State ex rel. K.M.

2007 UT 93
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
----oo0oo----
State of Utah, in the interests No. 20060683
of K.M., a person under eighteen
years of age.
F I L E D
K.M.,
Petitioner. December 4, 2007
---
Third District Juvenile, Salt Lake
The Honorable Elizabeth A. Lindsley
No. 167056
Attorneys: Mark L. Shurtleff, Att’y Gen., Joanne C. Slotnik,
Asst. Att’y Gen., Narda Beas-Nordell, Michael O.
Zabriskie, Salt Lake City, for the State
Joan C. Watt, Debra M. Nelson, Salt Lake City, for
K.M.
---
On Certiorari to the Utah Court of Appeals
NEHRING, Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 The juvenile court accepted K.M.’s admission to child
abuse homicide, an offense that would be a third degree felony if
committed by an adult. K.M. then sought to withdraw her
admission. The juvenile court denied her motion, and the court
of appeals affirmed. In this review on certiorari, we conclude
that rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure, upon which
the juvenile court relied in accepting K.M.’s admission, fails to
afford due process of law to juveniles because it does not
mandate that the juveniles understand the nature and elements of
the offense to which they are admitting. The inadequate
communication of the nature and elements of the offense, which
rule 25 permitted, led the juvenile court to accept a plea that
was at odds with the contents of K.M.’s admission and was
therefore not entered into knowingly. We therefore reverse the
court of appeals.

1 K.M.’s aunt and mother were concerned that K.M. might have
developed a tumor because one of K.M.’s sisters had developed one
years earlier and because K.M. appeared to be having severe
menstrual symptoms that night.
No. 20060683 2
BACKGROUND
¶2 K.M. did not know she was pregnant until she gave birth
in the downstairs bathroom of her home. K.M. was fifteen years
old at the time. On the day K.M. delivered the infant, she
suffered from what she thought was severe menstrual cramping. To
alleviate the pain, she took several Advil and soaked in a bath.
After several hours of severe cramping, K.M. had an urge to run
into the bathroom, and then she had the urge to push. When the
infant’s “little body fell into [her] arms,” K.M. said that it
made “[n]o movement, no sound.” K.M. was confused by what had
just happened and did not know what to do with the still, silent
human form that inexplicably appeared next to her. She did not
want to place the infant on the floor and chose instead to open
the bathroom window and put the child in the window well. K.M.
watched the little body for five or ten seconds. It did not
appear to move or breathe or utter a sound. The birth occurred
between 11:00 and 11:30 on the night of September 4, 2002.
¶3 K.M. experienced severe blood loss, and she failed to
summon assistance from any of her family members before she
eventually lost consciousness. After regaining consciousness,
K.M. showered in an attempt to clean herself, but she continued
to bleed. She left the shower and attempted to reach her room.
K.M. lost consciousness several more times before she made her
way to her bed, where she passed out. At approximately two
o’clock in the morning, K.M’s mother discovered her in her bed
covered in blood.
¶4 K.M.’s mother called K.M.’s aunt, who is a nurse and
who had been tending K.M. throughout that day, and reported that
something was terribly wrong with K.M. When K.M.’s aunt arrived,
she estimated that K.M. had lost between 600 and 1000 cubic
centimeters of blood and needed immediate medical attention. She
knew the bleeding was vaginal and thought it might be a
spontaneous hemorrhage, perhaps attributable to a tumor.1 K.M.’s
aunt told K.M.’s mother to call 911. She did, and paramedics
arrived soon after.
¶5 K.M. was transported to the hospital. After an
ultrasound and pelvic exam indicated that K.M. had recently given
birth, K.M. told her mother about the little body she had left in

