* Does 1, 2, 4, 5, Appellants/cross-respondents V. Sam Sueoka, Et Al., Respondents/cross-appellants

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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
JOHN DOES 1, 2, 4, 5,
Appellants/Cross Respondents,
JANE DOE 1 and JOHN DOE 3,
Plaintiffs,
v.
SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT and
the SEATTLE POLICE DEPARTMENT
OFFICE OF POLICE
ACCOUNTABILITY,
Respondents,
and
SAM SUEOKA,
Respondent/Cross Appellant,
JEROME DRESCHER, ANNE BLOCK,
and CHRISTI LANDES,
Respondents.
DIVISION ONE
No. 83700-1-I
PUBLISHED OPINION
DWYER, J. — “There are rights of constitutional stature whose exercise a
State may not condition by the exaction of a price.” Garrity v. State of New
Jersey, 385 U.S. 493, 500, 87 S. Ct. 616, 17 L. Ed. 2d 562 (1967). Among these
are the rights guaranteed by the First Amendment to our federal constitution.
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. Police officers “are not relegated to a watered-down
version of [such] rights.” Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
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No. 83700-1-I/2
2
In this Public Records Act litigation, the trial court failed to heed this
pronouncement. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order requiring
disclosure of certain unredacted records. We affirm the ancillary orders of the
trial court and remand the matter for further proceedings.
I
Soon after the United States Supreme Court pronounced that police
officers are not condemned to a “watered-down version” of core constitutional
rights, the voters of our state passed by popular initiative the predecessor to
Washington’s Public Records Act1 (PRA). See Progressive Animal Welfare
Soc’y v. Univ. of Wash., 125 Wn.2d 243, 250-52, 884 P.2d 592 (1994) (PAWS)
(noting approval of the public disclosure act in November 1972). Thus, since the
day of the enactment of our state’s public records law, police officers in
Washington have been entitled to the same federal constitutional protections as
are all other Washingtonians. It is by adherence to this principle that we decide
this case.
We are presented today with the question of whether the Seattle Police
Department (SPD) and the City of Seattle (the City) may disclose in investigatory
records the identities of current or former Seattle police officers who were
investigated regarding potential unlawful or unprofessional conduct during the
events of January 6, 2021, in Washington, D.C. John Does 1, 2, 4, and 5 (the
Does) sought judicial declaratory and injunctive relief after being informed that
SPD, their employer, intended to publicly disclose the unredacted investigatory
1 Ch. 42.56 RCW.
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No. 83700-1-I/3
3
records in response to several PRA requests. Investigators have determined
that allegations against the Does of unlawful or unprofessional conduct were “not
sustained.” The Does contend that their identities should thus not be disclosed in
the requested records, which include transcripts of interviews in which they were
compelled to disclose and discuss their political beliefs and affiliations.
The trial court denied the Does’ motion for a preliminary injunction,
concluding that the exceptions to permitted disclosure set forth in the PRA are
inapplicable. The Does appealed from the trial court’s order. In addition, Sam
Sueoka, a member of the public who filed a records request to obtain copies of
the investigatory records, cross appealed, asserting that the trial court erred by
permitting the Does to proceed pseudonymously in this litigation.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized a First Amendment
right to privacy that protects against state action compelling disclosure of political
beliefs and associations. Thus, only if the state actor (here, the City)
demonstrates a compelling interest in disclosure, and that interest is sufficiently
related to the disclosure, can the state actor lawfully disclose the Does’ identities
in the investigatory records. Because there is here established no compelling
state interest in disclosing the Does’ identities, the trial court erred by denying the
Does’ motion for a preliminary injunction.
The trial court properly concluded, however, that the Does should be
permitted to use pseudonyms in litigating this action. Because the Does assert a
First Amendment privacy right, it is federal constitutional law—not state law—that
controls their request to litigate pseudonymously. Pursuant to federal First
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No. 83700-1-I/4
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Amendment open courts jurisprudence, plaintiffs may litigate using pseudonyms
in circumstances wherein the injury sought to be prevented by prevailing in the
lawsuit would necessarily be incurred as a result of the compelled disclosure of
the plaintiffs’ identities, required as a condition of commencing the very lawsuit in
which vindication of the constitutional right is sought. Accordingly, the Does may
remain anonymous in this action.
II
The Does are current or former SPD officers2 who attended former
President Donald Trump’s “Stop the Steal” political rally on January 6, 2021 in
Washington, D.C. Upon returning to Washington State, the Does received
complaints from SPD’s Office of Police Accountability (the OPA) alleging that
they might have violated the law or SPD policies during their attendance at the
rally.
The Does thereafter submitted to OPA interviews in which they were
“ordered to answer all questions asked, truthfully and completely,” and informed
that “failure to do so may result in discipline up to and including termination.” In
addition to inquiring regarding the Does’ whereabouts and activities on January
6, the OPA also inquired regarding their political beliefs and associations,
including whether they attended the rally “to articulate [their] political views,”
whether they were “affiliated with any political groups,” and “[their] impressions
of, and reactions to, the content of the Rally.” Because the Does were under
2 John Doe 1 resigned from SPD in December 2021 “as a direct result of the pressure”
from the investigation and “public backlash arising” therefrom, as well as his concern “over
retribution” from the incident.
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No. 83700-1-I/5
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standing orders to do so, they answered these questions “truthfully and as
completely as possible.”
Sueoka and other members of the public submitted records requests
pursuant to the PRA, chapter 42.56 RCW, seeking disclosure of the investigatory
records pertaining to police officers who participated in the events of January 6,
2021, in our nation’s capital. In response to the records requests, SPD informed
the Does that it intended to disclose both records regarding its ongoing
investigation and the Does’ personnel files.
On February 23, 2021, the Does filed a complaint for declaratory relief and
preliminary and permanent injunction in the trial court.3 They concurrently filed a
motion for permission to proceed pseudonymously and a motion for a temporary
restraining order (TRO) and order to show cause why the preliminary injunction
should not issue.
On February 24, 2021, the trial court granted the Does’ motion for a TRO,
enjoining production of the requested records until a show cause hearing was
held. On March 9, 2021, the trial court granted the Does’ motion to proceed
pseudonymously, ruling that the order would “remain in effect at least until the
merits of Plaintiffs’ PRA claims are resolved.”
Following the show cause hearing, held on March 10, 2021, the trial court
denied the Does’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The Does sought review of
the trial court’s ruling in this court, and review was granted. Sueoka thereafter
3 The complaint was filed by Jane and John Does, 1 through 6. Jane Doe 1 and John
Doe 3 are not parties in this appeal. While litigation was ongoing in the trial court, the OPA
determined that Jane Doe 1 and John Doe 3 had violated both the law and SPD policies on
January 6, 2021, and their employment by SPD was terminated.
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No. 83700-1-I/6
6
moved to transfer the cause to our Supreme Court. Then, on June 28, 2021, the
OPA concluded its investigation. The OPA determined that allegations that the
presently-litigating Does had violated the law or SPD policies or had engaged in
unprofessional conduct were “not sustained.”
On August 4, 2021, our Supreme Court granted Sueoka’s motion to
transfer the cause to that court. However, following oral argument on November
9, 2021, the court determined that, “in light of changed circumstances,” review of
the preliminary injunction was moot. The court dismissed review of the matter
and remanded the cause to the trial court for further proceedings.
The trial court proceedings at issue herein then commenced. On January
5, 2022, Sueoka filed a “motion to change the case title and bar the use of
pseudonyms.” On January 12, 2022, the Does filed an additional motion for a
preliminary injunction, again requesting that the trial court redact their identities in
any disclosed records.4
Following a January 28, 2022 hearing, the trial court again denied the
Does’ motion for a preliminary injunction, ruling that the Does had not “met their
burden of proof that they have a privacy right that falls within an exemption under
the [PRA].” The court additionally concluded that the record contains “insufficient
evidence” that disclosure will cause the Does to “experience a level of
harassment that will result in a chilling effect on their First Amendment rights.”
4 Jane Doe 1 and John Doe 3 were no longer parties at that point in the litigation.
Accordingly, the motion was filed by the “Represented Doe Plaintiffs,” who are the same
individuals as the Does in this appeal.
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No. 83700-1-I/7
7
The trial court also denied Sueoka’s motion to preclude the Does from
proceeding in pseudonym.
The Does appeal from the trial court’s order denying their motion for a
preliminary injunction. Sueoka cross appeals, asserting that the trial court erred
by denying his “motion to change the case title and bar the use of pseudonyms.”
Sueoka also requests that we change the case title and bar the use of
pseudonyms in this appeal.
III
The Does assert that the trial court erred by determining that they were
unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claim that their identities are exempt
from disclosure in the requested records and, accordingly, denying their motion
for a preliminary injunction precluding such disclosure. We agree. The First
Amendment, made applicable to the states though the due process clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment, Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652, 45 S. Ct. 625, 69 L.
Ed. 1138 (1925), confers a right to privacy in one’s political beliefs and
associations that may be impinged only on the basis of a subordinating state
interest that is compelling.
Our Supreme Court’s decisional authority, the profusion of legislatively
enacted exceptions to disclosure, and the policy underlying the PRA indicate that
there is no compelling state interest in disclosing to the public the identities of
public employees against whom unsustained allegations of wrongdoing have
been made. Therefore, we hold that the trial court erred by denying the Does’
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No. 83700-1-I/8
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request for a preliminary injunction precluding disclosure of their names and
other identifying information in the requested records.
A
1
The party seeking an injunction pursuant to the PRA has the burden of
proof. Lyft, Inc. v. City of Seattle, 190 Wn.2d 769, 791, 418 P.3d 102 (2018).
When a party seeks a preliminary injunction or a TRO, “the trial court need not
resolve the merits of the issues.” Seattle Children’s Hosp. v. King County, 16
Wn. App. 2d 365, 373, 483 P.3d 785 (2020). “Instead, the trial court considers
only the likelihood that the moving party ultimately will prevail at a trial on the
merits.” SEIU Healthcare 775NW v. Dep’t of Soc. & Health Servs., 193 Wn. App.
377, 392-93, 377 P.3d 214 (2016).
We stand in the same position as the trial court when, as here, “the record
consists of only affidavits, memoranda of law, and other documentary evidence,
and where the trial court has not seen or heard testimony requiring it to assess
the witnesses’ credibility or competency.” Bainbridge Island Police Guild v. City
of Puyallup, 172 Wn.2d 398, 407, 259 P.3d 190 (2011). “Whether requested
records are exempt from disclosure presents a legal question that is reviewed de
novo.” Wash. Pub. Emps. Ass’n v. Wash. State Ctr. for Childhood Deafness &
Hearing Loss, 194 Wn.2d 484, 493, 450 P.3d 601 (2019).
2
“The PRA ensures the sovereignty of the people and the accountability of
the governmental agencies that serve them by providing full access to
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No. 83700-1-I/9
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information concerning the conduct of government.” Predisik v. Spokane Sch.
Dist. No. 81, 182 Wn.2d 896, 903, 346 P.3d 737 (2015). Its basic purpose “is to
provide a mechanism by which the public can be assured that its public officials
are honest and impartial in the conduct of their public offices.” Cowles Publ’g Co.
v. State Patrol, 109 Wn.2d 712, 719, 748 P.2d 597 (1988). To that end, the act
requires state and local agencies to “make available for public inspection and
copying all public records,” unless the record falls within a specific exemption in
the PRA or an “other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of specific
information or records.” RCW 42.56.070(1).
We have interpreted the “other statute” provision to incorporate
exemptions set forth not only in other legislative enactments, but also those
deriving from the state or federal constitutions. Wash. Fed’n of State Emps.,
Council 28 v. State, 22 Wn. App. 2d 392, 511 P.3d 119 (2022), review granted,
200 Wn.2d 1012, 519 P.3d 585 (2022); see also White v. Clark County, 188 Wn.
App. 622, 354 P.3d 38 (2015). Although our Supreme Court has not directly held
that RCW 42.56.070(1)’s “other statute” provision incorporates constitutional
protections against disclosure, the court has acknowledged that such an
argument “has force.” Yakima County v. Yakima Herald-Republic, 170 Wn.2d
775, 808, 246 P.3d 768 (2011) (addressing the argument that provisions of the
United States Constitution qualify as “other statutes”).
Moreover, the high court has recognized that, even absent legislative
incorporation of constitutional guarantees in the PRA, Washington courts must
nevertheless protect such rights. Seattle Times Co. v. Serko, 170 Wn.2d 581,
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No. 83700-1-I/10
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594-96, 243 P.3d 919 (2010). In the context of fair trial rights, the court
explained that while “[t]here is no specific exemption under the PRA that
mentions the protection of an individual’s constitutional fair trial rights, . . . courts
have an independent obligation to secure such rights.” Seattle Times Co., 170
Wn.2d at 595. Indeed, because “the constitution supersedes contrary statutory
laws, even those enacted by initiative,” “the PRA must give way to constitutional
mandates.” Freedom Found. v. Gregoire, 178 Wn.2d 686, 695, 310 P.3d 1252
(2013).
In addition to setting forth exemptions to the mandate for disclosure of
public records, the PRA includes an injunction provision stating that disclosure
may be enjoined only when “examination would clearly not be in the public
interest and would substantially and irreparably damage any person, or would
substantially and irreparably damage vital governmental functions.” RCW
42.56.540. Based on this statutory provision, our Supreme Court has held that
“finding an exemption applies under the PRA does not ipso facto support issuing
an injunction.” Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 786. Rather, for the disclosure of records to
be precluded due to a statutory exemption, the court has held that the PRA’s
standard for injunctive relief must also be met. Morgan v. City of Federal Way,
166 Wn.2d 747, 756-57, 213 P.3d 596 (2009); see also Soter v. Cowles Publ’g
Co., 162 Wn.2d 716, 757, 174 P.3d 60 (2007) (plurality opinion) (“[T]o impose the
injunction contemplated by RCW 42.56.540, the trial court must find that a
specific exemption applies and that disclosure would not be in the public interest
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No. 83700-1-I/11
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and would substantially and irreparably damage a person or a vital government
interest.”).
3
Our analysis of the issues presented relies on the holdings of our nation’s
highest court establishing that the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution confers a privacy right in an individual’s political beliefs and
associations. Accordingly, we must explore the decisional authority establishing
the contours of that right.
The United States Supreme Court has recognized “political freedom of the
individual” to be “a fundamental principle of a democratic society.” Sweezy v.
New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250, 77 S. Ct. 1203, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1311 (1957).
“Our form of government,” the Court explained, “is built on the premise that every
citizen shall have the right to engage in political expression and association,” a
right “enshrined in the First Amendment.” Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 250. Indeed, “[i]n
the political realm . . . thought and action are presumptively immune from
inquisition by political authority.” Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 266.5 Thus, the federal
constitution protects not only the right of individuals to engage in political
expression and association, but also to maintain their privacy in so doing.
Indeed, the Court has “repeatedly found that compelled disclosure, in
itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by
5 See also Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S. 539, 570, 83 S. Ct.
889, 9 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1963) (Douglas, J., concurring) (“‘The First Amendment in its respect for the
conscience of the individual honors the sanctity of thought and belief. To think as one chooses,
to believe what one wishes are important aspects of the constitutional right to be let alone.’”
(quoting Pub. Utils. Comm’n of Dist. of Columbia v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468, 72 S. Ct. 813, 96
L. Ed. 1068 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting))).
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No. 83700-1-I/12
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the First Amendment.” Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 64, 96 S. Ct. 612, 46 L. Ed.
2d 659 (1976) (citing Gibson v. Florida Legis. Investigation Comm., 372 U.S.
539, 83 S. Ct. 889, 9 L. Ed. 2d 929 (1963); Nat’l Ass’n for Advancement of
Colored People v. Button, 371 U.S. 415, 83 S. Ct. 328, 9 L. Ed. 2d 405 (1963);
Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 80 S. Ct. 412, 4 L. Ed. 2d 480 (1960);
Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479, 81 S. Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231 (1960); Nat’l
Ass’n for Advancement of Colored People v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449, 78 S. Ct.
1163, 2 L. Ed. 2d 1488 (1958) (NAACP)); see also Doe v. Reed, 561 U.S. 186,
232, 130 S. Ct. 2811, 177 L. Ed. 2d 493 (2010) (Thomas, J., dissenting) (“This
Court has long recognized the ‘vital relationship between’ political association
‘and privacy in one’s associations,’ and held that ‘[t]he Constitution protects
against the compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs.’” (alteration
in original) (citation omitted) (quoting NAACP, 357 U.S. at 462; Brown v. Socialist
Workers ’74 Campaign Comm. (Ohio), 459 U.S. 87, 91, 103 S. Ct. 416, 74 L. Ed.
2d 250 (1982))). Thus, the Court has recognized a “pervasive right of privacy
against government intrusion” that is “implicit in the First Amendment.” Gibson,
372 U.S. at 569-70 (Douglas, J., concurring). This “tradition of anonymity in the
advocacy of political causes . . . is perhaps best exemplified by the secret ballot,
the hard-won right to vote one’s conscience without fear of retaliation.” McIntyre
v. Ohio Elections Comm’n, 514 U.S. 334, 343, 115 S. Ct. 1511, 131 L. Ed. 2d
426 (1995); see also Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 266 (“It cannot require argument that
inquiry would be barred to ascertain whether a citizen had voted for one or the
other of the two major parties either in a state or national election.”).
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No. 83700-1-I/13
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The Supreme Court’s jurisprudence regarding this constitutional right to
privacy evolved in response to legislative investigations seeking to compel the
disclosure of individuals’ political beliefs. In the 1950s, the Court considered the
constitutional limits of legislatures’ authority to inquire into belief and activity
deemed to be subversive to federal or state governments. Uphaus v. Wyman,
360 U.S. 72, 79 S. Ct. 1040, 3 L. Ed. 2d 1090 (1959); Watkins v. United States,
354 U.S. 178, 77 S. Ct. 1173, 1 L. Ed. 2d 1273 (1957); Sweezy, 354 U.S. 234;
Wieman v. Updegraff, 344 U.S. 183, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. Ed. 216 (1952). This
“new kind of [legislative] inquiry unknown in prior periods of American history . . .
involved a broad-scale intrusion into the lives and affairs of private citizens,”
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 195, thus requiring the Court to ensure that such inquiry did
not “unjustifiably encroach upon an individual’s right to privacy.” Watkins, 354
U.S. at 198-99. In considering this “collision of the investigatory function with
constitutionally protected rights of speech and assembly,” Uphaus, 360 U.S. at
83 (Brennan, J., dissenting), the Court recognized the state interest in “self-
preservation, ‘the ultimate value of any society.’” Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 80
(quoting Dennis v. United States, 341 U.S. 494, 509, 71 S. Ct. 857, 95 L. Ed.
1137 (1951)). However, the Court rejected any notion that exposure itself was a
valid state interest:
We have no doubt that there is no congressional power to
expose for the sake of exposure. The public is, of course, entitled
to be informed concerning the workings of its government. That
cannot be inflated into a general power to expose where the
predominant result can only be an invasion of the private rights of
individuals.
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No. 83700-1-I/14
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Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200 (footnote omitted); see also Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 82
(Brennan, J., dissenting) (recognizing the “investigatory objective” therein to be
“the impermissible one of exposure for exposure’s sake”).
The Watkins Court recognized the governmental intrusion resulting from
such legislative inquiry, as well as the “disastrous” consequences that may ensue
as a result of compelled disclosure of the individual’s political beliefs.
The mere summoning of a witness and compelling him to testify,
against his will, about his beliefs, expressions or associations is a
measure of governmental interference. And when those forced
revelations concern matters that are unorthodox, unpopular, or
even hateful to the general public, the reaction in the life of the
witness may be disastrous.
354 U.S. at 197; see also Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[I]n
an era of mass communications and mass opinion, and of international tensions
and domestic anxiety, exposure and group identification by the state of those
holding unpopular and dissident views are fraught with such serious
consequences for the individual as inevitably to inhibit seriously the expression of
views which the Constitution intended to make free.”).
However, it is not only those individuals compelled to disclose their beliefs
who may be impacted. To the contrary, the Court recognized an additional “more
subtle and immeasurable effect upon those who tend to adhere to the most
orthodox and uncontroversial views and associations in order to avoid a similar
fate at some future time.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197-98. Moreover, that the injury
was not inflicted solely by government actors did not nullify the constitutional
infirmity; rather, that the “impact [was] partly the result of non-governmental
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No. 83700-1-I/15
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activity by private persons [could not] relieve the investigators of their
responsibility for initiating the reaction.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 198.
The Supreme Court further defined this constitutional privacy interest in
response to legislative action seeking to compel the disclosure of organizational
membership. NAACP, 357 U.S. 449; Bates, 361 U.S. 516; Shelton, 364 U.S.
479; Gibson, 372 U.S. 539. In 1958, the Court considered whether Alabama
could, consistent with our federal constitution, compel the NAACP to disclose its
membership list to the Alabama Attorney General. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 451. “It
is beyond debate,” the Court held, “that freedom to engage in association for the
advancement of beliefs and ideas is an inseparable aspect of the ‘liberty’ assured
by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, which embraces
freedom of speech.” NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460. Although the state itself had
“taken no direct action” in the challenged contempt judgment, the Court
recognized that “abridgement of [First Amendment] rights, even though
unintended, may inevitably follow from varied forms of governmental action.”
NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461. Indeed, “[t]he governmental action challenged may
appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties.” NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461.
Nevertheless, the Court held, the State could require disclosure of the
membership lists only if there existed a “‘subordinating interest of the State [that
is] compelling.’” NAACP, 357 U.S. at 463 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265);
see also Bates, 361 U.S. at 524 (“Where there is a significant encroachment
upon personal liberty, the State may prevail only upon showing a subordinating
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No. 83700-1-I/16
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interest which is compelling.”). The Court concluded that it discerned no such
state interest. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 464.
The Court again considered whether the First Amendment, incorporated
through the due process clause, precluded the compelled disclosure of NAACP
membership lists in Bates, 361 U.S. 516. There, the organization asserted the
rights of its “‘members and contributors to participate in the activities of the
NAACP, anonymously, a right which has been recognized as the basic right of
every American citizen since the founding of this country.’” Bates, 361 U.S. at
521. Again, the Court recognized that it was not simply a “heavy-handed frontal
attack” against which First Amendment freedoms are protected, but “also from
being stifled by more subtle governmental interference.” Bates, 361 U.S. at 523.
In concurrence, Justices Black and Douglas recognized that mere exposure by
the government can impinge these constitutional protections. Bates, 361 U.S. at
528 (Black & Douglas, JJ., concurring). “First Amendment rights,” the Justices
recognized, “are beyond abridgement either by legislation that directly restrains
their exercise or by suppression or impairment through harassment, humiliation,
or exposure by government.” Bates, 361 U.S. at 528 (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
concurring) (emphasis added). As in NAACP, the Bates Court discerned no
sufficient state interest to compel the disclosure of the membership lists. 361
U.S. at 525.
That same year, the Court addressed the constitutionality of an Arkansas
statute requiring public school teachers to disclose, as a condition of
employment, all organizations with which they had been associated in the
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No. 83700-1-I/17
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previous five years. Shelton, 364 U.S. 479. Recognizing the State’s
undoubtedly legitimate interest in investigating the fitness and competency of its
teachers, the Court nevertheless observed that the statute’s “scope of inquiry”
was “completely unlimited.” Shelton, 364 U.S. at 485, 488. Significantly, the
statute would have required “a teacher to reveal the church to which he belongs,
or to which he has given financial support. It [would have required] him to
disclose his political party, and every political organization to which he may have
contributed over a five-year period.” Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488. This
“comprehensive interference with associational freedom,” the Court held, “goes
far beyond what might be justified in the exercise of the State’s legitimate inquiry
into the fitness and competency of its teachers.” Shelton, 364 U.S. at 490.
As in NAACP, the Supreme Court in Shelton again recognized that
exposure by the State could impinge constitutional privacy rights. Because the
Arkansas statute nowhere required confidentiality of the information involuntarily
disclosed to the government, the Court considered that the teachers’ religious,
political, and other associational ties could additionally be disclosed to the public.
Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486-87. The Court was clear that such an intrusion into the
teachers’ privacy would further impinge their constitutional rights. Such “[p]ublic
exposure, bringing with it the possibility of public pressures upon school boards
to discharge teachers who belong to unpopular or minority organizations, would
simply operate to widen and aggravate the impairment of constitutional liberty.”
Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486-87.
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No. 83700-1-I/18
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Four Justices dissented in Shelton, disagreeing with the majority’s holding
that, under the circumstances presented, the extent of constitutional infringement
resulting from compelled disclosure was sufficient to override the countervailing
legitimate state interest.6 Nevertheless, even the dissenting opinions in Shelton
recognized both the existence of a constitutional privacy interest and the
potential for public exposure of associational ties to impinge upon those rights.
For instance, Justice Frankfurter, distinguishing NAACP and Bates due to the
absence of a legitimate state interest presented in those cases, recognized “that
an interest in privacy, in non-disclosure, may under appropriate circumstances
claim constitutional protection.” Shelton, 364 U.S. at 490 (Frankfurter, J.,
dissenting). Similarly, Justice Harlan suggested that public disclosure of the
teachers’ associational ties, beyond simply the compelled disclosure to their
school boards, might impinge their liberty rights: “I need hardly say that if it turns
out that this statute is abused, either by an unwarranted publicizing of the
required associational disclosures or otherwise, we would have a different kind of
case than those presently before us.” Shelton, 364 U.S. at 499 (Harlan, J.,
dissenting).
Three years later, the Court was “called upon once again to resolve a
conflict between individual rights of free speech and association and
governmental interest in conducting legislative investigations.” Gibson, 372 U.S.
6 See Shelton, 364 U.S. at 496 (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) (concluding that “the
disclosure of teachers’ associations to their school boards” is not “without more, such a restriction
upon their liberty . . . as to overbalance the State’s interest in asking the question”); Shelton, 364
U.S. at 497 (Harlan, J., dissenting) (concluding that the statute’s disclosure requirement “cannot
be said to transgress the constitutional limits of a State’s conceded authority to determine the
qualifications of those serving it as teachers”).
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No. 83700-1-I/19
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at 543. There, a Florida legislative committee sought to subpoena NAACP
membership lists, presumably to investigate suspected communist involvement.
Gibson, 372 U.S. at 540-41. The Supreme Court again affirmed that such an
investigation, “which intrudes into the area of constitutionally protected rights of
speech, press, association and petition,” is lawful only when the State can
“convincingly show a substantial relation between the information sought and a
subject of overriding and compelling state interest.” Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546.
The Court held that “all legitimate organizations are the beneficiaries of these
protections,” but noted that the protections “are all the more essential . . . where
the challenged privacy is that of persons espousing beliefs already unpopular
with their neighbors.” Gibson, 372 U.S. at 556-57. In such circumstances, “the
deterrent and ‘chilling’ effect on the free exercise of constitutionally enshrined
rights of free speech, expression, and association is consequently the more
immediate and substantial.” Gibson, 372 U.S. at 557.
In the decades that have followed, the Supreme Court has continued to
hold that First Amendment rights may be impinged when the government
compels disclosure of political beliefs and associations. In 1982, the Court again
affirmed that “[t]he Constitution protects against the compelled disclosure of
political associations and beliefs.” Brown, 459 U.S. at 91. “Such disclosures,”
the Court recognized, “‘can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief
guaranteed by the First Amendment.’” Brown, 459 U.S. at 91 (quoting Buckley,
424 U.S. at 64). Again, the Court held that only by demonstrating a compelling
interest can the State lawfully impinge such rights:
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No. 83700-1-I/20
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The right to privacy in one’s political associations and beliefs will
yield only to a “‘subordinating interest of the State [that is]
compelling,’” NAACP[, 357 U.S. at 463] (quoting Sweezy[, 354 U.S.
at 265]) (opinion concurring in result), and then only if there is a
“substantial relation between the information sought and [an]
overriding and compelling state interest.” Gibson[, 372 U.S. at
546].
Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92 (some alterations in original).
Over a decade later, in declaring unconstitutional an Ohio statute
prohibiting the distribution of anonymous campaign literature, the Supreme Court
once again “embraced [the] respected tradition of anonymity in the advocacy of
political causes.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 343 (citing Talley v. California, 362 U.S.
60, 80 S. Ct. 536, 4 L. Ed. 2d 559 (1960)); see also Watchtower Bible & Tract
Soc’y of New York, Inc. v. Vill. of Stratton, 536 U.S. 150, 122 S. Ct. 2080, 153 L.
Ed. 2d 205 (2002) (recognizing a right to anonymity in declaring unconstitutional
an ordinance requiring individuals to obtain and display a permit to engage in
door-to-door advocacy). In McIntyre, the Court recognized the constitutional
significance of “core political speech,” describing the speech involved therein—
the “handing out [of] leaflets in the advocacy of a politically controversial
viewpoint”—as “the essence of First Amendment expression.” 514 U.S. at 347.
Acknowledging that the reasons for anonymity could be many,7,8 the Court held
that the freedom to remain anonymous, whether in “the literary realm” or “in the
field of political rhetoric,” “is an aspect of the freedom of speech protected by the
7 “The decision in favor of anonymity,” the Court noted, “may be motivated by fear of
economic or official retaliation, by concern about social ostracism, or merely by a desire to
preserve as much of one’s privacy as possible.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 341-42.
8 “Even the Federalist Papers, written in favor of the adoption of our Constitution, were
published under fictitious names. It is plain that anonymity has sometimes been assumed for the
most constructive purposes.” Talley, 362 U.S. at 65.
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No. 83700-1-I/21
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First Amendment.” McIntyre, 514 U.S. at 342-43. For Justice Stevens, writing in
McIntyre, the value of anonymity in political speech could not be overstated:
Under our Constitution, anonymous pamphleteering is not a
pernicious, fraudulent practice, but an honorable tradition of
advocacy and of dissent. Anonymity is a shield from the tyranny of
the majority. See generally J. Mill, On Liberty and Considerations
on Representative Government 1, 3-4 (R. McCallum ed. 1947). It
thus exemplifies the purpose behind the Bill of Rights, and of the
First Amendment in particular: to protect unpopular individuals from
retaliation—and their ideas from suppression—at the hand of an
intolerant society.
514 U.S. at 357.
For nearly a century, the rights afforded by the First Amendment have
been protected against intrusion by the States as an “inseparable aspect of the
‘liberty’ assured by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
which embraces freedom of speech.” NAACP, 357 U.S. at 460; see Gitlow, 268
U.S. 652. During this time, the Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized that
encompassed within this liberty interest is the right of individuals to privacy in
their political beliefs and associations, wherein “thought and action are
presumptively immune from inquisition by political authority.” Sweezy, 354 U.S.
at 266 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). This privacy interest “yield[s] only to a
‘subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,’ and then only if there is a
‘substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and
compelling state interest.’” Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92 (second and third
alterations in original) (citation and internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265; Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546).
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No. 83700-1-I/22
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It is with cognizance of these principles that we consider whether SPD and
the City may disclose the Does’ identities in the investigatory records at issue.
B
The Does assert that the disclosure of their identities in the requested
records will violate their First Amendment right to political anonymity.9 They
contend that the trial court erred by determining that no constitutional privacy
interest is implicated in this situation. We agree.
Both the Does’ attendance at the January 6 rally and their compelled
statements to investigators implicate the First Amendment. Exposure by the
government of this information, through disclosure of the unredacted requested
records, would impinge the Does’ constitutional right to anonymity in their political
beliefs and associations.
Pursuant to United States Supreme Court decisional authority, the State
must demonstrate that disclosure of the unredacted requested records would
further a compelling state interest and that such disclosure is narrowly tailored to
achieve that state interest. Because no compelling state interest exists to justify
disclosure of the unredacted records, the Does are entitled to an injunction
prohibiting exposure by the government of their identities.
9 The parties’ initial appellate briefing primarily concerns whether the Does are entitled to
a preliminary injunction pursuant to statutory exemptions set forth in the PRA. However, the
Does additionally contended that disclosure would violate their First Amendment rights.
Following oral argument, the parties submitted supplemental briefing addressing this issue more
thoroughly. Because the answer to the Does’ request for a remedy is found in First Amendment
jurisprudence, we need not address the parties’ arguments regarding PRA statutory exemptions
to disclosure.
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No. 83700-1-I/23
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1
The Does assert that disclosure of their identities in the requested records,
both with regard to their attendance at the January 6 rally and their statements
made to investigators concerning their political views and affiliations, will violate
their First Amendment right to privacy. They aver that the trial court erred in two
respects. First, the Does contend that the trial court erroneously concluded that,
because the January 6 rally was a public event, the Does had no right to privacy
in attending that event. Second, they argue that the trial court erred by
concluding that they had not demonstrated a sufficient probability of a “chilling
effect” on their constitutional rights to be entitled to the relief sought.
Sueoka contends, on the other hand, that the Does’ attendance at the
January 6 rally is not protected by a constitutional privacy right. He further
contends that, even if disclosure of the Does’ identities in the requested records
implicates a First Amendment right, the Does relinquished that right by
cooperating with the OPA’s investigation. Finally, Sueoka asserts that the trial
court properly determined that the Does have not shown a sufficient probability of
harm to establish a constitutional right to privacy.
The Does’ contentions, consistent as they are with United States Supreme
Court decisional authority, are the more persuasive. We conclude that the Does
have a First Amendment privacy right in their identities in the requested records.
(a)
The First Amendment to the United States Constitution, as incorporated
through the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, “protects against
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No. 83700-1-I/24
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the compelled disclosure of political associations and beliefs.” Brown, 459 U.S.
at 91; see also Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64 (noting that the Court had “repeatedly
found that compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on privacy of
association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment”). Even when the
State takes “no direct action” to abridge an individual’s First Amendment rights,
those rights may be impinged by “varied forms of governmental action” that “may
appear to be totally unrelated to protected liberties.” NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461.
In other words, it is not solely a “heavy-handed frontal attack” by government that
may abridge an individual’s First Amendment rights; such constitutional
transgression may also arise from “more subtle governmental interference.”
Bates, 361 U.S. at 523. Indeed, simple “exposure by government” may be
sufficient to impinge such rights. Bates, 361 U.S. at 528.
Here, the trial court concluded, and Sueoka presently asserts, that the
Does have no right to privacy in having attended a public political rally. The trial
court reasoned:
Whether a person attended a public rally is not the type of
intimate detail that courts in Washington have said should remain
private. Washington courts have not previously found an inherent
right to privacy in attendance at a public political rally. Attending a
public rally is not an act that is inherently cloaked in privacy.
In so ruling, the court was clearly referring to Washington law concerning
whether an individual has a statutory right to privacy pursuant to the PRA.10 We
10 Because the PRA does not define “right to privacy,” our Supreme Court adopted the
common law tort definition of the term, which provides, in part, that the privacy right is implicated
when the “‘intimate details of [a person’s] life are spread before the public gaze in a manner
highly offensive to the ordinary reasonable [person].’” Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123,
136, 580 P.2d 246 (1978) (quoting RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D, at 386 (AM. LAW
INST. 1977)). The trial court referenced this language in ruling that the Does’ attendance at the
January 6 rally does not implicate a privacy right.
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No. 83700-1-I/25
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do not evaluate, however, whether disclosure of the Does’ identities is precluded
by a statutory right to privacy.
Rather, we conclude that, pursuant to United States Supreme Court
decisional authority, the disclosure by the government of the Does’ identities in
the requested records would violate their federal constitutional right to anonymity
in political belief and association. See, e.g., Watchtower Bible, 536 U.S. 150;
McIntyre, 514 U.S. 334; Brown, 459 U.S. 87; Buckley, 424 U.S. 1; Gibson, 372
U.S. 539; Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; Talley, 362 U.S. 60; Bates, 361 U.S. 516;
Uphaus, 360 U.S. 72; NAACP, 357 U.S. 449; Watkins, 354 U.S. 178; Sweezy,
354 U.S. 234; Wieman, 344 U.S. 183. Such governmental action would expose
to the public not only records evidencing the Does’ attendance at the January 6
rally, but also the transcripts of interviews in which the Does were compelled to
“articulate [their] political views,” discuss whether they were “affiliated with any
political groups,” and describe “[their] impressions of, and reactions to, the
content of the Rally.” The requested records thus implicate the Does’ personal
political views and their affiliations, if any, with political organizations.11 “It cannot
Because, at common law, sovereign immunity precluded actions against the government,
it comes as little surprise that in this case—wherein the actions of government are directly at
issue—the answer is found not in the common law but in the First and Fourteenth Amendments—
which are each solely directed at governmental action.
11 The trial court did not consider whether the Does’ statements regarding their political
beliefs and associations, compelled to be disclosed during the OPA investigation, implicated
either a statutory or constitutional right to privacy. Instead, the court found that there was “no
evidence . . . indicating whether the requested records sought contain explicit information about
the Does’ political beliefs or associations.”
The record does not support this finding. The Does’ declarations state that each was
“ordered to answer all questions asked, truthfully and completely, and that failure to do so may
result in discipline up to and including termination.” These questions included “why [they]
attended” the rally, whether they attended “to articulate [their] political views,” whether they were
“showing support for a political group” or were “affiliated with any political groups,” and what were
their “impressions of, and reactions to, the content” of the rally. In their declarations, each of the
Does stated: “Because I believed I was under a standing order to answer these personal
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No. 83700-1-I/26
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require argument,” the United States Supreme Court has stated, “that inquiry
would be barred to ascertain whether a citizen had voted for one or the other of
the two major parties either in a state or national election.” Sweezy, 354 U.S. at
266. If such direct governmental action would impinge the Does’ constitutional
privacy interests, then so, too, does exposure by the government of that same
information pursuant to a records request. See Bates, 361 U.S. at 523; NAACP,
357 U.S. at 461.
Sueoka nevertheless contends that our Supreme Court’s decision in
Spokane Police Guild v. Liquor Control Board, 112 Wn.2d 30, 769 P.2d 283
(1989), “puts to rest any claim” that the Does’ attendance at the January 6 rally is
protected by a constitutional privacy right.12 In that case, the court considered
whether a statutory exemption precluded disclosure of an investigatory report
that identified police officers who had attended a party on Spokane Police Guild
Club premises. Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wn.2d at 31. The party, “variously
referred to as a bachelor party, stag show and strip show,” had been determined
to violate regulations of the liquor board. Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wn.2d at
31. Our Supreme Court held that disclosure of the report would not violate the
statutory right to privacy conferred by the statutory predecessor of the PRA.
Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wn.2d at 37-38. Recognizing that this privacy right
pertains “only to the intimate details of one’s personal and private life,” the court
reasoned that there was “no personal intimacy involved in one’s presence or
questions, I did so truthfully and as completely as possible.” These declarations are themselves
evidence that the requested records contain statements regarding the Does’ political beliefs and
affiliations.
12 Br. of Resp’t/Cross Appellant at 31.
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No. 83700-1-I/27
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conduct at such a well attended and staged event which would be either lost or
diminished by being made public.” Spokane Police Guild, 112 Wn.2d at 38.
According to Sueoka, this holding compels the conclusion herein that the
Does’ attendance at the January 6 rally—occurring, as it did, in a public
location13—does not implicate a right to privacy. However, in so asserting,
Sueoka confuses the statutory privacy right bestowed by the PRA with the
constitutional privacy right deriving from the First Amendment. In Spokane
Police Guild, the disclosure of the officers’ political beliefs and associations was
not at issue; accordingly, the court considered only whether a statutory
exemption prohibited disclosure of the investigative report. 112 Wn.2d at 37-38.
Moreover, in focusing solely on the Does’ attendance at a public event, Sueoka
disregards that disclosure of the requested records would additionally expose the
Does’ statements regarding their political beliefs and associations, which the
Does were compelled to disclose during the OPA investigation. In short, Sueoka
asserts that Washington Supreme Court decisional authority concerning a
statutory right to privacy stemming from the common law of torts precludes a
determination that a federal constitutional right prohibits disclosure by a
government. This contention is wholly unavailing.
Sueoka additionally contends that the United States Supreme Court’s
decisional authority regarding the First Amendment right to political anonymity is
13 The Capitol Police issued six permits authorizing gatherings on January 6, 2021 on
property under its control. Jason Leopold, The Capitol Police Granted Permits For Jan. 6
Protests Despite Signs That Organizers Weren’t Who They Said They Were, BUZZFEED NEWS
(Sept. 17, 2021), https://www.buzzfeednews.com/article/jasonleopold/the-capitol-police-said-jan-
6-unrest-on-capitol-grounds [https://perma.cc/LWM5-P3MN].
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No. 83700-1-I/28
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inapposite because, he argues, the Does “cannot be compared to members of
small and powerless political or religious groups,” and are not “seeking
anonymity from the government itself.”14 Again, we disagree.
Contrary to Sueoka’s assertion, the United States Supreme Court has not
limited the applicability of the First Amendment’s privacy right to members of
“small and powerless political or religious groups.” To the contrary, the Court has
recognized that “the deterrent and ‘chilling’ effect on the free exercise of
constitutionally enshrined rights of free speech, expression, and association” is
“the more immediate and substantial” when “the challenged privacy is that of
persons espousing beliefs already unpopular with their neighbors.” Gibson, 372
U.S. at 556-57. Nevertheless, the Court was clear that, “of course, all legitimate
organizations are the beneficiaries of these protections.” Gibson, 372 U.S. at
556.15 Moreover, the question is not whether an individual is a member of a
“small and powerless” group, as Sueoka asserts, but whether the individual
“espous[es] beliefs . . . unpopular with their neighbors,” Gibson, 372 U.S. at 557,
such that exposure of those beliefs could discourage the exercise of
constitutional rights.
Thus, it is the opprobrium that the community has for the individual’s
beliefs that is material to any “chilling effect” on constitutional rights.16 We are
14 Br. of Resp’t/Cross Appellant at 32.
15 In Gibson, a Florida legislative committee sought to subpoena NAACP membership
lists, 372 U.S. at 540-41, hence the Court’s reference to “organizations.” However, it was the
constitutional rights of the individuals whose identities would be disclosed in the membership lists
that was at issue. In any event, we see no reason to distinguish between “organizations” and
individuals on this point.
16 As discussed infra, case law does not support Sueoka’s assertion that the Does were
required to demonstrate a more substantial “chilling effect” to establish a First Amendment
privacy right in the requested records.
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No. 83700-1-I/29
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cognizant that, in the Seattle community, the Does would likely face opprobrium
were their identities disclosed.17 This is likely notwithstanding the fact that the
OPA investigation determined that any allegations of unlawful or unprofessional
conduct against the Does were unsustained. We reach this conclusion with an
awareness of the events of recent years, including the Department of Justice
finding of the systemic use of excessive force by SPD officers (necessitating the
federal district court’s imposition of a consent decree), the horrific killing of
George Floyd and other unarmed Black individuals throughout our country, and
the eruption of protests, including in Seattle, in response to those incidents.18
Whether correctly or not, as Sueoka’s briefing demonstrates, the Seattle
community is likely to presume that the Does’ attendance at the January 6 rally
indicates that they are white supremacists who sought to undermine our nation’s
democracy. But whatever various individuals might infer, it remains true that all
17 In 2016, Donald Trump received 8 percent of the vote in Seattle precincts. Here’s How
Seattle Voters’ Support for Trump Compared to Other Cities’, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 17, 2016),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/heres-how-seattle-voters-support-for-trump-
stacks-up-to-other-u-s-cities/ [https://perma.cc/4PNL-G68W]. In 2020, he again received 8
percent of the vote in Seattle. Danny Westneat, Don’t Look Now, but Trump Did Better in Blue
King County Than He Did the Last Time, SEATTLE TIMES (Nov. 11, 2020),
https://www.seattletimes.com/seattle-news/politics/dont-look-now-but-trump-did-better-in-blue-
king-county-than-he-did-the-last-time/ [https://perma.cc/N8F8-TFHL].
18 Whether records are subject to disclosure must be determined without regard to the
motivation of the records requestor. RCW 42.56.080 (“Agencies shall not distinguish among
persons requesting records, and such persons shall not be required to provide information as to
the purpose for the request except to establish whether inspection and copying would violate
RCW 42.56.070(8) or 42.56.240(14), or other statute which exempts or prohibits disclosure of
specific information or records to certain persons.”); see also Livingston v. Cedeno, 164 Wn.2d
46, 53, 186 P.3d 1055 (2008) (holding that the Department of Corrections, in “its capacity as an
agency subject to” the PRA, “must respond to all public disclosure requests without regard to the
status or motivation of the requester”). However, when the impingement of constitutional
protections for speech and association are at issue, it is clear that courts may consider the
pertinent political and cultural atmosphere in determining whether exposure could discourage the
exercise of First Amendment rights.
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No. 83700-1-I/30
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citizens, including public employees, may benefit from the constitutional right to
privacy in their political beliefs espoused by our nation’s highest court.19
As the Court has held, the mere compelling of an individual to disclose
“beliefs, expressions or associations is a measure of governmental interference.”
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197. When these “forced revelations concern matters that
are unorthodox, unpopular, or even hateful to the general public, the reaction in
the life of [that individual] may be disastrous.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197; see also
Uphaus, 360 U.S. at 84 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (“[E]xposure and group
identification by the state of those holding unpopular and dissident views are
fraught with such serious consequences for the individual as to inevitably inhibit
seriously the expression of views which the Constitution intended to make free.”).
While we have no sympathy for those who sought to undermine our democracy
on January 6, 2021, the fact here is that the allegations that the Does were
engaged in unlawful or unprofessional conduct were not sustained. They did not
forfeit their First Amendment rights.
As our nation’s highest court long-ago made clear,
[a] final observation is in order. Because our disposition is
rested on the First Amendment as absorbed in the Fourteenth . . .
our decisions in the First Amendment area make[] plain that its
protections would apply as fully to those who would arouse our
society against the objectives of the petitioner. See, e.g., Near v.
Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697[, 51 S. Ct. 625, 75 L. Ed. 1357 (1931)];
Terminiello v. Chicago, 337 U.S. 1[, 69 S. Ct. 894, 93 L. Ed. 1131
19 Concurring in Wieman, 344 U.S. at 193, Justice Black recognized the importance of
ensuring that First Amendment protections are secured for all individuals:
Our own free society should never forget that laws which stigmatize and penalize
thought and speech of the unorthodox have a way of reaching, ensnaring and
silencing many more people than at first intended. We must have freedom of
speech for all or we will in the long run have it for none but the cringing and the
craven. And I cannot too often repeat my belief that the right to speak on matters
of public concern must be wholly free or eventually be wholly lost.
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No. 83700-1-I/31
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(1949)]; Kunz v. New York, 340 U.S. 290[, 71 S. Ct. 312, 95 L. Ed.
280 (1951)]. For the Constitution protects expression and
association without regard to the race, creed, or political or religious
affiliation of the members of the group which invokes its shield, or
to the truth, popularity, or social utility of the ideas and beliefs which
are offered.
Button, 371 U.S. at 444-45.
Returning to Sueoka’s contentions, we are similarly unpersuaded by his
assertion that the Does cannot establish a First Amendment right to privacy
because, according to him, they are not “seeking anonymity from the government
itself.”20 In fact, as Sueoka notes, the Does have already been compelled to
disclose their political beliefs and associations to SPD and the City. However,
the government need not take “direct action” in order to unlawfully impinge an
individual’s constitutional privacy right. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461. Rather,
“abridgement of such rights, even though unintended, may inevitably follow from
varied forms of governmental action,” including action that “may appear to be
wholly unrelated to protected liberties.” NAACP, 357 U.S. at 461.
Indeed, the United States Supreme Court has held that “First Amendment
rights are beyond abridgement either by legislation that directly restrains their
exercise or by suppression or impairment through harassment, humiliation, or
exposure by government.” Bates, 361 U.S. at 528 (Black & Douglas, JJ.,
concurring) (emphasis added); see also Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486-87 (“Public
exposure, bringing with it the possibility of public pressures upon school boards
to discharge teachers who belong to unpopular or minority organizations, would
simply operate to widen and aggravate the impairment of constitutional liberty.”).
20 Br. of Resp’t/Cross Appellant at 32.
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No. 83700-1-I/32
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Here, the state action challenged is the government’s exposure, pursuant
to state statute, of the Does’ identities in the requested records, which implicate
their political beliefs and associations. Sueoka’s insinuation that the City’s
disclosure of the Does’ identities would not constitute governmental action is
simply wrong.
(b)
Sueoka additionally asserts that, even if disclosure of the Does’ identities
would impinge their constitutional rights, the Does willingly relinquished their right
to privacy. This is so, Sueoka contends, because the Does “had a right to keep
their political opinions private,” knew that their employer was subject to the PRA,
but nevertheless attended the January 6 rally and “then informed their employer
of their activities.”21 We disagree. Contrary to Sueoka’s assertion, the Does did
not relinquish their constitutional rights.
The facts are these. The Does submitted to interviews during an
investigation in which they were alleged to have violated the law or SPD policies
during their attendance at the January 6 rally. They were “ordered to answer all
questions asked, truthfully and completely.” They were informed that “failure to
do so may result in discipline up to and including termination.” They were then
questioned regarding their reasons for attending the January 6 rally, their political
beliefs and affiliations with political groups, if any, and their impressions of the
content of the rally. The Does answered these questions “truthfully and as
completely as possible” because they were under standing orders to do so.
21 Br. of Resp’t/Cross Appellant at 27-28.
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No. 83700-1-I/33
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In other words, the Does did not “ha[ve] a right to keep their political
opinions private.” Nor, contrary to Sueoka’s assertion, did the Does voluntarily
“inform[] their employer of their activities.” Rather, the Does were placed in the
untenable position of either refusing to answer investigators’ questions, thus
risking their livelihoods, or cooperating with the investigation, thereby
compromising their constitutional rights.22
Nearly a century ago, the United States Supreme Court rejected the
notion that an indirect assault on constitutional protections due to a purported
“choice” is less insidious than is direct impingement of such rights. Frost v. RR
Comm’n of State of Cal., 271 U.S. 583, 593, 46 S. Ct. 605, 70 L. Ed. 2d 1101
(1926). There, a California statute precluded private carriers from the privilege of
using public highways for “transacting private business thereon” unless they
submitted to regulation lawfully imposed on common carriers. Frost, 271 U.S. at
591. The Supreme Court struck down the statute, which, it concluded, was
intended to protect the business of common carriers by controlling competition.
Frost, 271 U.S. at 591, 593. In so doing, the Court held that a state may not
require the relinquishment of a constitutional right as the basis to confer a
privilege. Frost, 271 U.S. at 593. Were it otherwise, “constitutional guaranties,
so carefully safeguarded against direct assault, [would be] open to destruction by
the indirect but no less effective process of requiring a surrender, which, though
in form voluntary, in fact lacks none of the elements of compulsion.” Frost, 271
22 Adopting Sueoka’s assertion that the Does’ cooperation in the investigation was
voluntary would also lead to the problematic conclusion that police officers need not cooperate in
such investigations. Little public good would flow from such a holding.
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U.S. at 593. To be given only “a choice between the rock and the whirlpool,”
wherein the option is to forego one’s livelihood or “submit to a requirement which
may constitute an intolerable burden,” is in reality, the Court announced, no
choice at all. Frost, 271 U.S. at 593.
Four decades later, the Supreme Court explicitly rejected the proposition
advanced by Sueoka herein—that statements obtained from police officers as a
result of those officers cooperating (in compliance with a lawful request to do so)
in investigations conducted by their employer or at their employer’s direction are
deemed voluntary. Garrity, 385 U.S. 493. In Garrity, police officers were ordered
to cooperate in an investigation by the New Jersey Attorney General regarding
“alleged irregularities in handling cases in the municipal courts” of certain New
Jersey boroughs. 385 U.S. at 494. Prior to questioning, each officer was warned
“(1) that anything he said might be used against him in any state criminal
proceeding; (2) that he had the privilege to refuse to answer if the disclosure
would tend to incriminate him; but (3) that if he refused to answer he would be
subject to removal from office.” Garrity, 385 U.S. at 494. After cooperating in the
investigation, the officers were convicted of conspiracy to obstruct the
administration of the traffic laws, and “their convictions were sustained over their
protests that their statements were coerced, by reason of the fact that, if they
refused to answer, they could lose their positions with the police department.”
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 495 (footnote omitted).
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No. 83700-1-I/35
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The Supreme Court held that, where the officers were given the choice
between self-incrimination and losing their livelihoods, their statements were not
voluntary:
The choice given petitioners was either to forfeit their jobs or
to incriminate themselves. The option to lose their means of
livelihood or to pay the penalty of self-incrimination is the antithesis
of free choice to speak out or to remain silent. That practice, like
interrogation practices we reviewed in Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S.
436, 464-65[, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966)], is “likely to
exert such pressure upon an individual as to disable him from
making a free and rational choice.” We think the statements were
infected by the coercion inherent in this scheme of questioning and
cannot be sustained as voluntary under our prior decisions.
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98 (footnote omitted). Police officers, the Court
concluded, “are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional rights.”
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. Moreover, the Court therein confirmed that the rights
secured by the First Amendment are among those “rights of constitutional stature
whose exercise a State may not condition by the exaction of a price.” Garrity,
385 U.S. at 500.
As in Garrity, the Does here were informed by SPD, their employer, that
their continued employment could be contingent on their cooperation with the
investigation. The answers elicited from the Does during interviews directly
implicate speech protected by the First Amendment. The Does, as with the
police officers in Garrity, were afforded a choice “‘between the rock and the
whirlpool,’” 385 U.S. at 496 (quoting Stevens v. Marks, 383 U.S. 234, 243, 86 S.
Ct. 788, 15 L. Ed. 2d 724 (1966)), whereby only by relinquishing their
constitutional privacy interests could the Does ensure their continued
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No. 83700-1-I/36
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employment. “[D]uress is inherent” when statements are thusly obtained.
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 498.
As the precedent of our nation’s highest court makes clear, the Does’
statements to investigators were not voluntary. We reject Sueoka’s assertion
that the Does relinquished their constitutional rights by cooperating with the
OPA’s investigation.
(c)
Sueoka next contends that the Does have not set forth sufficient evidence
that harm would result from disclosure of their identities in the requested records,
such that they should be entitled to an injunction precluding such disclosure. He
asserts that the Does must demonstrate that disclosure would create a “chilling
effect” on their constitutional rights and that they have not done so. Again, we
disagree. Adhering to precedent from our Supreme Court, and cognizant that
federal courts have determined that a “chilling effect” may, at times, be assumed,
we hold that the evidence submitted by the Does is sufficient to meet the
necessary showing of potential harm.
In Doe v. Reed, the United States Supreme Court considered whether,
pursuant to Washington’s PRA, the disclosure of referendum petitions, and
thereby of the identities of the petition signers, would violate the First
Amendment. 561 U.S. 186. The Court therein concluded that disclosure would
not violate the First Amendment with respect to referendum petitions in general.
Reed, 561 U.S. at 202. However, the Court articulated the standard it had
applied “in related contexts,” that “those resisting disclosure can prevail under the
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No. 83700-1-I/37
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First Amendment if they can show ‘a reasonable probability that the compelled
disclosure [of personal information] will subject them to threats, harassment, or
reprisals from either Government officials or private parties.’” Reed, 561 U.S. at
200 (alteration in original) (quoting Buckley, 424 U.S. at 74).
Our Supreme Court applied this standard in evaluating the constitutionality
of a discovery order compelling the disclosure of meeting minutes of the
Freedom Socialist Party. See Snedigar v. Hoddersen, 114 Wn.2d 153, 156, 786
P.2d 781 (1990). In that case, the court reversed a decision of this court, in
which we had held that the party resisting the discovery order was required to
make “an initial showing of actual infringement on First Amendment rights.”
Snedigar, 114 Wn.2d at 158. This was wrong, our Supreme Court explained,
because “[t]he party asserting the First Amendment associational privilege is only
required to show some probability that the requested disclosure will harm its First
Amendment rights.” Snedigar, 114 Wn.2d at 158. And, indeed, in that case, the
Party’s national secretary submitted affidavits stating that (1) “Party members
and supporters had been subjected to acts of reprisal and harassment in the
past,” and (2) that “the expectation of confidentiality in internal discussions [was]
essential to the Party’s survival.” Snedigar, 114 Wn.2d at 163. These affidavits,
our Supreme Court held, were sufficient to demonstrate that disclosure would
“chill” the Party’s constitutional rights. Snedigar, 114 Wn.2d at 164.
In evaluating whether sufficient probability of harm was shown, our
Supreme Court in Snedigar recognized that some courts have explicitly held that
“a concrete showing of ‘chill’ is unnecessary” to determine that disclosure would
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No. 83700-1-I/38
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impinge First Amendment rights. 114 Wn.2d at 162 (citing Black Panther Party v.
Smith, 661 F.2d 1243, 1267-68, (D.C. Cir. 1981); Britt v. Superior Court, 20 Cal.
3d 844, 855, 574 P.2d 766, 143 Cal. Rptr. 695 (1978)). Indeed, the court noted,
some courts “have overlooked the absence of a factual record of past
harassment and . . . assumed that disclosure of information” would chill such
rights. Snedigar, 114 Wn.2d at 162 (citing Shelton, 364 U.S. at 485-86; Talley,
362 U.S. at 64; Local 1814, Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, AFL-CIO v. Waterfront
Comm’n of New York, 667 F.2d 267, 272 (2d Cir.1981); Pollard v. Roberts, 283
F. Supp. 248, 258 (E.D. Ark. 1968), aff’d, 393 U.S. 14, 89 S. Ct. 47, 21 L. Ed. 2d
14 (1968)).
Moreover, as the Second Circuit has recognized, “a factual record of past
harassment is not the only situation in which courts have upheld a First
Amendment right of non-disclosure.” Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 667 F.2d at
271. Rather,
[t]he underlying inquiry must always be whether a compelling
governmental interest justifies any governmental action that has
“the practical effect ‘of discouraging’ the exercise of constitutionally
protected political rights,” “even if any deterrent effect . . . arises . . .
as an unintended but inevitable result of the government’s conduct
in requiring disclosure.”
Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 667 F.2d at 271 (citation omitted) (quoting NAACP,
357 U.S. at 461; Buckley, 424 U.S. at 65). Based on this principle, courts,
including the United States Supreme Court, have in various circumstances
“adopted a commonsense approach [that] recognized that a chilling effect was
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No. 83700-1-I/39
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inevitable.” Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 667 F.2d at 272 (citing Shelton, 364 U.S.
at 486; Pollard, 283 F. Supp. at 258).23
Here, the Does’ declarations state that they have “a significant fear that
disclosure of [their] attendance at the January 6 Rally would result in significant
jeopardy to [their] personal safety and [their] ability to provide effective law
enforcement to the community.” Two of the Does described their fears for the
safety and well-being of their families were their identities disclosed, one noting
“the extreme volatility that has gone hand in hand with politics in this region over
the last year regarding law enforcement.” The Does additionally submitted the
declarations of other SPD officers who stated that they had endured harassment
and threats made against them and their families from members of the public.
23 Such a “commonsense approach”—which assumes a “chilling effect” on speech and
associational rights—has been utilized when disclosure was required to be made to a public
employer and when the individuals seeking anonymity espoused beliefs unpopular in their
communities.
For instance, in Shelton, the Supreme Court recognized that impingement of teachers’
rights to free association “is conspicuously accented when the teacher serves at the absolute will
of those to whom the disclosure must be made.” 364 U.S. at 486. “[T]he pressure upon a
teacher to avoid any ties which might displease those who control his professional destiny would
be constant and heavy.” Shelton, 364 U.S. at 486; see also Int’l Longshoremen’s Ass’n, 667 F.2d
at 272 (recognizing that the investigatory body had “pervasive control over the economic
livelihood” of those seeking anonymity).
Likewise, in Pollard, there was “no evidence” that the individuals seeking anonymity had
“been subjected to reprisals on account of” their contributions to the Arkansas Republican Party.
283 F. Supp. at 258. Nevertheless, given the unpopularity of the party in the state at that time,
the court held that “it would be naïve not to recognize” that disclosure would subject the
contributors to “potential economic or political reprisals,” thus discouraging the exercise of
constitutional rights. Pollard, 283 F. Supp. at 258. The court described the constitutional injury
thereby inflicted thusly:
To the extent that a public agency or officer unreasonably inhibits or discourages
the exercise by individuals of their right to associate with others of the same
political persuasion in the advocacy of principles and candidates of which and of
whom they approve, and to support those principles and candidates with their
money if they choose to do so, that agency or officer violates private rights
protected by the First Amendment.
Pollard, 283 F. Supp. at 258.
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No. 83700-1-I/40
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Consistent with the cases cited above, we conclude that the Does have
submitted sufficient evidence that disclosure of their identities would discourage
the exercise of political speech and associational rights.24 In so holding, we are
mindful that it is not only the Does’ constitutional rights that may be “chilled” by
disclosure here, but also those of other public employees whose employers are
subject to the PRA. Indeed, as the United States Supreme Court has
recognized, in addition to the impact on the exercise of rights by those seeking
anonymity, there is a “more subtle and immeasurable effect upon those who tend
to adhere to the most orthodox and uncontroversial views and associations in
order to avoid a similar fate at some future time.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at 197-98.
We conclude that disclosure of the Does’ identities in the requested
records constitutes governmental action that would impinge their First
Amendment rights. This is so despite the public nature of the January 6 rally.
We find unmeritorious Sueoka’s contentions that the Does relinquished their
constitutional rights by cooperating with the OPA’s investigation or that they
failed to demonstrate that disclosure would discourage the exercise of such
rights. Having so concluded, we must determine whether the State’s interest in
impinging those rights is sufficient to nevertheless mandate disclosure.
24 We reach this conclusion notwithstanding Sueoka’s assertion, in supplemental briefing,
that the identities of the Does are already publicly known. As our Supreme Court has held, an
individual’s statutory right to privacy is not nullified because some members of the public may
already know that individual’s identity. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 414 (“[J]ust
because some members of the public may already know the identity of the person in the report
does not mean that an agency does not violate the person’s right to privacy by confirming that
knowledge through its production.”). The same is certainly true of the right to privacy inhering in
the First Amendment to the United States Constitution.
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No. 83700-1-I/41
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(d)
Before we do so, however, we must address a related contention. In a
statement of additional authorities submitted following oral argument, Sueoka
asserts that, because the Does did not notify the attorney general of any intent to
challenge the constitutionality of the PRA, we cannot consider whether the PRA
violates the federal constitution if it is construed so as to require disclosure of
unredacted records in this case.
This ground has been previously trod. Indeed, the District Court of the
Western District of Washington considered this very issue in Roe v. Anderson,
2015 WL 4724739 (W.D. Wash. 2015), which we cite as evidence of our state
attorney general’s official position on this aspect of PRA analysis. In the cited
case, certain erotic dancers and managers of an erotic dance studio sought to
enjoin the disclosure of their personal information pursuant to a PRA request.
Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *1. They asserted that disclosure would violate
their constitutional rights to privacy and free expression and sought a declaration
that the PRA, as applied to them, was unconstitutional. Anderson, 2015 WL
4724739, at *1.
At the court’s invitation, the Washington attorney general filed an amicus
brief asserting that the PRA “does not require the disclosure of information
protected from disclosure by the Constitution” because “its exemptions
incorporate any constitutionally-required limitation on such disclosures.”
Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *1 (emphasis added). The “other statute[s]”
provision, RCW 42.56.070(1), the attorney general explained, is a “‘catch all’
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No. 83700-1-I/42
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saving clause” that “does not require a disclosure that would violate the
Constitution.” Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *2 (emphasis added). Citing
decisional authority from our Supreme Court, the attorney general clarified that
“[i]f the requested records are constitutionally protected from
public disclosure, that protection exists without any need of
statutory permission, and may constitute an exemption under the
PRA even if not implemented through an explicit statutory
exemption.”
“In other words, it is not necessary to read the PRA in
conflict with the Constitution when the Act itself recognizes and
respects other laws (including constitutional provisions) that
mandate privacy or confidentiality.”
Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *2-3 (emphasis added).
The district court held that “[t]he State is correct.” Anderson, 2015 WL
4724739, at *3. “The PRA, by design, cannot violate the Constitution, and
constitutional protections (such as freedom of expression) are necessarily
incorporated as exemptions, just like any other express exemption enumerated in
the PRA.” Anderson, 2015 WL 4724739, at *3.
We agree with and adopt this analysis. Thus, once the constitutional right
is established and the constitutional injury that disclosure would cause is shown,
it is entirely unnecessary for the citizen to establish an additional entitlement to
an injunction in order to preclude disclosure. The law is clear and the principle
simple—the government may not violate a person’s First Amendment rights,
even in the absence of an injunction specifically forbidding it from doing so.25
2
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly affirmed that
25 See discussion infra § III C.
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No. 83700-1-I/43
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[t]he right to privacy in one’s political associations and beliefs will
yield only to a “‘subordinating interest of the State [that is]
compelling,’” NAACP[, 357 U.S.] at 463 (quoting Sweezy, 354 U.S.
[at 265] (opinion concurring in result)), and then only if there is a
“substantial relation between the information sought and [an]
overriding and compelling state interest.” Gibson[, 372 U.S. at
546].
Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92 (some alterations in original). Thus, having concluded
that disclosure of the Does’ identities in the requested records would impinge
their First Amendment rights, we must determine whether an overriding and
compelling state interest nevertheless requires such disclosure.
For its part, the City contends that a less stringent standard should apply
because, according to the City, “public employees have diminished First
Amendment rights, even for purely private speech.”26 Not so. Police officers,
such as the Does, “are not relegated to a watered-down version of constitutional
rights.” Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500. The City’s assertion to the contrary, reliant as it
is on inapposite decisional authority, is unpersuasive.
We conclude that the State has no compelling interest in disclosing the
Does’ identities in the requested records. The state interest in disclosing the
