Kendall Lee Crawford v Commonwealth of Virginia

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Elder, Bray and Bumgardner
Argued at Richmond, Virginia
KENDALL LEE CRAWFORD
MEMORANDUM OPINION* BY
v. 	Record No. 1844-99-3 	JUDGE RUDOLPH BUMGARDNER, III
MAY 16, 2000
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF STAUNTON
Humes J. Franklin, Jr., Judge
David B. Hargett (J. Paul Gregorio;
Morrissey & Hershner, PLC; Darvin Satterwhite
Law Office, on brief), for appellant.
Michael T. Judge, Assistant Attorney General
(Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief),
for appellee.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.
Upon a plea of guilty, the trial court convicted Kendall
Lee Crawford of conspiring to distribute marijuana and cocaine
in violation of Code § 18.2-256 and sentenced him to twenty
years with fourteen suspended. 	The defendant argues the trial
court lacked jurisdiction to try him for the offense. 	Finding
no error, we affirm.
The arrest warrant charged the defendant with conspiring to
distribute drugs from August 15, 1996 to November 3, 1997. 	The
defendant waived preliminary hearing before the general district
court, which certified the charge. 	The grand jury returned an

indictment that also charged the conspiracy occurred from August
15, 1996 to November 3, 1997.
The defendant moved to dismiss the indictment for lack of
jurisdiction because the defendant was still a juvenile during
part of the time charged in the conspiracy indictment. 	The
defendant became an adult February 13, 1997, but the indictment
charged the conspiracy began August 15, 1996. 	The trial court
denied the defendant's motion to dismiss, and over his
objection, amended the indictment to charge the defendant with
conspiring from February 13, 1997 through November 3, 1997. 	The
amended indictment excluded any period of time when the
defendant was a juvenile. 	The trial court re-arraigned the
defendant, and he changed his plea to guilty.
The defendant contends that the juvenile and domestic
relations district court alone had jurisdiction over the charge
because the original warrant alleged acts committed while the
defendant was a juvenile. 	He argues that amending the
indictment could not bestow jurisdiction that was lacking in the
original warrant and subsequent indictment.
While the general district court did not have jurisdiction
over a warrant charging the defendant with crimes while he was a
juvenile, the juvenile and domestic relations district court
would not have had jurisdiction over crimes committed while he
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was an adult. 	Code § 19.2-2311 permits the trial court to amend
an indictment to correct a "defect in form." 	Willis v.
Commonwealth, 10 Va. App. 430, 437, 393 S.E.2d 405, 408 (1990).
A trial court can amend the indictment "provided the amendment
does not change the nature and character of the offense." 	Id.
"The statute is remedial in nature and is to be liberally
construed in order to achieve the laudable purpose of avoiding
further unnecessary delay in the criminal justice process by
allowing amendment, rather than requiring re-indictment."
Thomas v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 256, 262, 487 S.E.2d 289,
292 (1997) (citing Sullivan v. Commonwealth, 157 Va. 867,
876-77, 161 S.E. 297, 300 (1931)), aff'd, 256 Va. 38, 501 S.E.2d
391 (1998).
1 Code § 19.2-231 provides:
If there be any defect in form in any
indictment, . . ., or if there shall appear
to be any variance between the allegations
therein and the evidence offered in proof
thereof, the court may permit amendment of
such indictment, . . ., at any time before
the jury returns a verdict or the court
finds the accused guilty or not guilty,
provided the amendment does not change the
nature or character of the offense charged.
After any such amendment the accused shall
be arraigned on the indictment, . . . as
amended, and shall be allowed to plead anew
thereto, if he so desires, and the trial
shall proceed as if no amendment had been
made; but if the court finds that such
amendment operates as a surprise to the
accused, he shall be entitled, upon request,
to a continuance of the case for a
reasonable time.
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In this case, the amendment to the indictment did not
change the nature and character of the offense charged. 	It
reduced the time during which it charged the defendant with
conspiring to distribute drugs. 	The amendment did not expand
the dates specified in the original offense or shift the periods
encompassed by the charge. 	Cf. Crawford v. Commonwealth, 23 Va.
App. 661, 665, 479 S.E.2d 84, 86 (1996) (en banc) (court should
grant continuance where amended indictment alleged new offense
dates and defendant presented alibi defense).
The amended indictment did not substantively alter the
charge against the defendant. 	It charged the defendant under
the same code section and alleged the same acts in furtherance
of the conspiracy. 	See Thomas, 25 Va. App. at 262, 487 S.E.2d
at 292 (amended indictment altered habitual offender offense
from "having been once or more previously convicted and
sentenced for a like offense" to "being a second or subsequent
offense"); Sullivan, 157 Va. at 876, 161 S.E. at 300 (amendment
authorizing greater punishment does not change character of
offense charged).
The defendant pled guilty to the indictment as amended and
stipulated the evidence. 	See Fontaine v. Commonwealth, 25 Va.
App. 156, 165, 487 S.E.2d 241, 245 (1997) (court is authorized
to enter judgment where defendant acquiesces to being found
guilty of charge set forth in amended indictment). 	The trial
court noted that it convicted the defendant only for acts that
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occurred after the defendant became an adult. 	The trial court
further stated, "[a]ny sentencing that's done is going to be
done with respect to acts that were stipulated and took place
after [the defendant] turned eighteen."
We conclude that the trial court had jurisdiction to try
the offense. 	Accordingly, we affirm the conviction.
Affirmed.
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