In Re The Marriage Of: Carol C. Guettler, Appellant V. James D. Guettler, Respondent

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
In the Matter of the Marriage of:
JAMES GUETTLER,
Respondent,
and
CAROL GUETTLER,
Appellant.
DIVISION ONE
No. 80609-2-I
UNPUBLISHED OPINION
DWYER, J. — This matter involves a dispute regarding the proper amount
of a judgment lien awarded to James Guettler more than 10 years ago as part of
the dissolution of his marriage to Carol Guettler.1
The parties herein focused primarily on the fact that the decree of
dissolution sets forth two options for how Carol was supposed to pay James the
judgment amount, which the parties identify as “Option A” and “Option B.” When
James sought to collect on his judgment, Carol filed a motion purporting to seek
clarification as to which option applied, arguing that, if Option B applied, James’s
lien should be offset by certain debts James allegedly owed Carol. This motion
was denied by both a court commissioner and a superior court judge ruling on a
motion to revise the commissioner’s decision. The superior court judge
disagreed with Carol that Option B applied, instead concluding that the parties
1 To avoid confusion, we will refer to the parties by their first names.

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2
followed Option A and that James had, therefore, correctly calculated the amount
of the judgment lien.
Thereafter, James successfully obtained an order compelling the sale of
real property to satisfy his judgment lien. Carol now appeals from both the order
denying her motion for clarification and the order compelling the sale of real
property to satisfy James’s lien.
We conclude that the superior court erred when it ruled that the parties
followed Option A. However, the choice between Option A and Option B has no
impact on the amount of James’s judgment lien, which was plainly set forth in the
decree of dissolution independent of the payment option selected by the parties.
Therefore, we reverse the superior court’s order resolving the motion for
clarification of the decree insofar as it concluded that the parties followed Option
A. In all other respects, we affirm that order. We also affirm the order compelling
the sale of real property to satisfy James’s lien.
I
James and Carol Guettler entered into a dissolution of their marriage in
2006. At the time, they owned two properties (a house and an apartment
building) which they had purchased together, obtaining the necessary funds by
way of a loan from Carol’s parents. James and Carol failed to pay off their debt
to Carol’s parents before dissolving their marriage.
In their dissolution decree, entered in King County Superior Court on
March 31, 2006, Carol was awarded both the house and the apartment and
James was awarded a $300,000 judgment lien on both properties, with interest to

No. 80609-2-I/3
3
accrue at a rate of 6 percent per annum. Exhibit A to the dissolution decree
specified that these awards were subject to the following conditions:
A. If the wife decides not to sell the house and/or apartment
building within the next twenty-four months, then
a. For the next 8 years, or until the apartment building is
sold to a neutral third party, whichever is earlier, the
husband shall be allowed to remain in Apartment 4 or
Apartment 10 if he choose[s] (when apartment 10 first
becomes available; and husband must notify wife that he
wishes to move to apartment 10 within 7 days of being
notified it will be available), at no rent, though he must sign a
standard lease and be bound by the terms of that lease like
any other tenant; and
b. Husband shall receive a lien on both properties for a
total of $300,000 secured by Deeds of Trust on both
properties and payable as follows:
a. $75,000 to be paid as soon as possible; i.e.
wife to start refinance, if necessary to obtain the
money, of either property within 30 days to pay this
amount and husband to cooperate with refinance
b. remainder due $112,500 in 2008 and $112,500
in 2010 or when either the house or the apartment is
sold, with interest at 6% starting April 2006.
B. If, during the next twenty-four months, the wife decides to
sell the apartment building or if the apartment building is foreclosed
upon then
a. if husband receives a cash payment of at least
$275,000 and a release from any liability toward the wife’s
parents, then the wife’s[2] judgment lien shall be satisfied in
full;
b. Otherwise, both properties shall be sold and the
proceeds divided as follows:
Sales price
-mortgages at time of separation
- costs of sale (agent fees, required repairs, unpaid
taxes up to the amount owed at the time of
separation, unpaid utilities up to the amount owed at
the time of separation, and other required fees and
costs)
- estimate capitol [sic] gains taxes from the sale of the
apartment building (if taxes are overpaid as shown by
the wife’s actual tax return then the husband shall be
2 This appears to be an error, as the only judgment lien established by the decree is
James’s lien.