entirety of a particular public record is illuminated by the purpose of the PRA and
its scope, as determined by our legislature and Supreme Court. Such
considerations demonstrate that the state interest here falls short of the standard
required to impinge the Does’ First Amendment rights. We thus hold that the
State has no compelling interest in disclosing the Does’ identities in the
requested records.
26 City of Seattle, Suppl. Mem. at 2.
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No. 83700-1-I/44
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(a)
We first address the City’s argument, set forth in supplemental briefing,
that the state actor need not demonstrate a compelling interest in order to
impinge the Does’ constitutional rights. The City, itself an employer of vast
numbers of public employees, asserts that “public employees have diminished
First Amendment rights, even for purely private speech.”27 Hence, the City
contends, the constitutional rights of public employees, unlike those of other
citizens, can be impinged absent the demonstration of a compelling state
interest. We disagree.
When the State seeks to compel disclosure of an individual’s political
beliefs and associations, it can do so only by demonstrating a compelling state
interest with sufficient relation to the information sought to be disclosed. See,
e.g., Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92; Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546; NAACP, 357 U.S. at
463; Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265. That the State’s interest must be compelling
reflects the United States Supreme Court’s recognition that “political freedom of
the individual” is a “fundamental principle of a democratic society,” Sweezy, 354
U.S. at 250, and that “compelled disclosure, in itself, can seriously infringe on
privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.” Buckley,
424 U.S. at 64.
Moreover, as we have discussed, our nation’s highest Court has rejected
the notion that public employees are not entitled to the same stature of
constitutional rights as are other citizens. In 1967, the Court in Garrity
27 City of Seattle, Suppl. Mem. at 2.
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No. 83700-1-I/45
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considered whether police officers, by virtue of being compelled to cooperate in
an investigation by the New Jersey Attorney General, relinquished the
constitutional right against self-incrimination. 385 U.S. at 494-98. The Court
determined that the statements of the police officers, who were given the choice
between self-incrimination and losing their livelihoods, were not voluntary.
Garrity, 385 U.S. at 497-98. In so holding, the Court “conclude[d] that policemen,
like teachers and lawyers, are not relegated to a watered-down version of
constitutional rights.” Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500.
In asserting to the contrary—that the Does are, indeed, condemned to a
diluted version of First Amendment rights—the City urges us to apply the
“balancing test” set forth by the Supreme Court in Pickering v. Board of
Education of Township High School District 205, Will County, Ill., 391 U.S. 563,
88 S. Ct. 1731, 20 L. Ed. 2d 811 (1968).28 The City’s reliance on Pickering is
misplaced.
In Pickering, a public school teacher submitted to a local newspaper a
letter regarding a proposed tax increase that was critical of the manner in which
the school board and superintendent had “handled past proposals to raise new
revenue for the schools.” 391 U.S. at 564. The teacher was dismissed from his
position pursuant to an Illinois statute that permitted such dismissal for actions
detrimental to the interests of the school system. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 564-65.
He thereafter filed suit, asserting that the Illinois statute was unconstitutional as
28 See City of Seattle, Suppl. Mem. at 6 (“It is this balancing test, not strict scrutiny, that
applies to disclosure of the public records containing employees’ speech.”).
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No. 83700-1-I/46
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applied pursuant to the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Pickering, 391 U.S.
at 565.
In considering the constitutionality of the Illinois statute, the Court
recognized that “the State has interests as an employer in regulating the speech
of its employees that differ significantly from those it possesses in connection
with regulation of the speech of the citizenry in general.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at
568. Thus, the Court announced what has come to be known as the “Pickering
balancing test,”29 which seeks to “arrive at a balance between the interests of the
[public employee], as a citizen, in commenting upon matters of public concern
and the interest of the State, as an employer, in promoting the efficiency of the
public services it performs through its employees.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 568.
However, the teacher’s statements in Pickering were “neither shown nor
[could] be presumed to have in any way either impeded the teacher’s proper
performance of his daily duties in the classroom or to have interfered with the
regular operation of the schools generally.” 391 U.S. at 572-73 (footnote
omitted). The Court held that, in such circumstances, “the interest of the school
administration in limiting teachers’ opportunities to contribute to public debate is
not significantly greater than its interest in limiting a similar contribution by any
member of the general public.” Pickering, 391 U.S. at 573. In other words, the
“Pickering balancing test,” which the City urges us to apply here, is applicable
29 See, e.g., Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d 689
(2006) (describing the “two inquiries to guide interpretation of the constitutional protections
accorded to public employee speech” as set forth in “Pickering and the cases decided in its
wake”); Moser v. Las Vegas Metro. Police Dep’t, 984 F.3d 900, 904-05 (9th Cir. 2021) (describing
the “Pickering balancing test”). Neither of these opinions, both of which are cited by the City, is
apposite to the circumstances presented in this case.
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No. 83700-1-I/47
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only when a public employee’s speech may affect the employer’s operations.
See also Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 418, 126 S. Ct. 1951, 164 L. Ed. 2d
689 (2006) (“A government entity has broader discretion to restrict speech when
it acts in its role as employer, but the restrictions it imposes must be directed at
speech that has some potential to affect the entity’s operations.” (emphasis
added)). Only then may a government employer have “an adequate justification
for treating the employee differently from any other member of the general
public,” thus permitting it to restrict the public employee’s speech. Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 418.
Indeed, in Pickering, the United States Supreme Court explicitly rejected
the proposition that public employees are entitled to lesser constitutional
protections simply by virtue of their public employment:
To the extent that the Illinois Supreme Court’s opinion may
be read to suggest that teachers may constitutionally be compelled
to relinquish the First Amendment rights they would otherwise enjoy
as citizens to comment on matters of public interest in connection
with the operation of the public schools in which they work, it
proceeds on a premise that has been unequivocally rejected in
numerous prior decisions of this Court. E.g., Wieman v. Updegraff,
344 U.S. 183[, 73 S. Ct. 215, 97 L. Ed. 2d 216] (1952); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479[, 81 S. Ct. 247, 5 L. Ed. 2d 231] (1960);
Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589[, 87 S. Ct. 675, 17 L.
Ed. 2d 629] (1967). “[T]he theory that public employment which
may be denied altogether may be subjected to any conditions,
regardless of how unreasonable, has been uniformly rejected.”
Keyishian[, 385 U.S.] at 605-06.
391 U.S. at 568 (some alterations in original).
Put simply, the notion that the Does, as public employees, “have curtailed
First Amendment rights,” as the City brazenly asserts,30 is directly contradicted
30 City of Seattle. Suppl. Mem. at 5.
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by United States Supreme Court decisional authority. Unlike this case, each of
the cases cited by the City involves an adverse employment action based on a
speech restriction that precluded public employees from engaging in speech
alleged to injuriously impact their employer’s operations.31 Indeed, it is only
when a public employee’s speech “has some potential to affect [the employer’s]
operations” that the employer may have “an adequate justification for treating the
employee differently from any other member of the general public.” Garcetti, 547
U.S. at 418. This rule is premised on the recognition that the government
possesses a “legitimate purpose in ‘promot[ing] efficiency and integrity in the
discharge of official duties, and . . . maintain[ing] proper discipline in the public
service.’” Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 150-51, 103 S. Ct. 1684, 75 L. Ed. 2d
708 (1983) (some alterations in original) (quoting Ex parte Curtis, 106 U.S. 371,
373, 1 S. Ct. 381, 27 L. Ed. 232 (1882)).32 Such principles do not apply to the
facts of this case.33
31 See Progressive Democrats for Soc. Just. v. Bonta, 588 F. Supp. 3d 960 (N.D. Cal.
2022); Garcetti, 547 U.S. 410; City of San Diego, Cal. v. Roe, 543 U.S. 77, 125 S. Ct. 521, 160 L.
Ed. 2d 410 (2004); Waters v. Churchill, 511 U.S. 661, 114 S. Ct. 1878, 128 L. Ed. 2d 686 (1994);
Pickering, 391 U.S. 563; Hernandez v. City of Phoenix, 43 F. 4th 966 (9th Cir. 2022); Moser, 984
F.3d 900; Berry v. Dep’. of Soc. Servs., 447 F.3d 642 (9th Cir. 2006). For the reasons described
above, each of these cases is inapposite here.
32 In Connick, Justice Brennan disagreed with the majority’s balancing of the competing
considerations set forth in Pickering. 461 U.S. at 157-58 (Brennan, J., dissenting). However, as
pertinent here, he adeptly explained that the government, as a public employer, has an interest in
regulating employee speech only when such speech may impact the government’s ability to
perform its duties. He wrote:
The balancing test articulated in Pickering comes into play only when a
public employee’s speech implicates the government’s interests as an employer.
When public employees engage in expression unrelated to their employment
while away from the workplace, their First Amendment rights are, of course, no
different from those of the general public.
Connick, 461 U.S. at 157 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (citing Pickering, 391 U.S. at 574).
33 The City also asserts that our Supreme Court’s decision in Service Employees
International Union Local 925 v. University of Washington, 193 Wn.2d 860, 447 P.3d 534 (2019)
(SEIU), indicates that “disclosure of public records is mandated by the PRA notwithstanding any
speech rights or a chilling effect thereon.” City of Seattle, Suppl. Mem. at 3. We disagree.
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No. 83700-1-I/49
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Here, the Does’ employer, SPD, did not impose a restriction on the Does’
speech. Nor does the speech at issue—the Does’ attendance at a political rally
and their statements regarding their political views and affiliations—have any
impact on their employer’s operations. Indeed, any allegation that the Does
engaged in conduct contrary to their employer’s policies was found to be
unsustained.
We decline the City’s invitation to contravene United States Supreme
Court decisional authority in order to restrict public employee speech in
circumstances beyond those in which such speech may interfere with the public
employer’s operations. Instead, we take the United States Supreme Court at its
word that police officers “are not relegated to a watered-down version of
constitutional rights.” Garrity, 385 U.S. at 500; see also Pickering, 391 U.S. at
568. Similarly, we recognize the Supreme Court’s repeated affirmations that
“[t]he right to privacy in one’s political associations and beliefs will yield only to a
‘subordinating interest of the State [that is] compelling,’ and then only if there is a
‘substantial relation between the information sought and [an] overriding and
compelling state interest.’” Brown, 459 U.S. at 91-92 (second and third
In that decision, our Supreme Court addressed only whether particular faculty e-mails
relating to union organizing constitute “public records” pursuant to the PRA. SEIU, 193 Wn.2d at
867-76. Although the labor union seeking to enjoin disclosure of the requested e-mails asserted
that “their release would chill union organizing efforts, restrain speech, and violate individuals’
privacy rights,” SEIU, 193 Wn.2d at 865, our Supreme Court explicitly stated that its “holding on
the ‘scope of employment’ test does not dispose of” the labor union’s other arguments, including
“assertions of statutory and constitutional exemptions from PRA coverage.” SEIU, 193 Wn.2d at
876.
Contrary to the City’s assertion, our Supreme Court did not suggest in that decision that
the constitutional rights of our state’s citizens can be summarily dismissed on the basis of a
legislative enactment. While we agree with the City that the PRA is an important statute, it
nevertheless remains merely a statute. See Freedom Found., 178 Wn.2d at 695.
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No. 83700-1-I/50
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alterations in original) (citation and internal quotations marks omitted) (quoting
Sweezy, 354 U.S. at 265; Gibson, 372 U.S. at 546). Accordingly, only if an
overriding and compelling state interest exists to impinge the Does’ constitutional
rights may their identities be disclosed in the requested records. As discussed
below, we determine that no such compelling interest exists.
(b)
The scope of the State’s interest in public record disclosure—and, thus,
whether the City, as a state actor, has a compelling interest in disclosing the
Does’ identities—is illuminated by the purpose of the PRA’s disclosure mandate.
“The basic purpose of the [PRA] is to provide a mechanism by which the public
can be assured that its public officials are honest and impartial in the conduct of
their public offices.” Cowles Publ’g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 719. The statute “ensures
the sovereignty of the people and the accountability of the governmental
agencies that serve them by providing full access to information concerning the
conduct of government.” Predisik, 182 Wn.2d at 903. Similarly, our legislature
has defined the policy of the PRA as such: “That, mindful of the right of
individuals to privacy and of the desirability of the efficient administration of
government, full access to information concerning the conduct of government on
every level must be assured as a fundamental and necessary precondition to the
sound governance of a free society.” RCW 42.17A.001(11); see also In re
Request of Rosier, 105 Wn.2d 606, 611, 717 P.2d 1353 (1986) (recognizing the
policy underlying the statute as “allow[ing] public scrutiny of government, rather
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No. 83700-1-I/51
51
than . . . promot[ing] scrutiny of particular individuals who are unrelated to any
governmental operation”).
To this end, while the PRA contains a broad mandate for disclosure, our
legislature also included in the statute an exemption whereby “[p]ersonal
information in files maintained for employees . . . of any public agency” are not
subject to disclosure “to the extent that disclosure would violate their right to
privacy.” RCW 42.56.230(3). This “right to privacy” is “invaded or violated,” such
that the statutory exemption applies, when disclosure of the information would be
“highly offensive to a reasonable person” and is “not of legitimate concern to the
public.”34 RCW 42.56.050.
The PRA does not define the “right to privacy.” Our Supreme Court thus
sought to “‘fill [this] definitional void’” by adopting the common law tort definition
set forth in the Restatement. Cowles Publ’g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 721 (quoting
Hearst Corp. v. Hoppe, 90 Wn.2d 123, 136, 580 P.2d 246 (1978)); see
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §652D (AM. LAW INST. 1977). Employing this
definition, and consistent with the purpose of the PRA, our Supreme Court has
deemed significant to the question of privacy whether a public employee’s
conduct “occurred in the course of public service.” Cowles Publ’g Co., 109
Wn.2d at 726. “Instances of misconduct of a police officer while on the job are
not private, intimate, personal details of the officer’s life,” but rather, “are matters
34 We do not hold that the personal information exemption, RCW 42.56.230(3), a
statutory exemption set forth within the PRA, precludes disclosure of the Does’ identities in the
requested records. Rather, as discussed supra, it is the First Amendment to the United States
Constitution that precludes such disclosure, absent an overriding and compelling state interest.
Nevertheless, the purpose of the PRA and the scope of its disclosure mandate, as set forth by
our legislature and decisional authority interpreting the act, illuminates the state interest here at
issue.
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No. 83700-1-I/52
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with which the public has a right to concern itself.” Cowles Publ’g Co., 109
Wn.2d at 726. Premised on this principle, the court held that “a law enforcement
officer’s actions while performing his public duties or improper off duty actions in
public which bear upon his ability to perform his public office” are not within the
ambit of conduct exempt from disclosure due to statutory “personal privacy.”
Cowles Publ’g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 727.
In addition, in determining whether a public employee’s statutory right to
privacy is implicated, the court has distinguished between “substantiated” and
“unsubstantiated” allegations. “[W]hen a complaint regarding misconduct during
the course of public employment is substantiated or results in some sort of
discipline, an employee does not have a right to privacy in the complaint.”
Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405, 164 Wn.2d 199, 215,
189 P.3d 139 (2008). However, the court has held that public employees have a
statutory right to privacy in their identities in connection with unsubstantiated
allegations of sexual misconduct, “because the unsubstantiated allegations are
matters concerning [the employees’] private lives.” Bainbridge Island Police
Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 413; see also Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 215-16.
“An unsubstantiated or false accusation,” the court reasoned, “is not an action
taken by an employee in the course of performing public duties.” Bellevue John
Does, 164 Wn.2d at 215.
Similarly, our Supreme Court has concluded that whether allegations
against a public employee are substantiated bears on whether disclosure of the
employee’s identity is a matter of “legitimate” public concern. Bainbridge Island
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No. 83700-1-I/53
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Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 416; Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 221. Thus,
consistent with the PRA’s purpose to enable the public to oversee governmental
agencies, the court determined that the public has no legitimate interest in the
identities of public employees against whom unsubstantiated allegations of
misconduct were asserted. Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 220. This is
because, when the allegations are unsubstantiated, precluding disclosure of the
employee’s identity would “not impede the public’s ability to oversee” government
investigations into alleged employee misconduct. Bellevue John Does, 164
Wn.2d at 220. Rather, disclosure in such circumstances, the court reasoned,
“‘serve[s] no interest other than gossip and sensation.’” Bellevue John Does, 164
Wn.2d at 221 (quoting Bellevue John Does 1-11 v. Bellevue Sch. Dist. No. 405,
129 Wn. App. 832, 854, 120 P.3d 616 (2005)).
The state interest in disclosure pursuant to the PRA is to uphold the
purpose of the statute—that is, to enable the public to ensure “that its public
officials are honest and impartial in the conduct of their public offices.” Cowles
Publ’g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 719 (emphasis added); see also RCW 42.56.030 (“The
people insist on remaining informed so that they may maintain control over the
instruments that they have created.”). To that end, in the context of defining the
scope of statutory exemptions to disclosure, our Supreme Court has determined
that disclosure of the identities of public employees is not permitted when (1) the
allegations asserted against the employees are unsubstantiated and (2) the
conduct did not occur in the course of public service or occur off-duty and impact
the performance of public duties. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at
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No. 83700-1-I/54
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413; Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 213-16, 221; Cowles Publ’g Co., 109
Wn.2d at 726. In other words, in such circumstances, the State does not have
an interest in disclosing the employees’ identities.
Significantly, in those cases, whether disclosure of the public officials’
identities was precluded was determined pursuant to statutory exemptions, not
premised upon the disclosure’s impingement on constitutional First Amendment
rights. Thus, the public officials’ interests at issue in those cases, not being of
constitutional import, were less significant than those presented here, where the
Does’ First Amendment rights are implicated. Nevertheless, here, as in those
cases, the Does’ alleged misconduct did not occur in the course of their public
duties, and the allegations against the Does were determined to be
unsustained.35 Even when constitutional rights were not implicated by
disclosure, those same circumstances have been deemed by our legislature and
Supreme Court to fall outside the ambit of the state interest in such disclosure.
Thus, here, where the Does’ constitutional rights would be impinged by
disclosure, the state interest cannot be said to be compelling, such that
disclosure would nevertheless be permitted.36
35 We note that, while some of the OPA’s findings were “not sustained” because the
allegations were determined to be “unfounded,” others were unsustained because the
investigation as to those findings was deemed to be “inconclusive.” However, an “inconclusive”
finding remains a finding that the allegations were unsustained; it neither constitutes a finding
against the officer nor authorizes disciplinary action. Accordingly, we treat the “inconclusive”
unsustained findings in the same manner as the “unfounded” unsustained findings.
36 Sueoka asserts that the trial court properly determined that the public has a legitimate
interest in disclosure of the Does’ identities in the requested records because OPA Director
Andrew Myerberg may have previously represented one of the Does in a civil rights case. This
purported conflict, Sueoka contends, may have undermined the investigation.
However, even when only a statutory privacy interest is implicated, Washington courts
have held that complete records need not be disclosed for the public interest of government
oversight to be achieved. See, e.g., Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 416 (“Although
lacking a legitimate interest in the name of a police officer who is the subject of an
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No. 83700-1-I/55
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The United States Supreme Court has recognized that “[t]he public is, of
course, entitled to be informed concerning the workings of its government. That
cannot be inflated into a general power to expose where the predominant result
can only be an invasion of the private rights of individuals.” Watkins, 354 U.S. at
200 (footnote omitted). Here, disclosure of the Does’ identities would fulfill only
the “impermissible [objective] of exposure for exposure’s sake.” Uphaus, 360
U.S. at 82 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
Based on our legislature’s and Supreme Court’s delineation of the
purpose of the PRA’s disclosure mandate, we conclude that the State has no
compelling interest in disclosure of the Does’ identities in the requested records.
Accordingly, because the Does have established a constitutional privacy right
that would be impinged by disclosure, the superior court erred by denying the
Does’ motion for a preliminary injunction precluding such disclosure.37
unsubstantiated allegation of sexual misconduct, the public does have a legitimate interest in how
a police department responds to and investigates such an allegation against an officer.”);
Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 220 (“Precluding disclosure of the identities of teachers who
are subjects of unsubstantiated allegations will not impede the public’s ability to oversee school
districts’ investigations of alleged teacher misconduct.”). Indeed, our Supreme Court has made
plain that a public employee’s “right to privacy does not depend on the quality of the [public
employer’s] investigations.” Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 223. Here, given the
constitutional right at stake, we hold that the State has no compelling interest in disclosure of the
Does’ identities for this purpose.
Moreover, “[a]n agency should look to the contents of the document and not the
knowledge of third parties when deciding if the subject of a report has a right to privacy in their
identity.” Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at 414. In Bainbridge Island Police Guild,
our Supreme Court held that notwithstanding the fact that some members of the public might
know the identity of the individual identified in the records, the agency must nevertheless refuse
to disclose those records if an exemption exists. 172 Wn.2d at 414. Otherwise, agencies would
be required to “engage in an analysis of not just the contents of the report” but also of outside
knowledge regarding the incident described therein. Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d
at 414. The same logic applies here. Additionally, the City, in evaluating a records request,
cannot be charged with presuming the need to disclose individuals’ identities in investigative
records on the chance of potential conflict of interest of the investigator that is not established in
the records themselves. Such a presumption would gut the disclosure exemptions of the PRA.
37 The Does sought a preliminary injunction precluding the disclosure of their identities in
the requested records. They did not seek to prevent disclosure of redacted versions of those
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No. 83700-1-I/56
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(c)
We recognize that much of the United States Supreme Court’s
jurisprudence establishing a constitutional privacy right to anonymity in political
belief and association, which is grounded in the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution, predates the Court’s modern formulation of the strict scrutiny
standard applicable to governmental action impinging such rights. See Reed v.
Town of Gilbert, Ariz., 576 U.S. 155, 167, 135 S. Ct. 2218, 192 L. Ed. 2d 236
(2015) (recognizing that the Court’s decision in Button, 371 U.S. 415, “predated
[its] more recent formulations of strict scrutiny”).38 However, even applying these
“more recent formulations” of the standard, Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. at 167, the
result herein remains unchanged.
records. Thus, we do not consider whether the redacted records are subject to disclosure
pursuant to the PRA. We do note, however, that once the Does’ identities and other identifying
information are redacted from the requested records, their constitutional rights are no longer
implicated. Accordingly, it is the PRA, not federal constitutional principles, that dictate whether
the redacted records may be disclosed. As no party seeks to preclude such disclosure, that issue
is not before us.
However, we note that, when a constitutional right would not thereby be infringed, the
State has an interest in permitting disclosure of public records to enable government oversight,
thus fulfilling the purpose of the PRA. See, e.g., Bainbridge Island Police Guild, 172 Wn.2d at
416 (“Although lacking a legitimate interest in the name of a police officer who is the subject of an
unsubstantiated allegation of sexual misconduct, the public does have a legitimate interest in how
a police department responds to and investigates such an allegation against an officer.”);
Bellevue John Does, 164 Wn.2d at 220 (“Precluding disclosure of the identities of teachers who
are subjects of unsubstantiated allegations will not impede the public’s ability to oversee school
districts’ investigations of alleged teacher misconduct.”). See also RCW 42.56.210 (requiring
disclosure of records when exempted information can be redacted therefrom).
“[E]ven though the governmental purpose be legitimate and substantial, that purpose
cannot be pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal liberties when the end can
be more narrowly achieved.” Shelton, 364 U.S. at 488. Here, the purposes of the PRA are
achieved through disclosure of the redacted records.
38 The Court in Button held that a Virginia state law purporting to regulate the legal
profession unconstitutionally infringed on “the [First Amendment] right of the NAACP and its
members and lawyers to associate for the purpose of assisting persons who seek legal redress
for infringements of their constitutionally guaranteed and other rights.” 371 U.S. at 428. This
decision is among those cited by the Court for the proposition that “compelled disclosure, in itself,
can seriously infringe on privacy of association and belief guaranteed by the First Amendment.”
Buckley, 424 U.S. at 64 (citing Gibson, 372 U.S. 539; Button, 371 U.S. 415; Bates, 361 U.S. 516;
Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; NAACP, 357 U.S. 449).
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No. 83700-1-I/57
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As demonstrated by the profusion of legislatively enacted exceptions to
our state’s public records law, there is no compelling government interest in
disclosure of the unredacted requested records. Rather, the constitutionally
mandated narrow tailoring here requires precisely the remedy sought by the
Does—the redaction of their names and personal identifying information from the
requested records prior to disclosure. Thus, we hold that, applying the United
States Supreme Court’s modern formulation of the strict scrutiny standard,
disclosure of the requested records in redacted form serves to protect the First
Amendment interests at stake while allowing for the attainment of the
government’s legitimate interest in disclosure.
The Supreme Court’s modern formulation of the strict scrutiny standard,
as pertinent here, is articulated in Citizens United v. Federal Election
Commission, 558 U.S. 310, 130 S. Ct. 876, 175 L. Ed. 2d 753 (2010), in which
the Court pronounced:
Speech is an essential mechanism for democracy, for it is
the means to hold officials accountable to the people. The right of
citizens to inquire, to hear, to speak, and to use information to
reach consensus is a precondition to enlightened self-government
and a necessary means to protect it. . . .
For these reasons, political speech must prevail against laws
that would suppress it, whether by design or inadvertence. Laws
that burden political speech are “subject to strict scrutiny,” which
requires the Government to prove that the restriction “furthers a
compelling interest and is narrowly tailored to achieve that interest.”
Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 339-40 (citation omitted) (quoting Fed. Election
Comm’n v. Wisconsin Right to Life, Inc., 551 U.S. 449, 464, 127 S. Ct. 2652, 168
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No. 83700-1-I/58
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L. Ed. 2d 329 (2007)).39 Thus, the Supreme Court’s more recent formulations of
the strict scrutiny standard require that government restrictions on protected
speech be “narrowly tailored” to achieving the government’s compelling interest,
a mandate that was not explicitly articulated in the Court’s previous jurisprudence
establishing a First Amendment privacy right in political belief and association.
See, e.g., Brown, 459 U.S. 87; Gibson, 372 U.S. 539; Bates, 361 U.S. 516;
Shelton, 364 U.S. 479; NAACP, 357 U.S. 449.
The Citizens United explication of the modern formulation is grounded in
the Court’s historical jurisprudence and finds its genesis in the Court’s statement
in McIntyre that “[w]hen a law burdens core political speech, we apply ‘exacting
scrutiny,’ and we uphold the restriction only if it is narrowly tailored to serve an
overriding state interest.” 514 U.S. at 347.
As discussed above, our Supreme Court’s decisional authority and the
policies animating the PRA lead to the inexorable conclusion that, here, the
government has no compelling interest in disclosure of the Does’ identities in the
requested records. Rather, the government’s interest in the disclosure of public
records is to uphold the PRA’s purpose of enabling the public to ensure “that its
public officials are honest and impartial in the conduct of their public offices.”
Cowles Publ’g Co., 109 Wn.2d at 719. Further evidencing the absence of a
39 We acknowledge that differing levels of scrutiny apply to various claims of infringement
on federal constitutional rights. See, e.g., Town of Gilbert, 576 U.S. at 172 (in the context of
federal free speech guarantees, distinguishing between those laws subject to strict scrutiny
analysis and those “subject to lesser scrutiny”); Progressive Democrats for Soc. Just., 588 F.
Supp. 3d at 975-76 (describing differing levels of scrutiny in the context of the First and
Fourteenth Amendments, including rational basis review and strict scrutiny). However, no party
credibly seeks to establish that other such constructs are applicable in this case. We take the
United States Supreme Court at its word in Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340, that the strict
scrutiny standard applies in cases such as this.
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No. 83700-1-I/59
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compelling state interest in total disclosure of all records, our legislature has
enacted a plethora of exceptions to the PRA’s disclosure mandate—in fact, as of
March 2022, there were 632 such legislatively enacted exceptions.40 Without
question, this proliferation of exceptions to the PRA’s disclosure mandate
renders implausible any argument that a compelling state interest in disclosure of
the Does’ identities exists here. Rather, the government’s interest in disclosure
of the requested records inheres only in making public a redacted version of
those records.
When applying the modern strict scrutiny standard, we must ensure that
the government’s application of the PRA—the state action at issue here—is
narrowly tailored to serve its legitimate interest in the disclosure of public records.
See Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340. Such narrow tailoring compels us to
identify the “least restrictive alternative” that will achieve the pertinent state
interest. Ashcroft v. Am. Civ. Liberties Union, 542 U.S. 656, 666, 124 S. Ct.
2783, 159 L. Ed. 2d 690 (2004). “The purpose of [this] test is to ensure that
speech is restricted no further than necessary to achieve the [government’s]
goal, for it is important to ensure that legitimate speech is not chilled or
punished.” Ashcroft, 542 U.S. at 666.
Here, the very remedy sought by the Does—redaction of their names and
identifying information from the requested records—is precisely the narrow
40 See Appendix A (“Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee – Sunshine
Committee,” Schedule of Review, updated March 2022). Original available at https://agportal-
s3bucket.s3.amazonaws.com/uploadedfiles/Schedule%20of%20Review%20Update%20March%
202022.pdf.
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No. 83700-1-I/60
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tailoring that serves to protect the First Amendment rights at stake while
simultaneously allowing for the attainment of the government’s legitimate interest
in public records disclosure. Thus, applying the United States Supreme Court’s
more recent formulations of strict scrutiny, which require that governmental
action impinging on speech rights be narrowly tailored to serve a compelling
state interest, we reach the same conclusion as when applying the Court’s earlier
jurisprudence. In both circumstances, we conclude that disclosure of the
unredacted requested records would unconstitutionally impinge on the Does’
federal privacy rights—rights that are grounded in First Amendment guarantees.
The government’s sole legitimate interest in disclosure here is in making public a
redacted version of the requested records that excludes the Does’ names and
other identifying information.41
C
Sueoka and the City next assert that, even if the requested records are
exempt from disclosure, the Does are nevertheless entitled to a preliminary
injunction only if they can additionally demonstrate that they are likely to succeed
on the merits of meeting the statutory injunction standard set forth in the PRA.
We disagree.
When the disclosure of an individual’s identity in public records would
impinge a First Amendment right to privacy, the State may not place on that
individual an additional burden to vindicate that right. In such a circumstance,
41 An appropriate grant of such relief, as articulated by the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals,
would preclude the disclosure of “‘all personally identifying information or information from which
a person’s identity could be derived with reasonable certainty.’” Does 1-10 v. Univ. of Wash., 798
F. App’x 1009, 1010 (9th Cir. 2020).
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No. 83700-1-I/61
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the establishment of the right itself mandates the issuance of an injunction. This
is consistent with our Supreme Court’s jurisprudence establishing that, when a
statutory right precludes disclosure, the individual seeking to vindicate that right
must demonstrate not only that an exemption to disclosure applies, but also that
the PRA’s injunctive relief standard is satisfied. Mindful as we are that we must,
when possible, read statutes to avoid constitutional infirmity, we hold that the
PRA does not require that its statutory injunctive relief standard be met when a
First Amendment right to privacy precludes the disclosure of public records.
The PRA provides that “[t]he examination of any specific public record
may be enjoined if . . . the superior court . . . finds that such examination would
clearly not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably
damage any person, or would substantially and irreparably damage vital
governmental functions.” RCW 42.56.540. This two-part injunctive relief
provision “‘governs access to a remedy’ when records are found to fall within an
exemption” to the PRA’s disclosure mandate. Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 789 (quoting
PAWS, 125 Wn.2d at 258). Thus, when a statutory exemption to disclosure is
asserted, the trial court may impose an injunction pursuant to RCW 42.56.540
only if the court finds that “a specific exemption applies and that disclosure would
not be in the public interest and would substantially and irreparably damage a
person or a vital government interest.” Soter, 162 Wn.2d at 757.
Our Supreme Court so held in Lyft, 190 Wn.2d 769, wherein the court
addressed whether the disclosure of certain public records could be enjoined
pursuant to a statutory exemption to the PRA’s disclosure mandate. There, the
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No. 83700-1-I/62
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parties seeking to enjoin disclosure asserted that the records at issue contained
trade secrets protected by the federal Uniform Trade Secrets Act (UTSA),
chapter 19.108 RCW. Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 773. Our Supreme Court determined
that portions of the public records likely met “the definition of ‘trade secrets’ under
the UTSA.” Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 777, 780-84. The court nevertheless held that
disclosure of the records could be enjoined only if the PRA’s injunctive relief
standard, set forth in RCW 42.56.540, was also satisfied. Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at
773. Thus, our Supreme Court held that “finding an exemption applies under the
PRA does not ipso facto support issuing an injunction.” Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 786.
It is on the basis of this decisional authority that Sueoka and the City
contend that, in order to obtain the relief that they seek, the Does must
demonstrate that they are likely to succeed on the merits of meeting the PRA’s
two-part statutory injunctive relief standard. However, because disclosure of the
Does’ identities in the requested records would impinge their First Amendment
right to privacy, the argument advanced by Sueoka and the City is untenable.
Requiring that parties seeking to vindicate such rights establish not only the First
Amendment right itself, but also the requirements of the PRA’s injunctive relief
standard, would run afoul of the Supremacy Clause of our federal constitution,
which mandates that courts “‘shall’ regard the ‘Constitution,’ and all laws ‘made in
Pursuance thereof,’ as ‘the supreme Law of the Land.’” Armstrong v. Exceptional
Child Ctr., Inc., 575 U.S. 320, 324, 135 S. Ct. 1378, 191 L. Ed. 2d 471 (2015)
(quoting U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).42 We cannot interpret the PRA in a manner
42 The Supremacy Clause provides:
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that would render it unconstitutional. Utter ex rel. State v. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of
Wash., 182 Wn.2d 398, 434, 341 P.3d 953 (2015) (“We construe statutes to
avoid constitutional doubt.”). Nor does this resolution of the issue do so.
Rather, we read the PRA as consistent with the federal constitution simply
by recognizing the distinction between a legislatively created statutory right and a
federal constitutional right. When the state legislature creates a right, such as a
statutory exemption from the PRA’s disclosure mandate, the legislature may
impose conditions on the exercise of that right. This is precisely what the
legislature has done in enacting the PRA’s injunctive relief standard, RCW
42.56.540. Thus, as our Supreme Court has held, when a statutory right is
implicated, a finding that an exemption applies “does not ipso facto support
issuing an injunction.” Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at 786. Rather, the two-part standard set
forth in RCW 42.56.540 must also be satisfied, as the legislature has imposed
this statutory condition on the exercise of the statutory right against disclosure.
However, here, the Does’ claim of right does not depend upon a statutory
exemption, and the disclosure of the unredacted records would not merely
impinge a statutory right. Rather, the Does’ First Amendment right to privacy in
their political beliefs and associations would be impinged. The significance of
this distinction is readily apparent. Our state legislature can impose a condition
on the exercise of a right created by the legislature itself. However, the
This Constitution, and the laws of the United States which shall be made
in pursuance thereof; and all treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
authority of the United States, shall be the supreme law of the land; and the
judges in every state shall be bound thereby, any thing in the Constitution or laws
of any state to the contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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legislature, having created neither the First nor Fourteenth Amendments, cannot
condition the exercise of this federal constitutional right on whether the Does can
satisfy the statutory injunctive relief standard. Put simply, such a requirement
would authorize a state or local government to violate citizens’ constitutional
rights when they establish the impingement of such rights but are unable to also
demonstrate satisfaction of an additional statutory requirement to obtain
injunctive relief.43 The PRA injunction standard cannot serve as a bar to the
City’s obligation under the Fourteenth Amendment to safeguard the First
Amendment rights of Washington citizens in its application of state law. See,
e.g., Seattle Times Co., 170 Wn.2d 581 (discussed infra at 9-10).
Again, this analysis does not suggest a constitutional infirmity of the PRA.
Rather, recognizing the distinction between legislatively created statutory rights
and the First Amendment constitutional right implicated here, we note that the
43 This very absurdity appears to be consistent with the City’s understanding of its duty to
Washington’s citizens. In supplemental briefing, the City asserts that it has no “freestanding
obligation to honor” the constitutional rights of our state’s citizens. Specifically, the City contends
that the third party notice provision set forth in the PRA is the proper means for it to address
exceptions to disclosure premised on a constitutional right. The City argues, in other words, that
it has no obligation to independently honor the constitutional rights of third parties in response to
records requests. We do not so hold.
When, after receiving notice, an individual seeks injunctive relief premised on a
constitutional right, and thereafter establishes both that the right would be impinged by disclosure
and that no sufficient interest of the state permits disclosure, the City plainly has an obligation
under the Fourteenth Amendment not to violate the individual’s constitutional right,
notwithstanding the PRA’s injunction standard. In other words, here, once the constitutional right
is established, the City does not have unfettered discretion to either refuse to disclose the
records, pursuant to the PRA, or to permit disclosure premised upon the RCW 42.56.540’s
standard not being met. Such unfettered discretion of government actors to either honor citizens’
constitutional rights or refuse to honor such rights is anathema to the constitutional rule of law.
The City need not serve as the lawyer for every individual mentioned in requested public
records. However, when the constitutional right implicated by disclosure of particular requested
records is clear, the City must refuse to disclose the records (or the relevant portions thereof).
The City must then defend against any challenge to the action by the records requestor, unless,
following notice, the individual whose rights are implicated does not object to disclosure. The
City’s supreme obligation is to the federal constitution, not to the state statute. See U.S. CONST.
art. VI, cl.2.
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No. 83700-1-I/65
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application of RCW 42.56.540 would necessarily mandate the issuance of an
injunction. Given the State’s paramount interest in affirming the federal
constitutional rights of its citizens, disclosure that would impinge the Does’ First
Amendment right to privacy “would clearly not be in the public interest.” RCW
42.56.540. Moreover, because the Does’ constitutional rights would be impinged
by disclosure of the unredacted records, such disclosure would of necessity
“substantially and irreparably damage” the Does. RCW 42.56.540.
Thus, when disclosure is precluded by a First Amendment right to privacy,
rather than a statutory exemption, the establishment of that constitutional right
does, indeed, ipso facto mandate the issuance of an injunction. The State has
no lawful authority to impose an additional requirement on parties seeking to
vindicate their constitutional rights in order to trigger its obligations pursuant to
the Fourteenth Amendment. Because disclosure of the unredacted records
would impinge their First Amendment rights, the Does cannot be required to
additionally demonstrate satisfaction of an injunctive relief standard in order to
obtain the relief they seek, unless that standard is one that is ipso facto satisfied
by virtue of the establishment of the First Amendment right. Because the PRA
standard is one such standard, the Does have met their burden.44
IV
In his cross appeal, Sueoka contends that the trial court erred by denying
his motion to “change the case title and bar the use of pseudonyms” in this
44 We acknowledge the existence of case law, primarily from lower federal courts, that
occasionally applies non-PRA injunctive relief standards. Our Supreme Court has determined
that PRA disclosure is regulated by only the PRA injunctive relief standard. Lyft, 190 Wn.2d at
784-85.
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No. 83700-1-I/66
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litigation. According to Sueoka, Washington’s open courts principles, emanating
from article I, section 10 of our state constitution, require that the Does litigate
this matter using their actual names. We disagree.
In seeking to preclude the disclosure of their identities in the requested
records, the Does assert a First Amendment right. Thus, it is federal open courts
jurisprudence, which itself derives from the First Amendment, that here applies.
Such jurisprudence permits litigants to proceed pseudonymously when the injury
litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of their identities.
Herein, that precise outcome would occur were the Does not permitted to litigate
using pseudonyms.
Accordingly, we conclude that the trial court did not err in ruling that the
Does could proceed in pseudonym in this litigation. For the same reason, we
decline to grant Sueoka’s request to preclude the use of pseudonyms on appeal.
A
In these proceedings, both the trial court and our commissioner have
repeatedly entertained Sueoka’s argument that the Does should not be permitted
to litigate pseudonymously. In each instance, they have rejected that argument.
First, Sueoka objected to the Does’ motion to proceed in pseudonym filed
concurrent with their initial complaint for declaratory and injunctive relief. On
March 9, 2021, Judge Cahan granted the Does’ motion. Prior to so doing, Judge
Cahan considered the factors for redaction set forth in Seattle Times Co. v.
Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d 30, 640 P.2d 716 (1982), and made the findings required
therein. Judge Cahan also determined that the Does had complied with the
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relevant court rules, including General Rule (GR) 15. Three days later, on March
12, 2021, Judge Widlan denied the Does’ complaint for injunctive relief, and the
Does sought discretionary review.
Sueoka then filed a “motion to change the case title and bar the use of
pseudonyms” in this court. He subsequently filed a notice of cross appeal,
challenging Judge Cahan’s order permitting the Does to litigate in pseudonym.
Our commissioner denied Sueoka’s motion to change the case title on April 9,
2021. The commissioner explained that there “appear[ed] to be no dispute that
Judge Cahan evaluated the Ishikawa factors in reaching the March 9, 2021
decision and that no party asked Judge Widlan to revisit [that] order.” The
commissioner further reasoned that the “substance of Sueoka’s motion to
change the case title is inextricably tangled up with the merits of his appeal” and
concluded that “maintaining the case name adopted by the trial court . . . appears
to be necessary to allowing [this court] to reach the merits of this case.”
Following transfer of the appeal from Division One to our Supreme Court,
and that court’s subsequent dismissal of review and remand to the superior
court, Sueoka again filed a “motion to change the case title and bar the use of
pseudonyms.” Sueoka did not therein challenge Judge Cahan’s order granting
the Does’ motion to proceed in pseudonym. Judge Widlan denied Sueoka’s
motion, reasoning that “the purpose of [the Does’] lawsuit is to procure an
injunction to prevent disclosure of their names” and, thus, requiring use of their
names in court filings “would effectively prevent them from seeking any relief.”
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No. 83700-1-I/68
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B
Washington’s open courts jurisprudence derives from article I, section 10
of our state constitution, which requires that “[j]ustice in all cases shall be
administered openly, and without unnecessary delay.” WASH. CONST. art. I, § 10.
Because “[t]he openness of our courts ‘is of utmost public importance,’”
Washington courts begin “with the presumption of openness when determining
whether a court record may be sealed from the public.” Hundtofte v.
Encarnacion, 181 Wn.2d 1, 7, 330 P.3d 168 (2014) (quoting Dreiling v. Jain, 151
Wn.2d 900, 903, 93 P.3d 861 (2004)). Whether redaction implicates article I,
section 10’s mandate of open access to courts and court documents “depends
on application of the experience and logic test.” State v. S.J.C., 183 Wn.2d 408,
412, 352 P.3d 749 (2015). When article I, section 10 applies, redaction is
permitted only after consideration of the factors set forth in Ishikawa, 97 Wn.2d
30. When our state constitution is not implicated, GR 15 permits the redaction of
names in pleadings if the court “enters written findings that the specific sealing or
redaction is justified by identified compelling privacy or safety concerns that
outweigh the public interest in access to the court record.” GR 15(c)(2).
In a recent opinion, our Supreme Court reversed a decision of this court
wherein we had determined that allowing the plaintiffs to litigate using
pseudonyms did not implicate article I, section 10. John Doe G v. Dep’t of
Corr.,190 Wn.2d 185, 191, 410 P.3d 1156 (2018) (citing John Doe G v. Dep’t of
Corr., 197 Wn. App. 609, 627-28, 391 P.3d 496 (2017)). The Supreme Court
therein addressed a privacy right arising from a state statute. The questions
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presented were (1) whether special sex offender sentencing alternative
evaluations are exempt from disclosure pursuant to statutory exemptions, and (2)
whether “pseudonymous litigation was proper in [that] action.” Doe G, 190
Wn.2d at 189.
On appeal before this court, we had looked to federal open courts
jurisprudence for “guidance,” recognizing the “parallel rights [to those derived
from article I, section 10] under the First Amendment.” Doe G, 197 Wn. App. at
627. We noted federal court holdings that the use of pseudonyms is appropriate
when “‘the injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure
of the plaintiff’s identity.’” Doe G, 197 Wn. App. at 627 (quoting Doe v. Frank,
951 F.2d 320, 324 (11th Cir. 1992)). Based, in part, on this reasoning, we held
that “[e]xperience and logic” demonstrated “that allowing [the] plaintiffs to
proceed under pseudonyms [did] not implicate article I, section 10 where the
public’s interest in the plaintiffs’ names is minimal and use of those names would
chill their ability to seek relief.” Doe G, 197 Wn. App. at 628. Thus, we affirmed
the trial court’s ruling permitting the plaintiffs to litigate using pseudonyms,
notwithstanding that the trial court had not applied the Ishikawa factors. Doe G,
197 Wn. App. at 624.
Our Supreme Court reversed our decision, holding that “pseudonymous
litigation was improper . . . because the trial court did not adhere to the
requirements of article I, section 10 . . . and [GR] 15.” Doe G, 190 Wn.2d at 189.
In so holding, the court explained that it had “never used [the] analysis” set forth
in the federal appellate court decisions on which we had relied for guidance. Doe
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G, 190 Wn.2d at 198. Instead, the court held, Washington courts “rely on GR 15
and Ishikawa.” Doe G, 190 Wn.2d at 198.
C
Citing our Supreme Court’s decision in Doe G, 190 Wn.2d 185, Sueoka
contends that Judge Widlan “used the wrong legal standard” in denying his
motion to preclude the Does from litigating pseudonymously.45 However, in so
asserting, Sueoka misperceives the issue as one of Washington law.46 It is not.
Accordingly, his argument fails.
Unlike in Doe G, in this case, the Does assert that disclosure of their
identities would impinge a federal constitutional First Amendment right.
Preventing the Does from proceeding in pseudonym would preclude their ability
to obtain the relief that they seek in this action. In other words, requiring the
Does to use their actual names in the case caption would undermine their ability
to assert the First Amendment right that they seek to vindicate herein. Such a
result would violate the Supremacy Clause, U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2, which
mandates that we must not “give effect to state laws that conflict with federal
laws.” Armstrong, 575 U.S. at 324. When parties who assert that disclosure of
their identities would violate a federal constitutional right seek to litigate
45 Br. of Resp’t/Cross Appellant at 69-71.
46 We note that, if Washington law did apply here, Sueoka’s contention would
nevertheless be unavailing. As discussed above, Judge Cahan did apply GR 15 and the
Ishikawa factors in ruling that the Does could proceed in pseudonym. Sueoka does not challenge
Judge Cahan’s findings, which are, therefore, verities on appeal. In re Welfare of A.W., 182
Wn.2d 689, 711, 344 P.3d 1186 (2015); see also Doe AA v. King County, 15 Wn. App. 2d 710,
717, 476 P.3d 1055 (2020) (accepting as true the trial court’s Ishikawa findings that were
unchallenged on appeal). Following Sueoka’s subsequent motion seeking, once again, to
preclude the Does from litigating in pseudonym, Judge Widlan simply declined to revisit Judge
Cahan’s earlier ruling.
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No. 83700-1-I/71
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pseudonymously, it is federal open courts jurisprudence, arising from the First
Amendment itself, that we must apply.
This holding is consistent with our Supreme Court’s decision in Doe G,
190 Wn.2d 185. There, the litigants seeking to use pseudonyms asserted that
disclosure of their identities in the requested records was precluded by statutory
rights arising from statutory exemptions, including an exemption enumerated
within the PRA itself. Doe G, 190 Wn.2d at 189. Thus, our Supreme Court
properly held that Washington’s open courts jurisprudence applied and that we
had erred by importing federal case law into Washington law. Doe G, 190 Wn.2d
at 189, 198.
Here, however, the Supremacy Clause requires that First Amendment
jurisprudence be applied, both as to the constitutional right at issue—whether
disclosure of the Does’ identities in the requested records would violate a
constitutional privacy right—and as to the question of whether the Does may use
pseudonyms in seeking to vindicate that right. Accordingly, because the Does
assert an exemption from disclosure premised on a federal constitutional right,
rather than a statutory exemption, the application of federal open courts
jurisprudence does not conflict with our Supreme Court’s decision in Doe G but
does comport with the requirements of the Supremacy Clause.
Federal courts have made clear that “[p]ublic access [to plaintiffs’ names
in a lawsuit] is more than a customary procedural formality; First Amendment
guarantees are implicated when a court decides to restrict public scrutiny of
judicial proceedings.” Doe v. Stegall, 653 F.2d 180, 185 (5th Cir. 1981); see also
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No. 83700-1-I/72
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Roe II v. Aware Woman Ctr. for Choice, Inc., 253 F.3d 678, 688 (11th Cir. 2001)
(Hill, J., concurrence in part). When federal law applies, “[t]he ultimate test for
permitting a plaintiff to proceed anonymously is whether the plaintiff has a
substantial privacy right which outweighs the ‘customary and constitutionally-
embedded presumption of openness in judicial proceedings.’” Frank, 951 F.2d at
323 (quoting Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186). “A plaintiff should be permitted to
proceed anonymously only in those exceptional cases involving matters of a
highly sensitive and personal nature, real danger of physical harm, or where the
injury litigated against would be incurred as a result of the disclosure of the
plaintiff’s identity.” Frank, 951 F.2d at 324 (emphasis added).
Thus, the First Amendment both confers privacy rights in political speech
and also, in the standard regulating when a party can proceed in pseudonym,
provides that these substantive rights cannot be extinguished merely because a
party seeks to vindicate them. In other words, it provides that concerns about
public access to the courts cannot be applied to the detriment of First
Amendment rights under federal law, such that the vindication of constitutional
rights would be improperly conditioned on disclosure.47 In this action, the “injury
47 In NAACP, 357 U.S. at 459-60, the United States Supreme Court relied on this
principle—that federal law not be applied in a manner that precludes the vindication of individuals’
constitutional rights to privacy—in holding that the plaintiff organization had standing to assert the
rights of its members. The Court held that the general principle that parties must assert only
those constitutional rights “which are personal to themselves” is “not disrespected where
constitutional rights of persons who are not immediately before the Court could not be effectively
vindicated except through an appropriate representative before the Court.” NAACP, 357 U.S. at
459.
There, the NAACP challenged a court order mandating disclosure of its membership lists
to the Alabama Attorney General, asserting that such disclosure would violate its members’
constitutional privacy rights. NAACP, 357 U.S. at 451, 458. The Court held that the “right [was]
properly assertable by the [NAACP],” reasoning that “[t]o require that [the constitutional right] be
claimed by the [NAACP’s] members themselves would result in nullification of the right at the very
moment of its assertion.” NAACP, 357 U.S. at 459. See also Pollard, 283 F. Supp. at 256
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No. 83700-1-I/73
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litigated against” is disclosure of the Does’ identities in the requested records.
Were the Does not permitted to litigate pseudonymously, the very injury they
seek to litigate against would be incurred. Pursuant to federal open courts
jurisprudence, in this circumstance, “the almost universal practice of disclosure
must give way . . . to the privacy interests at stake.” Stegall, 653 F.2d at 186.
In summary, the Supremacy Clause prohibits the application of state open
courts jurisprudence to a pending First Amendment claim when such application
would cause the injury litigated against to be incurred, as federal open courts
principles, arising as they do from the First Amendment itself, would not mandate
the disclosure of the parties’ names in that circumstance. If the Does ultimately
prevail, they would be entitled to full protection of their First Amendment rights
against the government—here, protection against disclosure of their identities
within the requested records. State constitutional open courts provisions cannot
be applied in contravention of First Amendment jurisprudence in a manner that
frustrates protection of the citizen’s federal constitutional rights.
Accordingly, we hold that the Does must be permitted to use pseudonyms
in this action. The trial court did not err by so ruling. We additionally deny
Sueoka’s request that we change the case title in this appeal to require it to
include the Does’ actual names.
(recognizing “recent Supreme Court decisions establish[ing] that an organization made up of
private individuals has standing to protect those individuals from unwarranted invasions of
government of their rights of association and privacy guaranteed by the First and Fourteenth
Amendments”).
Similarly, here, the Does would be precluded from vindicating their constitutional rights
were they unable to litigate pseudonymously. First Amendment open courts jurisprudence
prohibits disclosure in such circumstances. Frank, 951 F.2d at 324.
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No. 83700-1-I/74
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D
The Does seek herein to vindicate rights enshrined in the federal
constitution. Thus, applying the open courts principles arising from article I,
section 10 of our state constitution to determine whether the Does may be
permitted to litigate in pseudonym would contravene the Supremacy Clause’s
mandate of state law supersession. Accordingly, as discussed above, we must
apply federal law to this question. We nevertheless note that application of
Washington open courts law would dictate the same resolution of this issue.
Again, this is due to the Supremacy Clause’s mandate that we not give
effect to state laws that conflict with federal laws. Precluding the Does from
litigating in pseudonym pursuant to article I, section 10 would itself be a state
action that would compel the disclosure of the Does’ individual political beliefs
and associations. Indeed, application by Washington courts of our state
constitution is itself a state action. Thus, only by demonstrating that the
disclosure of the Does’ identities “‘furthers a compelling interest and is narrowly
tailored to achieve that interest,’” Citizens United, 558 U.S. at 340 (quoting Fed.
Election Comm’n, 551 U.S. at 464), could a Washington court require such
disclosure when a party seeking to litigate in pseudonym asserts a federal First
Amendment claim. Washington courts, too, are subject to the Supremacy
Clause’s mandate.
Here, as we have discussed, there is no compelling state interest in the
disclosure of the Does’ identities in the requested records. Similarly, there is no
compelling state interest in requiring that the Does litigate using their actual
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No. 83700-1-I/75
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names. Given the profusion of exceptions to the disclosure mandate, this
conclusion is inescapable. Our state law currently includes 632 legislatively
created exceptions to the PRA’s disclosure mandate. See Appendix A. This
proliferation of exceptions undoubtedly demonstrates the absence of a
compelling state interest in the disclosure of the Does’ identities here.
Moreover, neither our legislature nor our Supreme Court, in permitting
broad categories of persons to retain their anonymity in court records, has
engaged in the particularized analysis that would be required if the disclosure of
those persons’ identities implicated a compelling state interest. For instance, our
legislature has determined that individuals are automatically entitled to anonymity
in certain court records, including records regarding adoptions, RCW 26.33.330;
confidential name changes, RCW 4.24.130(5); child victims of sexual assault,
RCW 10.52.100; juvenile nonoffender records, such as juvenile dependencies,
parental terminations, and truancy, at risk youth, and child in need of services
cases, RCW 13.50.100; juvenile offender records, RCW 13.50.050; mental
illness commitments, RCW 71.05.620; and mental illness commitments of
minors, RCW 71.34.335.
Similarly, by both court rule and order, Washington courts have deemed
certain categories of persons to be exempt from the general mandate that court
records include the actual names of the litigants. Washington court rule General
Rule 15, consistent with article I, section 10 of our state constitution, “preserves a
long-established principle that the complete names of parties are to be listed with
the actions to which they are parties,” subject to “carefully delimited” exceptions.
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No. 83700-1-I/76
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Hundtofte, 181 Wn.2d at 16 (Madsen, C.J., concurring). These exceptions,
however, are not based on a particularized analysis of each case. Rather, like
the legislative enactments discussed above, they exempt litigants in broad
categories of cases from the disclosure mandate. For instance, in adopting Rule
of Appellate Procedure (RAP) 3.4, our Supreme Court has determined that all
juvenile offenders are entitled to anonymity in court records.48 By order, the
Washington Court of Appeals has similarly required that case titles in certain
appeals—including those regarding adoption, civil commitment, dependency,
termination of parental rights, truancy, at risk youth, child in need of services, and
juvenile offender—use the parties’ initials rather than their full names. Gen. Ord.
for the Ct. of Appeals, In re Changes to Case Title (Wash. Ct. App. Aug. 22,
2018) (effective Sept. 1, 2018).
Thus, neither our state legislature nor Washington courts, in adopting
exceptions to our state open courts law, have deemed it necessary to conduct a
particularized case-by-case analysis prior to permitting the redaction of parties’
names in court records. Instead, whether by legislative enactment, court rule, or
court order, our state has exempted broad categories of persons from the
general disclosure requirement. Certainly, such broad exemptions do not
indicate the narrow tailoring that would be necessary were the state interest in
the disclosure of litigants’ actual names compelling. Thus, by exempting broad
48 RAP 3.4 provides:
In a juvenile offender case, the parties shall caption the case using the juvenile’s
initials. The parties shall refer to the juvenile by his or her initials throughout all
briefing and pleadings filed in the appellate court, and shall refer to any related
individuals in such a way as to not disclose the juvenile’s identity. However, the
trial court record need not be redacted to eliminate references to the juvenile’s
identity.
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No. 83700-1-I/77
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swaths of persons from article I, section 10’s open courts mandate, both the
Washington legislature and Washington courts have impliedly indicated that the
state interest in disclosure of litigants’ actual names is not a compelling one.
The Supremacy Clause prohibits the application of state open courts
jurisprudence when, as here, the right asserted is established by the federal First
Amendment. Nevertheless, even were we to apply Washington law to the
question of whether the Does may litigate in pseudonym, we would reach the
same conclusion—that not only “may” they so litigate, but that the federal
constitution demands they be permitted to do so. Such a determination by a
Washington court is, itself, state action. The broad exemptions to the open
courts mandate, both enacted by our legislature and adopted by our courts,
demonstrate that the state interest in the disclosure of individuals’ actual names
in court records is not a compelling one. Absent such an interest, and given the
Does’ First Amendment right to anonymity in political belief and association, we
cannot require the Does to litigate using their actual names here.
V
A
All members of the panel have taken an oath to “‘support the Constitution
of the United States.’” RCW 2.06.085. Each panel member views the methods
of analyses employed herein and the decisions reached as being in accord with
this oath.
Nevertheless, we are aware of the cultural and political tenor of our times.
This includes an awareness that many Americans despair that judicial decisions
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No. 83700-1-I/78
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have become result-oriented to achieve political ends. To disabuse those so
inclined from defaulting to such a judgment concerning this opinion, and to
assure the general public that its appellate court exists in a reality-based
environment, we choose to acknowledge several of the pertinent facts that
underlie the dispute at issue.
1
The 2020 Presidential Election
1. Joseph R. Biden, Jr. won the 2020 presidential election, receiving
81,283,501 popular votes.49 Donald J. Trump lost the 2020 presidential election,
receiving 74,223,975 popular votes.50 Biden received 7,059,526 more votes than
did Trump.
2. Biden’s popular vote total was the largest ever received by a candidate
for President of the United States.51
3. Biden received 51.3 percent of the popular vote.52 This was the
highest percentage of the popular vote attained by a challenger to a sitting
president since 1932, when Franklin Roosevelt defeated Herbert Hoover.53
49 U.S. FED. ELECTION COMM’N, FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2020: ELECTION RESULTS FOR THE U.S.
PRESIDENT, THE U.S. SENATE, AND THE U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES 5 (Oct. 2022), at 5,
https://www.fec.gov/resources/cms-
content/documents/federalelections2020.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XDB-2XJA]
50 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2020, supra, at 5.
51 Domenico Montanaro, President-Elect Joe Biden Hits 80 Million Votes in Year Of
Record Turnout, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (Nov. 25, 2020),
https://www.npr.org/2020/11/25/937248659/president-elect-biden-hits-80-million-votes-in-year-of-
record-turnout [https://perma.cc/4FZS-AWKK].
52 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2020, supra, at 5.
53 Presidential Election Margin of Victory, AM. PRESIDENCY PROJECT (Mar. 7, 2020),
https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/statistics/data/presidential-election-mandates
[https://perma.cc/9MJG-RAHE]; Share of Electoral College and Popular Votes from Each Winning
Candidate, in All United States Presidential Elections from 1789 to 2020, STATISTA (Dec. 2020),
https://www.statista.com/statistics/1034688/share-electoral-popular-votes-each-president-since-
1789 [https://perma.cc/B5SE-NLLY].
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No. 83700-1-I/79
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4. Biden earned 306 electoral votes. Trump earned 232.54 In 2016,
Trump earned 306 electoral votes, while Hillary Clinton earned 232.55 Thus,
Biden defeated Trump by the same Electoral College margin as Trump defeated
Clinton.
2
The Rally on January 6, 2021
1. A “Stop the Steal” rally was held on January 6, 2021 on public property
in the District of Columbia. Various permits were sought and obtained,
authorizing use of the public property.56
2. The theme of the rally was that the election had been “stolen” from
Donald Trump. Thus, Trump and rally organizers urged, Congress should not
finalize Biden’s victory by certifying the Electoral College results (as the law
required).57
3. Trump, the sitting president, spoke at the rally.58
3
The Insurrection at the Capitol
1. As the rally ended, a civil disturbance began at the Capitol. Hundreds
of persons illegally broke through security lines and eventually into the Capitol
54 FEDERAL ELECTIONS 2020, supra, at 7.
55 2016 Presidential Election Results, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 19, 2017, 9:00 AM),
www.nytimes.com/elections/2016/results/president.
56 See note 13, supra.
57 H.R. REP. NO. 117-663, at 231-33, 499-502 (2022),
https://www.govinfo.gov/content/pkg/GPO-J6-REPORT/pdf/GPO-J6-REPORT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/UH8B-ZQ7D].
58 H.R. REP. NO. 117-663, at 231-33.
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No. 83700-1-I/80
80
Building.59
2. Both the House of Representatives and the Senate were forced to
adjourn and flee to safety.60
3. In the riotous melee that ensued over 140 law enforcement officers
were injured.61 According to a U.S. Senate report, seven deaths were attributed
to the violence that took place.62
4. The common goal of the rioters was to keep Congress from performing
its lawful function—certification of Biden’s presidential election victory.63 Some
rioters, including those who chanted “Hang Mike Pence,” had other goals, such
as the killing or kidnapping of members of Congress.64
5. For the first time since the War of 1812, the United States government
lost physical control of the Capitol Building to a group of attackers.65
59 Audrey Kurth Cronin, The Capitol Has Been Breached Before: This Time It Was
Different, AM. UNIV. SCH. OF INT’L SERV. (Feb. 9, 2021),
https://www.american.edu/sis/centers/security-technology/the-capitol-has-been-attacked-before-
this-time-it-was-different.cfm [https://perma.cc/Y4NJ-7GE3]. See discussion H.R. REP. NO. 117-
663, at 637-88.
60 H.R. REP. NO. 117-663, at 664-66.
61 COMM. ON HOMELAND SEC. & GOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS & COMM. ON RULES & ADMIN., U.S.
SENATE, EXAMINING THE U.S. CAPITOL ATTACK: A REVIEW OF THE SECURITY, PLANNING, AND
RESPONSE FAILURES ON JANUARY 6, at 33 (June 2021),
https://www.rules.senate.gov/imo/media/doc/Jan%206%20HSGAC%20Rules%20Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/DL5Q-5XT3].
62 EXAMINING THE U.S. CAPITOL ATTACK, supra, at 1.
63 EXAMINING THE U.S. CAPITOL ATTACK, supra, at 1.
64 H.R. REP. NO. 117-663, at 37-39; Cronin, supra.
65 Cronin, supra; Amanda Holpuch, US Capitol’s Last Breach Was More Than 200 Years
Ago, GUARDIAN (Jan. 6, 2021, 7:59 PM), https://www.theguardian.com/us-news/2021/jan/06/us-
capitol-building-washington-history-breach [https://perma.cc/RU25-E3LP]; Amy Sherman, A
History of Breaches and Violence at the US Capitol, POLITIFACT (Jan. 6, 2021),
https://www.politifact.com/article/2021/jan/07/history-breaches-and-violence-us-capitol/
[https://perma.cc/8A7C-5L2H].
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No. 83700-1-I/81
81
6. Over 1,000 persons have been charged with crimes premised on
actions occurring at the Capitol on January 6, 2021.66 Over 630 have, to date,
pleaded guilty or been found guilty after trial.67
7. Many of the insurrectionists belonged to groups espousing white
supremacist views. Others of the rioters, while not group members, were shown
to possess such views.68
Given all of these facts, it is easy to understand the concerns motivating
the City and the requesters. Nevertheless, our duty to the United States
Constitution, and the Constitution’s embrace and protection of a right to
anonymity in political activity, lead us to the decisions we announce today.
B
The trial court’s denial of the Does’ motion for a preliminary injunction is
reversed and remanded.
The trial court’s issuance of a temporary restraining order is affirmed.
The trial court’s order denying Sueoka’s motion to preclude the Does’ use
of pseudonyms is affirmed.
66 The Jan. 6 Attack: The Cases Behind the Biggest Criminal Investigation in U.S.
History, NAT’L PUB. RADIO (May 12, 2023, 5:25 PM),
https://www.npr.org/2021/02/09/965472049/the-capitol-siege-the-arrested-and-their-stories
[https://perma.cc/S38K-B8DK].
67 The Jan. 6 Attack: The Cases Behind the Biggest Criminal Investigation in U.S.
History, supra.
68 See discussion H.R. REP. NO. 117-663, at 499-576; Sabrina Tavernise & Matthew
Rosenberg, These Are the Rioters Who Stormed the Nation’s Capitol, N.Y. TIMES (May 12, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/07/us/names-of-rioters-capitol.html; Deena Zaru, The Symbols
of Hate and Far-Right Extremism on Display in Pro-Trump Capitol Siege, ABC NEWS (Jan. 14,
2021, 2:01 AM), https://www.abcnewsgo.com/us/symbols-hate-extremism-display-pro-trump-
captiol-siege/story?id=75177671 [https://perma.cc/3T4R-2JRL]; Matthew Rosenberg & Ainara
Tiefenthäler, Decoding the Far-Right Symbols at the Capitol Riot, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 13, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/01/13/video/extremist-signs-symbols-capitol-riot.html.
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No. 83700-1-I/82
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Sueoka’s motion to change the case title is denied.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
WE CONCUR:
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1 of 38
1 	Agriculture 	42.56.380(6) 	Information on individual American ginseng growers
or dealers 	1996 	Oct. 2007 	June 2008 	SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010
Laws)
2
Personal
Information -
Research Data/Health
Care
42.56.360(1)(f); [now
(3)(a)]
Information relating to infant mortality pursuant to
RCW 70.05.170 	1992 	Oct. 2007 	Mar. 2008 	SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010
Laws)
3
Personal
Information -
Research Data/Health
Care
70.05.170
Medical records collected by a local department of
health in the course of conducting a child mortality
review
1992 	Oct. 2007 	Mar. 2008
SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010
Laws); SB 5049 (2011,
2012)
4 	Legislative
Records
42.56.010(2); [now
(3)]
Definition of "public records" for the senate and the
house are limited to definition of legislative records in
RCW 40.14.100 and budget, personnel, travel
records and certain reports. [Definition]
1995 	Oct. 2007 	Aug. 2009
5
Personal Information -
Public
Employment
42.56.250(2) 	Applications for public employment, including names,
resumes 	1987
Oct. 2007; March 2008;
Sept. 2008; Feb. 2017;
May 2017
Mar. 2008; September 2008;
May 2017
SB 5294 (2009); SB 5049
(2011, 2012); HB 1298
(2013); SB 5169 (2013);
HB 1537 (Ch. 229, 2019
Laws); SB 5246 (2019)
6 	Agriculture 	42.56.380(1);
15.86.110
Business records the department of agriculture
obtains regarding organic food products 	1992 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
7 	Agriculture 	42.56.380(2);
15.54.362
Information regarding business operations contained
in reports on commercial fertilizer 	1987 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
8 	Agriculture 	42.56.380(3)
Production or sales records required to determine
payments to various agricultural commodity boards
and commissions (Relates to exemptions in 10
commission statutes)
1996 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
9 	Agriculture 	42.56.380(4) 	Consignment information contained on phytosanitary
certificates issued by the department of agriculture 	1996 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
10 	Agriculture 	42.56.380(5)
Financial and commercial information and records
held by the department of agriculture for potential
establishment of a commodity board or commission
regarding domestic or export marketing activities or
individual production information
1996 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008; November 2012
11 	Agriculture 	42.56.380(7)
Identifiable information collected by department of
agriculture regarding packers and shippers of fruits
and vegetables for purposes of inspections and
certification
1996 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
12 	Agriculture 	42.56.380(8)
Financial statements provided to the department of
agriculture for purposes of obtaining public livestock
market license
2003 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
13 	Agriculture 	42.56.380(9) 	(Voluntary) National animal identification systems -
herd inventory mgmt., animal disease 	2006 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee - Sunshine Committee
"Legislation" = bills with Committee recommendations + other bills related to Committee recommendations (+ some related bills where the Legislature independently introduced legislation)
Category 	RCW (thru 2012) 	Description 	Date *
Enacted Recommendation	
Materials
Presented
Schedule of Review - Updated March 2022
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
APPENDIX A

