In the Matter of the Marriage of: Scott Gilbert Dashiell & Genesis Anna Dashiell

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
In the Matter of the Marriage of:
SCOTT GILBERT DASHIELL,
Respondent,
and
GENESIS ANNA DASHIELL,
Appellant.
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No. 39796-3-III
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
LAWRENCE-BERREY, C.J. — Genesis Dashiell appeals after the trial court enforced
a division of property contained in a separation agreement executed a few months before
dissolution proceedings commenced. Because Scott Dashiell, prior to execution of the
agreement, failed to disclose the value of his 50 percent interest in a company awarded to
him, we conclude the trial court erred by enforcing the property agreement. We remand
for a just and equitable distribution of the Dashiells’ estate. We also award Genesis1 her
reasonable attorney fees at the trial court level and on appeal, pursuant to RAP 18.1 and
CR 37.
1 Because the parties share a last name, for clarity, we will refer to them by their
first names.
FILED
DECEMBER 31, 2024
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III

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FACTS
On December 15, 2021, Genesis and Scott, both pro se, jointly filed a petition for
legal separation and legal separation agreement.
Property agreement
The Dashiells’ separation agreement, signed and notarized, addressed the
residential schedule and support for their minor daughter. The agreement also distributed
the Dashiells’ assets and liabilities. For ease of reference, we refer to this portion of the
agreement as the “property agreement.”
While the Dashiells’ property agreement did not expressly assign values to the
couple’s six real properties—five of which the agreement initially allocated to Scott—
Genesis, when negotiating the agreement, had herself proposed values that Scott did not
dispute. However, the property agreement allocated to Scott two limited liability
corporation interests to which the couple had never assigned any value. One of those
interests—a 50 percent share of Cascade Equipment Company, LLC (CES)—represented
the small business that Scott operated, earning him $9,383 per month. Scott did not
acquire any interest in the business until after his marriage to Genesis.
In an e-mail sent five months after the Dashiells executed their separation
agreement, Scott informed Genesis that CES owed over $440,000 on inventory lines of
credit. In other postseparation correspondence, Scott identified some of CES’s assets,

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including a GMC truck ($16,000), a “roll back” vehicle ($11,000), a dump truck
($10,000), two trailers ($12,000), and miscellaneous tools and property (either $15,000 or
$25,000). Clerk’s Papers (CP) at 85. Because Scott failed to disclose the value of all
CES assets, however—such as inventory, accounts receivable, undistributed earnings,
and goodwill—the value of Scott’s 50 percent interest in CES could not be approximated.
Failed dissolution petition
In March 2022—three months after separating and filing their separation
agreement—the Dashiells jointly filed to dissolve their marriage. The couple’s
dissolution petition incorporated by reference their separation agreement. However,
the commissioner who considered the Dashiells’ petition rejected it on the grounds that
90 days had not passed since the couple had filed. Notwithstanding this, the
commissioner agreed to enter a temporary family law order enforcing the terms of the
Dashiells’ separation agreement. By that time, the Dashiells had amended their
agreement to reallocate certain properties and require Scott to pay Genesis $50,000 to
settle the dissolution.
Renewed dissolution petition
Despite the commissioner’s instruction to wait 90 days before finalizing the
dissolution, Scott, after just two weeks, returned to court alone to a different court
commissioner and had the decree of dissolution entered. By Scott’s account, he had

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heard from the clerk’s office employees that he could do this without waiting 90 days.
By Genesis’s account, Scott had rushed the dissolution through because she had told him
she would hire a lawyer.
Successful vacation and ensuing motions
After learning that Scott had finalized their dissolution, Genesis secured
representation and moved to vacate the dissolution order. The court granted the motion
because the second court commissioner had entered the decree sooner than 90 days after
the Dashiells had filed their dissolution petition.
Two months later, Genesis served Scott with interrogatories seeking financial
information. When Scott did not respond to her interrogatories, Genesis moved to
compel discovery and requested attorney fees. In response, Scott filed a motion to
enforce the property agreement and to enter a decree of dissolution. Genesis opposed the
motion, and argued the property agreement was unenforceable because there was
evidence it awarded significantly more net assets to Scott, and because Scott had failed to
fully disclose CES’s assets.
The court took the matter under advisement and later entered an order granting
Scott’s motion to enforce the property agreement. The court found and concluded in
relevant part:

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3. . . . [T]he separation agreement was carefully crafted and
agreed. It outlined values on [numerous assets and debts]. The parties
declined to enter values on the six pieces of [real] property they own and
divided the property initially with [Scott] receiving five out of six pieces
but renegotiated later, on March 16, 2022, to grant [Scott] four out of six
pieces of property. The parties also agreed on March 16, 2022, that [Scott]
would pay [Genesis] $50,000.00.
4. Examining the settlement agreement, not considering the
value of the real property, some bank accounts, and the business, [Genesis]
received total assets and liabilities in the amount of $227,536.14 plus two
pieces of real property. [Scott] received total assets and liabilities of -
$308,292.00 plus four pieces of real property and 100 [percent] of a 50
[percent] partnership in [CES,] and 100 [percent] ownership in SGD
Properties LLC. The court cannot find that this agreement was unfair,
particularly considering the sophistication of the parties and the decisions
not to pursue or list values related to some assets.
CP at 285.2
Genesis timely appealed to this court.
ANALYSIS
A. ENFORCEABILITY OF THE PROPERTY AGREEMENT
Genesis argues the trial court should not have enforced the property agreement
because, absent a valuation of the couple’s business interests, the court could not have
determined whether the agreement was fair. We agree the trial court erred.
2 The parties do not explain how the trial court arrived at these values. Suffice it
to say, the values mean little, given the extensive real property and business interests the
court could not value, the latter because of Scott’s nondisclosures.