No. 80609-2-I/4
4
refunded 50% of the overpayment and if the taxes are
underpaid then the husband shall pay the wife 50% of
the deficit)
= community net sales proceeds
½ net comm.net
proceeds to wife
- 2/3 debt to wife’s
parents
- 50% of any remaining
community taxes owed
= wife final community
net
½ net comm. net
proceeds to husband
- 1/3 debt to wife’s
parents
- 50% of any remaining
community taxes owed
= husband final
community net
Any proceeds in excess of the community net is separate
property of the wife and shall be her sole property.
Wife shall be in charge of the sale but if husband feels that
he will not receive at least the amount of his lien plus interest
because the wife is not selling either property for fair market value
he may seek court assistance in setting a fair selling price for the
properties so that his interest is protected.
C. Husband shall subordinate his lien if the wife wishes to
refinance as long as no debt in addition to that already in existence
is incurred or, if new debt is incurred, as long as there remains
sufficient equity to secure the husband’s remaining judgment plus
12% of the then value of the property.
Shortly following the entry of the decree, the superior court entered
another order to make a correction to the judgment and decree, adding the
following language to the end of Exhibit A:
Husband shall receive a lien on the property in the amount and
fashion as set forth above. However, $75,000 of the lien is to be
paid as soon as possible, i.e. wife to start refinance of either
property, if necessary, and pay the husband $75,000 within 30 days
or as soon as a refinance can be completed and husband shall
cooperate with the refinance. The $75,000 shall be credited
against the amounts owed to the husband under either option A
(wife does not sell either property within 24 months) or option B
(wife sells either or both property within the next 24 months or a
property is foreclosed upon).

No. 80609-2-I/5
5
Carol sold the apartment building later that year. Then, on
December 14, 2006, Carol used some of the proceeds from the sale of the
apartment to make a $75,000 payment on James’s judgment lien. She did
not make any further payments on the judgment lien, nor did she make
any attempt to sell the house.
Approximately 10 years later, on January 8, 2016, James obtained an
order extending his judgment lien another 10 years. However, this order set forth
an incorrect judgment amount because it did not credit Carol for her $75,000
payment. On March 26, 2019, James obtained an amended order setting forth
the correct remaining judgment amount.
Then, on May 7, 2019, James filed an application for a writ of execution in
King County Superior Court’s ex parte department, seeking to compel the sale of
the house to pay off the remaining amount of his judgment lien. Carol was
served with notice of the filing. She subsequently filed a response, requesting a
continuance so that she could file a motion seeking clarification of the amount of
the lien and of James’s right to collect on his judgment under the decree. The
court granted Carol’s request for a continuance in order to allow her to file a
motion in family court seeking clarification of the lien amount and James’s right to
collect on his judgment.
In Carol’s subsequently filed motion for clarification, she sought “an order
clarifying the amount of [James]’s judgment lien, and the sale or refinance
provisions contained in the Decree.” Carol argued (1) that James’s calculation of
the remaining judgment amount is incorrect and should instead be fixed utilizing

No. 80609-2-I/6
6
the sale provisions set forth in section III(B)(b) to Exhibit A of the decree (Option
B), and (2) that the Decree required James to cease all efforts to collect on his
judgment lien to allow Carol to seek refinancing of the house to obtain the funds
to pay the lien amount. In support of her motion, Carol filed as an exhibit an
unsigned application for a loan secured by the house. In response, James
argued that (1) he correctly calculated the remaining judgment amount because
the proper method of calculating the remaining judgment amount is to apply the
provisions set forth in section III(A)(b)(b) of Exhibit A to the decree (Option A),
and (2) although the decree requires James to allow Carol to obtain refinancing
under certain conditions, Carol’s unsigned loan application contains many false
statements and does not support her contention that she is able to obtain a loan
to pay the remaining judgment amount.
Following oral argument, a court commissioner denied the motion for
clarification. In a June 20, 2019 order, the commissioner agreed with James that
Option A applied and that the decree required James to subordinate his lien in
certain circumstances to allow Carol to refinance the house so as to obtain funds
to pay the judgment amount. However, the commissioner also concluded that
the parties had failed to provide sufficient information to determine the correct
amount of James’s judgment lien or to establish that Carol could obtain the loan
money necessary to pay off the judgment. Additionally, the commissioner also
noted that the parties disclosed during oral argument that Carol’s parents’
judgment against James and Carol (arising from the loan default) had expired
without renewal.

