Carter v. U of U Med Ctr

2006 UT 78
This opinion is subject to revision before final
publication in the Pacific Reporter.
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
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Daniel Carter, individually and 	No. 20051087
on behalf of the heirs of
Marjorie Carter and on behalf
of the Estate of Marjorie Carter,
Plaintiff and Appellee,
v.
University of Utah Medical 	F I L E D
Center and Crestwood Care Center,
Defendants and Appellant. 	December 5, 2006
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Second District, Ogden
The Honorable Roger S. Dutson
No. 050901842
Attorneys: 	James R. Hasenyager, Peter W. Summerill, Ogden,
for appellee
David G. Williams, Rodney R. Parker, Terence L.
Rooney, Bradley R. Blackham, Salt Lake City,
for appellant
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DURHAM, Chief Justice:
INTRODUCTION
¶1 	This case comes before this court as the result of a
venue dispute. 	Specifically, University of Utah Medical Center
(University Hospital), a state entity, argues that venue is
appropriate only in Salt Lake County, while Mr. Carter argues
that venue is also appropriate in Weber County. 	The question
before us is whether the venue provision in the Governmental
Immunity Act of Utah controls the county in which Mr. Carter may
file his cause of action. 	We hold that it does.
BACKGROUND
¶2 	In December 2002, Marjorie Carter injured her hip and
shortly thereafter began a series of operations and medical
procedures. 	Mrs. Carter received treatment between January 30,

1 In his brief, Mr. Carter contends that Utah Code section
63-30-17 (1997) (repealed 2004), the predecessor of section 60-
30d-502, is the applicable statute because section 63-30d-502 did
not take effect until July 1, 2004, while Mrs. Carter died in
2003. 	However, section 63-30d-502 is the applicable statute in
this case because its effect is procedural rather than
substantive, and Mr. Carter’s case was filed with the district
court on March 22, 2005, after the new statute had taken effect.
Statutes affecting procedure apply to cases filed after the
effective date, regardless of when the claim actually arose.
Carlucci v. State Indus. Comm’n, 725 P.2d 1335, 1336-37 (Utah
1986). 	This point has no effect on the outcome of this case,
however, because the language of section 63-30d-502 is the same
as that of its predecessor, section 63-30-17.
No. 20051087 	2
2003, and February 15, 2003, at both University Hospital, located
in Salt Lake County, and Crestwood Care Center (Crestwood),
located in Weber County. 	On February 15, 2003, Mrs. Carter was
diagnosed with a methicillin resistant staph infection; she died
later that year.
¶3 	Following her death, Mrs. Carter’s husband filed a
wrongful death suit against University Hospital and Crestwood in
the district court in Weber County. 	Mr. Carter’s complaint
alleged that either University Hospital or Crestwood, or both,
caused the staph infection, which, according to Mr. Carter,
caused or directly contributed to Mrs. Carter’s death.
¶4 	In response to the complaint, University Hospital moved
the district court to dismiss the case for improper venue.
University Hospital is a state entity. 	See Utah Code Ann. § 63-
30d-102(9) (2004). 	Thus, it argued that the Utah Governmental
Immunity Act (the Act), Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-101 to -904
(2004 & Supp. 2006), controls. 	The venue provision in the Act
states, in part, that “[a]ctions against the state may be brought
in the county in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County.”
Id. § 63-30d-502(1). 	Because all of the treatment Mrs. Carter
received from University Hospital was given in Salt Lake County,
University Hospital argued that any claim against it must have
arisen in Salt Lake County. 	Therefore, it argued, Salt Lake
County is the only permissible venue under the Act.
¶5 	Mr. Carter opposed University Hospital’s motion by
arguing that venue is governed by Utah Code section 78-13-7
(2002), and not section 63-30d-502 or its predecessor. 1 	Section
78-13-7 is the general venue provision located in the Judicial
Code. 	It states, in pertinent part, “In all other cases the
action must be tried in the county in which the cause of action

