dunbar v pederzani

7ermont 	Superior 	Court
Filed 	09/21/26
Chittenden 	UUnit
CIVIL 	DIVISION
Case 	No. 	26-CV-2973
VERMONT 	SUPERIOR 	COURT
Chittenden 	Unit
175 	Main 	Street
Burlington 	VT 	05402
802-863-3467
.vermontjudiciary.org
GENE 	DUNBAR,
Plaintiff-Appellee
V. 	OPINION 	AND 	ORDER
DAWNA 	PEDERZANI,
Defendant-Appellant
DECISION 	ON 	APPEAL
Defendant 	Dawna 	Pederzani 	appeals 	the 	small 	claims 	court's 	judgment 	against 	her 	and 	in
favor 	of Plaintiff Gene 	Dunbar 	over 	payment 	for 	work 	that 	Dunbar, 	a 	contractor, 	did 	at
Pederzani's 	property. 	Pederzani 	had 	refused 	to 	pay 	Dunbar 	for 	the 	work 	he 	did, 	alleging 	that 	the
work 	was 	sub-par 	and 	that 	he 	did 	additional 	work 	that 	she 	did 	not 	ask 	him 	to 	do 	without
providing 	an 	estimate 	for 	that 	additional 	work. 	The 	Court 	has 	listened 	to 	the 	recording 	of the
small 	claims 	hearing 	and 	reviewed 	the 	record 	of this 	case. 	For 	the 	reasons 	discussed below, 	the
judgment 	of the 	small 	claims 	court 	is 	AFFIRMED 	IN 	PART 	and 	REVERSED 	IN 	PART.
Background
Based 	on the 	credible evidence, 	the 	small 	claims 	court 	made 	the 	following 	findings 	of
facts 	on 	the 	record 	at 	the 	hearing 	below. 	Pederzani 	and 	Dunbar 	had 	an 	agreement 	for 	Dunbar 	to
do 	some 	work 	at 	Pederzani's 	property. 	That 	work 	consisted 	of repairs 	to 	a 	gate, 	a 	fence, 	and 	a
shed, 	prepping 	and 	painting 	the 	shed, 	and 	work 	on the 	house. 	The 	parties' 	agreement 	took 	the
form 	of email 	communications 	and 	oral 	conversations. 	The 	parties 	did 	not 	dispute 	the 	extent 	and
quality 	of work 	done 	on 	the 	gate and 	fence, 	and 	Pederzani was 	satisfied 	with 	that 	work.
Pederzani 	did 	not 	express 	any 	concerns 	about 	the 	repair 	work 	on the 	shed. 	Thus, 	the 	focus 	of the
small 	claims 	court's 	decision 	was 	on the painting 	of the 	shed and 	the 	work 	on 	the 	house.
Dunbar 	spent 	approximately 	13.75 	hours 	for 	all 	the 	work 	excluding 	the 	priming 	and
painting 	of the 	shed. 	He 	also 	provided 	of his 	own 	accord 	paint 	for 	the 	house and 	primer 	for 	the
house and 	the 	shed, 	and 	did 	not 	charge 	for 	that. 	Dunbar 	testified 	that 	his 	initial 	quote 	for 	all 	the
work 	of 	$525, 	his 	updated 	estimate 	of 	$650, 	and 	his 	final 	bill 	of 	$775 	were 	all 	based 	on 	his
internal 	calculation 	using 	a 	$40 	per 	hour 	labor 	rate.
Pederzani 	was 	dissatisfied with 	the 	quality 	of the 	paint job 	on 	the 	shed, 	and 	the
photographs admitted 	into 	evidence 	show 	parts 	of the 	shed 	where 	the 	paint 	is 	peeling 	and 	where
the 	window 	has 	not 	been 	painted. 	Dunbar's 	view 	was 	that 	this 	was 	because 	he 	had 	agreed 	to
paint 	the 	shed 	only 	"'as 	needed" 	as 	captured in 	his 	Exhibit 	2.