2 of 38
14 	Agriculture 	42.56.380(10);16.36 Animal disease reporting 	2006 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
15 	Agriculture 	42.56.270(17) 	Farm plans that are voluntary and developed with
conservation district assistance 	2006
Jan. 2008; *See also
May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets
June 2008; November 2012;
*See also Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
16 	Agriculture 	42.56.610
Livestock nutrient management information: Certain
information obtained by state and local agencies from
dairies, animal feeding operations not required to
apply for a national pollutant discharge elimination
system permit disclosable only in ranges that provide
meaningful information to public
2005 (c510s5) 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008 	;
17 	Agriculture 	15.49.370(8) 	Seeds: operations and production information 	1969 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
18 	Agriculture 	15.53.9018 	Commercial Feed required reports 	1975 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
19 	Agriculture 	15.58.060(1)(c)
Washington Pesticide Control Act: Business
information of a proprietary nature regarding pesticide
formulas
1971 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
20 	Agriculture 	15.58.065(2)
Washington Pesticide Control Act: Privileged or
confidential commercial or financial information, trade
secrets re: pesticides
1971 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
21 	Agriculture 	15.65.510
Information regarding agricultural marketing
agreements (including info from noncompliance
hearings)
1961 	Feb. 2008 	June 2008
22 	Agriculture 	15.86.110
Business related information obtained by the
department of agriculture regarding entities certified
to handle and process organic or transitional food, or
entities applying for such certification
1992 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
23 	Agriculture 	17.24.061(2)
Insect Pests & Plant Diseases (including: trade
secrets or commercial or financial information
obtained by department of agriculture regarding
insect pests, noxious weeds, or organisms affecting
plant life
1991 	Nov. 2007
Jan. 2008 	June 2008
24 	Agriculture 	22.09.040(9) 	Financial information provided by applicants for a
warehouse license to the department of agriculture 	1987 	Feb. 2008 	June 2008
25 	Agriculture 	22.09.045(7) 	Financial information provided by applicants for a
grain dealer license to the department of agriculture 	1987 	Feb. 2008 	June 2008
26 	Agriculture 	43.23.270
Financial and commercial information obtained by the
department of agriculture for export market
development projects
1996 	Nov. 2007
Feb. 2008 	June 2008
27 	Personal Information 	28C.18.020 	List of nominees for director of work force training &
education board [Later eliminated] 	1991 	Feb. 2008 	Sept. 2008 	SB 5295 (Ch. 128 Laws of
2010)
28 	Personal Information 	79A.25.150 	Names of candidates for director of interagency
committee for outdoor recreation [Later eliminated] 	1989 	Feb. 2008 	Sept. 2008 	SB 5295 (Ch. 128 Laws of
2010)
Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation	Category 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee
RCW 	Description