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Where parties to a marriage enter into a separation contract, the contract,
except the parenting plan, “shall be binding upon the court unless it finds, after
considering the economic circumstances of the parties and any other relevant evidence
produced by the parties . . . that the separation contract was unfair at the time of its
execution.” RCW 26.09.070(3). In this context, trial courts determine fairness according
to a two-part test: (1) whether the parties, when forming the agreement, fully disclosed
“the amount, character and value of the property involved,” and (2) whether the parties
entered into the agreement “‘voluntarily [and] on independent advice,’” with knowledge
of their rights. In re Marriage of Cohn, 18 Wn. App. 502, 506, 569 P.2d 79 (1977)
(quoting In re Marriage of Hadley, 88 Wn.2d 649, 654, 565 P.2d 790 (1977)); see also
In re Marriage of Shaffer, 47 Wn. App. 189, 194-95, 733 P.2d 1013 (1987) (harmonizing
RCW 26.09.070(3) and Cohn).
Here, the trial court upheld the Dashiells’ “carefully crafted” separation agreement
on the grounds that “the sophistication of the parties and the decisions not to pursue or
list values related to some assets” precluded a finding of unfairness. CP at 285.
However, given the two-part test set forth above, the “decisions” to which the court
referred precluded it from enforcing the agreement.
As stated above, a separation agreement lacks fairness where the parties do not
fully disclose “the amount, character and value” of the property to be divided. Cohn,

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18 Wn. App. at 506. While Scott met this requirement with respect to most of the
properties, he did not meet it with respect to at least one substantial property awarded to
him—his 50 percent interest in CES.
Scott, while negotiating the property agreement, made no disclosures at all about
CES’s assets and liabilities. While Scott disclosed the salary and commissions he earned
from the company ($9,383 per month), this figure reflects only income, and was not a
disclosure of the value of his 50 percent interest in CES.
In subsequent correspondence, Scott did disclose that CES owed over $440,000 on
inventory lines of credit, and further disclosed the value of some of its assets. However,
Scott did not disclose the value of CES’s inventory, accounts receivable, undistributed
income, and goodwill. We conclude that the trial court erred by enforcing the property
agreement. Moreover, because of the extent of Scott’s nondisclosures, the trial court
should have ordered Scott to answer the discovery propounded to him.
B. CR 2A AND RCW 2.44.010(1)
Scott argues that CR 2A and RCW 2.44.010(1) authorized the trial court to
enforce the property agreement. We disagree.

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Under CR 2A,
No agreement or consent between parties or attorneys in respect to
the proceedings in a cause, the purport of which is disputed, will be
regarded by the court unless the same shall have been made and assented to
in open court on the record, or entered in the minutes, or unless the
evidence thereof shall be in writing and subscribed by the attorneys
denying the same.
Similarly, under RCW 2.44.010(1),
the court shall disregard all agreements and stipulations in relation to the
conduct of, or any of the proceedings in, an action or special proceeding
unless such agreement or stipulation be made in open court, or in presence
of the clerk, and entered in the minutes by him or her, or signed by the
party against whom the same is alleged, or his or her attorney.
Together, these provisions “avoid disputes regarding the existence and terms of
settlement agreements.” Morris v. Maks, 69 Wn. App. 865, 869, 850 P.2d 1357 (1993).
However, nothing in CR 2A nor RCW 2.44.010(1) supports the notion that agreements,
rendered unenforceable by statute, become enforceable once filed in court.
C. ATTORNEY FEES
Genesis, citing RAP 18.1 and CR 37, requests an award of attorney fees, both
below and on appeal, for Scott’s refusal to answer her discovery requests.
RAP 18.1 permits an award of reasonable attorney fees on appeal if recoverable
under applicable law. CR 37(a)(4) requires the party, whose conduct necessitated the

No. 39796-3-111
In re Marriage of Dashiell
motion to compel discovery, to pay the moving party reasonable attorney fees, unless the
court finds that the opposition to the motion was substantially justified.
Here, the governing statute and decisional authority clearly require full disclosure
of any valuable property, which would include Scott's 50 percent interest in CES. 	Scott
does not even attempt to argue he complied with this requirement with respect to CES.
We conclude that Scott's opposition to Genesis's motion to compel was not substantially
justified. Subject to Genesis's compliance with RAP 18.l(d), we grant her request for
reasonable attorney fees incurred at the trial court related to her motion to compel and on
appeal. Because Scott's defense of the motion to compel was his counter motion to
enforce the property agreement, the attorney fees incurred by Genesis in opposing Scott's
counter motion are, in our view, related to her motion to compel and thus are recoverable.
Remanded.
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to
RCW 2.06.040.
WE CONCUR:
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