* Ocwen Loan Servicing, Llc., App/cr-resp. V. Michael E. Bauman And Rocio Bauman, Resp/cr-apps

NOTICE: SLIP OPINION
(not the court’s final written decision)
The opinion that begins on the next page is a slip opinion. Slip opinions are the
written opinions that are originally filed by the court.
A slip opinion is not necessarily the court’s final written decision. Slip opinions
can be changed by subsequent court orders. For example, a court may issue an
order making substantive changes to a slip opinion or publishing for precedential
purposes a previously “unpublished” opinion. Additionally, nonsubstantive edits
(for style, grammar, citation, format, punctuation, etc.) are made before the
opinions that have precedential value are published in the official reports of court
decisions: the Washington Reports 2d and the Washington Appellate Reports. An
opinion in the official reports replaces the slip opinion as the official opinion of
the court.
The slip opinion that begins on the next page is for a published opinion, and it
has since been revised for publication in the printed official reports. The official
text of the court’s opinion is found in the advance sheets and the bound volumes
of the official reports. Also, an electronic version (intended to mirror the
language found in the official reports) of the revised opinion can be found, free of
charge, at this website: https://www.lexisnexis.com/clients/wareports.
For more information about precedential (published) opinions, nonprecedential
(unpublished) opinions, slip opinions, and the official reports, see
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions and the information that is linked there.

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC,
Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL E. BAUMAN and
ROCIO BAUMAN, individually
and their marital community;
and CROSS VALLEY WATER
DISTRICT,
Respondents.
No. 73548-9-1
(Consolidated with
Nos. 73549-7-1, 73648-5-1,
and 73649-3-1)
ORDER DENYING MOTION
FOR RECONSIDERATION
AND AMENDING OPINION
The appellant, Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC, filed a motion for reconsideration of
this court's opinion filed September 6, 2016. 	Respondents Michael E. Bauman and
Rocio Bauman have filed a response. 	The panel has determined that the motion should
be denied but the opinion amended to modify the second and third sentences of the
second paragraph of the discussion at page 5. Therefore, it is hereby
ORDERED that the appellant's motion for reconsideration is denied. 	The opinion
of this court in this case filed September 6, 2016, is hereby modified as follows:
The following words from the second sentence of the second paragraph of the
discussion on page 2 of the opinion, "in the trial court or" are deleted, and this sentence
shall state, "Ocwen did not make this argument in its briefing filed with this court." The
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

following sentence on page 3, "It makes no claim that this issue involves a manifest
error affecting a constitutional right," shall be deleted in its entirety.
The remainder of the opinion shall remain the same.
DATED this 20th day of October, 2016.
/jZsdLSlsA 	f 	//.
Ml 	0
ens
r\>
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
OCWEN LOAN SERVICING, LLC,
Appellant,
v.
MICHAEL E. BAUMAN and
ROCIO BAUMAN, individually
and their marital community;
and CROSS VALLEY WATER
DISTRICT,
Respondents.
No. 73548-9-1
(Consolidated with
Nos. 73549-7-1, 73648-5-1,
and 73649-3-1)
DIVISION ONE
PUBLISHED OPINION
FILED: September 6, 2016
Leach, J. — Ocwen Loan Servicing LLC appeals two related cases that
we consolidated. 	In each, the trial court dismissed, 	on 	summary judgment,
Ocwen's declaratory judgment action seeking to establish a right to redeem a
property foreclosed on by the Cross Valley Water District. 	Michael and Rocio
Bauman bought both at public auction. 	Based on a legal error in each order of
sale, the trial court decided that equitable grounds existed to grant a redemption
right but also concluded that Ocwen did 	not have standing to redeem either
property. 	The Baumans cross appeal, contending that the trial court erred when
it created an equitable right to redeem the properties.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 73548-9-1 (consol. w/ Nos. 73549-7-1,
73648-5-1, and 73649-3-1/2
Because a statute grants postforeclosure rights to redeem, the trial court
erred when it concluded that Ocwen had a longer equitable right to redeem the
properties. 	The relevant statute provides only a one-year right to redeem, and
Ocwen did not try to redeem during this time. 	Thus, for a different reason, the
trial court did not err by dismissing Ocwen's lawsuits on 	summary judgment.
Because we resolve the case on this basis, we do not reach the other issues
raised by Ocwen. We affirm.
FACTS
Patricia and Bruno Bonvicini and James L. Turner each borrowed money
to buy property. 	On June 20, 2008, the Bonvicinis purchased property located at
23030 105th Avenue SE in Woodinville. 	They financed their purchase with a
loan 	from 	Evergreen 	Moneysource, 	secured 	by 	a 	deed 	of trust 	in favor 	of
Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (MERS). 	On November 9, 2009,
Turner 	purchased 	property 	located 	at 	6602 	63rd 	Street 	SE 	in Snohomish,
financing his purchase with a loan from Golf Savings Bank, secured by a deed of
trust also in favor of MERS.
Both the Bonvicinis and Turner failed to pay their water service charges.
