* State Of Washington, Respondent V. Julie Ann Ianniciello, Appellant

NOTICE: SLIP OPINION
(not the court’s final written decision)
The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the
written opinions that are originally filed by the court.
A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions
can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an
order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential
purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits
(for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the
opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court
decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An
opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of
the court.
The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it
has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official
text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes
of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the
language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of
charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports.
For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential
(unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION ONE
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
JULIE ANN IANNICIELLO,
Appellant.
No. 86711-3-I
ORDER DENYING MOTION FOR
RECONSIDERATION AND
WITHDRAWING AND
SUBSTITUTING OPINION
The respondent, State of Washington, has filed a motion for reconsideration of the
opinion filed on December 15, 2025. 	The court has determined that the motion should
be denied, but the opinion should be withdrawn, and a substitute opinion filed; now,
therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the motion for reconsideration is denied; and it is further
ORDERED that the opinion filed on December 15, 2025 is withdrawn; and it is
further
ORDERED that a substitute published opinion shall be filed.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
Respondent,
v.
JULIE ANN IANNICIELLO,
Appellant.
No. 86711-3-I
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
FELDMAN, J. — Julie Ann Ianniciello appeals her conviction for first degree
murder after a jury found she shot and killed her husband following marital conflict
and infidelity. 	She argues she did not receive a fair trial because (a) the State
violated her Fifth Amendment right to silence by eliciting testimony regarding her
pretrial silence, (b) her due process rights were violated when the trial court
admitted approximately 800 pages of e-mails detailing her extramarital sexual
conduct, (c) the conviction is not supported by sufficient evidence, and (d) the State
invoked gender-based stereotypes at trial. Because the State violated Ianniciello’s
right 	to 	silence 	and 	has 	not 	proved 	beyond 	a 	reasonable 	doubt 	that 	the
constitutional violation was harmless, we reverse and remand for a new trial.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 2 -
I
On April 2, 2016, Ianniciello’s husband, Tom,1 was killed by a single gunshot
to his head as he slept in his bed. At the time of the murder, Tom and Ianniciello
had been married for over 16 years and lived together with their two daughters,
Felicia and Tabitha, and Tom’s biological daughter and Ianniciello’s stepdaughter,
Amber. The marriage was turbulent, as Tom had an issue with alcohol abuse and
would become abusive to Ianniciello. Though later in their marriage Tom stopped
drinking, the marriage improved only slightly.
Ianniciello began an affair with a coworker, Bradley Robinson, who was also
married. In March 2016, Robinson’s spouse suddenly passed away of pneumonia.
Thereafter, Robinson expressed that he did not know when Ianniciello would be
able to be together with him. 	Also around this time, Tom discovered Ianniciello
and Robinson together in the back seat of her car during their lunchtime and
became angry, hitting Ianniciello and calling her a whore. 	On March 29, a few
days before the murder, Ianniciello e-mailed Robinson and said, “I have people
packing my stuff for me, then I’m out. I don’t know if it [is] a safe plan or not but it’s
my plan.” Ianniciello’s daughters were unaware of any plan of hers to leave.
On the evening of April 2, Tom went to bed after taking some Benadryl.
Ianniciello, Felicia, and Tabitha decided to drive to pick up Amber from work.
Felicia and Tabitha got in the car and waited around 10 minutes for Ianniciello,
who was searching for Amber’s cat, to join them. When Ianniciello got to the car,
Felicia noticed that one of the doors to the house was open; Ianniciello went back
1 For clarity, we refer to Julie Ann Ianniciello as Ianniciello and refer to every other member of the
Ianniciello family by their first names.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 3 -
into the house to close that door. The group then stopped by Ianniciello’s parents’
house before picking up Amber from work and returning home.
Once back in the house, Ianniciello and Amber noticed several things were
out of order: Amber’s cat was outside the house, the kitchen drawer where Tom
kept his belongings was open and his belongings were on the countertop, and the
sliding door to the backyard was open. 	Then, when Ianniciello opened the
bedroom door, both she and Amber saw Tom on the bed, covered with blood.
Ianniciello immediately told Felicia, Tabitha, and Amber to leave the house. They
all went to the neighbor’s house where Ianniciello called 911.
Police arrived minutes later but did not establish a perimeter because they
did not think they “had somebody immediately fleeing the scene.” 	When the
officers began investigating in the bedroom, they observed that a 9 mm bullet had
been fired into the right side of Tom’s head, likely from 6 to 12 inches away, and
had become lodged in the wall. They did not render medical aid to Tom because
“it was fairly obvious that he was deceased.” Officers found one fired 9 mm shell
casing on the bed, and while Amber remembered that Tom previously owned a 9
mm gun, they did not find such a gun nor was one registered to Tom.