No. 80609-2-I/7
7
The commissioner delayed entry of her order “for 30 days after hearing of
a motion for revision or reconsideration, if any, or if a notice of appeal is filed, if
any, whichever is later.” Carol then filed a motion seeking revision of the
commissioner’s order. This motion was denied.
In its August 27, 2019 order affirming the commissioner’s ruling, the
superior court judge explicitly noted that:
1. With respect to the Decree of Dissolution entered on March
31, 2006 (the “2006 Order”), under the provision therein entitled
“Real Property”, Respondent and Petitioner (the “Parties”) operated
under [Option A] of the 2006 Order and not [Option B] of the 2006
Order;
2. Under the provision of the 2006 Order therein entitled “Real
Property”, Section III.C shall not be invoked given that insufficient
evidence exists of refinancing; and
3. The Petitioner’s request for attorneys’ fees is denied.
Carol then sought reconsideration of the superior court’s order denying the
motion for revision. Her motion for reconsideration was denied on September
12, 2019. Thereafter, Carol filed a notice of appeal on October 11, 2019, seeking
review of the order denying revision and the order denying reconsideration.
Carol did not seek a stay of any of the orders from which she appealed.
Less than a week later, James successfully sought an order to compel the
sale of the house. This order did not specify the manner by which proceeds from
the sale would be distributed between the parties. However, the order explicitly
retained jurisdiction over the parties so that the court could resolve any disputes
over the proper distribution of sale proceeds if the parties could not reach an
agreement.

No. 80609-2-I/8
8
Carol then filed an amended notice of appeal to add the sale order to the
list of orders from which she now appeals.
II
Carol contends that the remaining amount of the judgment lien must be
calculated taking into account the sale proceeds distribution provisions set forth
in Option B of Exhibit A to the decree and that because the sale order did not
take into account those provisions, it must be reversed. In response, James
asserts that the judgment lien amount was correctly calculated under Option A of
Exhibit A to the decree and that, therefore, the sale order was proper. Neither
party provides an entirely correct analysis.
The superior court reviews a motion to revise a commissioner’s ruling de
novo based on the record presented before the commissioner. In re Marriage of
Williams, 156 Wn. App. 22, 27, 232 P.3d 573 (2010) (citing RCW 26.12.215;
RCW 2.24.050; In re Marriage of Moody, 137 Wn.2d 979, 992-93, 976 P.2d 1240
(1999)). When, as is the case herein, “the superior court makes independent
findings and conclusions, the order on revision supersedes the commissioner’s
ruling.” In re Guardianship of Knutson, 160 Wn. App. 854, 863, 250 P.3d 1072
(2011). Thus, we review the superior court’s ruling, not the commissioner’s
ruling. State v. Ramer, 151 Wn.2d 106, 113, 86 P.3d 132 (2004). “We review
challenged findings of fact for substantial evidence and the conclusions of law de
novo.” Knutson, 160 Wn. App. at 863 (citing In re Marriage of Dodd, 120 Wn.
App. 638, 643, 86 P.3d 801 (2004)).