3 	No. 20051087
arises, or in the county in which any defendant resides at the
commencement of the action.” 	Utah Code Ann. § 78-13-7.
¶6 	The district court denied University Hospital’s motion
to dismiss, reasoning that section 63-30d-502(1) is not mandatory
because it provides only that “[a]ctions against the state may be
brought in the county in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake
County.” 	Id. § 60-30d-502(1) (emphasis added). 	Specifically,
the district court held:
In performing its analysis as to which venue
provision is appropriate in this instance,
the Court finds that Section 63-30d-502 uses
the word “may” when addressing actions
against the State, whereas Section 78-13-7
uses the word “must.” 	The Court finds this
distinction to be significant. 	The Court
interprets “may,” as used in Section 63-30d-
502, to mean that it is not mandatory that
actions against the state be brought where
specified in the statute. 	Therefore, the
Court finds that Section 78-13-7 is
applicable and that venue is proper.
¶7 	After the district court denied its motion, University
Hospital filed a petition for interlocutory appeal with this
court, which was granted. 	We have jurisdiction pursuant to Utah
Code section 78-2-2(3)(j) (2002).
STANDARD OF REVIEW
¶8 	This appeal involves a question of statutory
interpretation. 	We review questions of statutory interpretation
for correctness, granting no deference to the district court’s
decision. 	John Holmes Constr., Inc. v. R.A. McKell Excavating,
Inc., 2005 UT 83, ¶ 6, 131 P.3d 199.
ANALYSIS
¶9 	In this case, “we are faced with two statutes that
purport to cover the same subject.” 	Jensen v. IHC Hosps., Inc.,
944 P.2d 327, 331 (Utah 1997). 	To determine which statute
controls, we “follow the general rules of statutory
construction.” 	Id. 	When we engage in statutory construction,
“our primary goal . . . is to evince ‘the true intent and purpose
of the Legislature [as expressed through] the plain language of
the Act.’” 	Hall v. Dep’t of Corr., 2001 UT 34, ¶ 15, 24 P.3d 958
(alteration in original) (quoting Jensen v. Intermountain Health

No. 20051087 	4
Care, Inc., 679 P.2d 903, 906 (Utah 1984)). 	Determining the
legislature’s intent requires that “we seek to render all parts
[of the statute] relevant and meaningful, and we accordingly
avoid interpretations that will render portions of a statute
superfluous or inoperative.” 	Id. (internal citation and
quotation marks omitted). 	Thus, when we are confronted with two
statutory provisions that conflict, “the provision more specific
in application governs over the more general provision.” 	Id.
Keeping these principles in mind, we now turn to whether the
venue provision in the Act or the general venue provision
controls.
¶10 	Because our primary goal in interpreting statutes is to
“ascertain the true intent and purpose of the Legislature,” id.
(internal quotation marks omitted), we begin by addressing the
legislature’s purpose in passing the Governmental Immunity Act,
Utah Code Ann. §§ 63-30d-101 to -904 (2004 & Supp. 2006). 	The
legislature stated the Act’s scope and purpose as follows: 	“This
single, comprehensive chapter governs all claims against
governmental entities.” 	Id. § 63-30d-101(2)(b) (emphasis added).
We have recognized that the “‘allowance of a claim against [a
governmental entity] is a statutorily created exception to the
Doctrine of Sovereign Immunity. 	Inasmuch as the maintenance of
such a cause of action derives from such statutory authority, a
prerequisite thereto is meeting the conditions prescribed in the
statute.’” 	Davis v. Cent. Utah Counseling Ctr., 2006 UT 52,
¶ 42, 147 P.3d 390 (quoting Gallegos v. Midvale City, 492 P.2d
1335, 1336-37 (Utah 1972)).
¶11 	Keeping the legislature’s purpose in mind, we turn now
to our rules of statutory construction. 	The district court held
that the Act’s venue provision was not controlling in this case
because it provides only that a suit “may” be brought in the
county in which the claim arose or in Salt Lake County. 	We
disagree with the district court’s conclusion that “may” in this
instance is not mandatory because such an interpretation renders
a portion of the statute “superfluous or inoperative,” a result
we attempt to avoid when construing statutes. 	Hall, 2001 UT 34,
¶ 15. 	Interpreting “may” in section 63-30d-502(1) as optional
renders redundant that section’s provision that “[a]ctions . . .
may be brought in the county in which the claim arose.” 	Utah
Code Ann. § 63-30d-502(1). 	The general venue statute, Utah Code
section 78-13-7, also provides a litigant with the right to bring
a suit “in the county in which the cause of action arises.” 	Id.
§ 78-13-7. 	Thus, if we interpret the language in section 63-30d-
502(1) as optional, the provision that permits a litigant to
bring suit against the state “in the county in which the claim
arose” instead of Salt Lake County is unnecessary.