The officers found two other guns with holsters that were registered to Tom
in a drawer and one unfired 9 mm cartridge fell from one of the holsters. Neither
of the other guns that were found registered to Tom could have fired a 9 mm
cartridge. Weeks later, officers found a black trash bag in the bedroom with 9 mm
cartridges. 	All the 9 mm cartridges found in the bedroom and the 9 mm bullet
recovered from the wall were from the same manufacturer and each cartridge had
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 4 -
loading marks indicating they all had been cycled at some point through the same
firearm.
In 	the 	weeks 	following 	Tom’s 	murder, 	law 	enforcement 	spoke 	with
Ianniciello several times and searched her car but did not find any incriminating
evidence. 	Officers also questioned Robinson several times, obtained his e-mail
communications with Ianniciello, and accused him of playing a role in the murder.
After nearly three years, the State charged Ianniciello with first degree murder.
Ianniciello’s first trial, in 2022, ended in a mistrial after the jury was unable to render
a unanimous verdict. In 2024, the case proceeded to a second trial after which the
jury rendered a guilty verdict. This timely appeal followed.
II
Ianniciello argues the State violated her right to silence under the Fifth
Amendment of the United States Constitution and article I, section 9 of the
Washington Constitution by eliciting testimony from multiple witnesses that she did
not “reach out,” “call,” “check in,” or “provide information” to law enforcement. We
agree and remand for a new trial.
Although Ianniciello did not raise this constitutional challenge in the trial
court, we may review an assignment of error that is raised for the first time on
appeal when the claimed error concerns a “‘manifest error affecting a constitutional
right.’” 	State v. O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d 91, 98, 217 P.3d 756 (2009) (quoting RAP
2.5(a)(3)). 	To satisfy these requirements, the appellant must both identify a
constitutional error and demonstrate the error is manifest. Id. The manifest prong
requires a plausible showing of (1) actual prejudice, meaning “the asserted error
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 5 -
had practical and identifiable consequences in the trial,” and (2) “error . . . so
obvious on the record that the error warrants appellate review.” Id. at 99-100.2
Ianniciello’s asserted error satisfies these requirements. First, the asserted
error implicates her constitutional right to silence. See, e.g., State v. Easter, 130
Wn.2d 228, 243, 922 P.2d 1285 (1996) (“The Fifth Amendment right to silence
extends to situations prior to the arrest of the accused.”). 	Second, the asserted
error is manifest as Ianniciello has made a plausible showing that (1) the error had
practical and identifiable consequences at trial in that the jury was permitted to
consider her prearrest silence as evidence of guilt and (2) as the discussion below
shows, the error “should have been reasonably obvious to the trial court.” O’Hara,
167 Wn.2d at 108. 	Under RAP 2.5(a)(3), such an error “warrants appellate
review.” Id. at 100.
Turning to the merits of Ianniciello’s argument, the Fifth Amendment to the
United States Constitution provides that no person “shall be . . . compelled in any
criminal case to be a witness against himself.” 	Washington Constitution article I,
section 9 likewise states “No person shall be compelled in any criminal case to
give evidence against himself.” 	The Washington Supreme Court has long held
these constitutional provisions, which have been interpreted by Washington courts
equivalently, implicate a prearrest, as well as a postarrest, privilege against self-
2 While our courts’ many interpretations of RAP 2.5(a)(3) have been described as “confusing,”
“cumbersome,” and in “conflict with the plain language of the rule,” State v. J.W.M., 1 Wn.3d 58,
97, 524 P.3d 596 (2023) (Gordon McCloud, J., concurring), the discussion here strives to
harmonize those decisions by stating a simple test that includes each of the required elements of
“manifest error affecting a constitutional right.”
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 6 -
incrimination. Easter, 130 Wn.2d at 235, 238, 243 (“The Fifth Amendment applies
before the defendant is in custody or is the subject of suspicion or investigation.”).
Thus, it is a violation of a defendant’s Fifth Amendment right to remain silent
for “the State in its case in chief to call to the attention of the trier of fact the
accused’s pre-arrest silence to imply guilt.” 	Id. at 243. 	But because the Fifth
Amendment privilege “‘generally is not self-executing,’” the United States Supreme
Court has held that a witness who desires its protections “‘must claim it.’” Salinas
v. Texas, 570 U.S. 178, 181, 133 S. Ct. 2174, 186 L. Ed. 2d 376 (plurality opinion)
(2013) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Minnesota v. Murphy, 465 U.S.