3 No. 20060683
the window well. K.M.’s aunt immediately returned to the house
and found the lifeless body of a four-pound baby boy.
¶6 K.M. has an I.Q. between seventy-nine and eighty-four
and multiple learning disabilities. She had been examined by two
doctors in the last few months preceding the unexpected birth,
but neither physician had diagnosed a pregnancy. According to
K.M., she had her menstrual cycle two weeks prior to going into
labor. She attributed her swollen abdomen to weight gain.
¶7 According to the medical examiner, the infant’s
partially inflated lungs indicated that the baby had been born
alive. The medical examiner could not ascertain the cause of
death but expressed the opinion that maternal neglect contributed
to the infant’s death.
¶8 The State filed a petition in juvenile court charging
K.M. with one count of murder, a first degree felony if committed
by an adult. After her trial on this charge had begun, K.M.
reached a plea agreement with the State and agreed to admit to
child abuse homicide, a third degree felony if committed by an
adult. Pursuant to rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile
Procedure, the juvenile court conducted a colloquy with K.M.,
assisted by K.M.’s counsel. The juvenile court asked K.M.’s
counsel to “advise [K.M.] of her rights on the record.” Counsel
indicated that he had talked to K.M. at length about her rights
and explained to her the nature of a trial. Counsel then
explained to K.M. on the record the rights that K.M. was
surrendering by admitting culpability. He described K.M.’s right
to confront witnesses, her right against self-incrimination, and
her right to appeal an unlawful sentence. He indicated that she
would be able to withdraw the plea for good legal reason up until
the time of sentencing. Then, acknowledging K.M.’s emotional
state, counsel sought to elicit from K.M. an indication of
whether she understood what was happening and whether she was
willing to proceed. She responded that she understood the
proceedings and that she wished to continue. The judge
supplemented counsel’s explanation of K.M.’s rights by telling
her in simple terms that she had a right to call witnesses who
could help her case and a right against self-incrimination.
Neither K.M.’s counsel nor the judge advised her that she was
presumed to be innocent unless and until the State proved beyond
a reasonable doubt all of the elements the offense with which she
was charged and that she would waive her right to testify at
trial by admitting the crime.
¶9 The juvenile court then questioned K.M. about the
events surrounding the birth and death of the infant. K.M.
presented a detailed account of the circumstances surrounding the

No. 20060683 4
offense. She admitted that she now understood that she could
have asked her aunt for help but explained that she was in shock
at the time and that she did not know what was happening to her.
Despite her willingness to enter the plea agreement, K.M.
expressly refused to admit that the infant was born alive.
Nevertheless, the juvenile court determined that, based on the
medical evidence that the infant’s lungs were partially inflated,
there was sufficient factual basis for K.M.’s admission to one
count of child abuse homicide and accepted her admission.
¶10 K.M. subsequently moved to withdraw her admission. She
asserted that she “understood little or none” of the admission
colloquy, that she was pressured into admitting the amended
allegation, and that she did not realize that she was admitting
to causing the death of the child. The juvenile court held a
hearing on K.M.’s motion, and K.M. testified that she had
questioned her admission immediately after entering it. K.M.
explained that she did not understand the plea colloquy because
of the “big words” and that she “didn’t want to sound stupid [by]
saying no.” When the judge probed her understanding of basic
legal concepts, she gave nonsensical answers. When asked by
counsel what her right against self-incrimination meant, she
answered, “I didn’t know that I could take back the plea, I
guess.” When asked about her right to remain silent, K.M.
responded, “I thought I could never talk again.” K.M. explained
the right to proof beyond a reasonable doubt as “[f]or a trial to
become” and “[f]or a trial to come.” After considering the
evidence, the juvenile court denied the motion to withdraw and
sentenced K.M. The judge imposed a suspended sentence of thirty
days’ detention, placed K.M. on probation, and ordered her to
complete rehabilitation programs and 250 hours of community
service.
¶11 After the juvenile court denied her motion to withdraw
her admission, K.M. appealed. The court of appeals affirmed the
juvenile court’s denial of K.M.’s motion to withdraw. We granted
certiorari to review two issues: (1) “[w]hether rule 25 of the
Rules of Juvenile Procedure incorporates the provisions of rule
11 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure and/or additional
requirements with respect to a juvenile court’s colloquy with a
juvenile at the time of accepting an admission to a criminal
offense”; and (2) “[w]hether Petitioner’s admission in this case
was knowing and voluntary according to the requirements of due
process applicable in juvenile proceedings.”
DISCUSSION
¶12 This case touches on a number of bedrock dilemmas that
confront a society founded on the rule of law when the state is

