State Of Washington, Respondent V. Jahad Hill, Appellant

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
JAHADV.D. HILL,
B.D. 4/18/95,
Appellant.
No. 70426-5-I
DIVISION ONE
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: 	July 21, 2014
Leach, 	J. 	— Jahad 	Hill 	appeals 	his juvenile 	adjudication 	for criminal
trespass in the first degree. 	He argues that the State's evidence was insufficient
and that the admission of testimonial hearsay violated his right of confrontation.
We affirm.
FACTS
On September 22, 2012, a security guard at The Commons, a Federal
Way shopping mall, received information that Hill and three other juveniles were
suspected of shoplifting from the American Eagle store. 	The guard followed the
juveniles as they left the mall and used his radio to notify Federal Way Police
Officer Richard 	Adams, 	who 	is assigned 	to patrol the 	mall. 	Officer Adams
approached the group and told them to stop. 	Hill immediately began to run.
Officer Adams placed Hill under arrest for obstruction. 	After Officer Adams read

No. 70426-5-1 / 2
Hill his Miranda1 rights, Hill admitted that he had been inside the mall but denied
stealing from 	the American 	Eagle store. 	Officer Adams checked the 	police
department's 	computer system and discovered that 	Hill 	had been 	issued a
"permanent trespass notice" on two prior occasions, once in 2009 and once in
2011, prohibiting him from entering the mall. 	Hill then admitted that he knew that
he was prohibited from entering the mall. 	He also admitted to giving a false
name when he received the trespass notice in 2011. 	The State charged Hill with
one count of criminal trespass in the first degree.
At trial, Officer Adams testified that he had issued Hill the trespass notice
in 2009 for "stealing at Sears and several other stores." When asked whether he
remembered the circumstances surrounding the 2009 trespass notice, Officer
Adams stated that he did not have any personal recollection "[ojther than that he
was arrested for theft and that he had been identified as stealing from several
stores." 	Hill did not object to this testimony. 	Officer Adams did not issue the
2011 	trespass notice and did not have personal knowledge of the underlying
circumstances.
Following a fact-finding hearing, the trial court found Hill guilty as charged.
Hill appeals.
Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
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No. 70426-5-1 / 3
DISCUSSION
Sufficiency of the Evidence
Sufficient 	evidence 	supports 	an 	adjudication 	of 	guilt 	in 	a 	juvenile
proceeding if, viewed 	in the light most favorable to the State, it permits any
rational 	trier 	of 	fact 	to 	find 	the 	essential 	elements 	of 	the 	crime 	beyond 	a
reasonable doubt.2 	All reasonable inferences from the evidence must be drawn
in favor of the State and against the defendant.3 	We defer to the trier of fact on
issues of conflicting testimony, credibility of witnesses, and the persuasiveness of
the evidence.4
"In 	reviewing 	a 	juvenile 	court 	adjudication, 	we 	must 	decide 	whether
substantial 	evidence 	supports 	the 	trial 	court's findings 	of fact 	and, 	in turn,
whether the findings support the conclusions of law."5 	We review conclusions of
law de novo.6
A 	person 	commits criminal 	trespass 	in the first 	degree 	if the 	person
knowingly 	enters 	or 	remains 	unlawfully 	in a 	building.7 	A person 	"enters or
remains unlawfully" in or upon premises when he or she is not licensed, invited,
2 State v. Echeverria, 85 Wn. App. 777, 782, 934 P.2d 1214(1997).
3 State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068 (1992).
4 State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 821, 874-75, 83 P.3d 970 (2004).
5 State v. B.J.S., 140 Wn. App. 91, 97, 169 P.3d 34 (2007).
6 State v. Lew, 156 Wn.2d 709, 733, 132 P.3d 1076 (2006).
7 RCW 9A.52.070.
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No. 70426-5-1/4
or otherwise privileged 	to so enter or remain.8 	However, 	it is a defense to
criminal trespass if "[t]he premises were at the time open to members of the
public and the actor complied with all lawful conditions imposed on access to or
remaining in the premises."9 	"Once a defendant has offered some evidence that
the entry was permissible under a statutory defense, the State bears the burden
to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant lacked license to enter."10
Because this 	defense 	challenges 	the 	sufficiency of the 	State's 	evidence, 	a
defendant may raise it for the first time on appeal.11
Here, the record includes evidence sufficient to support the trial court's
adjudication. 	Hill 	had 	been 	notified on two separate occasions that 	he was
permanently prohibited from entering the mall. 	Following a valid waiver of his
Miranda rights, Hill admitted that he 	had 	entered the mall in violation of the
trespass notices. 	Because the trespass notices revoked Hill's license to enter
the mall, his entry to the mall was unlawful.
Citing State v. Green12 and State v. R.H.,13 Hill contends that the State
must prove more than the defendant's exclusion from the property; rather, it must
8RCW9A.52.010(5).
9 RCW 9A.52.090(2).
10 State v. Green, 157 Wn. App. 833, 844, 239 P.3d 1130 (2010) (citing City
of Bremerton v. Widell, 146 Wn.2d 561, 570, 51 P.3d 733 (2002)).
11 State v. R.H., 86 Wn. App. 807, 811, 939 P.2d 217 (1997).
12 157 Wn. App. 833, 239 P.3d 1130 (2010).
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No. 70426-5-1 / 5
prove that the exclusion was lawful. 	In other words, argues Hill, the State must
prove that he stole from mall stores in 2009.
In 	Green, 	a 	school 	district 	issued 	the 	defendant 	a 	trespass 	notice
prohibiting her from going to her child's elementary school except under very
limited circumstances.14 The district asserted as the basis for the trespass notice
the defendant's alleged disruptive behavior at the school's curriculum night and
disregard of a staff member's instructions in the school parking lot.15 	At trial, an
attorney for the school district testified to the reasons for the trespass notice but
admitted he had 	no personal knowledge of the underlying events.16 	Over the
defendant's hearsay objection, the trial court admitted this testimony to explain
the school's reason for issuing the trespass notice but not to prove the alleged
disruptions 	occurred.17 	The 	defendant 	testified 	that 	she 	had 	not 	been
disruptive.18 	Because there was no competent testimony to establish that the
school district had any factual basis for revoking the defendant's statutory right to
access 	her child's school, 	this 	court held 	that the State failed 	to 	prove the
lawfulness of the trespass notice.19 This court reversed the trespass conviction.20
13 86 Wn. App. 807, 939 P.2d 217 (1997).
14 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 838-40.
15 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 842.
16 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 852.
17 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 852.
18 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 842-43.
19 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 852.

