Save Our Schools v. Board of Education

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| 2005 Ur 55 |

This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH

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Save Our Schools et al., No. 20030994
Plaintiffs and Appellants,
v.
The Board of Education of FILED
Salt Lake City et al.,

Defendants and Appellees. August 30, 2005

Third Dstrict, Salt Lake
The Honorable Sandra N Peuler
No. 010908776

Attorneys: Paul M Durham Mrk O Mprris, Wade R_ Budge,
Salt Lake Gity, for plaintiffs
John E. S. Robson, Joan M Andrews, Salt Lake City,
for defendants

WLKINS, Associate Chief Justice:

q1 The Plaintiffs appeal the trial court’s ruling that the
Salt Lake Gity School Board did not act arbitrarily or
Capriciously when it determined to close Lovell and Rosslyn
Heights elenentary schools. W affirm

BACKGROUND

12 June 19, 2001, the Salt Lake City School Board (“the
Board”) voted to close Lowell and Rosslyn Fights el enentary
schools. This decision represented the culmnation of nore than
four years of deliberation over howto resolve problens rel ating
to school facilities usage, school boundaries, and school
cl osure. Parents and others opposing the closure of the two
schools filed separate lawsuits that were later consolidated into
a single action. The matter was tried before the trial court
fromjJune 23 to July 7, 2003.

No. 20030994 2
¶3 The sole issue before the trial court was whether the
Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously in deciding to close the
two schools because it allegedly failed to consider one of its
closure policies, Policy FLA, in making its determination. The
trial court held that the Board’s closure decision should be
upheld unless it was arbitrary and capricious. The court further
held that such a finding could be made only if there was no
reasonable basis for the Board’s decision.
¶4 The Plaintiffs argued that the Board’s decision was
illegal because the Board ignored Policy FLA, a basic closure
policy the Board enacted in 1973 to guide school closure
decisions. Policy FLA was comprised of the following six
factors:
(1) keeping neighborhood schools as close to
students and community as economically
possible;
(2) safety of students in travel to school
and within the buildings they occupy;
(3) minimize the amount and distance of
transportation required to place students in
neighborhood schools;
(4) placement of students in efficient and
educationally functional buildings;
(5) newer schools with more adequate
facilities and less maintenance costs should
be selected, if available in any given area,
in preference to older schools; and
(6) replacement of old schools by building
strategically placed new schools.
¶5 The Plaintiffs contended that because the Board members
did not receive a copy of Policy FLA and some members were
unaware of the specific policy itself, the Board should be
precluded from asserting that it properly considered the policy
in making the decision to close the two schools. The Board, on
the other hand, maintained that all of the factors enumerated in
Policy FLA were fully incorporated into new documents that guided
the determination to close Rosslyn Heights and Lowell. Thus, the
Board argues, regardless of whether all the Board members
specifically knew about Policy FLA, its contents provided the

3 No. 20030994
basis for the decision and the Board therefore properly adhered
to its closure policies.
¶6 At the conclusion of trial, the court made the factual
finding that the Plaintiffs had “not proven that the Board failed
to follow its closure policy in making its decision to close the
two schools,” and thus concluded that the Board had not acted
arbitrarily or capriciously. It deferred to the Board’s
decision, holding that it could not do otherwise unless there was
no reasonable basis for the Board’s action. Accordingly, the
trial court upheld the Board’s decision and the Plaintiffs
appealed. We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78-
2-2(3)(j) (2002).
ANALYSIS
¶7 This appeal requires us to analyze two issues. First,
we must determine whether the trial court erred in making the
factual finding that the Board considered Policy FLA in deciding
to close Rosslyn Heights and Lowell elementary schools. We
conclude that the trial court did not clearly err in making that
finding. Second, we must determine whether the trial court
granted the appropriate amount of deference to the Board’s
closure decision. We conclude that it did. We address each
issue in turn.
I. THE BOARD ACTED IN CONFORMITY WITH ITS POLICIES
¶8 The sole basis for the Plaintiffs’ argument that the
Board acted arbitrarily or capriciously in deciding to close the
two schools is that the Board acted without regard to Policy FLA.
However, since the trial court found that the Board did consider
Policy FLA, we would have to determine that the trial court’s
finding on that point was clearly erroneous before we could
conclude that the Board acted arbitrarily and capriciously. See
Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a) (“Findings of fact . . . shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous.”); 438 Main St. v. Easy Heat,
Inc., 2004 UT 72, ¶ 76, 99 P.3d 801 (evaluating a challenge to
the trial court’s factual findings under a clearly erroneous
standard).
¶9 The trial court’s factual findings will not be
considered clearly erroneous unless they are “not adequately
supported by the record, resolving all disputes in the evidence
in a light most favorable to the trial court’s determination.”
State v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994); see also 438 Main
St., 2004 UT 72 at ¶ 75 (holding that we will not “undertake an
independent assessment of the evidence presented during the
course of trial and reach our own separate findings,” but will