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29 	Personal Information 	43.33A.025(2) 	State investment board criminal history record checks
of finalists for board positions 	1999 	May 2008 	June 2008
30 	Personal Information:
Employment and Licensing 	42.56.250(4)
Address, phone numbers, email addresses, SSNs,
drivers' license numbers, identicard numbers, payroll
deductions, and emergency contact information of
public employees or volunteers held by public
1987; 2020 	May 2008; Feb. 2016;
May 2016 	May 2016 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418;
HB 1538 (2019)
31 	Personal Information 	42.56.230(1)&(2)
Personal information in files for students in public
schools, patients or clients of public institutions or
public health agencies, or welfare programs (1);
children in listed programs (2)
1973
(I-276); Re (2): 2011 c
173 s 1, 2013 c 220 s 1,
2015 c 47 s 1
Nov. 2008; May 2014;
Feb. 2016; May 2016 	May 2016 (re consent)
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418.
See also HB 1293 (2011);
SB 5314 (2011), HB 2646
(2011); HB 1203 (Ch. 220,
2013 Laws); SB 5198
(2013); SB 5098 (Ch. 173,
2011 Laws); HB 1538
(2019); SB 5246 (2019)
32 	Public Utilities &
Transportation 	42.56.330(3) 	Personal information in vanpool, carpool, ride-share
programs 	1997 	May 2008 	Nov. 2008; November 2012
SB 5294 (2009); SB 5049
(2011, 2012); HB 1298
(2013); SB 5169 (2013);
HB 1980 (2015); SB 6020
(2015) HB 1554 (2015) (re
(2))
33 	Public Utilities &
Transportation 	42.56.330(4)
Personal information of current or former participants
or applicants in transit services operated for those
with disabilities or elderly persons
1999 	May 2008 	Oct. 2008
34 	Personal Information
41.04.364 (repealed)
- 41.04.362 - also see
42.56.360(1)(j)
(same)
Personally identifiable information in state employee
wellness program 	1987; 2010 c. 128 s 3 	May 2008 (2008 law) 	July 2008 (2008 law) 	SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010
Laws)
35 	Public Utilities &
Transportation 	42.56.330(5) 	Personal information of persons who use transit
passes and other fare payment media 	1999; 2012 	May 2008 	Oct. 2008
SB 5294 (2009); SB 5295
(Ch. 129, 2010 Laws); SB
5049 (2011); SB 2552
(Ch. 68, 2012 Laws); HB
1298 (2013); SB 5169
(2013); HB 1980 (2015);
SB 6020 (2015)
36 	Misc. Government
Functions 	42.56.290
Agency records relevant to a controversy but which
would not be available to another party under the
rules of pretrial discovery for causes pending in the
superior courts
1973
(I-276) 	June 2008 	Nov. 2008 	SB 5294 (2009)
37 	Personal Information 	42.56.250(6)
Information that identifies a person who, while an
agency employee: (a) Seeks advice, under an
informal process established by the employing
agency, in order to ascertain his or her rights in
connection with a possible unfair practice under
chapter 49.60 RCW against the person; and (b)
requests his or her identity or any identifying
information not be disclosed
1992 	Sept. 2008 	Oct. 2008 	HB 1538 (2019)
RCW	Category 	Materials
Presented 	Recommendation	Description 	Date
Enacted
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee

4 of 38
38 	Personal Information 	42.56.250(5)
Investigative records compiled by an employing
agency conducting a current investigation of a
possible unfair practice under chapter 49.60 RCW or
of a possible violation of other federal, state, or local
laws prohibiting discrimination in employment.
1994 	Sept. 2008; Feb. 2016;
May 2016 	Oct. 2008; May 2016
SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010
Laws) ; see also HB 2761
(2012) (employer
investigations);
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
39 	Personal Information 	42.56.250(8)
Employee salary and benefit information collected
from private employers for salary survey information
for marine employees
1999 	Sept. 2008 	Oct. 2008 	SB 5295 (Ch. 128, 2010
Laws)
40 	Personal Information 	42.56.230(3)
(formerly (2))
Personal information in files on employees,
appointees, or elected officials if disclosure would
violate their right to privacy
1973 (I-276)
Nov. 2008; Jan. 2012;
March 2012; Feb. 2014;
Aug. 2014; Oct. 2014; Feb.
2015; May 2016 (re
consent)
Nov. 2012; May 2016 (re consent) 2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
(re consent)
41 	Court Proceedings 	13.34.100 	Background information regarding a court appointed
guardian ad litem. 	1993 	Oct. 2008 	May-10
SB 5049 (2011); HB 1297
(2013); SB 5170 (2013)
HB 1298 (2013), HB 1980
(2015); SB 6020 (2015)
42 	Public Utilities &
Transportation 	42.56.330(7)
Personally identifying information of persons who use
transponders and other technology to facilitate
payment of tolls
2005 	Mar. 2009 	May 2009
43 	Public Utilities &
Transportation 	42.56.330(8) 	Personally identifying information on an ID card that
contains a chip to facilitate border crossing. 	2008 	Mar. 2009 	May 2009
44 	Public Utilities &
Transportation 	42.56.330(2) 	Residential addresses and phone numbers in public
utility records 	1987; 2014 c 33 s 1 	Mar. 2009; Nov. 2013 	Oct. 2009; Nov. 2013 	HB 2114 (2014); SB 6007
(Ch. 33, 2014 Laws)
45 	Public Utilities &
Transportation 	42.56.330(6)
Information obtained by governmental agencies and
collected by the use of a motor carrier intelligent
transportation system or comparable information
equipment
1999 	Mar. 2009 	May 2009
46 	Public Utilities &
Transportation 	42.56.335 	Records of any person belonging to a public utility
district or municipality owned electrical utility 	2007 	Mar. 2009 	May 2009
47 	Public Utilities &
Transportation 	42.56.330(1) 	Valuable commercial information, trade secrets, etc.
supplied to the utilities and transportation commission 	1987 	Mar. 2009 	Mar. 2009
48 	Public Utilities &
Transportation 	80.04.095
Utility records filed with utilities and transportation
commission containing valuable commercial
information
1987 	Mar. 2009 	Oct. 2009
49 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(2)
Information obtained and exempted by the health
care authority that is transferred to facilitate
development, acquisition, or implementation of state
purchased health care
2003 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
50 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(3) 	Names of individuals in life insurance policy
settlements 	1995 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
51 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.102.030
Insurance viatical settlement broker records which
may be required and examined by the insurance
commissioner [later repealed]
1995 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation
Schedule of Review
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills

5 of 38
52 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(4) 	Insurance antifraud plans 	1995 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
53 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.30A.060 	Insurance company antifraud plans submitted to the
insurance commissioner 	1995 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
54 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(5)
Insurers' reports on material acquisitions and
disposition of assets, etc. filed with the insurance
commission
1995 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
55 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(7) 	Information provided to the insurance commissioner
regarding service contract providers 	1997 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
56 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.110.040(3) 	Monthly financial reports made by service contract
providers to the insurance commissioner 	2005 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
57 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(8) 	Information obtained by the insurance commissioner
relating to market conduct examinations 	2001 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
58 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(12)
Documents obtained by the insurance commissioner
to perform market conduct examinations. Report is
disclosable under RCW 48.37.060.
2007 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
SB 5049 (2012); HB 1298
(2013); SB 5169 (2013) re
RCW 48.37.060
59 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(13) 	Confidential and privileged documents obtained in
market conduct examination 	2007 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
60 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(14)
Information provided to the insurance commissioner
by insurance company employees asserting market
conduct violations
2007 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
61 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.37.080 	Documents related to insurance commissioner's
market conduct examination 	2007 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
62 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(9)
Proprietary information provided to the insurance
commissioner regarding health carrier holding
companies
2001; 2015 c 122 ss 13 &
14 	May 2009; May 2010 	May 2010
63 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(10) 	Data filed with the insurance commissioner that
reveals identity of claimant, provider, or insurer 	2001 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	SB 5049 (2012); HB 1299
(2013); SB 5171 (2013)
64 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(11) 	Documents obtained by insurance commissioner
relating to insurance fraud 	2006 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
65 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.135.060 	Documents obtained by insurance commissioner
relating to insurance fraud 	2006 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
66 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(15) 	Documents obtained by insurance commissioner
regarding misconduct by agent/broker
2007
Eff. 1/1/09 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
67 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.17.595(6) 	Information obtained by insurance commissioner in
investigation of misconduct by agent/broker 	2007 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
68 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.403 	Documents that provide background for actuarial
opinion filed with insurance commissioner 	2006 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
69 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.02.120
Formulas, statistics, assumptions, etc. used by
insurance companies to create rates; such
information that is submitted to the insurance
commissioner
1985 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
70 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.05.385(2)
Statement of actuarial opinion is a public record.
Documents that provide background for statement of
actuarial opinion filed with insurance commissioner
are exempt
2006 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee
Category 	RCW 	Materials
Presented	
Description 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills	
Recommendation	
Date
Enacted

6 of 38
71 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.03.040(6)(a) 	Examinations and investigations by state insurance
commissioner 	1937 	May 2009; Aug 2010 	Aug. 2010
72 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.03.050 	Examinations and investigations by state insurance
commissioner 	1937 	May 2009 	Oct. 2009 	SB 5049 (2011)
73 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.05.465 	Insurance companies risk based capital (RBC)
reports and plans 	1995 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
74 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.43.335(1)
Insurance companies risk based capital (RBC)
reports and plans (should not be used to compare
insurance companies and are therefore confidential)
1998 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
75 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.20.530 	Proof of nonresident pharmacy licensure used by
insurance companies to provide drugs to residents 	1991 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
76 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.21.330 	Proof of nonresident pharmacy licensure used by
insurance companies to provide drugs to residents 	1991 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
77 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.44.470 	Proof of nonresident pharmacy licensure used by
insurance companies to provide drugs to residents 	1991 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
78 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.46.540 	Proof of nonresident pharmacy licensure used by
insurance companies to provide drugs to residents 	1991 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
79 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.31B.015(2)(b) 	Source of consideration (identity of the lender) for
loan associated with acquiring an insurance company 	1993 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
80 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.62.101(2) 	Local government self-insurance liability reserve
funds 	1991 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
81 	Placeholder
82 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.94.010(5) 	Summary of reasoning for insurance commissioner's
refusal to issue reinsurance intermediary license 	1993 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
83 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.130.070
Records of the interstate insurance product regulation
compact involving privacy of individuals and insurers'
trade secrets
2005 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
84 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	70.148.060(1)
Examination and proprietary records of potential
insurers obtained by the director of the Washington
state pollution liability insurance agency when
soliciting bids to provide reinsurance for owners of
underground storage tanks
1989; 2015 c224 s 5 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010-modify
SB 5049 (2011, 2012);
HB1298 (2013); SB 5169
(2013); HB 1980 (2015);
SB 6020 (2015)
85 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	70.149.090
Business and proprietary information of insurers
obtained by the director of the Washington state
pollution liability insurance agency, to provide
insurance to owners of heating oil tanks
1995 	May 2009; Aug. 2010 	Aug. 2010
86 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(6)
Examination reports and information obtained by the
department of financial institutions from banking
institutions
1997 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
87 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	21.20.855 	Reports and information from department of financial
services examinations 	1988 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
88 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	30.04.075(1)
Information obtained by the director of financial
institutions when examining banks and trust
companies
1977 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
89 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	30.04.230(4)(a) 	Information obtained during investigations of out of
state banks 	1983 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
Category 	RCW 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Description
Sunshine Committee
Recommendation

7 of 38
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
90 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	31.12.565(1)
Examination reports and information obtained by the
director of financial institutions while examining credit
unions
1984 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
91 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	32.04.220(1) 	Information from examinations of mutual savings
banks 	1977 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
92 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	33.04.110(1) 	Information from examinations of savings and loan
associations 	1977 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
93 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	32.32.228(3) 	Findings disapproving conversion from mutual
savings bank to capital stock savings bank 	1989 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
94 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	32.32.275
Information applicants deem confidential relating to
conversion of mutual savings bank to capital stock
savings bank
1981 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
95 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	7.88.020 	Financial institution compliance review documents 	1997 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
96 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	9A.82.170
Information obtained from a financial institution's
records pursuant to subpoena under the criminal
profiteering act
1984 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
97 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	21.30.855 	Reports and information from department of financial
services examinations 	1988 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
98 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	30.04.410(3) 	Findings related to disapprovals of bank acquisitions 	1989 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
99 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	33.24.360(1)(d) 	Name of lender financing the acquisition of a savings
and loan, if requested by the applicant 	1973 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
100 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.450 	Personal information on check cashers and sellers
licensing applications and small loan endorsements 	1991; 1995 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
101 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	31.35.070 	Reports on examinations of agricultural lenders 	1990 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
102 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	31.45.030(3) 	Addresses and phone numbers and trade secrets of
applicants of a check casher or seller license 	1991 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
103 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	31.45.077(2)
Addresses, phone numbers and trade secrets of
applicants for a small loan endorsement to a check
cashers or sellers license
1995 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
104 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	31.45.090
Trade secrets supplied by licensed check cashers
and sellers as part of the annual report to director of
financial institutions
2003 	Oct. 2010 	Sept. 2011
105 	L&I-Injured workers 	51.16.070(2) 	Information in employer's records obtained by labor &
industries under industrial insurance 	1957 	Oct. 2010 	Aug.2011
106 	L&I-Injured workers 	51.28.070 	Information and records of injured workers contained
in industrial insurance claim files 	1957 	Oct. 2010 	Aug.2011
107 	L&I-Injured workers 	51.36.110(1)
Information (including patients' confidential
information) obtained in audits of health care
providers under industrial insurance
1994 	Oct. 2010 	Aug. 2011
108 	Personal Information 	42.56.230(5)
(formerly (3))
Credit card numbers, debit card numbers, electronic
check numbers, and other financial information,
except when disclosure is required by other law
Aug. 2010 	Aug.2010; November 2012
SB 5049 (2011); HB 1298
(2013); SB 5169 (2013);
HB 1980 (2015); HB 1980
(2015)
109 	Personal Information 	42.56.230(4) 	Certain taxpayer information if it would violate
taxpayers right of privacy 	1973 	Feb., May, Aug. 2016 	May 2016 (re consent)
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee

8 of 38
110 	Personal Information 	42.56.230(5)
Personal and financial information related to a small
loan or any system of authorizing a small loan in
section 6 of this act (RCW 31.45.---)
2009 	May 2016 (re consent) 	May 2016 (re consent)
111 	Personal Information 	42.56.230(6) 	Personal information required to apply for a driver’s
license or identicard 	2008 	May 2016 (re consent) 	May 2016 (re consent)
112 	L&I-Injured workers 	49.17.080(1) 	Name of employee of company seeking industrial
safety & health act 	1973 	Aug. 2011 	Aug. 2011
113 	L&I-Injured workers 	49.17.200 	Trade secrets reported to labor & industries under
Washington industrial safety & health act 	1973 	Aug. 2011 	Aug. 2011
114 	L&I-Injured workers 	49.17.210 	Identification of employer or employee in labor &
industries studies 	1973 	Aug. 2011 	Aug. 2011
115 	L&I-Injured workers 	49.17.250(3)
Info obtained by labor & industries from employer-
requested consultation re. industrial safety & health
act
1991 	Aug. 2011 	Aug. 2011
116 	L&I-Injured workers 	49.17.260 	Labor & industries investigative reports on industrial
catastrophes 	1973 	Aug. 2011 	Aug. 2011
117 	L&I-Injured workers 	51.36.120 	Financial or valuable trade info from health care
providers 	1989 	Aug. 2011 	Aug. 2011
118 	L&I-Injured workers 	42.56.400(1) 	Board of industrial insurance records pertaining to
appeals of crime victims’ compensation claims 	Aug. 2011 	Aug. 2011
119 	Fish & Wildlife 	42.56.430 (1)
Commercial fishing catch data provided to the
department of fish and wildlife that would result in
unfair competitive disadvantage
May 2017; Aug. 2017;
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018
120 	Fish & Wildlife 	42.56.430 (2) 	Sensitive wildlife data obtained by the department of
fish and wildlife
May 2017; Aug. 2017;
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018
121 	Fish & Wildlife 	42.56.430 (3) 	Personally identifying information of persons who
acquire recreational or commercial licenses
May 2017; Aug. 2017;
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018
122 	Fish & Wildlife 	42.56.430(4)
Information subject to confidentiality requirements of
Magnuson-Stevens fishery conservation and
management reauthorization act of 2006
2008 c 252 s 1 	May 2017; Aug. 2017;
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018
123 	Employment and Licensing 	42.56.250(1)
Test questions, scoring keys, and other exam
information used on licenses, employment or
academics
1973 	May 2021; Aug. 2021;
Oct. 2021
124 	Personal Information 	66.16.090 	Records of LCB showing individual purchases of
liquor-confidential 	1933 	Jun. 2013 	Jun. 2013
HB 2764 (2013); HB 2663
(Ch. 182, 2016 Laws) -
Repealed
125
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(9)
Personally identifying information collected by law
enforcement agencies pursuant to local security
alarm system programs and vacation crime watch
programs
2012 c 288 s 1
126
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(11)
Identity of state employee or officer who files a
complaint with an ethics board under RCW 42.52.420
or reports improper governmental action to the
auditor or other official
2013 c 190 s 7
127 	Employment and Licensing 	42.56.250(7) 	Criminal history record checks for investment board
finalist candidates 	2010
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Sunshine Committee

9 of 38
128 	Employment and Licensing 	42.56.250(7)
Employee salary and benefit information collected
from private employers for salary survey information
for maritime employees
1999
129 	Employment and Licensing 	42.56.250(8) 	Photographs, month/year of birth in personnel files of
public employees; news media has access 	2010; 2020
HB 2447 (2010); See also
HB 2259 (criminal justice
agency/employee info)
and HB 1317 (Ch. 257,
2010 Laws) (amending
.230);
130 	Real estate Appraisals 	42.56.260
Real estate appraisals for agency acquisition or sale
until project or sale abandoned, but no longer than 3
years in all cases
1973; 2015 c 150 s 1 	Aug. 2014; Oct. 2014 	Oct. 2014 	HB 1431 (Ch. 150, 2015
Laws); SB 5395
131
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(1)
Specific intelligence and investigative information
completed by investigative, law enforcement, and
penology agencies, and state agencies that discipline
members of professions, if essential to law
enforcement or a person’s right to privacy*
1973
Jan. 2012; March 2012;
May 2012; March 2013;
June 2013; Feb. 2014;
Oct. 2014; Oct. 2019
Oct .2019
Burglar alarm info - HB
2896 (2010); HB 1243
(Ch. 88, 2012 Laws); SB
5244 (2011); SB 5344
(2011). Traffic stop info -
SB 6186 (2009)
132
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(2)
Identity of witnesses, victims of crime, or persons who
file complaints, if they timely request nondisclosure
and disclosure would endanger their life, personal
safety, or property—does not apply to PDC
complaints
Jan. 2012; March 2012;
March 2013; June 2013;
Sept. 2013; May 2014;
August 2014
HB 2764 (2013); see also
HB 2610 (2010), SB 6428
(2010) (to amend .230))
133
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(3)
Records of investigative reports prepared by any law
enforcement agency pertaining to sex offenses or
sexually violent offenses which have been transferred
to WASPC
Jan. 2012; March 2012;
June 2013
134
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(4) 	Information in applications for concealed pistol
licenses 	1988 	May 2011; March 2013 	May, 2011
135
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(5) 	Identifying information regarding child victims of
sexual assault 	1992
May 2011; Feb. 2015;
May 2015; Aug. 2015;
Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018;
Feb. 2019; May 2019;
Aug. 2019; Oct. 2019
Sept. 2011; August 2015
SB 5049 (2012); HB 1299
(2013); SB 5171 (2013);
HB 1980 (2015); SB 6020
(2015)
136
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(6) 	Statewide gang database in RCW 43.43.762 	2008 	May, 2011 	Sept. 2011; November 2012
SB 5049 (2012); HB 1299
(2013); SB 5171 (2013);
HB 1980 (2015); SB 6020
(2015)
137
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(7) 	Data from electronic sales tracking system
(pseudoephedrine) 	2010 	May, 2011 	May, 2011
138
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(8)
Person's identifying info submitted to sex offender
notification and registration system to receive notice
regarding registered sex offenders
2010 	May, 2011 	May, 2011
139
Personal
Information/proprietary and
tax information
82.36.450(3)
Information filed with department of licensing or open
to department of licensing inspection under
agreement is personal information under RCW
42.56.230(3) (b) and exempt from public inspection
and copying
2007 	Sept. 2011
Recommendation	Category
Schedule of Review
Materials
Presented	
RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee

10 of 38
140
Personal
Information/proprietary and
tax information
82.38.310(3)
Information filed with department of licensing or open
to department of licensing inspection under
agreement is personal information under RCW
42.56.230(3) (b) and exempt from public inspection
and copying
2007 	Sept. 2011
141 	Lists of Individuals 	42.56.070(9) 	Lists of individuals for commercial purposes. 	1973 	Feb. 2017; May 2017
142 	Juries 	2.36.072(4) 	Information provided to court for preliminary
determination of statutory qualification for jury duty 	1993
143 	Personal Information 	42.56.230 (7)(a) 	Personal information required to apply for a driver’s
license or identicard 	2008 c 200 s 5 	Nov. 2013; Dec. 2013;
May 2016 (re consent) Feb. 2014; May 2016 (re consent) 2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
144 	Personal Information 	42.56.230 (7)(b) 	Persons who decline to register for selective service
under RCW 46.20.111 	2011 c 350 s 2 	May 2016 (re consent) 	May 2016 (re consent) 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
145 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(1)
Valuable formulae, designs, drawings and research
obtained by agency within 5 years of request for
disclosure if disclosure would produce private gain
and public loss
1973 (I-276)
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
146 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(2) 	Financial information supplied by a bidder on ferry
work or highway construction 	1983
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
147 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(3) 	Financial information and records filed by persons
pertaining to export services 	1986
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
148 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(4) 	Financial information in economic development loan
applications 	1987
*May 2016; Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
149 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(5) 	Financial information obtained from business and
industrial development corporations 	1989
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
150 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(6) 	Financial information on investment of retirement
moneys and public trust investments 	1989
May 2015; Aug. 2015;
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
Aug. 2015; see also *Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
SB 6170 (Chap. 8, 2016
Laws 1st Sp. Sess.);
2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
151 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(7) 	Financial and trade information supplied by and under
industrial insurance coverage 	1989
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
152 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(8)
Financial information obtained by the clean
Washington center for services related to marketing
recycled products
1994
May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
153 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(9) 	Financial and commercial information requested by
public stadium authority from leaser 	1997
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
Schedule of Review
Date
Enacted
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation	Category 	RCW 	Description
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee

11 of 38
154 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(10)
Financial information supplied for application for a
liquor, gambling, lottery retail or various marijuana
licenses
2014 c 192 s 6
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
155 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(11)
Proprietary data, trade secrets, or other information
submitted by any vendor to department of social and
health services for purposes of state purchased
health care
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
156 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(12)(a)(i)
Financial or proprietary information supplied to
DCTED in furtherance of the state’s economic and
community development efforts
1993, 1989
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
157 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(12)(a)(ii)
Financial or proprietary information provided to the
DCTED regarding businesses proposing to locate in
the state
1999
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
158 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(14)
Financial, commercial, operations, and technical and
research information obtained by the life sciences
discovery fund authority
2005 (c424s6)7/25/2006
May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
159 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(20)
Financial and commercial information submitted to or
obtained by the University of Washington relating to
investments in private funds
2009 c 384 s 3
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
160 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(21) 	Market share data submitted by a manufacturer under
RCW 70.95N.190(4) 	2013 c 305 s 14
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
161
Preliminary records
containing opinions or
policy formulations
42.56.280
Preliminary drafts, notes, recommendations, and intra-
agency memos where opinions are expressed or
policies formulated or recommended, unless cited by
an agency
1973 (I-276) 	May 2021; Oct. 2021
162 	Archaeological sites 	42.56.300(3) 	Information identifying the location of archaeological
sites 	1976; 2014 c 165 s 1
163 	Library records 	42.56.310 	Library records disclosing the identity of a library user 	1982
164 	Educational Information 	42.56.320(1) 	Financial disclosures filed by private vocational
schools 	1986
165 	Educational Information 	42.56.320(2) 	Financial and commercial information relating to the
purchase or sale of tuition units
166 	Educational Information 	42.56.320(3) 	Individually identifiable information received by the
WFTECB for research or evaluation purposes
167 	Educational Information 	42.56.320(4) 	Information on gifts, grants, or bequests to institutions
of higher education (1975) 	1975 	May 2021; Oct. 2021
168 	Educational Information 	42.56.320(5) 	The annual declaration of intent filed by parents for a
child to receive home-based instruction 	2009 c 191 s 1
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation
Sunshine Committee
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills	
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee

12 of 38
169 	Timeshare, condominium
owner lists 	42.56.340
Membership lists and lists of owners of interests in
timeshare projects, condominiums, land
developments, or common-interest communities,
regulated by the department of licensing
1987 	Feb. 2017; May 2017;
Aug.2017 	Aug. 2017
2019: HB 1537 (repealed
exemption) (Ch. 229, 2019
laws)
170 	Health Professionals 	42.56.350(1) 	SSNs of health care professionals maintained in files
of the department of health 	1993
171 	Health Professionals 	42.56.350(2)
Residential address and telephone numbers of health
care providers maintained in files of the department of
health
1993
172
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.230(7)(c)
Records pertaining to license plates, drivers' licenses
or identicards that may reveal undercover work,
confidential public health work, public assistance
fraud, or child support investigations
2013 c 336 s 3
173 	Employment and Licensing 	42.56.240(13) 	Criminal justice agency employee/worker residence
GPS data 	2015 c 91 s 1
174 	Health Care 	42.56.360(1)(c)
Information and documents created, collected, and
maintained by the health care services quality
improvement program and medical malpractice
prevention program
1995
175 	Health Care 	42.56.360(1)(d)
Proprietary financial and commercial information
provided to department of health relating to an
antitrust exemption
1997
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
176 	Health Care 	42.56.360 (1) (e) 	Physicians in the impaired physicians program 	1987, 1994, 2001
177 	Health Care 	RCW 70.05.170(3) -
see also 42.56.360(3)
Information relating to infant mortality pursuant to
former RCW 70.05.170/RCW 42.56.360 - See 184
and 185
1992; Amended 2010 c
128 s 3 	2008 (2008 law) 	March 2008 (2008 law)
178 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(23) 	Notice of crude oil transfers 	2015 c 274 s 24
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
179 	Health Care 	42.56.360(1)(f) 	Complaints filed under the health care professions
uniform disciplinary act 	1997
180 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(24)
Certain information supplied to the liquor and
cannabis board per RCW 69.50.325, 9.50.331,
69.50.342 and 69.50.345
2015 c 178 s 2
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
181 	Health Care 	42.56.360(1)(i) 	Information collected by the department of health
under chapter 70.245 RCW. 	2009 c 1 s 1
182 	Health Care 	42.56.360(1)(k)
Claims data and information provided to the statewide
all-payer health care claims database that is exempt
under RCW 43.373.040
2014 c 223 s 17
183 	Health Care 	42.56.360(2) and
70.02
Health care information disclosed to health care
provider without patients permission 	1991
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Schedule of Review
Description	RCW
Sunshine Committee
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation	Category

13 of 38
184 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(24)
Certain information and data submitted to or obtained
by the liquor and cannabis board re applications for
licenses or reports required under RCW 69.50.372
2016 1st sp.s. c 9 s 3
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
185 	Health Care; Marijuana 	42.56.625 	Records in medical marijuana authorization database
I RCW 69.51A.230 	2015 c 70 s 22
186 	Domestic Violence 	42.56.370
Client records of community sexual assault program
or services for underserved populations [amended
2012]
1991; 2012 c 29 s 13 	Check 	Check
187 	Agriculture and Livestock 	42.56.380(10) 	Results of animal testing from samples submitted by
the animal owner 	2012 c 168 s 1(10) 	Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017;
May 2018; Aug. 2018 	Aug. 2018
188 	Agriculture and Livestock 	42.56.380(11) 	Records of international livestock importation that are
not disclosable by the U.S.D.A. under federal law. 	2012 c 168 s 1(11) 	Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017;
May 2018; Aug. 2018 	Aug. 2018
189 	Agriculture and Livestock 	42.56.380(12)
Records related to entry of prohibited agricultural
products imported into Washington that are not
disclosable by the U.S.D.A. under federal law
2012 c 168 s 1(12) 	Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017;
May 2018; Aug. 2018 	Aug. 2018
190 	Emergency or Transitional
Housing 	42.56.390
Names of individuals residing in emergency or
transitional housing furnished to the department of
revenue or a county assessor
1997
191 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(16)
Documents, materials, or information obtained by the
insurance commissioner under RCW 48.102.-051 (1)
and 48.102.-140 (3) and (7)(a)(ii))
2009 c 104 s 37
192 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.52.400(17)
Documents, materials, or information obtained by the
insurance commissioner under RCW 48.31.025 and
48.99.025
2010 c 97 s 3
193 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(18)
Documents, material, or information relating to
investment policies obtained by the insurance
commissioner under RCW 48.13.151
2011 c 188 s 21
194 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(19) 	Data from (temporary) study on small group health
plan market 	2010 c 172 s 2
195 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(20);
48.19.040(5)(b)
Information in a filing of usage-based component of
the rate pursuant to RCW 48.19.040(5)(b) 	2012 c 222 s 1
196 	Insurance & Financial Inst.
42.56.400(21);
42.56.400(22);
42.56.400(23);
42.56.400(24);
42.56.400(25)
Data, information, and documents submitted to or
obtained by the insurance commissioner
2012 2nd sp. s. c 3 s 8;
2013 c 65 s 5; 2013 c 277
s 5; 205 c 17 ss 10 & 11
197 	Employment Security 	42.56.410 	Most records and information supplied to the
employment security department
198 	Security 	42.56.420(1) 	Records relating to criminal terrorist acts
199 	Security 	42.56.420(2)
Records containing specific and unique vulnerability
assessments and emergency and escape response
plans – adds civil commitment facilities
2009 c 67 s 1
200 	Security 	42.56.420(3) 	Comprehensive safe school plans that identify
specific vulnerabilities
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Sunshine Committee
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation
Schedule of Review

14 of 38
201 	Security 	42.56.420(4)
Information regarding infrastructure and security of
computer and telecommunications networks to the
extent that they identify specific system vulnerabilities
1999 	Feb. 2014 	Feb. 2014
202 	Security 	42.56.420(5) 	Security sections of transportation security plans for
fixed guideway systems
203 	Personal Information 	42.56.230(8)
Information regarding individual claim resolution
settlement agreements submitted to the board of
industrial insurance appeals
2014 c 142 s 1
204 	Veterans’ discharge papers 	42.56.440 	Veterans’ discharge papers
205 	Fireworks, Explosives 	42.56.460
Records and reports produced under state fireworks
law, chapter 70.77 RCW and the Washington state
explosives act, chapter 70.74 RCW
1995
206 	Correctional industries
workers 	42.56.470 	Records pertaining to correctional industries class I
work programs 	2004
207 	Inactive programs 	42.56.480(1) 	Contracts files by railroad companies with the utilities
& transportation commission prior to 7/28/91 	1984 	Jun. 2013 	Jun. 2013
HB 2764 (2013); HB 2663
(Chap. 282, 2016 Laws)
(repealed)
208 	Inactive programs 	42.56.480(2) 	Personal information in international contact data
base 	1996 c 253 s 502 	Jun. 2013 	Jun. 2013 	HB 2663 (Chap. 282,
2016 Laws) (repealed)
209 	Inactive programs 	42.56.480(3)
Data collected by department of social and health
services pertaining to payment systems for licensed
boarding homes
2003 	Jun. 2013 	Jun. 2013
HB 2764 (2013); HB 2663
(Chap. 282, 2016 Laws)
(repealed)
210 	Enumeration Data 	42.56.615
Enumeration data used by office of financial
management for population estimates per RCW
43.43.435
2014 c 14 s 1
211
Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information;
Marijuana
42.56.620 	Reports submitted by marijuana research licensees
that contain proprietary information 	2015 c. 71 s 4
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
212 	Mediation Communication 	42.56.600 	Records of mediation communications that are
privileged under the uniform mediation act 	2005 c 424 s 16
213 	Code Reviser 	1.08.027 	Code Reviser drafting services 	1951 	Feb. 2015 	Feb. 2015
214 	Judicial - Investigative 	2.64.111 	Judicial conduct commission investigations and initial
proceedings 	1989
215 	Health Care Professions 	4.24.250 	Hospital review committee records on professional
staff 	1971 	Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020
216 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	4.24.601 	Trade secrets and confidential research, development
or commercial information 	1994
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
217 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	4.24.611
Trade secrets, confidential research, development or
commercial information concerning products or
business methods
1994
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
Description	Category 	RCW 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee
Schedule of Review