No. 80609-2-I/9
9
The interpretation of a dissolution decree presents a legal question that
we review de novo. In re Marriage of Thompson, 97 Wn. App. 873, 877, 988
P.2d 499 (1999). When a decree is unambiguous, there is nothing for us to
interpret. But if it is ambiguous, we apply the general rules of construction
applicable to statutes, contracts, and other writings to determine the intent of the
court that entered the decree. Thompson, 97 Wn. App. at 878.
We review a superior court’s order on a motion for reconsideration for a
manifest abuse of discretion. Sligar v. Odell, 156 Wn. App. 720, 734, 233 P.3d
914 (2010) (citing Drake v. Smersh, 122 Wn. App. 147, 151, 89 P.3d 726
(2004)). A superior court abuses its discretion when “its decision is based on
untenable grounds or is manifestly unreasonable or arbitrary.” Weyerhaeuser
Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 142 Wn.2d 654, 683, 15 P.3d 115 (2000).
Carol contends that the superior court erred when it concluded that Option
A in Exhibit A to the decree, rather than Option B, was followed by the parties
and that the judgment amount is correctly calculated utilizing the provisions in
Option A. In response, James asserts that the judgment amount was properly
calculated under Option A. Both parties are incorrect.
First, we note that Carol is correct that the conditions triggering the
application of Option B, rather than those triggering the application of Option A,
transpired herein. As the language added to the decree in the correction order
specifies, Option B applies to a situation in which the “wife sells either or both
property within the next 24 months or a property is foreclosed upon.”3 Because
3 By contrast, Option A would have applied had Carol not sold either property within 24
months of the entry of the decree.

No. 80609-2-I/10
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Carol sold the apartment within 24 months of the entry of the decree, Option B
applied. The superior court’s conclusion that Option A applied is therefore
incorrect.
However, we conclude that this error was harmless insofar as it concerns
the superior court’s determination that James had correctly calculated the
judgment amount. The judgment amount is plainly set forth on the first page of
the decree of dissolution as $300,000, with interest to accrue at 6 percent per
annum, and even a cursory reading of Option B reveals that it does not purport to
modify that amount.4 Instead, Option B purports to determine the proper
distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the apartment and the house
between James and Carol. It literally states that “both properties shall be sold
and the proceeds divided as follows” prior to listing the amounts that Carol now
asserts should be deducted from the judgment lien amount. Nowhere does any
language set forth in Option B state that it has any effect on the judgment lien
amount.
Indeed, a later provision contained in Option B makes it even plainer that
its sale proceeds division provisions have no impact on the judgment lien amount
when it states that “[a]ny proceeds in excess of the community net is separate
property of the wife and shall be her sole property.” Because Option B specifies
that half of the community net proceeds from the sale is to be distributed to Carol
and half is to be distributed to James, there could not possibly be any excess
4 Of course, the remaining amount of the judgment was modified by Carol’s $75,000
payment. But such modification was correctly noted in the amended order extending James’s
judgment.

No. 80609-2-I/11
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amount unless (1) James’s collection of the sale proceeds is limited to the
amount of his judgment lien, and (2) the lien amount is not determined by
calculation of the net proceeds from the sale of the house and apartment. In
short, Option B’s sale proceeds provisions have no impact on the amount of
James’s judgment lien.5
That the total amount of James’s judgment lien is determined independent
of whether Option A or Option B applies was further clarified by the court’s
subsequent correction order, which added the following language to the end of
Exhibit A:
Husband shall receive a lien on the property in the amount and
fashion as set forth above. However, $75,000 of the lien is to be
paid as soon as possible, i.e. wife to start refinance of either
property, if necessary, and pay the husband $75,000 within 30 days
or as soon as a refinance can be completed and husband shall
cooperate with the refinance. The $75,000 shall be credited
against the amounts owed to the husband under either option A
(wife does not sell either property within 24 months) or option B
(wife sells either or both property within the next 24 months or a
property is foreclosed upon).
This language plainly explains that James receives a judgment lien, and
that Carol must pay $75,000 of that amount within 30 days of the entry of the
5 Furthermore, Carol’s contention that she should be able to offset James’s alleged debts
against his judgment assumes that her claims that James has not paid his debts to her under the
decree are equivalent to James’s judgment against her. Carol does not cite to any authority to
support such a presumption. While it is a longstanding principle of law that, in certain
circumstances, judgments, once rendered, may be offset against other judgments, Spokane Sec.
Fin. Co. v. Bevan, 172 Wash. 418, 421-22, 20 P.2d 31 (1933), no such similar principle permits a
party to offset a mere claim against a judgment. If Carol wishes to offset James’s unpaid debts
against his judgment, she must first obtain a judgment against him, as “no right of set-off as to
judgments can come into existence until both judgments have been rendered.” Spokane Sec.
Fin. Co., 172 Wash. at 421.