No. 20030994 4
instead overturn the trial court’s findings only if they “are
against the clear weight of the evidence”).
¶10 It is the Plaintiffs’ responsibility to marshal the
evidence to demonstrate that the factual findings made by the
trial court were erroneous. See Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(9).
Specifically, our marshaling rule requires plaintiffs to “marshal
all the evidence in favor of the facts as found by the trial
court and then demonstrate that even viewing the evidence in a
light most favorable to the court below, the evidence is
insufficient to support the findings of fact.” Chen v. Stewart,
2004 UT 82, ¶ 76, 100 P.3d 1177 (internal quotation omitted).
We find that the Plaintiffs have failed to present sufficient
evidence to overturn the factual finding made below. Because we
find that the Plaintiffs failed to meet their burden, we accept
the trial court’s factual determination that the Board did
consider Policy FLA in reaching its decision to close the two
elementary schools. We repeat the facts in the record to explain
our conclusion.
¶11 The trial court found that the Board members knew about
the existence of Policy FLA, though “with some degree of
difference regarding the [policy’s] binding effect,” and agreed
that no policy should be ignored. It also found that the members
conceded that “they did not review [the] FLA [policy] at the time
the closure decision was made, and that no discussion involved
any specific acknowledgment of the criteria contained within the
policy.” The Plaintiffs contend that this concession equates to
an admission that the Board acted without regard to its own
policies, and therefore acted arbitrarily and capriciously.
¶12 The trial court disagreed, finding instead that the
Board meeting minutes, the documents drafted and circulated to
the Board pertaining to the closure decision, and the
instructions to subcommittees charged with assisting in the
closure evaluation are replete with discussion of the factors
listed in the FLA document, and demonstrate the Board’s
compliance with its closure policies. Further, Superintendent
Robles testified that she knew of the policy and that she
specifically incorporated it into the guidelines the Board used
in deciding whether and which schools to close. She did not cite
the FLA document as the source of the policy consideration
because she felt that the factors were so obvious and basic that
doing so was unnecessary. The Board members also testified that
the six factors in the FLA document were important, driving
concerns in the decision-making process. The trial court found
the evidence to be clear that the basic factors contained in the

5 No. 20030994
FLA document were thoroughly discussed when the Board made the
closure decision.
¶13 In addition, it is important to note that the language
of the factors themselves portrays the discretionary nature of
Board decisions. The factors are necessarily competing
considerations, as there may be instances in which a newer
facility that is more efficient and educationally functional may
also be located slightly further away than an older, less
functional school. The FLA document does not dictate a formula
for deciding between schools that satisfy some but not all of the
requirements. The policy itself requires the Board to exercise
discretion in making these decisions.
¶14 For example, a preference for a newer but more distant
school over a closer, older one is simply a matter of discretion
itself, with no obvious answer under the FLA guidelines. Board
members are to consider those factors in making their decisions;
the members are not instructed as to how much weight each factor
should receive. Rather, they were elected by their constituents
to weigh the advantages and disadvantages of such alternatives.
¶15 Here, the trial court found that the Board did exactly
that. Though the Board members did not have the specific FLA
document in front of them during their deliberations, they did
have documents that incorporated, without reference, the very
factors outlined in the FLA document. Whether the Board placed
increased emphasis on some of the factors over others or included
additional factors in their analysis is the prerogative of the
Board and is irrelevant to the determination of whether the Board
acted without regard to the FLA policy. The record demonstrates
that the Board considered each factor the FLA policy set forth.
We hold that the trial court did not err in finding that the
Board complied with its policies in making the closure decision.
¶16 We now address whether the trial court afforded proper
deference to the Board when it sustained its decision to close
the two elementary schools. We hold that it did.
II. THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DEFERRED TO SCHOOL BOARD ACTION
¶17 The trial court held that it would overturn the Board’s
decision only “if there was no reasonable basis for [that
decision].” The Plaintiffs argue that such deference was
inappropriate in this case because the decision constituted
administrative, not legislative, action. Thus, they argue,
courts reviewing school board decisions like the one at issue