15 of 38
218 	Claims 	4.92.210 	Information in centralized risk management claim
tracking system 	1989
219 	Privileges 	5.60.060
General statements of privileged communications
between persons & various professionals, e.g.,
attorneys or physicians – presumably applies to
records (see also # 276)
1954 & later dates
220 	Mediation Communication 	5.60.070 	Materials used in any court ordered mediation 	1991 	Feb. 2017; May 2017;
221 	Mediation Communication 	7.07.050(5) 	Mediation communications 	2005 	Feb. 2017; May 2017
222 	Mediation Communication 	7.07.070 	Mediation communications 	2005 	Feb. 2017; May 2017
223 	Health Care Records 	7.68.080(9)(a)
The director may examine records of health care
provider notwithstanding any statute that makes the
records privileged or confidential
2011 c 346 s 501
224 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	7.68.080(10) 	At the request of health care contractor, department
must keep financial and trade information confidential 	2011 c 346 s 501
See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
225 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	7.68.140 	Records re. Victims of crimes confidential & not open
to inspection 	1973 	May 2021
226 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	7.69.A.030(4) 	Name, address, or photograph of child victim or child
witness 	1985
Feb. 2015; May 2015;
Aug. 2015; Aug. 2018;
Oct. 2018; Feb. 2019;
May 2019; Aug. 2019;
Oct. 2019
Oct. 2019 	HB 2485 (2019)
227 	Mediation Communication 	7.75.050 	County or city dispute resolution center records 	1984
228 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	7.88.020 & .30 	Financial institution compliance review documents 	1997
229 	Health Care 	9.02.100 	General statement of fundamental right to
reproductive privacy – could apply to records 	1991
230 	Health Care - Concealed
Pistols 	9.41.097(2) 	Mental health info provided on persons buying pistols
or applying for concealed pistol licenses 	1994
231 	Concealed Pistols 	9.41.129 	Concealed pistol license applications 	1994
232 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	9.73.230 	Name of confidential informants in written report on
wire tapping 	1989
233 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses
72.09.710 (recod eff
8/1/09) (See also #
451)
Names of witnesses notified when drug offenders
released (formerly 9.94A.610)
1991 - Recod 2008 c 231
s 26, 56 (See dispositions
table)
234 	Placeholder
235 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses
72.09.712 (recod eff
8/1/09) (See also #
451)
Names of victims, next of kin, or witnesses who are
notified when prisoner escapes, on parole, or
released (formerly 9.94A.610)
1985 - Recod 2008 c 231
s 27, 56 (see dispositions
table)
236 	Privileges 	5.60.060 	Alcohol or drug addiction sponsor privilege 	2016 st sp. ss. c 24 s 1
237 	Offender Information 	9.94A.745
Records of the interstate commission for adult
offender supervision that would adversely affect
personal privacy rights or proprietary interests
2002
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
Materials
Presented
Schedule of Review
Category 	RCW 	Description
Sunshine Committee
Recommendation
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Date
Enacted

16 of 38
238 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	9.94A.885
Information regarding victims, survivors of victims, or
witnesses that are sent clemency hearing notices
may not be released to offender
1999
239 	Offender Information 	9A.44.138
Sex offender registration information given to high
school or institution of higher education regarding an
employee or student is confidential
2011 c 337 s 4
240 	Criminal Proceedings -
Investigative 	10.27.090 	Grand jury testimony 	1971 	Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020
241 	Criminal Proceedings -
Investigative 	10.27.160 	Grand jury reports 	1971
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020;
Feb. 2021; May 2021;
Aug. 2021; Oct. 2021
242 	Public Utilities &
Transportation 	19.29A.100 	Electric utilities may not disclose private or proprietary
customer information 	2015 3rd sp. S. c 21 s 1
Check on any prior
Committee discussion re
utilities
243 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	48.31B.015(1)(b)
Filing by controlling person of insurer seeking to
divest its controlling interest is confidential until
conclusion of transaction
2015 c 122 s 3
244
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(14) 	Body worn camera recordings 	2016 c 163 s 2
245
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(14) 	Records and info in the statewide sexual assault kit
tracking system under RCW 43.43. 	2016 c. 173 s 8
246 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	10.52.100 	Identity of child victims of sexual assault 	1992
Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018;
Feb. 2019; May 2019;
Aug. 2019; Oct. 2019
247 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	10.77.205
Information about victims, next of kin, or witnesses
requesting notice of release of convicted sex or
violent offenders
1990
248 	Offender Information 	10.77.210 	Records of persons committed for criminal insanity 	1973 	May 2021
249 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	10.97
Privacy of criminal records, including criminal history
information on arrests, detention, indictment,
information, or other formal criminal charges made
after 12/31/77 unless dispositions are included
1977
250 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	10.97.130 	Names of victims of sexual assaults who are 18 years
of age or younger 	1992
Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018;
Feb. 2019; May 2019;
Aug. 2019; Oct. 2019
2018 	HB 1505 (Ch.300, 2019
Laws); HB 2484 (2019)
251 	Judicial - Indigent Defense 	10.101.020 	Information given by persons to determine eligibility
for indigent defense 	1989
252 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses - Juvenile 	13.40.150 	Sources of confidential information in dispositional
hearings on juvenile offenses 	1977
Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018;
Feb. 2019; May 2019;
Aug. 2019
253 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses - Juvenile 	13.40.215 and .217
Information about victims, next of kin, or witnesses
requesting notice of release of juvenile convicted of
violent sex offense or stalking
1990
Aug. 2018; Oct. 2018;
Feb. 2019; May 2019;
Aug. 2019
Description 	Date
Enacted
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee
Category 	RCW 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation

17 of 38
254 	Juvenile Records 	13.50.010(12)
Electronic research copy of juvenile records
maintains same level of confidentiality and anonymity
as juvenile records in judicial information system
2009 c 440 s 1; 2014 c
117 s 5
255 	Juvenile Records 	13.50.010(13)
Information in records released to the Washington
state office of public defense retain confidential
nature
2009 c 440 s 1; 2014 c
117 s 5; 2016 c 72 s 109
256 	Juvenile Records 	13.50.050(3) 	Records on commission of juvenile crimes 	1979; Oct. 2019 	Oct. 2019 	HB 2484 (2019)
257 	Juvenile Records 	13.50.010(14)(b)
Records of juveniles who receive a pardon are
confidential, including the existence or nonexistence
of the record
2011 c 338 s 4
258 	Juvenile Records 	13.50.100(2) 	Juvenile justice or care agency records not relating to
commission of juvenile crimes 	1979
Re 42.56.380(6) - Oct.
2007; May 2019; Aug.
2019; Oct. 2019
Re. 42.56.380(6) - Jun. 2008
259 	Agriculture and Livestock 	15.19.080
Information on purchases, sales, or production of
ginseng by individual growers or dealers (see also
42.56.380 (6))
1998
See # 1 on Schedule of
Review; Aug. 2017; Oct.
2017; May 2018; Aug.
2018
See # 1 on Schedule of Review
Aug. 2018
See # 1 on Schedule of
Review
260 	Agriculture and Livestock 	16.65.030(1)(d) 	Financial statement info in public livestock market
license applications 	2003 	Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017;
May 2018; Aug. 2018 	Aug. 2018
261 	Health Care Professions 	18.130.095(1)(a) 	Complaints filed under uniform disciplinary act for
health professionals 	1997
262 	Health Care Professions 	18.130.172(1) 	Summary and stipulations in complaints against
health care professionals 	1993
263 	Health Care Professions 	18.130.175(4) 	Voluntary substance abuse records on health care
professionals 	1988
264 	Health Care Professions 	18.130.057 ( c 157 s
1(2)(b)
Disciplining authority may not disclose information in
a file that contains confidential or privileged
information regarding a patient other than the person
making the complaint or report
2011 c 157 s 1
265 	Counselors 	18.19.180 	Information counselors acquire and
acknowledgement of practice disclosure statements 	1987
266 	Boarding Homes 	18.20.120 	Identity of individual or name of boarding homes from
boarding home licensing records 	1959 	Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020
267 	Health Care Professions 	18.20.390 	Information and documents created, collected and
maintained by a quality assurance committee 	2004
268 	Health Care Professions 	18.32.040
Implication that information in dentistry registration
records is only accessible by the registered person
unless disclosure would compromise the examination
process
1937 	Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020;
Oct. 2021
269 	Placeholder
270 	Health Care Professions 	18.44.031(2) 	Personal information in applications for escrow agent
licenses 	1999
271 	Health Care Professions 	18.46.090
Information on maternity homes received by
department of health identifying individuals or
maternity homes
1951
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020;
Feb. 2021; May 2021;
Aug. 2021
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills	
Category 	RCW 	Description
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Schedule of Review
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation
Sunshine Committee
Date
Enacted

18 of 38
272 	Health Care Professions 	18.53.200 	Information and records of optometrists 	1975 	May 2021; Aug. 2021;
Oct. 2021
273 	Health Care Professions 	18.64.420 	Records obtained by department of health regarding
various insurance companies 	1991
274 	Health Care Professions 	18.71.0195 	Contents of physician disciplinary report 	1979
275 	Health Care Professions 	18.71.340 	Entry records under impaired physician program 	1987
276 	Privileges 	18.83.110 - also
5.60.060 (# 219)
Communications between client and
psychologist—could apply to records 	1955 	Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020
277 	Other Professions -
Plumbers 	18.106.320(2) 	Info obtained from contractors on plumbing trainee
hours 	2002
278 	Health Care Professions 	18.130.095(1)(a) 	Complaints filed under uniform disciplinary act for
health professionals 	1997
279 	Health Care Professions 	18.130.172(1) 	Summary and stipulations in complaints against
health care professionals 	1993
280 	Health Care Professions 	18.130.095(1)(a)
(Repealed 2019)
Complaint of unprofessional conduct against health
profession licensee 	1997
281 	Health Care Professions 	18.130.175(4) 	Voluntary substance abuse records on health care
professionals 	1988
282 	Health Care Professions 	18.130.175(4) 	Substance abuse treatment records of licensed
health professionals
283 	Elderly Adults - Referrals 	18.330.050(2)(f)
On referral disclosure statement, must include
statement that agency will need client authorization to
obtain or disclose confidential information
2011 c 357 s 6
284 	Other Professions -
Business Licenses 	19.02.115
Master license service program licensing information
is confidential and privileged except as provided in
this section
2011 c 298 s 12
285 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary 	19.16.245 	Collection agency financial statements 	1973
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
286 	Other Professions -
Electrical 	19.28.171 	Info obtained from electrical contractors on electrical
trainee hours 	1996
287 	Other Professions -
Electrical 	19.28.171 	Information obtained from electrical contractor by
department of licenses 	1996
288 	Security - Electronic Keys 	19.34.240 	Private keys under the electronic authentication act 	1996
289 	Security - Electronic Keys 	19.34.420 	Electronic authentication info 	1998
290 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	19.108 	Trade Secrets Act 	1981
*May 2016, Aug. 2016 &
Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 &
trade secrets/proprietary
info
*Oct. 2016 - 42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
291 	Juvenile Records 	13.50.010(14) 	Records released by the court to the state office of
civil legal aid 	2015 c 262 s 1
292 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary - Mortgages 	19.146.370(4)
Chapter 42.56 RCW relating to supervisory
information or information subject to subsection (1) of
this section is superseded by this section
2009 c 528 s 15
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
Description 	Date
Enacted
Sunshine Committee
Category 	RCW 	Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee

19 of 38
293 	Other Professions - Money
Transfer Co's. 	19.230.190 	Money transfer licensing information 	2003
294 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	19.330.080(5)
Confidential technology information used in
manufacturing products sold in state is subject to a
protective order
2011 c 98 s 8
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
295 	Investigative Records 	21.20.480 	Security act investigations 	1959 	Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020;
Feb. 2021
296
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary information -
Investigations
21.30.170 	Some information obtained by the department of
financial institutions 	1986
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
297 	Placeholder
298
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary information -
Nonprofits & Mutuals
24.06.480
Information in interrogatories of nonprofit
miscellaneous and mutual corporations by secretary
of state
1969; Feb 2021
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info;
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020;
Feb. 2021; May 2021
299 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	26.04.175 	Marriage applications and records about participants
in address confidentiality program 	1991
300 	Mediation Communications 	26.09.015 	Divorce mediation proceedings—may apply to
records of the proceedings 	1986
301 	Judicial - Court Files 	26.12.080 	Superior court may order family court files closed to
protect privacy 	1949 	Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020;
Feb. 2021
302 	Child Support Records 	26.23.120(1) 	Records concerning persons owing child support 	1987
303 	Child Support Records 	26.23.150 	Social security numbers collected by licensing
agencies not to be disclosed 	1998
304 	Adoption Records 	26.33.330 & .340 &
.345
Adoption records (except by order of the court under
showing of good cause); adoption contact preference
form and parent medical history
1984; 2013 c 321 s 1
305 	Archaeological Records 	27.53.070
(42.56.300)
Communications on location of archaeological sites
not public records 	1975 	May 2021; Oct. 2021
306 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	28B.85.020(2) 	Financial disclosures provided to HEC Board by
private vocational schools 	1996
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
307 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	28C.10.050(2)(a) 	Financial disclosures by private vocational schools 	1986
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
308 	Voter and Election
Information 	29A.08.710 	Original voter registration forms or their images 	1991
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018;
May 2018; Aug. 2018;
Oct. 2018
RCW 	Materials
Presented
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Description 	Date
Enacted
Sunshine Committee
Schedule of Review
Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills	
Category

20 of 38
309 	Voter and Election
Information 	29A.08.720 	The department of licensing office at which any
particular individual registers to vote 	1994
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018;
May 2018; Aug. 2018;
Oct. 2018
310 	Voter and Election
Information
29A.20.191; recod to
29A.56.670
Minor party and independent candidate nominating
petitions 	2004; 2013 c 11 s 93(4)
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018;
May 2018; Aug. 2018;
Oct. 2018
311 	Voter and Election
Information 	29A.32.100 	Argument or statement submitted to secretary of state
for voters' pamphlet 	1999
Oct. 2017; Feb. 2018;
May 2018; Aug. 2018;
Oct. 2018
312
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information -
Mortgages
31.04.274(4)
Chapter 42.56 RCW relating to disclosure of
supervisory information or any information described
in subsection (1) of this section is superseded by this
section
2009 c 120 s 26
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
313 	Security 	35.21.228(4) 	Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency
preparedness plan 	1999
314 	Security 	35A.21.300(4) 	Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency
preparedness plan 	1999
315 	Security 	36.01.210(4) 	Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency
preparedness plan 	1999
316 	Placeholder
317 	Security 	36.57.120(4) 	Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency
preparedness plan 	1999
318 	Security 	36.57A.170(4) 	Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency
preparedness plan 	1999
319 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	36.102.200
Financial info on master tenant, concessioners, team
affiliate, or sublease of a public stadium authority’s
facilities
1997
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
320 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information
39.10.100 (2) recod.
as 39.10.470 (2);
39.10.470(3)
Trade secrets & proprietary information from
contractors under alternative public works; proposals
from design-build finalists for alternative public works
until selection is made or terminated
1994
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
321
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information -
Bids
39.26.030(2)
Competitive bids subject to chapter 42.56 RCW
except exempt from disclosure until apparent
successful bidder announced
2012 c 224 s 4 	Aug. 2016; Oct. 2016 	Oct. 2016 	2017: HB 1160/SB 5418
322 	Archive Records 	40.14.030 (2) 	Records transferred to state archives 	2003 	May 2012; August 2012;
June 2013 	Aug. 2012
323 	Offender Records 	40.14.070 (2)(c ) 	Sex offender records transferred to Washington
association of sheriffs and police chiefs 	1999
324 	Bill Drafting Records 	40.14.180 	Bill drafting records of the code reviser’s office 	1971 	Feb. 2015 	Feb. 2015
325 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	40.24.070
Names of persons in domestic violence or sexual
assault programs; and records in address
confidentiality program
1999; 1991; 2015 c 190 s
2
326 	Public Employment
Information 	41.06.160 	Salary and fringe benefit info identifying private
employer from department of personnel salary survey 	1981
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee

21 of 38
327 	Public Employment
Information 	41.06.167 	Salary and fringe benefit rate info collected from
private employers 	1980
328 	Collective Bargaining 	41.56.029(2) 	Collective bargaining authorization cards of adult
family home provider workers 	2007
329 	Personal Information -
Research 	42.48.020 & .040 	Personally identifiable public records used in scientific
research 	1985
330 	Health Care Records 	43.01.425 	Crisis referral services communications and
information are confidential 	2009 c 19 s 2
331 	Investigative Records 	43.06A.050 	Investigative records of office of family and children’s
ombudsman 	1996
332 	Financial, Proprietary and
Commercial Information 	43.07.100 	Info from businesses deemed confidential held by
bureau of statistics in secretary of state 	1895
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
333 	Investigative Records -
Whistleblower 	43.09.186(4) 	Identity of person and documents in report to toll-free
efficiency hotline - state auditor 	2007
334 	Financial, Proprietary and
Commercial Information 	42.56.270(22)
Certain financial information supplied to department
of financial institutions or a portal to obtain an
exemption from state securities registration
2014 c 144 s 6
335 	Juvenile Records 	13.50.010(15) 	Child welfare records that may assist in meeting the
educational needs of foster youth 	2016 c 71 s 2 	May 2019; Aug. 2019
336 	Placeholder
337 	Personal Information -
Printing Vendors 	43.19.736
Print jobs contracted with private vendors must
require vendor to enter into a confidentiality
agreement if materials contain sensitive or personally
identifiable information
2011 c 43 1st sp. s. s 309
338 	Claims 	43.41.350 Recod
43.19.781 	Risk management loss history information 	1989; 2011 1st sp. s. c 43
s 535
339
Financial, Proprietary and
Commercial Information -
Marijuana
42.56.270(25)
Marijuana transport, vehicle and driver ID data and
account numbers or unique access identifiers issued
for traceability system access per RCW 69.50.325,
9.50.331, 69.50.342, 69.50.345
2016 c 178 s 2
340 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	43.21A.160 	Information on unique production processes given to
the DOE 	1970
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info;
Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020;
Feb. 2021
341 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	43.21F.060(1) 	Proprietary information received by the state energy
office 	1976
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
342 	Employer - Labor Statistics 	43.22.290 	Employer labor statistics reports provided to the
department of labor & industries 	1901 	Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Schedule of Review

22 of 38
343 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	43.22.434 	Info obtained from contractors through an audit 	2002
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
344
Deliberative Process -
Records Provided to
Governor
43.41.100 	Confidential reports made to the governor by director
of office of financial management 	1969 	Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020;
Feb. 2021; May 2021
345 	Investigative Records 	43.43.710 	Washington state patrol information in records
relating to the commission of any crime by any person 	1972 	May 2021; Aug. 2021
346 	Investigative Records
43.43.762 –
referenced in
42.56.240(6)
Information in criminal street gang database 	2008 c 276 s 201
347 	Investigative Records 	43.43.856 	Washington state patrol organized crime Investigative
information 	1973 	May 2021
348 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	43.52.612
Financial information provided to operating agencies
in bid forms and experience provided by a contractor
to a joint operating agency regarding bids on
constructing a nuclear project
1982
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
349 	Health Care 	43.70.050(2) 	Health care related data identifying patients or
providers obtained by state agencies 	1989
350 	Health Care 	43.70.052 	American Indian health data 	1995; 2014 c 220 s 2
351 	Health Care 	43.70.056(2)(e)(ii) 	Hospital reports and information on health care-
associated infections 	2007
352 	Health Care 	42.56.360(4); 70.54 Info and documents relating to maternal mortality
reviews per RCW 70.54 	2016 c 238 s 2
353 	Health Care Professions -
Whistleblower 	43.70.075 	Identity of whistleblower who makes a complaint to
the department of health re: improper care 	1995
354 	Health Care Professions 	43.70.510 	Information and documents created, collected and
maintained by a quality assurance committee 	2005
355 	Health Care Professions 	43.70.695(5) 	Healthcare workforce surveys identifying individual
providers 	2006
356 	Investigative Records 	43.190.110 	Complaint and investigation records of long-term care
ombudsman 	1983
357 	Employment Records,
Investigative Records 	43.101.400 	Criminal justice training commission records from
initial background investigations 	2001; 2021
358 	Investigative Records -
Fatality Review 	43.235.040(1) 	Domestic violence fatality review info 	2000
359 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	43.330.062
Protocols may not require release of information that
associate development organization client company
has requested remain confidential
2011 c 286 s 1
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Sunshine Committee
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Description	Category 	RCW

23 of 38
360 	Health Care 	43.370.050(2) 	Individual identification in released health care data
for studies and analysis 	2007
361 	Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records
46.12.380(1) Recod
46.12.635
Names and addresses of motor vehicle owners
except for "business" & other purposes 	1984; 2016 c 80 s 2
362 	Placeholder 	Check codified citation 	2010 c 161 s 1210
363 	Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records 	46.20.041 	Info on physically or mentally disabled person
demonstrating ability to drive 	1965 	Sept. 2020; Oct. 2020;
Feb. 2021
364 	Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records 	46.20.118 	Photos on drivers’ licenses & identicards 	1981
365 	Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records 	46.52.065 	Blood sample analyses done by state toxicology 	1971 	May 2021; Aug. 2021;
Oct. 2021
366 	Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records 	46.52.080 & .083 	Most info in police accident reports 	1937 	Feb. 2021
367 	Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records 	46.52.120 	Individual motor vehicle driver records 	1937 	Feb. 2021; May 2021;
Aug. 2021
368 	Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records 	46.52.130 	Abstracts of motor vehicle driver records
369 	Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records 	46.70.042 	Application for vehicle dealer licenses, for 3 years 	1967 	Feb. 2021; May 2021;
Aug. 2021; Oct. 2021
370 	Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records 	46.35.030(1)(a) 	Information obtained by a court order pursuant to
discovery is not subject to public disclosure 	2009 c 485 s 3
371 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	47.28.075 	Info supplied to department of transportation to qualify
contractors for highway construction 	1981
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
372 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	47.60.760 	Financial info submitted to qualify to submit bid for
ferry construction contracts 	1983
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info;
and RCW39.26.030 (bid
information)
373 	Personal Information 	42.56.420(6)
Personally identifiable info of employees and other
security info of a private cloud service provider that
has entered into a criminal justice information
services agreement
2016 c 152 s 1
374 	Insurance Information 	48.02.065(1) 	Information provided in the course of an insurance
commissioner examination 	2007
375 	Insurance Information 	48.05.510(4) 	Insurer's reports to insurance commissioner 	1995
376 	Insurance Information 	48.13.151
Information related to investment policies provided to
the insurance commissioner is confidential and not a
public record
2011 c 188 s 16
(eff 7/1/12)
377 	Insurance Information 	48.31.405(1) 	Commissioner info relating to supervision of any
insurer 	2005
378 	Insurance Information 	48.74. __(6) 	Information obtained in the course of an actuarial
examination/investigation 	2016 c 142 s 6
Schedule of Review
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee

24 of 38
379 	Insurance Information 	48.32.110(2) 	Request for examination into insurer's financial
condition 	1971 	May 2021; Oct. 2021
380 	Insurance Information 	48.43.200(4) 	Reports of material transactions by certified health
plans 	1995
381 	Insurance Information 	48.44.530(4) 	Reports of material transactions by health care
service contractors 	1995
382 	Insurance Information 	48.46.540 	Current licensure of nonresident pharmacies through
which an insurer provides coverage 	1991
383 	Insurance Information 	48.46.600(4) 	Reports of material transactions by health
maintenance organizations 	1995
384 	Insurance Information -
Investigations 	48.102.140(5)(a)
Documents and evidence provided regarding life
settlement act fraud investigations are confidential
and not public records
2009 c 104 s 17
385 	Insurance Information 	48.104.050(1) 	Holocaust insurance company registry records 	1999
386 	Workers Compensation
Records 	49.17.260 	Labor & industries investigative reports on industrial
catastrophes 	1973 	May 2021; Aug. 2021;
Oct. 2021
387 	Investigative Records 	49.60.240 	Option for human rights commission complaints not
to be made public 	1993
388 	Agriculture and Livestock 	49.70.119(6)(a) 	Name of employee seeking records of agricultural
pesticide applications 	1973 	Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017;
May 2018; Aug. 2018 	Aug. 2018
389 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	49.76.040 	Employee’s information regarding domestic violence
is confidential 	2008 c 286 s 4
390 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	49.76.090
Domestic violence leave information in files and
records of employees is confidential and not open to
public inspection
2008 c 286 s 10
391 	Employment Security
Records 	50.13.060(8) 	Welfare reform info in WorkFirst program 	2000
392 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	53.31.050 	Financial & commercial info & records supplied to
port district export trading company 	1986
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
393 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	63.29.380 	Info relating to unclaimed property that is furnished to
the department of revenue 	1983
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
394 	Insurance Information 	48.43.730 	Provider compensation agreements are confidential 	2013 c 277 s 1
395 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	63.29.300(4)
Material obtained during an examination under RCW
63.29 is confidential and may not be disclosed except
per RCW 63.29.380
2015 3rd sp s c 6 s 2107
396 	Health Care; Investigative
Records 	68.50.105 	Records of autopsies and post mortems 	1953; 2013 c 295 s 1
397 	Health Care 	68.64.190 	Certain information released to tissue or organ
procurement organization is confidential 	2008 c 139 s 21
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Date
Enacted	
Category 	RCW 	Description

25 of 38
398
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information;
Health Professions; Health
Care
69.41.044;
42.56.360(1)(a);
42.56.360(1)(b);
69.45.090
Records and information supplied by drug
manufacturers, and pharmaceutical manufacturer info
obtained by the pharmacy quality assurance
commission
1987; 1989; 2013 c 19 s
47
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
399 	Health Care 	69.41.280 	Info on legend drugs obtained by the pharmacy
quality assurance commission 	1989
400 	Insurance Information 	48.74.--(1)(a) 	Opinion and memo submitted to the insurance
commissioner under RCW 48.74.025 	2016 c 142 s 7
401 	Health Care 	69.51.050 	Names of persons participating in controlled
substances therapeutic research programs 	1979
402 	Health Care 	70.02.020, .050, et.
al.
Health care info disclosed to heath care provider w/o
patients permission 	1991
403 	Health Care 	70.24.022 	Info gathered by health care workers from interviews
re. sexually transmitted diseases 	1988
404 	Placeholder
405 	Health Care 	70.24.034 	Records on hearings on dangerous sexual behavior
of sexually transmitted disease carriers 	1988
406 	Placeholder
407 	Health Care 	70.28.020 	Tuberculosis records 	1899 	Feb. 2021
408 	Health Care 	70.41.150 	Department of health info on inspections of hospitals 	1955 	Feb. 2021; May 2021
409 	Health Care Professions 	70.41.200(3) 	Info maintained by a health care services quality
improvement committee 	1986
410 	Health Care Professions 	70.41.220 	Hospital records restricting practitioner’s privileges in
possession of medical disciplinary board 	1986
411 	Health Care 	70.42.210 	Identity of person from whom specimens of material
were taken at a medical test site 	1989
412 	Health Care 	70.47.150 	Records of medical treatment 	1990
413 	Law Enforcement 	70.48.100 	Jail register records 	1977
414 	Health Care 	70.54.250 	Cancer registry program 	1990
415 	Health Care 	70.58.055(2) 	Info on birth & manner of delivery kept in birth
certificate records 	1991
416 	Fireworks 	70.77.455 	Fireworks license records 	1995
417 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	70.94.205 	Info provided to DOE on processes or if may affect
competitive position relating to air quality 	1967
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info;
May 2021; Oct. 2021
418 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	70.95.280
Guidelines for proprietary info on solid waste
management practices in possession of DOE [Since
this addresses guidelines, not clear if it is an
exemption.]
1989
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee
Schedule of Review
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills

26 of 38
419 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	70.95C.040(4) 	Proprietary info re. waste reduction in possession of
DOE 	1988
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
420 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	70.95C.220(2) 	Waste reduction plans 	1990
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
421 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	70.95C.240(1) 	Some info in executive summaries of waste reduction
efforts 	1990
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
422 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	70.95N.140(4) 	Proprietary info in electronic product recycling reports 	2006
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
423 	Placeholder
424 	Health Care 	70.104.055 	Reports on pesticide poisoning 	1989
425 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	70.105.170 	Manufacturing or business info re: Hazardous waste
management in possession of DOE 	1983
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
426 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	70.118.070 	Trade secret info re: On-site sewage disposal in
possession of DOE 	1994
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
427 	Investigative Records -
Whistleblower 	70.124.100 	Name of whistleblower in nursing home or state
hospital 	1997
428 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	70.125.065 	By implication records of community sexual assault
program or underserved populations provider 	1981; 2012 c 29 s 11
429 	Placeholder
430 	Health Care 	70.127.190 	Hospice records 	1988
431 	Health Care 	70.129.050 	Personal and clinical records of long-term care
residents 	1994
432 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	70.158.050
Tobacco product manufacturers’ information required
to comply with chapter 70.58 RCW is confidential and
shall not be disclosed
2003
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
433 	Health Care 	70.168.070 	Limitations on disclosure of reports made by hospital
trauma care on-site review teams 	1990
434 	Health Care 	70.168.090 	Patient records and quality assurance records
associated with trauma care facilities 	1990
435 	Health Care 	70.170.090 	Charity care information in hospitals 	1989
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills	
Category 	RCW
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee
Date
Enacted 	Recommendation	Description 	Materials
Presented