2 The court of appeals’ dissent also aptly observes that the
juvenile court’s disposition imposed consequences on K.M. that
could hardly be characterized as punitive. The combination of
this favorable outcome and the possibility that upon remand of
this case the State may elect to renew the murder charge it
originally pursued against K.M. highlights yet another variation
(continued...)
5 No. 20060683
called upon to bring the power of that law to bear on persons
who, because of their youth, cognitive deficits, or other
disabilities, are incapable of comprehending how or why they are
being held to account for their behavior. The court of appeals’
dissent presented the central dilemma in real world terms when it
asked, “If a juvenile is too young to enter into a legally
binding contract to purchase a set of tires, how can that same
juvenile validly waive constitutional rights and enter into a
legally binding plea agreement?” K.M. v. State (State ex rel.
K.M.), 2006 UT App 74, ¶ 30 n.1, 136 P.3d 1230 (Orme, J.,
dissenting).
¶13 Our juvenile courts owe their existence to the
legislature’s recognition that the sharp edges of the law, which
are necessary to achieve predictability and even-handedness when
dealing with the affairs of adults, often inflict harm on
children who come in contact with them. Thus, owing to a
juvenile’s stage of development, a juvenile’s decisions about
legal affairs may be influenced in varying degrees by the demands
or expectations of family or peers. And an almost countless
array of other forces--several of which are noted in the court of
appeals’ dissent--may diminish a child’s ability to exercise the
independent decision-making judgment we assume to be available to
adults. See State ex rel. K.M., 2006 UT App 74, ¶ 41. Juvenile
court judges are, therefore, called upon to a much greater degree
than their adult counterparts to discern between applications of
the law that are arbitrary and those that are apropos.
¶14 In few instances is a juvenile judge’s power of
discernment put to a greater test than when a juvenile appears
before the judge seeking to admit guilt for committing a crime.
Like an adult defendant, a juvenile charged with a crime is
guaranteed protection against arbitrary infliction of the
coercive power of the state by both the United States
Constitution and the Utah Constitution. A juvenile is entitled
to the benefits of these protections even in those instances
where there is little doubt that the juvenile would also benefit
from lessons imparted by taking responsibility for one’s conduct:
displaying remorse, seeking forgiveness, and submitting herself
to other similar remedies for human imperfection.2

2 (...continued)
of the juvenile court dilemma, here in the form of honoring a
tactical decision that most knowledgeable observers would
consider highly ill-advised.
3 We do not intend to suggest that a live birth is always
necessary to sustain a conviction or adjudication for child abuse
homicide; it is not.
No. 20060683 6
¶15 Here, we conclude that K.M.’s admission was not made
knowingly and voluntarily because she was not informed of and did
not understand the nature and elements of the offense of child
abuse homicide. A full understanding of one’s conduct and of how
and why that conduct made one culpable in the eyes of the law may
be more important in the life of a juvenile than in the life of
an adult. An important trait of a responsible citizen is the
ability to have respect for and confidence in the rule of law and
the institutions that put the rule of law into practice in the
real world. The acquisition of this characteristic is unlikely
to be nurtured if a juvenile is left to face consequences imposed
by courts for behavior that is branded unlawful for reasons that
are left unexplained. In its current form, rule 25 permits this
uncertainty to occur by not requiring juveniles to be informed of
the nature and elements of offenses at the time they admit
culpability for them.
¶16 We ground our holding in our determination that rule 25
is constitutionally defective because it does not require a
juvenile court judge to ensure that the juvenile understands the
nature and elements of the crime to which she is admitting. This
defect was exposed in this case by K.M.’s steadfast insistence
during the admission colloquy that her child was never alive.
K.M.’s refusal to admit that her child was born alive is one of
the dilemmas driving this case through Utah’s court system. The
juvenile court judge clearly believed that K.M.’s insistence that
her child was born dead was a matter of some legal importance.
It is impossible to otherwise explain why the judge elected to
invite a proffer of the medical examiner’s conclusion that the
baby had been born alive in an attempt to establish a factual
basis for K.M.’s admission.
¶17 That K.M. did not admit that her baby was born alive
acquires great value when we recognize that the uncontested facts
in this case leave little doubt that K.M. could not have been
adjudicated guilty of child abuse homicide without proof that her
child was born alive.3 K.M.’s refusal to admit that the child
was born alive is a singular circumstance that spawned multiple