Cross Valley Water District filed lawsuits against the Bonvicinis and Turner to
foreclose the water district's statutory lien for delinquent water service charges.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 73548-9-1 (consol. w/ Nos. 73549-7-1,
73648-5-1, and 73649-3-1/3
The trial court entered a judgment and order of sale for each property. 	It ordered
each 	sold 	"to 	the 	highest 	and 	best 	bidder for 	cash 	as 	provided 	by 	RCW
84.64.080 and RCW 57.20.135." 	Each judgment also stated that the property
was subject to a two-year postsale right of redemption under RCW 35.50.270, a
statute that governs foreclosures to collect local improvement assessments.
On 	March 13, 2012, the Baumans purchased both properties at public
auction. 	The water district delivered a quitclaim deed to the Baumans for each
property "subject to the right of redemption within two years from the date of the
sale pursuant to RCW 35.50.270."
Ocwen claims the right to enforce the deed of trust encumbering each
property. 	It notified the Baumans of its intent to redeem the Bonvicini property on
March 25, 2013, and of its intent to redeem the Turner property on May 8, 2013.
And on March 11, 2014, Ocwen filed two lawsuits against the Baumans, claiming
a right to redeem the properties under the Bonvicini and Turner deeds of trust.
The 	Baumans 	moved 	for 	summary judgment 	after 	discovery. 	They
contended that the trial court entering the foreclosure judgment had erroneously
included the postsale redemption right under RCW 35.50.270 and that Ocwen
lacked standing to redeem either property.
-3-
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 73548-9-1 (consol. w/ Nos. 73549-7-1,
73648-5-1, and 73649-3-1/4
The trial court decided that RCW 35.50.270 applied only to foreclosures to
recoup local improvement assessments; it did not apply to these properties. 	But
it concluded that because the trial court issued an order describing a right to
redemption under the statute, it would be inequitable to deny that right. 	But the
trial court also concluded that Ocwen lacked standing to exercise any redemption
right for either property because it did not show that it had a qualifying interest by
the relevant date, March 13, 2014. 	It dismissed both cases.
Ocwen 	moved 	for 	reconsideration 	in 	both 	cases 	and 	supported 	the
request with new evidence. 	The Baumans opposed each motion and asked that
the trial court not consider the evidence Ocwen offered because it was available
to Ocwen when it filed its response to the summary judgment motions. 	The trial
court agreed and denied Ocwen's motions for reconsideration. 	Ocwen appeals,
and the Baumans cross appeal.
STANDARD OF REVIEW
This court reviews summary judgment rulings de novo, viewing all the
facts 	and 	inferences 	in favor 	of the 	nonmoving 	party and 	finding 	summary
judgment proper only if no genuine issue of material fact exists.1 	This court
1 Lyons v. U.S. Bank Nat'l Ass'n, 181 Wn.2d 775, 783, 336 P.3d 1142
(2014).
-4-
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 73548-9-1 (consol. w/ Nos. 73549-7-1,
73648-5-1, and 73649-3-1/5
reviews a trial court's order granting equitable relief de novo as a question of
law.2 We review statutory interpretation de novo.3
DISCUSSION
We first address the Baumans' cross appeal and consider whether the
court erred when it created an equitable right to redeem the properties.
At oral argument Ocwen, for the first time, contended that we should not
consider this issue because the Baumans' claim is an impermissible collateral
attack on the two foreclosure judgments in the water district foreclosure lawsuits.
Ocwen did not make this argument in the trial court or in its briefing filed with this
court. 	It makes no claim that this 	issue involves a manifest error affecting a
constitutional right. 	Consistent with the general practice of Washington appellate
courts, 	we decline to 	review this contention 	raised for the first time at oral
argument.4
The trial court concluded that each order of sale and each deed conveying
a property to the Baumans should not have described a redemption right under
RCW 35.50.270 because that statute does not apply to a foreclosure to collect a
2 Bank of Am.. NA v. Prestance Corp., 160 Wn.2d 560, 564, 160 P.3d 17
(2007).
3 P.H.T.S.. LLC v. Vantage Capital, LLC, 186 Wn. App. 281, 287, 345
P.3d20(2015).
4 See RAP 2.5(a); Anderson v. Dussault, 181 Wn. 2d 360, 373, 333 P.3d
395 (2014) (citing RAP 12.1).
-5-
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 73548-9-1 (consol. w/ Nos. 73549-7-1,
73648-5-1, and 73649-3-1/6
water district's service charges. 	But the trial court also decided that since the
"[pjroperty 	was 	sold 	subject to the 	two year 	period 	of redemption," 	under
principles of equity, "language regarding redemption is binding on the Baumans."
The 	Baumans 	claim 	that 	a 	trial 	court 	cannot 	create 	an 	equitable
redemption right when a statute provides a redemption right. 	The Baumans rely
primarily on Schroeder v. City of Raymond.5 	In that case, the Supreme Court
held that when an owner of municipal bonds brought a foreclosure action under a
statute permitting the lawsuit, "the court had no power to grant other than the
statutory relief, hence the language of the decree which goes beyond what the
statute 	directs 	is 	of 	no 	force 	or 	effect."6 	The 	Schroeder 	court 	based 	its
conclusion on the fact that the foreclosure was "a purely statutory proceeding
brought under the statute and controlled thereby."7 	Any language in the court
decree going beyond the statutory relief had no force or effect.8
More recent cases have applied equitable principles to temper the rule
that a redemption right must be exercised in strict compliance with the statute
creating the right.9 	In GESA Federal Credit Union v. Mutual Life Insurance Co.,10
5 117 Wash. 238, 200 P. 1092 (1921), affd, 117 Wash. 238, 204 P. 180
(1922).
