Cain Yates v Marie Yates

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA
Present: 	Judges Benton, Coleman and Willis
CAIN YATES
MEMORANDUM OPINION*
v. 	Record No. 1282-99-3 	PER CURIAM
NOVEMBER 30, 1999
MARIE YATES
FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF DICKENSON COUNTY
Donald A. McGlothlin, Jr., Judge
(Donald E. Earls; Earls & Fleming, on brief),
for appellant.
(Buddy H. Wallen; Buddy H. Wallen, P.C., on
brief), for appellee.
Cain Yates (husband) appeals the decision of the circuit
court granting Marie Yates (wife) spousal support and dividing the
marital property of the parties. 	On appeal, husband argues that
the trial court erred by (1) failing to consider all the statutory
factors when awarding spousal support and making its equitable
distribution decision; and (2) placing undue significance on
wife's age and health while not considering husband's health and
ability to work. 	Upon reviewing the record and briefs of the
parties, we conclude that this appeal is without merit.
Accordingly, we summarily affirm the decision of the trial court.
See Rule 5A:27.
* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, recodifying Code
§ 17-116.010, this opinion is not designated for publication.

The record on appeal includes an opinion letter dated
March 26, 1998, specifying the trial court's findings and rulings;
the decree entered March 4, 1999, reciting verbatim the findings
and rulings contained in the opinion letter; and a written
statement of facts. 	The decree was endorsed by husband's counsel
"Seen and objected to." 	Neither the decree nor the written
statement of facts contains a statement of husband's objections.
Husband filed a motion to rehear on August 7, 1998, requesting
that the trial court "in the least award him a portion of the U.S.
Savings Bond previously awarded to [wife]." 	No other objection is
stated.
On appeal, husband contends that the trial court failed to
consider the statutory factors set out in Code § 20-107.1 when
awarding spousal support to wife. 	The brief does not contain
references to the pages of the record where this question was
preserved in the trial court. 	See Rule 5A:20(c). 	We find no
indication in the record that husband raised this issue before the
trial court. 	"No ruling of the trial court . . . will be
considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated
together with the grounds therefor at the time of the ruling
. . . ." 	Rule 5A:18. 	"We cannot assume that appellant's
objection and reasons were proffered but not made a part of the
record." 	Lee v. Lee, 12 Va. App. 512, 516, 404 S.E.2d 736, 738
(1991) (en banc). 	We will not consider on appeal an issue that
was not presented to the trial court.
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Husband also argues that the trial court failed to consider
certain statutory factors set out in Code § 20-107.3 when making
its equitable distribution decision. 	Husband's motion to rehear
referred to certain payments made by husband for wife's expenses
and requested redistribution of a specific piece of marital
property. 	That is not the argument husband now raises on appeal.
The endorsement of the order "Seen and objected to" gave no
indication what husband's specific objections were.
[N]either the Code [§ 8.01-384] nor Rule
5A:18 is complied with merely by objecting
generally to an order. 	Since the rule
provides that "[a] mere statement that the
judgment or award is contrary to the law and
the evidence is not sufficient," it follows
that a statement that an order is "seen and
objected to" must also be insufficient.
Lee, 12 Va. App. at 515, 404 S.E.2d at 738. 	The endorsement was
insufficient to preserve the question husband now raises on
appeal.
Finally, husband also contends that the trial court placed
undue significance on wife's age and health and failed to
consider his health and ability to work. 	For the reasons stated
above, we find no indication that husband raised this issue
below or preserved it for appeal.
Accordingly, the decision of the circuit court is summarily
affirmed.
Affirmed.
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