both the
amount she spent on the land and the amount she spent on
construction costs before the parties divide the remaining equity.1
1. Ann has never disputed that Farrell should receive half the
equity 	gained 	through 	the 	home’s 	appreciation 	during 	the
marriage.

Oldroyd v. Oldroyd
20210073-CA 	3 	2022 UT App 145
¶4 	In its original findings of fact and conclusions of law in the
parties’ divorce, the district court found that Farrell’s non-
monetary contributions were “roughly equal” to Ann’s financial
contributions and that he had therefore acquired “a separate
premarital interest in the improvements on the property.” Id. ¶ 4
(quotation 	simplified). 	However, 	we 	overturned 	that
determination on appeal because the court “did not explain what
legal theory gave rise to that equitable interest.” Id. ¶ 8.
¶5 	On remand, the district court again determined that Farrell
had a premarital interest in the home but this time premised its
ruling on a theory of unjust enrichment. Oldroyd II, 2019 UT App
155, ¶ 4. However, we once again reversed the court’s ruling, this
time on the basis that Farrell had never asserted an unjust
enrichment claim. Id. ¶¶ 7–9.
¶6 	In Oldroyd II, we further explained that Farrell’s pleadings
did not raise a claim that he had acquired a premarital interest in
the home. Rather, Farrell asserted that because he had “exerted
hours and money into the home, including trade work,” he
“should be awarded a sum certain from [Ann’s] equity in the
home for all the work he has completed on the home, and for
value of his trade work that he has performed for investment on
the marital home.” Id. ¶ 7 (quotation simplified). In other words,
Farrell raised not an equitable claim “for a premarital interest in
property,” but “a claim for an equitable award of a portion of
[Ann’s] premarital asset.” Id. However, because the district court
had not considered equitable bases on which Farrell might be
entitled to a share of Ann’s premarital interest, we left open the
possibility that the court might determine that such an award was
appropriate. Id. ¶ 11 & n.3.
¶7 	On remand, the district court, for the third time, awarded
Farrell a share of equity in the home. This time, the court
recognized that the property was Ann’s premarital asset but
concluded 	that 	Farrell 	was 	entitled 	to 	a 	portion 	of 	Ann’s

Oldroyd v. Oldroyd
20210073-CA 	4 	2022 UT App 145
premarital equity based on the contribution exception and the
extraordinary situation exception. Ann again appeals.
ISSUE AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 	Ann asserts that the district court erred in awarding Farrell
a share of her equity in the home because Farrell’s contributions
occurred prior to the marriage and the extraordinary situation
exception is not applicable. “We generally defer to a trial court’s
categorization and equitable distribution of separate property,”
Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 26, 392 P.3d 968 (quotation
simplified), so long as the court’s judgment “fall[s] within the
spectrum of appropriate resolutions,” id. ¶ 29.
ANALYSIS
¶9 	Historically, 	we 	have 	recognized 	three 	equitable
exceptions that may justify an award of one spouse’s premarital
property to the other spouse: (1) the commingling exception,
(2) the contribution exception, and (3) the extraordinary situation
exception. See Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 33, 392 P.3d
968. 	Only 	the 	contribution 	exception 	and 	the 	extraordinary
situation exception are at issue in this case.
¶10 	As 	a 	threshold 	matter, 	we 	note 	that 	it is 	somewhat
unclear 	from 	the 	district 	court’s discussion 	whether 	it 	was
relying 	on 	the 	contribution 	exception, 	the 	extraordinary
situation 	exception, 	or 	both 	exceptions 	in 	awarding 	the
disputed funds. The parties’ arguments on appeal primarily
concern the applicability of the extraordinary situation exception,
and they appear to be operating under the assumption that the
court’s decision rested on that exception. However, given that the
court’s application of the extraordinary situation exception was
based on its determination that Farrell’s premarital contributions
made it equitable to award him a share of Ann’s premarital

Oldroyd v. Oldroyd
20210073-CA 	5 	2022 UT App 145
property, we think it appropriate to address both exceptions in
our analysis.
I. Contribution Exception
¶11 	“Under the contribution exception, a spouse’s separate
property may be subject to equitable distribution [upon divorce]
when the other spouse has by his or her efforts or expense
contributed to the enhancement, maintenance, or protection of
that property, thereby acquiring an equitable interest in it.”
Lindsey v. Lindsey, 2017 UT App 38, ¶ 35, 392 P.3d 968 (quotation
simplified). Common examples include a spouse working for the
other spouse’s premarital business without taking a salary, see,
e.g., Rappleye v. Rappleye, 855 P.2d 260, 263 (Utah Ct. App. 1993),
or a couple using marital funds to make improvements to or pay
a mortgage on a premarital property, see, e.g., Schaumberg v.
Schaumberg, 875 P.2d 598, 601 (Utah Ct. App. 1994). However, as
we noted in Oldroyd II, “[p]revious cases addressing equitable
division of premarital assets have involved contributions made to
those assets during the course of the marriage,” and “Utah courts
have not had the opportunity to assess the extent to which one
spouse’s premarital contributions to another spouse’s premarital
assets may be considered in the context of a divorce court’s
equitable division of property.”2 2019 UT App 155, ¶ 11 n.3, 474
P.3d 467.
¶12 	Having now been presented with the opportunity to
consider 	the 	applicability 	of 	the 	contribution 	exception 	to
premarital contributions, we are convinced that it does not apply
in this context. Unlike a married person, an unmarried person has
2. We have discovered one case in our research that appears to
have used the contribution exception to affirm an award of a share
of one spouse’s premarital property to another spouse. See Barber
v. Barber, 792 P.2d 134 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). However, the analysis
in that case is rather superficial, and we consider it to be of limited
utility in our discussion.