7 No. 20060683
legal issues, most notably whether a sufficient factual basis
supported K.M.’s admission and whether K.M. understood the nature
of her admission.
¶18 In the court of appeals, the majority and the dissent
each confronted the factual basis problem, but in different ways.
The majority, sidestepping the question of whether sufficient
facts supported K.M.’s admission in the face of her denial that
the child was born alive, maintained that the factual basis
question was not preserved. State ex rel. K.M., 2006 UT App 74,
¶¶ 16-18. The dissent, on the other hand, would have held that
the factual basis behind the admission was
adequately established by the autopsy of the
baby, K.M.’s statement to the court regarding
the birth of the baby, and K.M.’s own
attorney’s concession that there’s no dispute
about whether the baby was born alive[,] the
puzzlement comes from what caused the baby to
die.
Id. ¶ 32 n.2 (Orme, J., dissenting) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (alteration in original). In our view, however, the
legal consequences of K.M.’s insistence that her baby was not
born alive are not put to rest by treating the matter as one of
factual sufficiency; the factual sufficiency question, however,
is ultimately resolved. Rather, the fact of K.M.’s insistence
that there was no live birth also looms over an assessment of
whether K.M.’s admission was knowing and voluntary and whether
rule 25 adequately safeguards a juvenile’s right to due process
of law.
¶19 The distinction between a claim of insufficient factual
basis for the admission, which we did not agree to review, and a
claim that the admission was not knowing and voluntary, which is
within the scope of our grant of certiorari, is both subtle and
opaque. We will therefore attempt to clarify our approach by
introducing it through a closer assessment of the court of
appeals’ treatment of K.M.’s claim that her admission lacked
factual support. Examining the text of K.M.’s motion to withdraw
her admission, which asserted that K.M. “was unaware that she was
admitting to causing the death of [her] child,” the court of
appeals’ majority concluded that K.M. “did not raise the issue of
inadequate factual basis.” Id. ¶ 17. Instead, the court
reasoned that “this assertion implied that K.M. had admitted to
causing the baby’s death, but had done so unwittingly.” Id.
(emphasis in original). The majority appears to interpret
“unwittingly” to imply that K.M. experienced an after-the-fact
realization that she had misapprehended the nature of the

No. 20060683 8
proceedings. We find that K.M.’s stated grounds for challenging
her admission also imply that K.M. made her admission unwittingly
because she did not fully understand the nature and elements of
the offense to which she was admitting. This interpretation was
preserved in the juvenile court, and it forms the basis of our
analytical approach to this case. Moreover, it appears that the
juvenile court actually ruled on the inadequate factual basis
challenge, a fact that calls into question the court of appeals’
majority’s determination that the factual basis question was not
preserved. In its minutes and order relating to the motion to
withdraw, the juvenile court found that K.M.’s admission was
entered knowingly and voluntarily. Specifically, the court
explained, “[K.M.] was advised of all of her rights, she waived
them voluntarily, she gave a factual basis for her admission.
There is no good cause to withdraw her admission . . .” (emphasis
added).
¶20 Preserved or not, the factual sufficiency of K.M.’s
admission is not before us. The effect of K.M.’s refusal to
admit that her baby was born alive endures, however, and we now
turn to analysis on how this circumstance compromised K.M.’s
understanding of the nature of her admission. This approach
falls in line with our order granting certiorari, where we asked
whether there are any “additional requirements” in addition to
those provided in rule 25 “with respect to a juvenile court’s
colloquy with a juvenile at the time of accepting an admission to
a criminal offense” and where we asked whether K.M.’s admission
“was knowing and voluntary according to the requirements of due
process applicable in juvenile proceedings.” We find that due
process requires a juvenile court judge to ensure that a juvenile
understand the nature and elements of the crime to which she
admits, a requirement not currently reflected in rule 25.
Further, we find that K.M. did not have a sufficient
understanding of the nature of the crime to which she admitted in
order to make her admission knowing and voluntary. We reiterate,
however, that our fault-finding is directed at the shortcomings
in rule 25 and not at the juvenile court judge who followed the
rule and conducted a competent plea colloquy with K.M.
¶21 Much like rule 11 of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, rule 25 of the Utah Rules of Juvenile Procedure
establishes the procedure for taking admissions in juvenile
court. Rule 11 has generated a prodigious body of jurisprudence
in Utah’s appellate courts, but rule 25 has not. We agree with
the court of appeals that rule 11 caselaw is therefore of great
value as a guide to the interpretation of rule 25. But we also
find that a key feature of rule 11 that does not appear in the
text of rule 25 causes rule 25 to be constitutionally defective.
Unlike rule 11, rule 25 does not require the juvenile court judge