5 	No. 20051087
¶12 	On the other hand, interpreting section 63-30d-502(1)
as the only venue provision applicable to cases brought against
the state prevents this superfluous construction because the two
statutes’ similar clauses will not both apply to the same
situation. 	Rather, section 78-13-7 will apply only to situations
where neither the Act’s venue provision nor any other venue
provision controls. 	In other words, section 78-13-7 will
function as a general catch-all provision, which, considering the
statute’s plain language, is what the legislature intended. 	See
id. § 78-13-7 (“In all other cases the action must be tried in
the county in which the cause of action arises, or in the county
in which any defendant resides at the commencement of the
action.” (emphasis added)). 	Indeed, we have previously
recognized that “[section] 78-13-7 applies only when no other
[venue] provision applies.” 	Jorgensen v. John Clay & Co., 660
P.2d 229, 231 (Utah 1983). 	This construction is consistent with
our rule that “the [statutory] provision more specific in
application governs over the more general provision.” 	Hall, 2001
UT 34, ¶ 15.
¶13 	Moreover, an interpretation that “may” is merely
permissive does not effectuate the legislative purpose of the
Act. 	When interpreting statutory language, “[w]e read the plain
language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions
in harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related
chapters.” 	Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ¶ 17, 66 P.3d 592. 	We
think construing “may” as mandatory is harmonious with the
legislative intent underlying the Act, namely, to provide a
protocol that must be followed by those seeking to file a claim
against the government. 	In other words, the Act creates a
“filing privilege” in favor of the state. 	Thus, the Act’s venue
provision applies in this case, and Mr. Carter must file in the
county where the claim arose or in Salt Lake County.
¶14 	We note that section 63-30d-502(1) places a mandatory
limitation only on where an action against the state may be
“brought.” 	After a case has been properly filed in a venue
provided for by section 63-30d-502(1), there is nothing to
prevent a party from moving for a change of venue pursuant to the
general law of venue. 	Utah Code section 78-13-9 provides that a
court may grant a motion for a change of venue if “there is
reason to believe that an impartial trial cannot be had” in the
current venue or “convenience of witnesses and the ends of
justice would be promoted by the change.” 	Utah Code Ann. § 78-
13-9(2), (3) (Supp. 2006). 	Thus, after filing a suit in one of
the venues provided for by section 63-30d-502(1), a party may

2 Utah Code section 78-13-9 (Supp. 2006) as a whole reads as
follows:
The court may, on motion, change the place of
trial in the following cases:
(1) when the county designated in the
complaint is not the proper county;
(2) when there is reason to believe that
an impartial trial cannot be had in the
county, city, or precinct designated in
the complaint;
(3) when the convenience of witnesses
and the ends of justice would be
promoted by the change;
(4) when all the parties to an action,
by stipulation or by consent in open
court entered in the minutes, agree that
the place of trial may be changed to
another county.
No. 20051087 	6
move for a change of venue pursuant to section 78-13-9. 2 	This
provision is designed to permit litigants to avoid hardship or
injustice otherwise caused by venue requirements. 	We offer no
view as to whether the facts of this case would support a change
of venue to Weber County. 	We mention the point only to draw
attention to the fact that even though section 63-30d-502(1)
creates a mandatory restriction on where suits against the state
may be filed, it does not prevent the application of general
change-of-venue principles.
CONCLUSION
¶15 	Utah Code section 63-30d-502(1) is the controlling
venue provision in this action against University Hospital.
Accordingly, Salt Lake County is the only venue where the action
may be properly filed. 	We therefore reverse the district court’s
decision and remand for an order transferring venue to Salt Lake
County.
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¶16 	Associate Chief Justice Wilkins, Justice Durrant,
Justice Parrish, and Justice Nehring concur in Chief Justice
Durham’s opinion.