Oldroyd v. Oldroyd
20210073-CA 	6 	2022 UT App 145
no reasonable expectation of any benefit from or entitlement to
separate property owned or acquired by their significant other.
Here, Farrell chose to assist Ann in building her home without
seeking compensation.3 At that time, even though he may have
expected to eventually marry Ann and live in the home with her,
he had no guarantee that would happen. “As a general rule, . . .
premarital property is viewed as separate property, and equity
usually requires that each party retain the separate property he or
she brought into the marriage.” Walters v. Walters, 812 P.2d 64, 67
(Utah Ct. App. 1991) (quotation simplified), superseded by statute
on other grounds as stated in Whyte v. Blair, 885 P.2d 791 (Utah 1994).
Only “where unique circumstances exist” may a trial court
“reallocate premarital property as part of a property division
incident to divorce.” Id. “Generally, trial courts are . . . required to
award premarital property, and appreciation on that property, to
the spouse who brought the property into the marriage.” Elman v.
Elman, 2002 UT App 83, ¶ 18, 45 P.3d 176.
¶13 	Farrell had several options for protecting his interests,
which he chose not to take advantage of. First, he could have
entered into a contract with Ann requiring her to pay him for his
services. 	Second, 	he 	could 	have 	negotiated 	a 	prenuptial
agreement 	acknowledging 	his 	premarital 	contributions 	and
granting him an interest in the home in case of divorce. Third—
though likely an undesirable option given his relationship to
Ann—Farrell could have filed a lawsuit bringing a quasi-contract
claim, such as unjust enrichment, to obtain compensation for his
services. However, the contribution exception is simply not one
of the options available where the contributions occurred prior to
the parties’ marriage.
3. Ann did pay Farrell approximately $18,000 to $19,000 while he
was working on the home, but the district court found that this
was a gift to help Farrell with some specific expenses rather than
compensation for his services in helping to build the home. See
Oldroyd I, 2017 UT App 45, ¶ 3, 397 P.3d 645.

Oldroyd v. Oldroyd
20210073-CA 	7 	2022 UT App 145
II. Extraordinary Situation Exception
¶14 	Just 	as 	Farrell’s 	premarital 	contributions 	to 	Ann’s
premarital asset cannot support an award to him of Ann’s
separate property under the contribution exception, they also
cannot support an award under the extraordinary situation
exception.
¶15 	“The bar for establishing an extraordinary situation is high,
traditionally 	requiring 	that 	invasion 	of 	a 	spouse’s 	separate
property is the only way to achieve equity.” Lindsey v. Lindsey,
2017 UT App 38, ¶ 46, 392 P.3d 968 (quotation simplified). “A
quintessential extraordinary situation arises when a spouse owns
separate property but lacks income to provide alimony.” Id. In
that circumstance, “an equitable distribution of the [separate
property] would be well within the trial court’s discretion.”
Kunzler v. Kunzler, 2008 UT App 263, ¶ 37, 190 P.3d 497 (Billings,
J., concurring in part and dissenting in part); see also Burt v. Burt,
799 P.2d 1166, 1169 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) (“The court may award
an interest in the inherited property to the non-heir spouse in lieu
of alimony.”). The doctrine has also been applied in situations
where a person did not contribute directly to their spouse’s
premarital asset but their contributions to the marital estate
allowed their spouse to enhance their own separate assets rather
than the marital estate. See Henshaw v. Henshaw, 2012 UT App 56,
¶ 20 & n.7, 271 P.3d 837 (affirming an award of premarital ranch
property to a wife, despite the fact that the value of the ranch had
depreciated during the marriage, because the wife had borne “the
financial burdens of the family in order to allow [the husband] to
work almost exclusively on the ranch”); Elman v. Elman, 2002 UT
App 83, ¶ 24, 45 P.3d 176 (affirming an award of stock in a
premarital business to a wife whose income-earning activities
allowed her husband to quit his job and devote time to managing
and growing his premarital assets rather than contributing to
marital assets). Taking on “domestic burdens” to make possible a
spouse’s full-time participation in a premarital business may also
be an extraordinary situation where the bulk of the business’s

Oldroyd v. Oldroyd
20210073-CA 	8 	2022 UT App 145
value is developed during the marriage. Savage v. Savage, 658 P.2d
1201, 1204 (Utah 1983).
¶16 	But none of those examples reflect the situation we have
here. Farrell seeks a portion of Ann’s premarital asset as payment
for the work he did on the home prior to the couple’s marriage,
not because Ann lacks the resources to pay alimony or enhanced
her own separate asset during the marriage in lieu of contributing
to the marital estate. And as we discussed above, Farrell had
several 	options 	to 	protect 	his 	financial 	interests 	and 	to 	be
compensated for his contributions to the home before marrying
Ann. The fact that he chose not to employ any of these options
does not give rise to the type of inequity that can be addressed
only through the extraordinary situation exception. As a general
matter, “equitable relief should not be used to assist one in
extricating himself from circumstances which he has created.”
Utah Coal & Lumber Rest., Inc. v. Outdoor Endeavors Unlimited, 2001
UT 100, ¶ 12, 40 P.3d 581 (quotation simplified). Thus, the district
court exceeded its discretion in awarding Farrell a portion of
Ann’s premarital asset based on the extraordinary situation
exception.
CONCLUSION
¶17 	Because we conclude that the contribution exception does
not apply to premarital contributions to premarital property, that
exception cannot be used to award Farrell a portion of Ann’s
premarital interest in the home. Moreover, because Farrell had
several options for seeking reimbursement for his premarital
efforts, which he declined to exercise, awarding him an interest in
the home at this stage of the proceedings is not justified under the
extraordinary situation exception. Accordingly, we reverse the
court’s award of the disputed portion of the home’s equity and
remand with instructions to award the disputed equity to Ann.