9 No. 20060683
to ascertain that the juvenile understands the nature and
elements of the offense to which she is admitting. And in this
case, the resulting absence of a discussion of the nature and
elements of the offense within the admission colloquy between the
juvenile court judge and K.M. has left us without sufficient
confidence that K.M.’s admission was knowing and voluntary.
¶22 Rule 11(e)(4)(A) of the Utah Rules of Criminal
Procedure, which imposes on a trial judge the responsibility to
communicate to a defendant the nature and elements of each
offense to which a plea is contemplated, together with its
companion rule 11 requirements, reflects the exacting demands the
law places on those who choose to surrender their right to make
the state prove their guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. In State
v. Thurman, we explained that, to ensure that a defendant’s plea
is “‘truly voluntary’” under the Constitution, the judge
receiving the plea must “determine that the defendant ‘possesses
an understanding of the law in relation to the facts’” and must
confirm “that the defendant understands the elements of the
crime.” 911 P.2d 371, 373 (Utah 1996) (quoting State v.
Breckenridge, 688 P.2d 440, 444 (Utah 1983)). Due process,
therefore, requires that the defendant “possess[] an
understanding of the law in relation to the facts” for a plea to
be knowing and voluntary. Id. (internal quotation marks
omitted).
¶23 We conclude that juveniles who appear in juvenile court
are also entitled to benefit from this due process protection.
This conclusion is not based on our belief that the taking of
juvenile admissions should simply follow in lock step with the
mandates of rule 11. We are sensitive to the practical reality
that due process takes on an altered form in juvenile courts
because of the rehabilitative focus of the juvenile court system.
See generally In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 14-21 (1967) (explaining
that “[f]rom the inception of the juvenile court system, wide
differences have been tolerated--indeed insisted upon--between
the procedural rights accorded to adults and those of juveniles”
and recounting the “history and theory underlying this
development”).
¶24 The due process standard in juvenile proceedings is
“fundamental fairness.” McKeiver v. Pennsylvania, 403 U.S. 528,
543 (1971). And the United States Supreme Court has
characterized its juvenile due process cases as having “an
emphasis on factfinding procedures.” Id. Still, if there is a
legitimate policy-based rationale for limiting a juvenile’s due
process rights in the juvenile court context, it may be
appropriate to limit those rights. For example, juveniles are
guaranteed the rights of “notice, counsel, confrontation, cross-

4 We decline at this time to articulate an amendment to rule
25 that would cure this constitutional defect. Such a task is
better left to the traditional rulemaking procedures, where this
court will have the advantage of working with a rulemaking
committee and receiving comment on any proposed amendments to the
rule.
5 Utah Code sections 76-5-109(3)(a) through (c) and 76-5-
208(3) also provide that a child abuse homicide done
intentionally, knowingly, recklessly, or with criminal negligence
could constitute a third degree felony if the injury is not
serious, which is bizarre, considering that this is a child abuse
homicide statute.
No. 20060683 10
examination, and standard of proof.” Id. Due process does not,
however, require the juvenile court to provide juveniles with a
trial by jury because “[t]he imposition of the jury trial on the
juvenile court system would not strengthen greatly, if at all,
the factfinding function, and would, contrarily, provide an
attrition of the juvenile court’s assumed ability to function in
a unique manner.” Id. at 547.
¶25 We can uncover no legitimate reason to withhold from
juveniles the right to understand the nature and elements of the
offense to which they propose to admit culpability and how the
law relates to the facts of their cases. We have searched
available archival sources and can find nothing to explain why
this constitutional right was not included in rule 25. Further,
we cannot think of such a reason. Therefore, although it is not
presently a violation of rule 25 for the juvenile court to fail
to ensure that a juvenile understand the nature and elements of
the crime to which she is admitting, it does offend due process
not to do so. Without an adequate communication of the nature
and elements of the offense that is the subject of the admission,
the admission is presumptively not knowing and voluntary.4
¶26 In this case, K.M. did not possess a reasonable
understanding of the law in relation to the facts of her case
when she entered her admission. K.M. entered an admission to
child abuse homicide, a third degree felony under Utah Code
section 76-5-208(3) (2003). Child abuse homicide results if “the
actor causes the death of a person under 18 years of age and the
death results from child abuse, as defined in [Utah Code]
Subsection 76-5-109(1).” Id. § 76-5-208(1). Further, child
abuse homicide will be a third degree felony if the child abuse
is done with criminal negligence.5 Id. § 76-5-208(3)(b).