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In R.H., 	a 	restaurant 	manager told 	several 	youths skateboarding and
loitering in the restaurant parking lot to leave, but they did not comply.21 	R.H.
was not part of this group; he arrived at the restaurant later by skateboard to wait
for a friend and eat at the restaurant.22 At the manager's request, a police officer
told all of the youths, including R.H., 	that they would be arrested for criminal
trespass if they did not leave.23 	R.H. did not believe he was required to leave
because he planned to 	be a customer at the restaurant.24 	When he did 	not
leave, he was arrested and charged with criminal trespass.25 	The evidence at
trial established that R.H. repeatedly told the arresting officer he was waiting for
another customer and that if R.H. had been planning to eat at the restaurant, he
had permission to be on the premises.26 	This court held that the State failed to
prove R.H.'s presence was unlawful because he had complied with "'all lawful
conditions imposed on access.'"27
Green and R.H. are distinguishable. To require the State to prove a lawful
basis for the trespass notice, Hill must present "some evidence" that he complied
20 Green, 157 Wn. App. at 853.
21 RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 808.
22 RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 808-09.
23 RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 809.
24 RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 809.
25R.H.,86Wn.App.at810.
26RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 811.
27 RJ±, 86 Wn. App. at 812 (quoting RCW 9A.52.090(2)).
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No. 70426-5-1 / 7
with lawful conditions imposed on his access to the mall. 	The defendants in
Green and R.H. both asserted that they had not engaged in the behavior alleged
as the basis for the trespass notice. 	In contrast, Hill presented no such evidence.
The burden did not shift to the State to establish a lawful basis for the trespass
notice.
Moreover, 	Officer 	Adams 	testified 	that 	Hill 	"was 	arrested 	for 	theft
and . . . had been identified as stealing from several stores." 	Hill did not object to
the 	statement. 	The 	record 	is 	unclear whether Officer Adams 	had 	personal
knowledge of these events. 	But, by challenging the sufficiency of the State's
evidence, Hill has necessarily admitted the truth of Officer Adams's testimony.
Based on this evidence, a rational trier of fact could have found a lawful basis for
the trespass notice.
Confrontation Clause
The confrontation clauses of the state and federal constitutions guarantee
the right of an accused to confront witnesses against him or her.28 	Admission of
testimonial 	hearsay 	violates 	a 	defendant's 	right of confrontation 	unless 	the
witness is unavailable and the defendant had an earlier opportunity to cross-
28 U.S. Const, amend. VI; Wash. Const, art. I, § 22.

No. 70426-5-1 / 8
examine about the statement.29 	Hearsay is "a statement, other than one made
by the declarant while testifying at the trial or hearing, offered in evidence to
prove the truth of the matter asserted."30 This court reviews confrontation clause
challenges de novo.31
Hill 	argues that Officer Adams 	provided 	testimonial 	hearsay when 	he
testified that Hill received a trespass notice in 2009 for stealing from mall stores.
But Hill does not show that Officer Adams repeated any out-of-court statements
of others. 	Neither the State nor Hill questioned Officer Adams as to the basis of
his knowledge that Hill had stolen merchandise or was arrested. 	Testimony
based on one's personal knowledge is not hearsay.32 	Thus, because Hill does
not 	show that 	Officer Adams 	testified 	to 	something 	about which 	he 	lacked
personal knowledge, Hill fails to show a violation of his confrontation right.
Moreover, 	Hill 	did 	not 	object to 	the 	testimony 	or 	assert 	his 	right to
confrontation below. A defendant must raise a confrontation clause claim at or
29 Crawford v. Washington, 541 	U.S. 36, 53-54, 124 S. Ct. 1354, 158 L. Ed.
2d 177(2004).
30 ER 801(c).
31 State v. Koslowski, 166 Wn.2d 409, 417, 209 P.3d 479 (2009).
32 State v. Simmons, 63 Wn.2d 17, 22, 385 P.2d 389 (1963).
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No. 70426-5-1 / 9
before trial to preserve this issue for appellate review. 	Hill waived any right of
confrontation by failing to timely assert it.
Affirmed.
WE CONCUR:
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