No. 80609-2-I/12
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decree, regardless of whether Option A or Option B applies. Thus, the judgment
amount is unaffected by the application of either option.6
Because we reject Carol’s contention that the amount of James’s
judgment lien must be modified by the sale proceeds provisions set forth in
Option B of Exhibit A to the decree, we similarly reject her contention that the
order compelling the sale of the house must be reversed for its failure to so
modify the lien amount.7 We therefore reverse only the portion of the superior
6 Even if, arguendo, Option B’s sale proceeds division provisions had any effect on the
judgment amount, Carol still could not benefit therefrom here because she failed to sell the house
as required for Option B’s sale proceeds division provisions to apply.
Option B states that
B. If, during the next twenty-four months, the wife decides to sell the apartment
building or if the apartment building is foreclosed upon then
a. if husband receives a cash payment of at least $275,000 and a release
from any liability toward the wife’s parents, then the wife’s judgment lien shall be satisfied
in full;
b. Otherwise, both properties shall be sold and the proceeds divided as
follows[.]
(Emphasis added.)
Here, it is undisputed that, when Carol sold the apartment, she did not provide James
with a $275,000 cash payment and a release of liability from her parents, nor did she proceed to
sell the house.
Because Option B’s requirement that both properties be sold did not set forth any
timelines or deadlines for when the sale was to occur, and such a term would be “essential to a
determination” of the rights of the parties were the sale proceed provisions determinative of the
judgment amount, it would be our role to supply “a term which is reasonable in the
circumstances.” RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 204 (AM. LAW INST. 1981). While we
need not decide that which would constitute such a reasonable time to resolve the issues
presented herein, it is apparent that it would be shorter than the over 10 years that have passed
between the entry of the decree and the present day. Thus, Option B’s sale proceeds division
provisions never became applicable.
We further note that it would be inequitable for James to be forced to comply with the
Option B sale proceeds provisions, and thus face a greater risk that he fail to recover his full lien
amount, after Carol financially benefited from her failure to comply with Option B’s requirement
that the house be sold to satisfy the judgment lien.
Additionally, because we conclude that Option B’s sale proceeds provisions do not affect
the amount of James’s judgment lien, we need not address any of James’s other arguments
pertaining to this issue.
7 Both parties request an award of attorney fees on appeal. We decline to award
attorney fees to either party. Carol is not the prevailing party and is therefore not entitled to fees.
In re Guardianship of Lamb, 173 Wn.2d 173, 197-98, 265 P.3d 876 (2011) (losing party not
entitled to fees). James asserts that he should be awarded fees because he is unable to pay his
own attorney fees. While it is true that “in a dissolution or postdissolution proceeding, a court
asked to apportion attorney fees must consider the parties’ relative need and ability to pay,” In re
Marriage of Shellenberger, 80 Wn. App. 71, 87, 906 P.2d 968 (1995), James does not establish

No. 80609-2-I/13
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court’s order on the motion for revision that concludes that the parties followed
Option A of Exhibit A to the decree. We otherwise affirm that order and affirm the
order compelling the sale of the house.
Affirmed in part, and reversed in part.
WE CONCUR:
that he will be unable to pay his own fees following the collection of the remaining amount of his
judgment lien. He offers no other argument or legal authority to support his assertion that he is
entitled to fees. Thus, we decline to grant him an award of attorney fees. Wilson Court Ltd.
P’ship v. Tony Maroni’s, Inc., 134 Wn.2d 692, 710 n.4, 952 P.2d 590 (1998) (declining to award
fees when request does not provide argument and citation to authority that supports an award of
fees).