6 The State notes that the juvenile court is required to
inform the juvenile of the nature and elements of the crime being
charged at the arraignment, as per rule 24 of the Utah Rules of
Juvenile Procedure. But we do not believe that this rule helps
the State’s case for two reasons. First, the allegations at the
arraignment may be different from the crimes to which the
juvenile ultimately admits. Second, we believe that the time
that elapses between the arraignment and the actual admission
will often be sufficient for juveniles to forget or to get
confused about the nature and elements of the crime to which they
are admitting, such that their admission would not be knowing and
voluntary.
11 No. 20060683
¶27 Because rule 25 did not require the juvenile court to
ensure that the juvenile understood the nature and elements of
the crime, the juvenile court in this case understandably did not
dedicate a portion of the admission colloquy to ensure that K.M.
understood the nature and elements of the crime to which she was
admitting. The juvenile court did recite the elements of the
crime when presenting the amended allegation to K.M., explaining
that the allegation was amended to read that K.M. “with criminal
negligence caused the death of a person under 18 years of age and
[that] the death results from child abuse.” The court then asked
K.M., “Do you admit or deny that?” K.M. responded that she would
“[a]dmit that,” and the court proceeded to attempt to establish a
factual basis for the plea. That, however, was the extent of the
juvenile court’s efforts to explain to K.M. the nature of the
crime to which she was admitting, and we find that those efforts
were constitutionally inadequate.6
¶28 In addition, further review of the admission colloquy
and the hearing on the motion to withdraw demonstrates that K.M.
did not understand the nature and elements of the crime to which
she admitted. For example, K.M. never admitted that the child
was born alive or that she had contributed, either directly or
indirectly, to the death of the child. After K.M. entered her
admission, the juvenile court proceeded to question K.M. about
the events in question, seeking to establish a factual basis for
the admission. In response to the court’s request that K.M.
recount everything that happened, K.M. told her story in great
detail. At the conclusion of her account, the court then
questioned K.M. about whether she thought the baby was born
alive:
THE COURT: [K.M.], did that child
ever make a noise?
[K.M.]: No, ma’am.

No. 20060683 12
THE COURT: Could you tell if the
baby was ever breathing
or not?
[K.M.]: Yes, ma’am, I would have.
MR. BRASS: She didn’t understand the
question. I heard it,
but she--
THE COURT: Was the baby breathing or
not?
[K.M.]: No, ma’am.
. . . .
THE COURT: Do you agree that the
baby was born alive?
[K.M.]: No, ma’am.
¶29 K.M.’s refusal to admit that the child was born alive
or that she contributed to its death demonstrates that she was
not aware of the nature and elements of the crime to which she
was admitting. The closest that she came to admitting to
indirectly causing the death of her child was in response to a
series of leading questions by the juvenile court during the
admission colloquy:
THE COURT: [K.M.], why didn’t you
call out to your aunt or
to your sisters?
[K.M.]: I was in shock. I didn’t
know what was happening.
THE COURT: But your aunt was there
trying to help you
through the whole night,
wasn’t she?
[K.M.]: Yes.
THE COURT: And you could have asked
for help, couldn’t you?
[K.M.]: Yes.

13 No. 20060683
THE COURT: And you should have asked
for help, shouldn’t you?
[K.M.]: Yes, I know that now.
Even putting aside the leading nature of the court’s questions,
K.M.’s acknowledgment that she should have asked for help does
not contribute to an understanding of how K.M.’s failure to
summon help could have resulted in the death of her already dead
baby. Further, K.M. repeatedly testified at the hearing on the
motion to withdraw her admission that she did not understand that
she was admitting to “abusing the little body” and that she was
not aware that she was admitting to causing the death of the
child, even indirectly.
¶30 We are sensitive to the practical challenges that
accompany requiring juvenile court judges to ensure that the
juveniles in their courtrooms understand the nature and elements
of the offenses to which they are admitting culpability. The
wide spectrum of ages, educational attainment, developmental
maturity, whether the child has cognitive disabilities, and the
child’s experience with the legal system contribute to making
difficult the necessary work of seeing to it that a juvenile
fully comprehend the nature and elements of the offenses before
her admitted culpability is formally acknowledged. These are the
same difficulties, however, that juvenile court judges face when
performing many of their duties. The fact that juvenile court
judges have proven to be so skillful at meeting these challenges
removes any reluctance we might otherwise have to impose upon
them this additional responsibility. To confirm our confidence
in juvenile court judges’ ability to communicate the nature and
elements of an offense, we need look no further than the manner
in which K.M.’s judge conducted the admission colloquy. The
record reveals that she took extra precautions to ensure that
K.M. was comfortable with the proceedings and that she understood
the nature of the constitutional rights that she was waiving.
¶31 In sum, we conclude that, owing to a constitutional
defect in rule 25’s procedures for accepting a juvenile’s
admission, the juvenile court judge did not adequately ensure
that K.M. understood the nature and elements of the offense for
which she admitted culpability. Her admission of responsibility
was therefore not knowing and voluntary, and her motion to
withdraw her admission should have been granted. We reverse and
remand.