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Pederzani was frustrated because she had asked Dunbar multiple times to communicate
by text rather than email. The parties also communicated orally on different occasions. The
nature of these communications resulted in miscommunications between the parties, such that
Pederzani may not be able to see all of the work that Dunbar did. The trial court credited that
Dunbar did the work on the house on the right side of the chimney, for instance.
The court stated that it asked about Dunbar’s hourly rate because it needed some way to
determine damages. It found that, despite the parties’ written communications supplemented by
their verbal conversations, the principles of quantum meruit and/or unjust enrichment applied.
Under those principles, the court concluded that Dunbar had invested his time and resources into
work on Pederzani’s property, some of which Pederzani does not dispute, and that it would be
unfair for her to receive the benefit of Dunbar’s labor without some compensation.
The small claims court also credited the photographic evidence that the painting on the
shed was not performed to a reasonable workmanlike quality that would be expected under the
circumstances and would require some sort of rework. Therefore, the court did not award
Dunbar the full amount of the requested damages. Instead, it awarded damages as follows:
 	13.75 hours of work excluding painting of shed: $550 (based on rate of $40 per hour)
 	Paint and primer supplied by Dunbar: $100
 	Disposal fee: $25
The total judgment for Dunbar was $675 to be paid by Pederzani over 10 months, with interest
not to run until after those 10 months. Pederzani appeals from that judgment.
Discussion
In small claims appeals, the Superior Court’s review is based on the trial record and is
limited to questions of law. 12 V.S.A. § 5538; V.R.S.C.P. 10(d). The small claims judge, as the
finder of fact, “is in a unique position to assess the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of
the evidence presented.” Kanaan v. Kanaan, 163 Vt. 402, 405 (1995). Thus, the findings of the
small claims court “must be construed, where possible, to support the judgment.” Kopelman v.
Schwag, 145 Vt. 212, 214 (1984). However, findings of fact must be supported by the evidence.
Brandon v. Richmond, 144 Vt. 496, 498 (1984).
On appeal, Pederzani first contends that the small claims court erred by applying quasi-
contract principles to a situation where there was an enforceable contract. Generally, “to prevail
on a quasi-contract claim” such as quantum meruit or unjust enrichment, a “plaintiff must prove
that (1) a benefit was conferred on defendant; (2) defendant accepted the benefit; and (3)
defendant retained the benefit under such circumstances that it would be inequitable for
defendant not to compensate plaintiff for its value.” Masiello Real Est., Inc. v. Matteo, 2021 VT
81, ¶ 30, 215 Vt. 607 (quotation omitted). Though similar, quantum meruit and unjust
enrichment are distinct, and that distinction is based on the measure of recovery: “Unjust
enrichment focuses on the value of the benefit actually conferred upon the defendant. Quantum
meruit, on the other hand, is determined by the reasonable value of plaintiff’s services regardless
of their value to defendant.” DJ Painting, Inc. v. Baraw Enters., Inc., 172 Vt. 239, 242 n.2

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(2001) (quoting In re Estate of Elliott, 149 Vt. 248, 253 n.2 (1988)). The small claims court’s
award below was based on the reasonable value of Dunbar’s services and, thus, invoked the
quasi-contract theory of quantum meruit.
Although the parties had some semblance of an agreement, that does not mean that
quantum meruit cannot apply. It is true, as Pederzani suggests, that “the existence of an express
agreement on the subject matter of an unjust-enrichment or quantum-meruit claim ordinarily
precludes recovery.” Beldock v. VWSD, LLC, 2023 VT 35, ¶ 78 n.14, 218 Vt. 144 (emphasis
added). But that “rule is not absolute.” Id. ¶ 77. “[F]or unjust-enrichment and quantum-meruit
claims, . . . the existence of an express agreement is not an automatic bar to recovery.” Id. ¶ 78
n.14. As our Supreme Court has explained:
A valid contract displaces any inquiry into unjust enrichment as to
matters within its scope. In other words, when an express contract
does not fully address a subject, a court of equity may impose a
remedy to further the ends of justice. Consequently, unjust
enrichment applies in the contract context only when a party
renders a valuable performance or confers a benefit upon another
under a contract that is invalid, voidable, or otherwise ineffective
to regulate the parties’ obligations.