420, 425, 427, 104 S. Ct. 1136, 79 L. Ed. 2d 409 (1984)). The Court has also held,
“‘[N]o ritualistic formula is necessary in order to invoke the privilege.’” Id. (quoting
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 164, 75 S. Ct. 668, 99 L. Ed. 964 (1955)).
“A witness does not expressly invoke the privilege by standing mute.” Id. at 187.
Rather, one must “‘make a timely assertion of the privilege’” to preclude the State
from introducing prearrest silence as evidence of guilt. Id. at 189 (quoting Garner
v. United States, 424 U.S. 648, 655, 96 S. Ct. 1178, 47 L. Ed. 2d 370 (1976)).
Here, the record establishes that Ianniciello invoked her Fifth Amendment
right to silence. 	In the hours after Tom’s death on April 2, 2016, Eleanor Broggi,
the lead detective, asked Ianniciello, “Did you shoot your husband?” 	Detective
Broggi expressed concern with Ianniciello’s demeanor, saying, “I want you to look
at our side kind of, of this” because “you don’t seem overly concerned, or, you
know, just upset about it.” Detective Broggi asked Ianniciello if she would be willing
to take a polygraph examination, and Ianniciello agreed to do so. 	A few weeks
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 7 -
later, on April 18, Ianniciello’s attorney contacted Detective Broggi, notified her that
Ianniciello would not be taking a polygraph examination, and asked her to have no
further contact with Ianniciello. 	This clear statement that Ianniciello would not
provide additional information to the police and should not be contacted by them
is sufficient to invoke her Fifth Amendment privilege.
Notwithstanding this invocation, the State elicited at trial direct testimony
from 	two detectives about 	Ianniciello’s 	failure 	to 	contact 	them. 	During 	its
examination of Detective Broggi, the State elicited testimony that Ianniciello did not
“reach out,” did not “check in on the status of the investigation,” and did not “ever
provide any 	information 	regarding items 	that 	were missing.” 	Then, during
Detective Michael Glasgow’s testimony, the State again elicited testimony that
Ianniciello never “reached out” and did not “call to check in about where things
were at” after Detective Glasgow became the new lead detective. Later, the State
again asked Detective Glasgow, “[Y]ou previously testified that Ms. Ianniciello
never reached out to you as the lead investigator; is that correct?” 	Detective
Glasgow responded, “That’s correct.” 	The State also continued this theme of
drawing the jury’s attention to Ianniciello’s prearrest silence by eliciting testimony
that Tom’s other family members would “reach out” and “check in” on the
investigation, “[b]ut not Ms. Ianniciello.”
The State’s conduct was an attempt to convince the jury that Ianniciello’s
silence, by not communicating with law enforcement, demonstrated her guilt. This
is precisely what the Fifth Amendment prohibits. As our Supreme Court noted in
Easter, “An accused’s right to remain silent and to decline to assist the State in the
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 8 -
preparation of its criminal case may not be eroded by permitting the State in its
case in chief to call to the attention of the trier of fact the accused’s pre-arrest
silence to imply guilt.” 130 Wn.2d at 243. Despite this clear holding, the jury was
permitted to consider Ianniciello’s failure to reach out, call, check in, or provide
information as evidence of guilt even though she had previously invoked her right
to silence. On this record, Ianniciello has established the State violated her Fifth
Amendment right to remain silent.
Having found the State violated Ianniciello’s constitutional right to silence,
we next examine whether the error was harmless. See State v. Chuprinov, 32 Wn.
App. 2d 508, 520, 556 P.3d 1127 (2024). 	We presume that an error of
constitutional magnitude is prejudicial, and the State bears the burden of proving
harmlessness beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 520-21; State v. Irby, 170 Wn.2d
874, 886, 246 P.3d 796 (2011). 	“We place such a heavy burden on the State to
‘deter . . . conduct’ that ‘undermines the principle of equal justice and is so
repugnant to the concept of an impartial trial that its very existence demands that
appellate courts set appropriate standards to deter such conduct.’” State v. Heng,
2 Wn.3d 384, 395, 539 P.3d 13 (2023) (quoting State v. Monday, 171 Wn.2d 667,
680, 257 P.3d 551 (2011)). “If the State cannot prove harmlessness, the remedy
is a new trial.” Chuprinov, 32 Wn. App. 2d at 521.
