trichrome vt v cannabis control bd

26-cv-3448Vtsuperct

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7ermont 	Superior 	Court
Filed 	09/18/26
Chittenden 	Unit
VERMONT 	SUPERIOR 	COURT
Chittenden 	Unit
175 	Main 	Street
Burlington 	VT 	05401
802-863-3467
.vermontjudiciary.org
CIVIL 	DIVISION
Case 	No. 	26-CV-03448
Trichome 	VT 	LLC,
Petitioner
DECISION 	ON 	MOTION
Vermont 	Cannabis 	Control 	Board,
Respondent
RULING 	ON 	MOTION 	TO 	DISMISS
This 	case 	concerns 	a 	cannabis 	cultivation 	business 	operating 	in 	a 	residential 	area 	of Essex
Junction. 	Jason 	Struthers 	owns 	the 	property 	where 	Trichome 	VT 	LLC 	("Trichome'") 	is 	located.
By 	letter 	dated 	November 	24, 	2025, 	the 	Vermont 	Cannabis 	Control 	Board 	(the 	"Board")
informed 	Struthers 	that 	he 	was 	required 	to 	"halt 	all 	licensed 	cultivation 	activities" 	due to 	the
revocation 	by 	the 	Essex 	Junction 	Local 	Cannabis 	Control 	Commission 	("LCCC") 	of Trichome's
license. 	In 	May 	2026, 	Struthers 	sent 	an 	email 	to 	the 	Board 	asking 	for 	a 	review 	of 	its 	November
2025 	letter 	pursuant 	to 	7 	V.S.A. 	§ 	847. 	The 	Board 	denied 	Struthers' 	request 	by 	email 	on 	May
18, 	explaining 	that 	he 	had 	no 	appellate 	right 	under 	§ 	847. 	Pursuant 	to 	Rule 	75 	of the 	Vermont
Rules 	of Civil 	Procedure, 	Trichome 	now 	seeks 	judicial 	review 	of (1) 	the 	Board's 	directive 	in 	the
November 	24, 	2025 	letter 	that 	Trichome 	"immediately 	halt 	all 	licensed 	cultivation 	activities" 	and
(2) 	the 	Board's 	May 	2026 	refusal 	to 	consider 	Trichome's 	appeal 	under 	7 	V.S.A. 	§ 	847. 	The
Board 	has 	moved 	to 	dismiss 	Trichome's 	petition 	pursuant 	to 	Rule 	12(b)(1), 	arguing 	the 	Court
lacks 	subject 	matter jurisdiction. 	The 	Board 	is 	represented 	by 	Assistant 	Attorney 	General 	Alison
L.T. 	Powers, 	and 	Trichome 	appears 	through 	Mr. 	Struthers, 	who 	is 	not 	a 	licensed 	attorney, 	but
was 	provisionally 	granted 	permission 	to 	represent 	the 	business 	in 	this 	action. 	For 	the 	reasons
discussed 	below, 	the 	Board's 	motion 	to 	dismiss 	is 	GRANTED.
Procedural 	History
On 	November 	24, 	2025, 	the 	Board 	sent 	Struthers 	and 	Trichome 	a 	letter 	informing 	them
that 	it 	had 	received 	notice 	that 	on 	November 	12, 	2025, 	the 	LCCC 	voted 	to 	revoke 	the 	local
license 	of Trichome's 	cannabis 	cultivation 	operation. 	In 	the 	letter, 	the 	Board 	stated: 	"Because
there 	has 	been 	a 	final 	administrative 	determination 	that 	you 	do 	not 	hold 	an 	LCCC 	cultivation
license, 	you 	must 	immediately 	halt 	all 	licensed 	cultivation 	activities 	unless 	the 	decision 	is 	stayed
by 	a 	court 	of competent 	jurisdiction." 	Following 	an 	unsuccessful 	appeal 	to 	this 	Court 	of the
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LCCC’s decision to revoke Trichome’s cultivation license,1 Struthers sent an email to the Board
on May 14, 2026, seeking review of its November 24, 2025 letter, under the procedures provided
by 7 V.S.A. § 847. The Board denied Struthers’ request by email on May 18, 2026, and
Trichome filed an appeal of the Board’s denial with the Vermont Supreme Court. The Supreme
Court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction, stating: “There is no decision by the Board
that is ripe for review at this juncture.” In re Trichome VT LLC, Case No. 26-AP-247, Entry
Order, dated Aug. 10, 2026. Following a second unsuccessful appeal to this Court of the
LCCC’s revocation decision,2 Trichome filed the current action against the Board.
Discussion
“‘Subject matter jurisdiction’ refers to the power of a court to hear and determine a
general class or category of cases.” Lamell Lumber Corp. v. Newstress Int’l, Inc., 2007 VT 83,
¶ 6, 182 Vt. 282 (citation omitted); see also Baron v. McGinty, 2021 VT 6, ¶ 31, 214 Vt. 141
(stating that because subject matter jurisdiction refers to a court’s power to hear a case, “a court
either has subject matter jurisdiction or it does not”). A motion to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction under Rule 12(b)(1) may not be granted “unless it appears beyond doubt that
there exist no facts or circumstances that would entitle the plaintiff to relief.” Wool v. Office of
Prof’l Regulation, 2020 VT 44, ¶ 8, 212 Vt. 305 (quotation omitted)). Before the Court can
reach the parties’ arguments regarding the merits of Trichome’s appeal, it must first determine
whether it has the authority to hear it. Cf. Denlinger v. Mudgett, 151 Vt. 208, 211, 559 A.2d 661,
663 (1989) (holding that a court cannot “accept appeals over which it has no jurisdiction”).
Trichome brings this appeal pursuant to Rule 75. “Rule 75 permits judicial review of
‘[a]ny action or failure or refusal to act by an agency of the state or a political subdivision
thereof, including any . . . commission . . . that is not reviewable or appealable under Rule 74 . . .
if such review is otherwise available by law.’” Maple Run Unified Sch. Dist. v. Vt. Human
Rights Comm’n, 2023 VT 63, ¶ 10, 218 Vt. 496 (quoting V.R.C.P. 75(a)). In other words, Rule
75 applies when the “legislation is silent on the mode of review” and appellate procedure is
available as a matter of law. Preston v. Burlington City Ret. Sys., 2013 VT 56, ¶ 13, 194 Vt.
147; see also Friends of Pine St. v. City of Burlington, 2020 VT 43, ¶ 22, 212 Vt. 342 (“Rule 75