No. 20060683 14
CONCLUSION
¶32 Due process requires that juveniles understand the
nature and elements of the crime to which they are admitting
before their admissions will be knowing and voluntary. Because
the juvenile court did not take steps to ensure such an
understanding in K.M. and because we find that K.M. did not
obtain such an understanding, we find that her admission was not
knowing and voluntary. She should therefore be allowed to
withdraw her admission.
---
¶33 Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, and Justice
Parrish concur in Justice Nehring’s opinion.
---
WILKINS, Associate Chief Justice, concurring in the result:
¶34 More than 100 years ago the first American court
devoted exclusively to the unique and difficult challenge of
dealing with children charged with crimes was established in
Chicago. Since then, in one form or another, every state in the
Union has adopted special rules for dealing with children in
court, generally by establishing a juvenile court. Utah joined
this trend in the mid-1900s, and by the latest turn of the
century our juvenile courts had achieved status equal to our
district courts, but as courts of specified and limited
statutorily delineated jurisdiction.
¶35 Utah’s juvenile courts are charged with the protection
of Utah’s children from the abuse, neglect, or other harmful
action of adults in their lives. They are also charged with the
protection of other citizens and property from the wrongful acts
of children, while recognizing the unique need to do all that is
reasonable to salvage a child who has strayed from the path of
acceptable behavior. As with all courts, our juvenile courts are
designed to see that those responsible for wrongful acts face
appropriate consequences. However, unlike our adult system, the
appropriateness of the consequences is measured in part by the
likelihood that a child’s pattern of behavior can and will be
modified in the direction of proper and acceptable behavior as a
result. Salvaging an errant child is a high priority.
¶36 In the adult system, an individual responsible for the
death of an infant will likely face incarceration and other
consequences designed to both punish and remove from society for
an extended period the perpetrator. In our adult correctional
system, less effort is directed at correcting the underlying

15 No. 20060683
cause of the criminal behavior. Preventing recurrence is
important, but is primarily accomplished through the threat of
harsh punishment for future misdeeds.
¶37 Where an adult charged with the same behavior as the
child defendant in this case could expect a term of years in
prison, a child of K.M.’s age and maturity received services at
state expense, counseling, treatment, and supervision. The
consequences imposed on K.M. were designed to convince K.M. that
her behavior was not acceptable in civilized society, to help her
in a very aggressive way to understand and to overcome the
circumstances that led to the death of her child, and to help her
to mature and develop into a responsible and reliable adult.
¶38 To facilitate the different role of the juvenile court
in dealing with acts that would be seen as serious crimes if
committed by adults, we employ a slightly different system of
justice. Juvenile proceedings are treated as civil, not
criminal. Children are charged with offenses, not crimes. The
offenses are defined as acts that would be crimes if committed by
an adult. Inherent in this distinction is the policy of this
state to treat offenses by children as something other than the
crimes that an adult would be charged with as a result of the
same actions.
¶39 We employ a different language. Allegations are
admitted or denied. A child does not plead guilty or innocent.
A charge against a child is found to be true or not true. A
child is not found guilty or not guilty. A child does not enjoy
the same unfettered right to self-representation afforded adults,
for obvious reasons: a child is not assumed to be capable of
making a mature and informed judgment regarding the risks of
self-representation. We require the intervention of adult
judgment, usually the concurrence of a parent, before we allow a
child to represent herself in court. Children are not entitled
to a jury of their peers in ascertaining the truthfulness of the
allegations against them, again for obvious reasons. In the
juvenile courts, we rely upon specialized judges steeped in the
policy and theory of juvenile justice to select from the vast
array of alternatives those most likely to meet the multiple
goals of a juvenile court proceeding.
¶40 The distinction of greatest importance between adult
and juvenile criminal justice process involves the role of adults
acting for and on behalf of the accused. In a case such as that
brought against K.M., we assign mature adults to act in the best
interests of the child, even if the child does not agree with
that action. The law assigns this role to the parents or legal
guardians of the child in most circumstances. When there exists