Id. ¶ 77 (quotations omitted); see generally Liss v. Studeny, 450 Mass. 473, 480, 879 N.E.2d 676,
682 (2008) (“While a party does not recover on the contract itself under quantum meruit, a court
may look to the terms of the underlying contract to help determine appropriate recovery under
quantum meruit.”). Given the various different communications (and miscommunications) that
formed the basis for Dunbar’s work at Pederzani’s property and the evidence that Pederzani
assented to Dunbar performing additional work beyond what was outlined in their original
“agreement,” it was reasonable to conclude that the initial “agreement” was “ineffective to
regulate the parties’ obligations.” Id. (quotation omitted). Consequently, it was entirely proper
to apply a quasi-contract theory such as quantum meruit, and the small claims court did not err in
that respect.
Pederzani maintains that even if it was proper to apply a quasi-contract theory, the court
below nevertheless erred in several ways. She argues that the entire shed “needed” to be painted
and that Dunbar should have done so. The trial court acknowledged that the painting of the shed
was “sub-par” and would require future remediation, and accordingly did not award Dunbar
damages for painting the shed.
She next contends that Dunbar produced no records, receipts, or documentation of having
spent 13.75 hours at her property and that this was an “unsubstantiated claim put forth the day of
the hearing.” Appellant’s Br. at 5 (filed June 18, 2026). This finding was based on Dunbar’s
testimony, which the trial court had discretion to credit. This Court cannot disturb that finding
on appeal. While Pederzani asserts that it was not “fair” or “just” that the court allowed Dunbar
to come up with an hourly rate “on the spot,” that was a reasonable inquiry to determine the
value of Dunbar’s services for the purposes of quantum meruit principles.

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Pederzani also asks that there be “no compensation” for “whatever [Dunbar] claims to
have done on the house” because the photographs “clearly show” that what she requested to be
scraped was “left untouched.” Id. at 6. However, the small claims court credited that Dunbar did
the work on the house on the right side of the chimney, and this Court cannot disturb that
credibility finding. Thus, he is entitled to recover the reasonable value of his services for that
work.
Pederzani contends that a contractor cannot agree to a specific scope of a job, and then
“randomly add on hours and materials for which they are not entitled.” Id. There is evidence,
however, that after the initial “agreement,” she later requested additional work through email or
verbal communications. Under quasi-contract principles, it would be unfair not to compensate
Dunbar for that additional work. She similarly contends that the court rewarded Dunbar
“unfairly by shifting from the agreed upon” flat fee of $525 to a “substantial hourly wage of
$40.00 per hour.” Id. There was no error. This was a reasonable method to ascertain the value
of Dunbar’s services for purposes of resolving the quantum meruit/unjust enrichment claim.
Lastly, Pederzani argues that the court erred in awarding Dunbar the cost of materials
because she gave Dunbar her Lowe’s credit card and all materials were charged to that card.
There is evidence in the record that Dunbar supplied at least some of his own paint and primer,
however, and the small claims court was well within its discretion to credit that testimony. This
Court observes that at the conclusion of the hearing below, Pederzani attempted to provide
contrary testimony, but that this occurred after the evidence was closed and after the court issued
its judgment. Nevertheless, the small claims court erred in awarding Dunbar for materials
because Dunbar told Pederzani that he would provide the paint and primer with no charge, and
he never asked for the cost of paint and primer at the hearing below. As the plaintiff in this
proceeding, it was his burden to articulate the relief he was seeking. Therefore, the damages
award must be reduced by $100.
Order
The judgment of the small claims court is AFFIRMED IN PART and REVERSED IN
PART. The judgment is reversed as to the award of $100 for paint and primer, but affirmed in all
other respects. The total judgment in favor of Dunbar is modified to $575. An amended
judgment shall issue.
Electronically signed on September 18, 2026 at 6:14 PM pursuant to V.R.E.F. 9(d).
________________________________
Megan J. Shafritz
Superior Court Judge