General Construction v. Peterson Plumbing

2011 UT 1
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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General Construction & 	No. 20080998
Development, Inc., et al.,
Plaintiffs and Appellees,
v.
F I L E D
Peterson Plumbing Supply,
Defendant and Appellant. 	January 7, 2011
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Fourth District, Provo Dep’t
The Honorable Samuel D. McVey
No. 080402976
Attorneys: Paul D. Dodd, Randall K. Spencer, Provo, for plaintiffs
Dana T. Farmer, Garrett A. Walker, Ogden, for defendant
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DURHAM, Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 	This interlocutory appeal involves a dispute over the timeliness of
multiple mechanics’ liens filed more than 180 days after final completion of the original
contracts, but within 90 days of the filing of notices of completion. We hold that under
a plain reading of Utah Code section 38-1-7(1)(a)(i) (2008), all the liens were timely
because they were filed within 90 days after the notices of completion. We therefore
reverse and remand.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	Appellee General Construction & Development, Inc. (GCD) developed
and built Rockwell Condominiums in Pleasant Grove City, Utah. GCD also owns

several of the condominium units at issue in this case. The other Appellees are also
owners of condominium units.
¶3 	GCD contracted with Pace Plumbing to do work on multiple buildings in
the development. Pace subcontracted with Appellant Peterson Plumbing Supply (PPS)
to provide materials to Pace. Pace failed to pay PPS for the materials provided. PPS
filed mechanics’ lien notices on each of the condominium units at issue. All these liens
were recorded more than 180 days after certificates of occupancy were issued for the
units.1 However, the liens were recorded within 90 days of GCD’s filing of a notice of
completion on each of the relevant properties.2
¶4 	Appellees filed a petition to nullify PPS’s liens. The district court granted
the petition, and the matter is before this court on interlocutory appeal. We have
jurisdiction pursuant to Utah Code section 78A-3-102(3)(j) (Supp. 2010).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶5 	“The interpretation of a statute is a question of law that we review for
correctness without any deference to the legal conclusions of the district court.” Jaques
v. Midway Auto Plaza, Inc., 2010 UT 54, ¶ 11, 240 P.3d 769.
ANALYSIS
¶6 	Appellees have challenged PPS’s liens on two grounds. First, they claim
the liens are untimely under Utah Code section 38-1-7(1)(a)(i) (2008).3 Second, they
claim the liens are wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act, see Utah Code Ann. §§ 38-9-
1 to -7 (2008), because they were untimely filed. We disagree. A plain reading of Utah
1 All liens were filed less than four months after the expiration of the 180-day
deadline. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(1)(a)(i)(A).
2 It appears that some liens were filed before and others after the filing of notices
of completion. We find this difference immaterial in our analysis of the statute so long
as all were filed within 90 days after the notices of completion. See id. § 38-1-
7(1)(a)(i)(B); infra ¶ 7.
3 The statute has since been amended in a substantive manner. Because the liens
at issue were all filed in 2008, we refer to the 2008 version of this statute (and other
relevant statutes) throughout this opinion unless specifically noted otherwise.
No. 20080998 	2

Code section 38-1-7(1)(a)(i) shows that the liens were timely filed. Because Appellees’
wrongfulness argument is premised on untimeliness, that argument is moot.4
I. UNDER A PLAIN READING OF UTAH CODE SECTION 38-1-7(1)(a)(i), THE LIENS
WERE TIMELY, BECAUSE THEY WERE FILED WITHIN 90 DAYS AFTER THE
FILING OF A NOTICE OF COMPLETION
¶7 	The parties agree that the timeliness issue is governed by Utah Code
section 38-1-7. There is no dispute regarding PPS’s right to file timely liens under that
section. The relevant portion of that statute states that “a written notice to hold and
claim a lien” must be filed “within: (A) 180 days after the day on which occurs final
completion of the original contract if no notice of completion is filed . . . or (B) 90 days
after the day on which a notice of completion is filed.” Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
7(1)(a)(i).5 The parties agree that all liens were filed beyond the 180-day limit outlined
in subsection (A). However, they dispute whether the 180 days is meant to be an upper,
ultimate limit. Appellees argue it is an upper limit and that subsection (B) can only
shorten the 180-day time limit; PPS argues the subsections are independent, and
subsection (B) can extend the 180-day deadline.
¶8 	“In interpreting a statute, we look to its plain language. We read statutory
provisions literally, unless such a reading would result in an unreasonable or
inoperable result.” State v. Jeffs, 2010 UT 49, ¶ 31, 243 P.3d 1250 (internal quotation
marks omitted). Only if there is ambiguity or absurdity will we depart from the plain
language to explore other sources of legislative intent. See State v. Jeffries, 2009 UT 57,
¶ 8, 217 P.3d 265 (“Our duty to give effect to the plain meaning of a statute, however,
should give way if doing so would work a result so absurd that the legislature could not
have intended it.”); R&R Indus. Park, L.L.C. v. Utah Prop. & Cas. Ins. Guar. Ass’n, 2008
UT 80, ¶ 23, 199 P.3d 917 (“If the plain language is unambiguous then we need not look
beyond it, and no other interpretive tools are needed in analyzing the statute.” (citation
omitted)).
4 We note that even if there were untimely liens here, those liens would not be
wrongful under the Wrongful Lien Act. As we explained in Hutter v. Dig-It, Inc., “the
legislature intended that the definition of ‘wrongful lien’ should encompass only
common law liens.” 2009 UT 69, ¶ 52, 219 P.3d 918.
5 The amended statute (which is not at issue in this case) now states that even
where a lien is filed within 90 days of a notice of completion it must be no “later than
the time frame established in Subsection (1)(a)(i)(A).” Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-
7(1)(a)(i)(B) (Supp. 2010).
3 	No. 20080998