The State has not proved its repeated Fifth Amendment violations were
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. At trial, the State’s case depended largely
on circumstantial evidence. 	The State’s theory heavily relied on Ianniciello’s
alleged desire to kill Tom to be with Robinson, her brief window of opportunity
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 9 -
when her daughters were waiting for her in the parked car, and her “odd”
demeanor. 	The State questioned eight witnesses about Ianniciello’s demeanor
and reactions in the weeks after Tom’s murder and elicited testimony that
Ianniciello’s demeanor was “calm,” “[e]xtremely calm with no emotion,” “weird,” and
“very cold.” 	Detective Broggi, the lead detective on the case, testified that she
found Ianniciello’s demeanor and reaction to her husband’s death “odd” and that
this 	was 	evidence 	that 	“consistently 	point[ed] 	to 	Ms. 	Ianniciello 	as 	being
responsible.”
The State also relied at trial on toolmark and ballistics evidence that, it
claims, conclusively established that Tom was murdered with his own gun and
therefore could not have been killed by a burglar as Ianniciello posited. 	But the
expert who provided this testimony did not testify unequivocally:
Q. 	So -- so I understand, was your conclusion that at some point,
all four of those unfired 9-millimeter cartridge casings were
inside these same guns that fired that casing?
A. 	Okay. 	Not quite that far. 	So all I can say, based on those
cycling marks, is that all the four unfired cartridges and the
one fired cartridge case were at one time cycled through the
same firearm. 	Now, at some point in time, they could get
cycled through another firearm. 	I don't know that. 	And the
one that's fired, because I don't have firing pin impressions
and other types of things, I can't say for certain that that fired
cartridge case was fired in the same firearm that cycled all of
them. That's an explanation. It's one of the possibilities. But
the other possibility is all of those were cycled in one firearm,
and that one fired cartridge case was additionally fired in a
second firearm. Those are -- those are the two possibilities.
Additionally, Ianniciello’s DNA and fingerprints were not detected on the fired
cartridge or the unfired bullets.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 10 -
Thus, contrary to the State’s argument, it did not overwhelmingly establish
Ianniciello’s guilt at trial. 	Indeed, the first trial ended in a hung jury, and we may
properly consider that result in deciding whether the State has proved its repeated
Fifth Amendment violations were harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. See State
v. Carlson, 80 Wn. App. 116, 129, 906 P.2d 999 (1995) (concluding, “the error was
not harmless,” and noting, “[t]he first trial ended in a hung jury”). 	The testimony
about Ianniciello’s prearrest silence and failure to communicate with the detectives
worked 	to 	support 	the 	State’s 	argument 	about 	Ianniciello’s 	“incriminatory”
demeanor, indicating Ianniciello was guilty because she was silent after Tom’s
murder and did not continue to talk with detectives. 	This testimony about
Ianniciello’s prearrest silence may have swayed the jury, and the State has not
proved beyond a reasonable doubt this constitutional error had no impact on the
jury’s verdict.
Despite this, the State argues the testimony it elicited from the two
detectives about Ianniciello’s failure to “check in,” “call,” “reach out,” and “provide
any information” “involved nontestimonial conduct and did not implicate the Fifth
Amendment.” The State’s argument is unpersuasive. The fact that Ianniciello did
not contact the detectives clearly meant she was not speaking with them and was
instead remaining silent. 	Ianniciello had asserted her Fifth Amendment right to
silence after having agreed to later speak with Detective Broggi again and take a
polygraph examination. 	Testimony of Ianniciello’s failure to “reach out,” “call,”
“check in,” or “provide any information” was a clear proxy for her prearrest silence
and thus implicates the Fifth Amendment.
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 11 -
The State also argues that the United States Supreme Court’s opinion in
Salinas “fatally undermines” our Supreme Court’s holding in Easter. 	The State
misreads Salinas. There, the prosecution introduced evidence of the defendant’s
noncustodial, prearrest silence. 570 U.S. at 182. The three-justice plurality chose
not to address “a division of authority in the lower courts over whether the
prosecution 	may 	use 	a 	defendant’s 	assertion 	of 	the 	privilege against 	self-
incrimination during a noncustodial police interview.” Id. at 183. Instead, the Court
concluded that the prosecution did not violate the Fifth Amendment by using the
defendant’s prearrest silence as evidence of guilt because the defendant did not
invoke his Fifth Amendment privilege. 	Id. at 186. 	Because the Salinas plurality
declined to address the division of authority on the issue of whether the Fifth
Amendment 	applies 	to 	prearrest 	silence, 	the 	Washington 	Supreme 	Court’s
interpretation of the Fifth Amendment as applying “before the defendant is in
custody,” Easter, 130 Wn.2d at 238, 243, has not been overruled.