is limited to those instances where Rule 74 does not apply.”). The “otherwise available by law”
language of Rule 75 refers to “review ‘under the traditional writs for extraordinary relief’
including mandamus, prohibition, scire facias, certiorari, and quo warranto.” Preston, 2013 VT
56, ¶ 13.3 These traditional writs have been abolished, and “[r]eview of any action or failure to
1 See Trichome VT LLC v. Essex Junction Local Cannabis Control Commission, Case No. 25-
CV-05447. In that case, Trichome sought appellate review pursuant to Rule 74. On March 31,
2026, the Court granted the City of Essex Junction’s motion to dismiss the appeal on the grounds
that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction under Rule 74, given that such review was not
authorized by statute.
2 See Trichome VT LLC v. City of Essex Junction, Case No. 26-CV-03449. In that case,
Trichome sought to appeal the LCCC’s revocation decision pursuant to Rule 75. On September
3, 2026, the Court dismissed his second appeal on the grounds that it was untimely.
3 Mandamus is a command from a court for a ministerial duty to be performed and issues only
“(1) when a party has a clear and certain right to the action sought by the request for
3
act by a governmental agency shall be in accordance with the procedure prescribed by Rule 74 or
75.” V.R.C.P. 81(b).
The problem with Trichome’s petition is that Vermont’s Cannabis Control Board
legislation is not “silent on the mode of review.” On the contrary, 7 V.S.A. § 847 plainly
establishes a right of appeal and the process Trichome must follow. It provides that a “party
aggrieved by a final decision of the Board” may appeal that decision to the Board’s executive
director, “who shall assign the case to an appellate officer.” 7 V.S.A. § 847(a)(1). If the party is
not satisfied with the appellate officer’s decision, the party may appeal that decision to the
Vermont Supreme Court. Id. § 847(c). The statute does not provide for the review of any
decision by the Board other than a final decision, and of equal importance, there is no right of
appeal to the Civil Division of the Superior Court under this statutory framework. See In re
Holland Cannabis, LLC, 2025 VT 61, ¶ 19, 350 A.3d 397 (noting steps for appealing a decision
of a cannabis board).
Where such an express appellate process and remedies are available, there is no
jurisdiction under Rule 75. Indeed, the Supreme Court has cautioned that a party may not
circumvent the Legislature’s intent by obtaining review of a decision pursuant to Rule 75 that
would not be permitted under Rule 74. See, e.g., Friends of Pine Street, 2020 VT 43, ¶ 23
(rejecting party’s “assertion that because it is not entitled to appeal pursuant to Rule 74 and the
statutory appeal process, it is entitled to review through Rule 75,” and explaining there “is no
absolute right to appellate review of administrative decisions”); In re Cabot Creamery Co-op.,
164 Vt. 26, 28-29, 663 A.2d 940, 941 (1995) (where statute excludes certain individuals from
appellate process, appeal will not be allowed under Rule 75 because “such an end run” would
“circumvent[ ] the Legislature’s intent”). Thus, where, as here, the Legislature has determined
the process and manner of taking an appeal, and limited such appellate rights to final decisions of
Board, Trichome may not appeal notices or other non-final decisions to the Superior Court.
Accordingly, because the Court concludes that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over
Trichome’s appeal of the actions by the Board, its petition must be dismissed.
[mandamus]; (2) [the request] is for the enforcement of ministerial duties, not those that involve
the exercise of an official’s judgment or discretion; and (3) there is no other adequate remedy at
law.” Island Indus., LLC v. Town of Grand Isle, 2021 VT 49, ¶ 21, 215 Vt. 162 (quotation
omitted). A writ of prohibition referred to an order to a lower tribunal “to cease abusing or
usurping judicial functions.” Maple Run Unified Sch. Dist., 2023 VT 63, ¶ 21 (quoting Gould v.
Parker, 114 Vt. 186, 188, 42 A.2d 416, 417 (1945)). “Scire facias” referred to a “writ of
requiring the person against whom it is issued to appear and show cause why some matter of
record should not be enforced, annulled, or vacated, or why a dormant judgment against that
person should not be revived.” Black’s Law Dictionary, scire facias (12th ed. 2024). A writ of
certiorari seeks judicial review of “substantial questions of law affecting the merits of a case
which involve the judicial action of inferior courts, special tribunals, public officers, [or] bodies
exercising judicial functions.” Petition of Town of Essex, 125 Vt. 170, 170, 212 A.2d 623, 625
(1965). A writ for “quo warranto” was used to question the authority under which a public office
was held. McCormack v. Scott, 2025 VT 7, ¶ 15, 220 Vt. 544.
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Order
For the foregoing reasons, the Vermont Cannabis Control Board’s Motion to Dismiss
(Mot. #4) is GRANTED.
Electronically signed on September 18, 2026 at 11:40 AM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).
________________________________
Megan J. Shafritz
Superior Court Judge

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