No. 20060683 16
a doubt about the impartiality, devotion, maturity, or competence
of the parent or guardian, the court is authorized and obligated
to assign another skilled adult to the role: the guardian ad
litem. In addition, when a child faces a serious charge, these
adults are required to assure competent legal counsel is provided
for the child.
¶41 Clearly, some children are incapable, because of their
age, mental ability, maturity, social experience, or other
reasons, of making sound and responsible decisions. That is a
basic distinction between children and adults, and the single
most important motivation for the establishment of a separate
juvenile court system. Children who engage in behavior that
would be considered serious crimes if committed by adults may, or
may not, understand the seriousness or potential consequences of
that behavior. They may, or may not, understand the process of
the juvenile justice system, and the unique and multifaceted role
of the juvenile court. They may, or may not, be able to
understand these important distinctions. It is for this exact
reason that we charge parents, guardians, counsel, and guardians
ad litem with the responsibility to think and understand for the
child, and to make decisions best suited for the child’s well-
being and future. We expect these adults to understand, and to
apply their maturity, reason, and concern for the child, to the
decisions required.
¶42 As a consequence of the special care, significantly
enhanced treatment and protection options, services, and reduced
penalties available to a child confronting a charge in juvenile
court, we do not extend to the child all of the adult protections
of our criminal justice system. To date, recognizing the more
limited role of the child in the decision process of the juvenile
justice system, we have not required what might well be fruitless
and wasted efforts to include a child in the difficult decisions
affecting their future. As a matter of state and national
policy, we have declined to grant directly to children the full
scope of criminal due process and other constitutional
protections ordinarily afforded accused adults. Instead, we
focus our efforts on protecting them from the life-long
consequences of acts committed when adult judgment and mature
experience are as yet not available to them.
¶43 In this instance, K.M. was charged with the wrongful
death of her newborn son. Her immaturity is clearly demonstrated
by her reaction to the birth of her child. At fifteen she was
pregnant but did not recognize it. She was surprised by the
birth of her child. She did not know what to do. She did not
seek help from her mother, with whom she was living. She put the
little body in the window well, took a shower, and went to sleep.

17 No. 20060683
When the situation was later discovered by her mother, the infant
was dead. Her intellectual ability is limited, testing at an
I.Q. level of between 79 and 84.
¶44 In the course of the investigation and trial, K.M. was
convinced to admit wrongdoing in the death of her infant son in
exchange for a reduction in the charge by the prosecution. She
had been charged with murder, a first degree felony if committed
by an adult. That charge was reduced to child abuse homicide, a
third degree felony if committed by an adult in exchange for her
admission of culpability. Her defense counsel, and her mother,
saw the admission as in K.M.’s self-interest. K.M. admitted that
she delivered the baby and put him in the window well without seeking
any other help for herself or the infant. In response to inquiry
from the juvenile judge, K.M. said she did not know the infant
was alive when born. Between the judge and K.M.’s defense
counsel, K.M. was told that she was giving up certain rights in
making the admission. These rights parallel some, but not all,
of the rights afforded adult criminal defendants under the
constitution.
¶45 At issue in this appeal is the question of whether or
not K.M.’s plea was constitutionally defective. The focus of
concern is on the extent of the effort made by the judge to
assure that K.M. personally understood the nature and elements of
the offense to which she was admitting responsibility. My
colleagues today extend another degree of constitutional
protection to the child herself. I would not.
¶46 Under our juvenile court system of criminal justice, it
is not critical that the child defendant fully comprehend the
nature and elements of the offense that would be a crime if she
were an adult before the allegations are admitted. What is
critical is that those admissions made by the child be factually
true, and that those adults specifically charged by the law with
applying mature judgment on behalf of the child fully understand
the nature and elements of the charge and the consequences that
will flow to the child as a result her admission. As part of the
very nature of juvenile court, the child must be fully involved
in the decisions, and accept responsibility for her actions.
However, it is the very absence of adult capacity to understand
and appreciate the circumstances that has placed the child in the
juvenile court system in the first place.
¶47 I dissent from the opinion expressed by my colleagues
to the extent that they mandate that the juvenile court assure
that the juvenile understand the nature and elements of the
offense to which the admission is made. While certainly a
desirable state of affairs, and one to be sought in every

No. 20060683 18
instance, it is contrary to the interests of the children
involved to elevate that desire to a constitutional right.
¶48 Some children charged with very serious offenses are
simply incapable of fully comprehending the nature and elements,
the potential consequences, and the choices before them.
Nonetheless, it may be very much in their best interest to agree
to a reduced charge, both in terms of short-term consequences,
and in terms of life-long impacts. If a duty exists to assure
the informed nature of an admission, it must fall to the adults
specifically and exclusively charged with the protection of the
child’s interests: parents, guardians, counsel, and guardians ad
litem. It is counterproductive, contrary to the policy
underpinning the juvenile court system as a whole, and
unnecessary to place that responsibility on the judge.
¶49 I would leave rule 25 unchanged, accept admissions made
on adequate facts, and recognize the unique and valuable
distinctions between adult criminal and juvenile civil process.
¶50 That said, I still would reverse the court of appeals
and remand the matter to the juvenile court. In this particular
case, the child did not admit the predicate facts sufficient to
find the allegations true. Whether or not K.M. understood that
the charge required proof or admission that the infant was born
alive, it did so require. And K.M. did not admit that necessary
fact. Consequently, the admission was insufficient to support
the charge as a matter of statutory law. I would reverse the
conviction and remand the matter for a new trial on that basis.
---