Lastly, the State argues Ianniciello cannot satisfy Salinas’s requirement that
she invoke her right to remain silent “because Ianniciello was never subject to
custodial interrogation” and thus “could not anticipatorily invoke her Miranda3
rights.” 	But Ianniciello did not invoke her Miranda rights; she invoked her Fifth
Amendment right to silence. 	The right to silence originates from the Fifth
Amendment, not Miranda. See Roberts v. United States, 445 U.S. 552, 560, 100
S. Ct. 1358, 63 L. Ed. 2d 622 (1980) (“the right to silence described in [Miranda]
warnings derives from the Fifth Amendment and adds nothing to it”); Easter, 130
3 Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 86 S. Ct. 1602, 16 L. Ed. 2d 694 (1966).
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 12 -
Wn.2d at 238 (“An accused’s right to silence derives, not from Miranda, but from
the Fifth Amendment itself.”). And as discussed above, one need not be in custody
to invoke their Fifth Amendment right to silence, as Ianniciello did here.
Despite Ianniciello’s invocation of her right to silence, the State elicited
testimony regarding her failure to “check in,” “call,” “reach out,” or “provide any
information” to law enforcement. 	This was constitutional error. 	Where, as here,
there was constitutional error and the State does not prove harmlessness, “the
remedy is a new trial.” Chuprinov, 32 Wn. App. 2d at 521.
III
Having granted a new trial based on the State’s repeated violation of
Ianniciello’s right to silence, we briefly acknowledge her remaining arguments.
Ianniciello argues her due process rights were violated and her trial was
rendered “fundamentally unfair” when the trial court admitted sexually explicit
e-mails chronicling Ianniciello and Robinson’s extramarital affair. The State again
argues we should not reach this issue because it was not preserved below and the
asserted error is evidentiary in nature and thus not of constitutional magnitude as
required to raise an issue for the first time on appeal. See O’Hara, 167 Wn.2d at
98-100 (quoted and discussed above). 	In so arguing, the State overlooks
Ianniciello’s reliance on Andrew v. White, 604 U.S. 86, 145 S. Ct. 75, 220 L. Ed.
2d 340 (2025). 	In Andrew, the State elicited evidence about Andrew’s sexual
partners, the outfits she wore to dinner or during grocery runs, the underwear she
packed for vacation, and how often she had sex in her car. 	Id. at 88-90. 	The
United States Supreme Court vacated Andrew’s murder conviction and remanded
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 13 -
the case for further proceedings, noting that “the Due Process Clause forbids the
introduction 	of 	evidence 	so 	unduly 	prejudicial 	as 	to 	render 	a 	criminal 	trial
fundamentally unfair.” Id. at 96.
This case tests the limits of the Court’s holding in Andrew. 	Similar to
Andrew, 	the 	e-mails at 	issue 	here 	detailed 	Ianniciello’s 	extramarital 	sexual
conduct, including how often she and Robinson had sex, how often that occurred
in their cars, the specific acts they performed during their sexual encounters, the
anatomical areas involved, and the corresponding sexual fetishes. While the State
argues that e-mails regarding the sexual nature of Ianniciello’s relationship with
Robinson were relevant to show her motive to kill Tom, the trial court admitted
several 	hundred 	e-mails 	detailing 	her 	extramarital 	sexual 	conduct—many
describing these activities in graphic detail—and the State in its closing argument
encouraged the jury “to please look at those e-mails . . . .”
As the Court recognized in Andrew, the introduction of unduly prejudicial
evidence regarding conduct similar to that at issue here can render a trial
fundamentally unfair. If that occurs and the error is manifest, it can be raised for
the first time on appeal under RAP 2.5(a)(3). See supra Part II. But we need not
(and do not) decide this issue, having reversed for the reasons set forth in Part II
above. For this same reason, we do not reach Ianniciello’s remaining arguments
that the evidence is constitutionally insufficient to support her conviction and the
State violated her right to a fair trial by employing gender-based stereotypes at
trial. 	We also leave for another day Ianniciello’s argument that gender-based
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.

No. 86711-3-I
- 14 -
misconduct should be analyzed under the heightened standard for prosecutorial
misconduct used in cases of racial bias.
Reversed and remanded.
WE CONCUR:
For the current opinion, go to https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports/.