No. 20030994 6
here must adopt a non-deferential “substantial evidence”
standard. We disagree.
¶18 Under our case law governing school board action, the
only question the courts have focused upon has been whether the
action taken was within the Board’s delegated powers to act, not
whether the action was legislative or administrative. These
cases have recognized that “a local school board is empowered to
‘make and enforce rules necessary for the control and management
of the district schools’ and to ‘do all other things necessary
for the maintenance, prosperity, and success of the schools and
the promotion of education.’” Bd. of Educ. v. Ward , 1999 UT 17,
¶ 9, 974 P.2d 824 (quoting Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-402(14), (18)
(2000) (current version at Utah Code Ann. § 53A-3-402(15)(a),
(20) (Supp. 2004))). We have repeatedly stated:
“‘In harmony with the import of the statutes
[governing the authority of school boards] is
the fact that it is inherent in the nature of
the board’s function in managing school
district business that it have a broad
latitude of discretion in order to carry out
its objective of providing the best possible
school system in the most efficient and
economical way.’”
Id. (quoting Espinal v. Salt Lake City Bd. of Educ. , 797 P.2d
412, 414 (Utah 1990) (brackets in original) (quoting Ricker v.
Bd. of Educ. , 396 P.2d 416, 420 (Utah 1964))).
¶19 Further, we have emphasized a school board’s broad
discretion in interpreting its own policy, stating that such
“management, supervision and determination of
policy are the prerogative and responsibility
of school officials; and that the courts
should be reluctant to enter therein; and
indeed not to do so unless it is shown that
the complainant was in some manner deprived
of due process, or that the action of the
board was so entirely without justification
that it must be deemed capricious and
arbitrary .”
Id. (emphasis added) (quoting E.M. v. Briggs , 922 P.2d 754, 757
(Utah 1996)) (further quotation omitted).

7 No. 20030994
¶20 As found by the trial court, the Board did not act
entirely without justification, nor did it interpret its FLA
policy in an arbitrary and capricious way. The trial court found
that the Board did in fact consider each and every policy factor
that the Plaintiffs contend the Board was required to consider in
making the closure decision. The fact that some members did not
know the origin of those factors does not mean that they failed
to consider them. Not only was the Board’s action not “entirely
without justification,” the trial court found that it was
pursuant to the very factors the Plaintiffs contend the Board was
required to utilize. There is nothing in the record to
demonstrate clear error in the trial court’s finding.
¶21 Though the closure of one’s neighborhood school is a
sad event for those affected, that disappointment does not
qualify a court to reevaluate an elected school board’s decision
unless that decision truly was without justification. The remedy
for those dissatisfied with a school board’s decision is in the
voting booths on election day. We accordingly affirm.
CONCLUSION
¶22 The trial court did not err in finding that the Board
considered all of the policies enumerated in the FLA document.
The Board closed the schools in an effort to save money to build
new schools in the west side of the city that it determined was
underserving its student population. The Board determined that
the city, and the student population as a whole, would be best
served if two of its east-side elementary schools, one of which
was significantly under-populated and located on an undesirable
lot, were closed and the students were redirected to another
area.
¶23 Though this decision is an unpopular one with the
parents of the affected children, the Plaintiffs cannot make out
a plausible case that the decision was arbitrary and capricious.
The trial court properly concluded that the Board considered all
of the policies it was bound to consider, as borne out by trial
testimony, Board documents, and minutes of the Board meeting. It
is not this court’s province to interfere in the decision made by
that elected body in the absence of arbitrary and capricious
decision-making. We affirm.
---
¶24 Chief Justice Durham, Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish,
and Justice Nehring concur in Associate Chief Justice Wilkins’
opinion.

No. 20030994
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