27 of 38
436 	Health Care 	70.230.110 	Ambulatory surgical facilities data related to the
quality of patient care 	2007
437 	Health Care 	70.230.170 	Information received by department of health
regarding ambulatory surgical facilities 	2007
438 	Health Care 	71.05.425
Persons receiving notice and the notice of release or
transfer of a person committed following dismissal of
offense
2013 c 289 s 6
439 	Health Care 	71.05.620 	Records on mental health treatment 	1989; 2013 c 200 s 34
440 	Investigative Records;
Attorney Client Privilege
74.34.035(10);
74.34.067
Investigation relating to vulnerable adult; attorney
client privilege 	2013 c 263 s 2
441 	Crime Victims and
Witnesses 	71.09.140(2)
Names of victims, next of kin, or witnesses who are
notified when sexually violent predator escapes, on
parole, or released
1995
442 	Health Care 	71.24.035(5)(g) 	Mental retardation records 	1982
443 	Health Care 	71.34.340 	Records on mental treatment of minors 	1985
444 	Health Care 	71.34.335 	Mental health court records are confidential 	1985
445 	Health Care; Investigative
Records 	74.66.030; 74.66.120
Information furnished pursuant to the Medicaid fraud
false claims act is exempt until final disposition and
all seals are lifted; records and testimony provided
under civil investigative demand
2012 c 241 s 203, 212
446 	Health Care 	71A.14.070 	Confidential info re. developmentally disabled
persons 	1988 	May 2019
447 	Health Care 	72.05.130(1) 	Reports regarding children with behavioral problems 	1951 	Feb. 2021; May 2021
448 	Offender Records 	72.09.116 	Info from correctional industries work program
participant or applicant 	2004
449 	Offender Records 	72.09.345(4) 	Certain info on sex offenders held in custody 	1997; 2011 c 338 s 5
450 	Personal Information 	70.39A.--
Personally identifiable info used to develop quarterly
expenditure reports for certain long term care
services
2016 1st sp s. c 30 s 3
451
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
[Former
9.94A.610(1)(b)]
72.09.710 (recod eff
8/1/09) (see also ##
233 and 235)
Names of witnesses notified when drug offenders
released
1991; Recod 2008 c 231
s 26 9 (see dispositions
table)
452 	Placeholder
453
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
[Former
9.94A.612(1)]
72.09.712 (recod eff
8/1/09)
Names of victims, next of kin, or witnesses who are
notified when prisoner escapes, on parole, or
released
1995; Recod 2008 c 231
s 27
454 	Placeholder
455 	Public Assistance 	74.04.060 & .062
Limited access to information in department of social
and health services registry concerning parents of
dependent children
1941 	Feb. 2021
456 	Public Assistance 	74.20.280 	Child support records 	1963 	Feb. 2021
457 	Public Assistance 	74.04.520 	Names of recipients of food stamps 	1969 	Feb. 2021
Category 	RCW
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Schedule of Review
Sunshine Committee Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills	
Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation

28 of 38
458 	Health Care 	74.09.290(1) 	Medical records of persons on public assistance 	1979
459 	Juvenile Records 	74.13.075(5)
A juvenile’s status as a sexually aggressive youth and
related information are confidential and not subject to
public disclosure by department of social and health
services
2009 c 250 s 2
460 	Juvenile Records 	74.13.640 	Child fatality reports are subject to disclosure but
confidential information may be redacted 	2011 c 61 s 2 	May 2019; Aug. 2019
461 	Juvenile Records 	[Former 74.13.121]
74.13A.045 (recod)
Info from adoptive parents of kids receiving public
assistance 	1971; 2009 c 520 s 95 	May 2019; Aug. 2019
462 	Placeholder
463 	Juvenile Records 	[Former 74.13.133]
74.13A.065 (recod) Adoption support records 	1971; 2009 c 520 s 95 	May 2019; Aug. 2019
464 	Placeholder
465 	Juvenile Records 	74.13.280(2) 	Info on child in foster care & child’s family 	1990 	May 2019; Aug. 2019
466 	Juvenile Records; Public
Assistance 	74.13.500 - .525 	Disclosure of child welfare records 	1997 	May 2019; Aug. 2019;
Oct. 2019; Feb. 2020
467 	Personal information -
clients 	74.18.127(1) 	Personal info maintained by the department of
services for the blind 	2003
468 	Juvenile Records; Public
Assistance 	74.20A.360 & .370 Certain records in division of child support 	1997 	May 2019; Aug. 2019
469
Whistleblower;
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
74.34.040 	Identity of person making report on abuse of
vulnerable adult 	1984
470
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
74.34.090 	Identity of persons in records of abused vulnerable
adults 	1984
471
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
74.34.095(1) 	Info concerning the abuse of vulnerable adults 	1999
472 	Whistleblower 	74.34.180(1) 	Name of whistleblower reporting abuse of vulnerable
adults in various facilities 	1997
473
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
74.34.300 	Files, etc. used or developed for vulnerable adult
fatality reviews 	2008 c 146 s 10
474 	Health Care 	74.42.080 	Records on nursing home residents 	1979
475 	Health Professions 	74.42.640 	Information and documents created, collected and
maintained by a quality assurance committee 	2005
476 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	78.44.085(5) 	Surface mining info 	2006
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation	Category
Schedule of Review
RCW 	Description

29 of 38
477 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	78.52.260 	Well logs on oil capable of being produced from a
“wildcat” well 	1951
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info;
Feb. 2021; May 2021
478 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information
[Former 79.76.230] -
recodified as
78.60.230
Geothermal records filed w. department of natural
resources 	1974 - Recodified 2003
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
479
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
79A.60.210 	Certain boating accident reports provided to the parks
& recreation commission 	1984
480
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
79A.60.220 	Boating accident reports/coroner 	1987
481 	Security 	81.104.115(4) 	Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency
preparedness plan 	1999; 2016 c 33 s 8
482 	Security 	81.112.180(4) 	Rail fixed guideway system security and emergency
preparedness plan 	1999
483
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information -
Tax Info
82.32.330(2) 	Certain tax return and tax information 	At least 1935
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info;
Feb. 2021; Aug. 2021
484
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information -
Tax Info
82.32.585
Taxpayer info supplied for survey is not disclosable.
Amt of tax deferral is not subject to 82.32.330
confidentiality provisions
2010 c 114 s 102(4)
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
485 	Placeholder
486
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information -
Tax Info
82.38.310(4) 	Info from tribes or tribal retailers received by the state
under a special fuel taxes agreement 	2007
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
487
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information -
Tax Info
Taxpayer info supplied for survey is not disclosable.
Amt of tax deferral is not subject to 82.32.330
confidentiality provisions
2008 c 15 s 2
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
488
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information -
Tax Info
82.32.808 	Amounts less than $10,00 claimed in a tax
preference; exceptions
2012 snd sp s. c 13 s
1702
489
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information -
Tax Info
84.08.210
Tax info obtained by department of revenue if highly
offensive to a reasonable person and not a legitimate
concern to public or would result in unfair competitive
disadvantage
1997
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
Category 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Description	RCW
Sunshine Committee
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills

30 of 38
490
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information -
Tax Info
84.36.389 	Income data for retired or disabled persons seeking
property tax exemptions 	1974
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
491
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information -
Tax Info
84.40.020 	Confidential income data in property tax listings 	1973
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
492 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	84.40.340
Utilities & transportation commission records
containing commercial info a court determines
confidential
1961
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info;
May 2021; Oct. 2021
493 	Agriculture and Livestock 	90.64.190 	Livestock producer info 	2005 	Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017;
Feb. 2018; May 2018
494 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information
2007 c 522 § 149 (3)
(uncodified)
Names and identification data from participants in
survey to identify factors preventing the widespread
availability and use of broadband technologies
2007
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info
495 	Health Care 	70.02.220 - .260 	Health care information 	2013 sp. S c 200 ss 6-10
496 	Health Care 	42.56.360(1)(f) 	Information relating to infant mortality pursuant to
RCW 70.05.170 	1992
497 	Dairies, Animal Feeding
Operations 	42.56.610
Certain information obtained by state and local
agencies from dairies, animal feeding operations not
required to apply for a national pollutant discharge
elimination system permit disclosable only in ranges
that provide meaningful information to public
2005 (c510s5) 	Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017;
Feb. 2018; May 2018
498
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
9.95.260
Information regarding victims, survivors of victims, or
witnesses that are sent pardon hearing notices may
not be released to offender
1999
499
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information -
Trusts
11.110.075
Instrument creating a charitable trust, possibly only if
the instrument creates a trust for both charitable and
non-charitable purposes
1971
*See also May 2016,
Aug. 2016 & Oct. 2016 -
42.56.270 & trade
secrets/proprietary info;
Feb. 2021; May 2021
500 	Juvenile Records 	13.04.155;
28A.320.163(5)
Information on juvenile conviction by adult criminal
court given to school principal and received by school
district staff
1997; 2020
501 	Juvenile Records 	13.24.011
Records of the interstate compact for juveniles that
would adversely affect personal privacy rights or
proprietary interests
2003
502 	Boarding Homes 	13.40.150 	Sources of confidential information in dispositional
hearings on juvenile offenses 	1977
RCW 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Sunshine Committee
Description
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Category 	Materials
Presented
Schedule of Review
Recommendation	
Date
Enacted

31 of 38
503 	Placeholder
504 	Employment Security
50.13.015, .020,
.040, .050, .100 &
110
Most info supplied to employment security
department 	1977
505 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	51.36.120 	Financial or valuable trade info from health care
providers, if request 	1989
506 	Health Care 	70.05.170 	Medical records re. Child morality review 	1992
507 	Juvenile Records 	13.34.046
Information regarding a youth subject to RCW 13.34
is confidential except as required under lawful court
order
2013 c 182 s 5 	May 2019; Aug. 2019
508 	Placeholder
509
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
79A.60.210
79A.60.220
Certain boating accident reports provided to the parks
& recreation commission 	1984
510
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(10) 	Felony firearm offense conviction database of felony
firearm offenders established in RCW 43.43.822 	2013 c 183 s 1
511
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(12) 	Security threat group information collected and
maintained by department of corrections 	2013 c 315 s. 2
512 	Legal proceedings;
Privilege
7.77.140; 7.77.150;
7.77.160; 7.77.170
Confidentiality of collaborative law proceedings;
privilege 	2013 c 119ss 15 - 18
513 	Emergency Information 	38.32; 42.56.230(9);
38.52.575; 38.52.577 Enhanced 911 Call information 	2015 c 224 s 2, 6 	Feb. 2014; Feb. 2015 	Feb. 2015 	SB 1980 (2015); Ch. 224,
2015 Laws
514
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(16) 	Campus sexual assault/domestic violence
communications and records 	2017 c 72 s 3
515
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
42.56.240(17) 	Law enforcement information from firearms dealers 	2016 c 261 s 7
516 	Employment and Licensing 	42.56.250(3) 	Professional growth plans 	2017 c 16 s 1
517 	Employment and Licensing 	42.56.250(10) 	GPS data of public employees or volunteers using
GPS system recording device 	2017 c 38 s 1
518 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(28) 	Trade secrets etc. re to licensed marijuana business,
submitted to LCB 	2017 c 317 s 7
519 	Public Utilities and
Transportation 	42.56.330(9) 	Personally identifying information in safety complaints
submitted under ch. 81-61 RCW 	2017 c 333 s 7
520 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(26)
Non public personal health information obtained by,
discussed to, or in custody of the insurance
commissioner
2017 c 193 s 2
521 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(27) 	Data, information, documents obtained by insurance
commissioner under RCW 48.02
2017 3rd sp. sess. c 30 s
2
522 	Fish & Wildlife 	42.56.430(3);
77.12.885
Damage prevention agreement, non lethal
preventative/measures to minimize wolf interactions 	2017 c 246 s 1
May 2017; Aug. 2017;
Oct. 2017; May 2018;
Aug. 2018; Feb. 2019;
Aug. 2020; Feb. 2021;
May 2021; Aug. 2021;
Oct. 2021; Nov. 2021
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee

32 of 38
523 	Fish & Wildlife 	42.56.430(4);
77.12.885 	Reported depredation by wolves on pets or livestock 	2017 c 246 s 1
May 2017; Aug. 2017;
Oct. 2017; May 2018;
Aug. 2018; Feb. 2019;
Aug. 2020; Feb. 2021;
May 2021; Aug. 2021;
Oct. 2021; Nov. 2021
524 	Fish & Wildlife 	42.56.430(7) 	Tribal fish & shellfish harvest information -
department of fish & wildlife 	2017 c 71 s 1 	May 2017; Aug. 2017;
Oct. 2017
525 	Fish & Wildlife 	42.56.430(8) 	Commercial shellfish harvest information -
department of fish & wildlife 	2017 c 71 s 1 	Aug. 2017; Oct. 2017
526 	Juvenile Records 	13.50.010(16)
Health/safety information from DYF to department of
commerce re youth in foster care admitted to
CRCs/HOPE centers
2017 c 272 s 1 	May 2019; Aug. 2019
527 	Juvenile Records 	13.50.010(17) 	DYF disclosures re child abuse/neglect, and for
health care coordination 	2017 3rd sp. s. c 6 5312 	May 2019; Aug. 2019
528 	Personal Information 	40.26.020 	Biometric identifiers 	2017 c 306 s 2; 2017 2nd
sp. s. c 1 s 1
529 	Insurance Information 	48.02.230 	Information used to develop an individual health
insurance market stability program 	2017 3rd sp. s. c 30 s 1
530 	Health Care 	50A.04.195(4)&(5) Family/medical leave 	2017 3rd sp. s. c 5 s 29
531 	Health Care 	50A.04.080(2)(b) 	Family/medical leave from employer records 	2017 3rd sp. s. c 5 s 33
532 	Health Care 	50A.04.205 	Family/medical leave ombuds surveys 	2017 3rd sp. sess. c 5 s
88
533
Voter and Election
Information - Personal
Information
42.56.230(10) 	Personally Identifiable voter registration information
for individuals under 18 	2018
534 	Religious Beliefs; Personal
Information 	42.56.235 	Personal identifying information about an individual's
religious beliefs 	2018 	Oct. 2018; Feb. 2019;
May 2019; Aug. 2019 	Aug. 2019
535
Investigative, law
enforcement, crime
victims; Juvenile Records
42.56.240(18) 	Audio and video recordings of child interviews
regarding child abuse or neglect 	2018
536
Voter and Election
Information - Employment
and Licensing; Personal
Information
42.56.250(11) 	Personally Identifiable voter registration information
for individuals under 18 	2018
537 	Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(29)
Financial, commercial, operations, technical, and
research information submitted to the Andy Hill
cancer research endowment program pertaining to
grants under chapter 43.348 RCW, that if revealed
would result in private loss
2018
538
Financial, Commercial and
Proprietary Information;
Health Care
42.56.270(30) 	Proprietary information filed with the department of
health 	2018
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation

33 of 38
539 	Agriculture and Livestock 	42.56.380(13)
Information obtained from the federal government if
exempt from disclosure under federal law and
personal financial information or proprietary data
obtained by the department of agriculture
2018
540 	Agriculture and Livestock 	42.56.380(14) 	Hop grower lot numbers and lab results 	2018
541 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(28)
An insurer's corporate governance annual disclosure
and related information obtained by the insurance
commissioner
2018
542 	Insurance & Financial Inst.;
Health Care 	42.56.400(28)
Claims, health care, and financial information
submitted by school districts to the office of the
insurance commissioner and health care authority
2018
543 	Firearms 	9.41.350(6) 	Records regarding a person's voluntary waiver of
firearm rights 	2018
544 	Agriculture and Livestock 	15.135.100(1) 	Information obtained from the federal government if
exempt from disclosure under federal law 	2018
545
Agriculture and Livestock;
Personal Information;
Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information
15.135.100(2) 	Personal financial information or proprietary data
obtained by the department of agriculture 	2018
546
Child Abuse; Juvenile
Records; Investigative
Records
26.44.187 	Recorded child interviews regarding child abuse or
neglect 	2018
547 	Parentage; Personal
Information 	26.26A.050 	Personally identifiable information of the child and
others in parentage proceedings 	2018
548 	Elections; Personal
Information 	29A.08.720(2)(b) 	The personally identifiable voter registration
information of individuals under 18 	2018
549 	Elections; Personal
Information 	29A.08.770
The personally identifiable voter registration
information of individuals under 18 maintained by the
secretary of state and county auditors
2018
550 	Elections; Personal
Information 	29A.08.359
Personal information supplied to obtain a driver's
license or identicard and used to certify registered
voters
2018
551 	Elections 	29A.92.100(3) 	A plaintiff's filing of an action regarding equal voting
rights under the Washington voting rights act of 2018 	2018
552 	School District Insurance 	41.05.890(2)
Claims, health care, and financial information
submitted by school districts to the office of the
insurance commissioner and health care authority
2018
553 	State Government 	43.216.015(15)
Oversight board for children, youth, and families
records, only the information if otherwise confidential
under state or federal law
2018
554 	State Government;
Investigative Records 	43.06C.060(3)
Information regarding investigations exchange
between the office of the corrections ombuds and the
department of corrections
2018
Category 	RCW 	Materials
Presented	
Description 	Date
Enacted 	Recommendation
Schedule of Review
Sunshine Committee
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee

34 of 38
555 	Insurance Information 	48.195.040(1)
An insurer's corporate governance annual disclosure
and related information submitted to the insurance
commissioner
2018
556
Unwanted Medication
Disposal; Financial,
Commercial and
Proprietary Information
69.48.170 	Proprietary information submitted to the department
of health regarding unwanted medication disposal 	2018
557 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(13) 	Financial and proprietary information submitted to or
obtained by the department of ecology
558 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(15)
Financial and commercial information provided as
evidence to the department of licensing from special
fuel licensees or motor vehicle fuel licensees
559 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(18)
Financial, commercial, operations, and technical and
research information submitted to health sciences
and services authorities if private loss would result
560 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(19)
Information that can be identified to a particular
business that was gathered as part of agency rule
making
561 	Health Care Professionals;
Health Care 	42.56.355
Information distributed to a health profession board or
commission by an interstate health professions
licensure compact
2017
562 	Marijuana 	42.56.630
Registration information of members of medical
marijuana cooperatives submitted to the liquor and
cannabis board
2015
563 	Health Professionals;
Personal Information 	42.56.640 	Personal identifying information of vulnerable
individuals and in-home caregivers 	2017
564 	Health Care 	71.05.445(4) 	Court-ordered mental health treatment records
received by the department of corrections 	2000
565 	Health Care Professionals;
Whistleblower 	74.09.315(2) 	Identity of whistleblower
566 	Personal Information;
Public Assistance 	43.185C.030 	Personal information collected in homeless census
567 	Juvenile Records 	26.44.125(6) 	Child abuse or neglect review hearings 	2012
568 	Juvenile Records 	74.13.285(4) 	Information on a child in foster care or child's family 	2007
569 	Health Professionals;
Personal Information 	74.39A.275(5) 	Personal information of vulnerable adults and in-
home care providers 	2016
570 	Health Professionals;
Personal Information 	43.17.410 	Personal information of vulnerable individuals and in-
home caregivers 	2017
571
Health Care; Personal
Information; Investigative
Records
74.39A.060(6)
Personal identifying information of complainant and
residents in a complaint against a long-term care
facility
572
Health Care; Financial,
Commercial, and
Proprietary Information;
Trade Secret
41.05.026 	Health care contractor proprietary information
Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation
Sunshine Committee
Schedule of Review
Category 	RCW
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills

35 of 38
573 	Collective Bargaining 	41.56.510 	Collective bargaining authorization cards of public
employees 	2010
574 	Personal Information 	42.56.230(11)
Information submitted to state regarding people self-
excluding themselves from gambling activities under
RCW 9.46.071 and 67.70.040
2019
575 	Personal Information;
Firearms 	42.56.230(12)
Personal information of individuals who participated in
the bump-fire stock buy- back program under RCW
43.43.920
2019
576 	Financial Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(31)
Confidential, valuable, commercial information filed
with the Department of Ecology regarding the
architectural paint stewardship program
2019
577
Agriculture and Livestock;
Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information;
Trade Secret
42.56.380(15)
Trade secrets, commercial information, and other
confidential information obtained by the federal Food
and Drug Administration by contract
2019
578
Agriculture and Livestock;
Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information;
Trade Secret
15.130.150
Trade secrets, commercial information, and other
confidential information obtained by the federal Food
and Drug Administration by contract
2019
579 	Insurance & Financial Inst. 	42.56.400(29) 	Findings and orders that disapprove the acquisition of
a state trust company 	2019
580 	Personal Information;
Employment and Licensing
42.56.660 (effective
7/1/2020)
Agency employee records if the requester sexually
harassed the agency employee 	2019
581 	Personal Information;
Employment and Licensing
42.56.675 (effective
7/1/2020)
Lists of agency employees compiled by agencies to
administer RCW 42.56.660 	2019
582 	Health Care 	42.56.650,
41.05.410(3)(b)
Data submitted by health carriers to the Health
Benefit Exchange and Health Care Authority 	2019
583 	Court Proceedings;
Guardian
11.130.300(3)
(effective 1/1/21)
Visitor report and professional evaluation regarding
appointment of guardian for an adult 	2019
584 	Court Proceedings;
Conservator
11.130.410(3)
(effective 1/1/21)
Visitor report and professional evaluation regarding
conservatorship of a minor 	2019
585 	Health Care 	19.390.070
Information submitted to the attorney general
regarding potential anticompetitive conduct in the
health care market
2019
586 	Placeholder
587
Personal Information;
Investigative, law
enforcement, and crime
victims
26.44.175(5)
Information provided to multidisciplinary child
protection team members in the course of a child
abuse or neglect investigation
2019
588
Insurance and Financial
Institutions; Financial
Commercial and
Proprietary
30B.44B.170
Department of Financial Institutions' records in
connection to involuntary liquidation of a state trust
company
2019
Sunshine Committee
Schedule of Review
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation

36 of 38
589
Insurance and Financial
Institutions; Financial
Commercial and
Proprietary
30B.53.100(3)
Department of Financial Institutions' findings and
order on the disapproval of a proposed acquisition of
a state trust company
2019
590
State Government;
Financial Commercial, and
Proprietary Information
43.155.160(6)(g)
Broadband service provider confidential business and
financial information submitted as part of an objection
to an application for a grant to expand access to
broadband service
2019
591 	State Government 	42.17A.120(3)
Modification hearing information on the suspension or
modification of campaign finance reporting
requirements under 42.17A.710
2019
592 	State Government; Health
Care 	43.71C.030(2) 	Pharmacy benefit manager information reported to
the Health Care Authority 	2019
593 	State Government; Health
Care
43.71C.050(7);
060(5); 070(3)
Prescription drug manufacturer information reported
to the Health Care Authority 	2019
594 	State Government; Health
Care 	43.71C.100 	Health Care Authority prescription drug data 	2019
595 	Insurance; Health Care;
Personal Information 	48.43.505(4) 	Nonpublic personal health information held by health
carriers and insurers 	2019
596
Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information;
Marijuana
69.50.561(6)
Licensed marijuana business's financial and
proprietary information supplied during consultative
services by the Washington State Liquor and
Cannabis Board
2019
597 	State Government; Health
Care 	70.225.040(1) 	Information submitted to the prescription monitoring
program 	2019
598
State Government;
Financial Commercial, and
Proprietary Information
70.375.130
Confidential, valuable, commercial information filed
with the Department of Ecology regarding the
architectural paint stewardship program
2019
599 	State Government; Health
Care
70.58A.400(5)
(effective 1/1/21)
Sealed birth records with adoption decrees under
chapter 26.33 RCW 	2019
600 	State Government; Health
Care
70.58A.500(3)
(effective 1/1/21) 	Sealed live birth records 	2019
601 	State Government; Health
Care 	70.58A.530(15), (16)
Certification of birth or fetal death, including
certification of birth resulting in stillbirth, that includes
information from the confidential section of the birth or
fetal death record
2019
602 	State Government; Health
Care
70.58A.540 (effective
1/1/21) 	Vital records, reports, statistics, and data 	2019
603
Employment and
Licensing; Personal
Information
42.56.250(11) 	Personal demographic details voluntarily submitted by
state employees 	2020
604 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(32) 	Commercial information obtained by the Liquor and
Cannabis Board in connection with distiller licensing 	2020
605 	Educational Information 	42.56.315 	Certain student information received by school
districts 	2020
606 	Health Care 	42.56.360(1)(I);
41.04.830
Medical information about members of retirement
plans 	2020
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Schedule of Review
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
Sunshine Committee

37 of 38
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
607 	Health Care 	70.390.030(7) 	Health care information held by the Health Care Cost
Transparency Board that could identify a patient 	2020
608
Educational Information;
Crime Victim and
Witnesses
42.56.375;
28B.112.060(3);
28B.112.070(2);
28B.112.080(5)
Identifying information regarding sexual misconduct
complainants and witnesses 	2020
609 	Insurance and Financial
Information; Health Care
42.56.400(31);
48.200.040;
48.43.731
Contracts with health care benefit managers filed with
the Insurance Commissioner 	2020
610 	Firearms; Health Care 	9.41.111(1)(c)
Mental health information received in connection with
a firearm frame or receiver purchase or transfer
application
2020
611
Juvenile Records;
Investigative, law
enforcement and crime
victims
13.50.260(12)
Confidential information and sealed records accessed
through the Washington state identification system by
criminal justice agencies
2020
612 	Juvenile Records; Public
Assistance 	74.13.730(7) 	Reports, reviews, and hearings involving certificates
of parental improvement 	2020
613 	Education Information 	28B.96.020(8) 	Data collected by the Undocumented Student
Support Loan Program 	2020
614 	Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records 	43.59.156(6)(a) 	Confidential information obtained by the Cooper
Jones Active Transportation Safety Council 	2020
615 	Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records
46.20.117(6);
46.20.161(6)
Self-attestations and data provided for identicard and
driver's license designations 	2020
616 	Juvenile Records 	28A.300.544(6)
Confidential information received by the work group
on students in foster care and/or experiencing
homelessness
2020
617 	Public Utilities and
Transportation 	81.88.160(7)
Gas pipeline company reports submitted to the UTC
that contain proprietary data or where disclosure
would affect public safety
2020
618 	Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information 	42.56.270(12)(a)(iii)
Financial and proprietary information provided to the
Department of Commerce in connection with the
industrial waste coordination program
2021
619 	State Government; Public
Health 	42.56.380(16)
Certain information obtained from the federal Food
and Drug Administration by Department of Health
public health laboratories for monitoring food supplies
for contaminants
2021
620 	Elections 	42.56.420(7) 	Certain election security information 	2021
621 	Personal Information 	42.56.680
Personal information obtained by the Department of
Commerce from residential real property notices of
default
2021 c 151 s 12
622 	Security 	42.56.422;
43.105.450(7)(d)
State agency information technology security reports
and information compiled in connection with the
Office of Cybersecurity
2021 c 291 s 8; 2021 c
291 s 1
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee

38 of 38
Category 	RCW 	Description 	Date
Enacted
Materials
Presented 	Recommendation 	Proposed Legislation &
Related Bills
623 	Personal information;
Crime Victims 	7.105.105(2) 	Confidential party information forms accompanying
petitions for civil protection orders 	2021 c 215 s 14
624
Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information;
Trade Secret
36.32.234(7)(a)
Trade secrets and proprietary information submitted
by bidders, offerors, and contractors in connection
with electric ferry design and procurement, when
requested and county concurs
2021 c 224 s 1
625
State Government;
Financial, Commercial, and
Proprietary Information
36.32.234(7)(b) 	Electric ferry procurement documents, until
notification of finalist made or selection terminated 	2021 c 244 s 1
626
Personal Information;
Motor Vehicle/Driver
Records
46.22.010
Information and records containing personal and
identity information obtained by the Department of
Licensing to administer driver and vehicle records
2021 c 93 s 4
627 	Personal Information;
Health Care 	49.17.062(3)
During public health emergencies, certain personally
identifiable information regarding employees of the
Department of Labor and Industries
2021 c 252 s 2
628 	Health Care 	70.14.065(4)
Records obtained or created relating to partnership
agreements for production, distributing, and
purchasing generic prescription drugs and insulin
2021 c 274 s 1
629 	Health Care 	71.40.140;
71.40.120(3)
Communications, records, and files of the Office of
Behavioral Health Consumer Advocacy, and related
organizations and advocates
2021 c 202 s 12; 2021 c
202 s 14
630 	State Government 	70A.245.030(2)
Reports and information submitted to the Department
of Ecology by producers of certain plastic products,
when requested
2021 c 313 s 4
631 	Security; State Government 	42.56.422
The report detailing the Office of Cybersecurity's
independent security assessment of state agency
information technology security program audits
2021
632 	Industrial Insurance;
Injured Worker 	51.04.063(13)
Information relating to individual claim resolution
settlement agreements submitted to the board of
industrial insurance appeals
2014
* For subsequent legislative history, see statutes online on the state legislative's website; see also Code Reviser's Office list ("Exemptions from Public Records Disclosure and Confidential Records") available on Sunshine Committee web page.
Schedule of Review
Public Records Exemptions Accountability Committee
Sunshine Committee