¶9 	Here the plain language is unambiguous and supports PPS’s
interpretation. The statute states that the 180-day limit applies “if no notice of
completion is filed.” Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-7(1)(a)(i)(A). Where a notice of completion
is filed, the statute allows for a lien recorded “within . . . 90 days after” the notice of
completion filing. Id. § 38-1-7(1)(a)(i)(B).
¶10 	Despite the unambiguous language in this statute, Appellees would have
us turn to other sources of legislative intent, including a subsequent amendment. They
argue we can do so because PPS’s interpretation is absurd and would permit a
mechanics’ lien notice to be filed years or decades after the completion of the final
contract, thus resurrecting the right to file a mechanics’ lien notice for an additional 90
days. They also point to the fact that multiple parties are entitled to file a notice of
completion, increasing the possibility of late filings. See id. § 38-1-33(1)(a) (2008).
¶11 	PPS properly counters that under the statute’s plain language mechanics’
lien claims would still be extinguished by the operation of the applicable statute of
limitations on the underlying breach of contract claim. See id. § 70A-2-725(1) (2008)
(“An action for breach of any contract for sale must be commenced within four years
after the cause of action has accrued.”). Furthermore, there may be factual scenarios
where equitable defenses, such as laches, would be available in addition to the
applicable statute of limitations, thus addressing situations involving unreasonable
delay. We are not persuaded that the plain meaning of the statute leads to absurd
results, and we will not investigate legislative history for alternate meanings. See
Jeffries, 2009 UT 57, ¶ 8 (“In defining the parameters of what constitutes an absurd
result . . . [we should] avoid[] an improper usurpation of legislative power through
judicial second guessing of the wisdom of a legislative act.” (internal quotation marks
omitted)).
¶12 	In the case before us, all liens were filed less than four months after the
expiration of the 180-day deadline. PPS (as a subcontractor on the condominium-
building project) was not entitled to file a notice of completion—so it could not have
purposefully extended its own time to file the liens. See Utah Code Ann. § 38-1-33(1)(a).
PPS’s time to file liens was extended beyond the 180 days only because of the belated
filing of the notices of completion by GCD, one of the Appellees. Under a plain reading
of the statute, the liens are timely because they were filed within 90 days after the
relevant notices of completion.
No. 20080998 	4

II. REQUESTS FOR ATTORNEY FEES ARE PREMATURE
¶13 	This matter has come to us on interlocutory appeal. “Under Utah Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(d)(1), an award of costs is to be given to the ‘prevailing party’ and is
to ‘abide the final determination of the cause.’” Benjamin v. Amica Mut. Ins. Co., 2006
UT 37, ¶ 39, 140 P.3d 1210. We have interpreted this rule to require a final judgment
before attorney fees are awarded, unless otherwise provided by statute. See id. Here,
none of the potentially applicable statutes cited by the parties requires attorney fees
before final judgment. We instruct the district court to evaluate claims regarding
expenses incurred in this interlocutory appeal (and applicable statutes) when the case is
finally resolved.
CONCLUSION
¶14 	Under the 2008 version of Utah Code section 38-1-7(1)(a)(i), the 180-day
deadline for filing mechanics’ liens could be extended when a notice of completion was
filed. Thus PPS’s liens in this case were timely. Therefore, we reverse and remand.
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¶15 	Associate Chief Justice Durrant, Justice Parrish, Justice Nehring, and
Justice Lee concur in Chief Justice Durham’s opinion.
5 	No. 20080998