6 Schroeder, 117 Wash, at 243.
7 Schroeder, 117 Wash, at 242.
8 Schroeder, 117 Wash, at 243.
9 Fid.Mut.Sav. Bank v. Mark, 112 Wn.2d 47, 54, 767 P.2d 1382 (1989).
10 105 Wn.2d 248, 251, 713 P.2d 728 (1986).
-6-
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 73548-9-1 (consol. w/ Nos. 73549-7-1,
73648-5-1, and 73649-3-1 / 7
our Supreme Court considered whether a purchaser's failure to file a statement
of paid taxes, as required by a redemption statute, barred the purchaser from
recovering 	those 	payments from 	a 	subsequent 	redemptioner. 	Because the
redemptioner had 	received actual notice from the purchaser, the court applied
the equitable principle of substantial compliance to excuse the failure to file. The
court distinguished 	redemption statute provisions creating a 	substantive right
from those establishing the procedure to perfect that right. 	It found the filing
requirement to be a procedural step subject to a substantial compliance rule.11
Fidelity Mutual Savings Bank v. Mark12 illustrates the importance of the
distinction between provisions creating substantive rights and those describing
perfection procedures. 	The court refused to apply equitable principles to provide
a redemption right to a judgment debtor's assignee whose assignment did not
comply with Washington's real 	property statutes and thus did not convey the
judgment debtor's title. 	Without title, the assignee was 	not "a successor in
interest" granted a statutory right to redeem.13 	The court noted the harshness of
its decision to deny equitable relief but characterized the requested relief as the
granting 	of 	a 	substantive 	right 	and 	stated, 	"The 	rights 	established 	by 	the
11 GESA Fed. Credit Union, 105 Wn.2d at 254-55.
12 112 Wn.2d 47, 767 P.2d 1382 (1989).
13 Mark, 112 Wn.2d at 53.
-7-
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 73548-9-1 (consol. w/ Nos. 73549-7-1,
73648-5-1, and 73649-3-1/8
Legislature must remain exclusive if they are to remain reliable."14 	Thus, the trial
court did not have the authority to create a redemption right.
Next we 	consider whether Ocwen had 	a statutory right to redeem the
properties. 	We interpret statutes to give effect to the legislative intent, looking
first 	to 	the 	statute's 	plain 	meaning 	and, 	where 	statutory 	language 	is
unambiguous, giving effect to that plain language.15
Cross Valley filed its foreclosure lawsuits under RCW 57.08.081 (4).16 This
statute provides that in a water district foreclosure lawsuit the laws "shall control
as in other civil actions."17 	This means that we look to the statutes providing for
the sale of real property to satisfy a judgment to decide if Ocwen has redemption
rights. 	Chapter 6.21 RCW contains the statutory provisions for a real property
14 Mark, 112 Wn.2d at 55.
15 P.H.T.S., 186 Wn. App. at 290.
16 The district may, at any time after the connection charges or
rates 	and 	charges 	for 	services 	supplied 	or 	available 	and
penalties are delinquent for a period of sixty days, bring suit in
foreclosure by civil action in the superior court of the county in
which the real property is located. 	The court may allow, 	in
addition to the costs and 	disbursements 	provided 	by statute,
attorneys' fees, title search and report costs, and expenses as it
adjudges reasonable. 	The action shall be in rem, and may be
brought in the name ofthe district against an individual or against
all of those who are delinquent in one action. The laws and rules
of the court shall control as in other civil actions.
17 RCW 57.08.081(4).
-8-
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 73548-9-1 (consol. w/ Nos. 73549-7-1,
73648-5-1, and 73649-3-1/9
execution sale. 	RCW 6.21.080 applies to the sales in this case and provides for
redemption rights as granted in chapter 6.23 RCW:
A sale of a real property estate of less than a 	leasehold of two
years 	unexpired term 	and 	a 	sale of a 	vendor's 	interest in real
property being sold under a real estate contract shall be absolute.
In all other cases, real property shall be sold subject to redemption,
as provided in chapter 6.23 RCW.
(Emphasis added.) And RCW 6.23.010 grants qualifying parties, including
successors in interest, redemption rights:
(1) Real property sold subject to redemption, as provided in RCW
6.21.080, or any part thereof separately sold, may be redeemed by
the following persons, or their successors in interest:
(a) The judgment debtor, 	in the whole or any part of the
property separately sold.
(b) A creditor having a 	lien by judgment, decree, deed of
trust, or mortgage, on any portion of the property, or any portion of
any part thereof, separately sold, subsequent in priority to that on
which 	the 	property was 	sold. 	The 	persons 	mentioned 	in this
subsection are termed redemptioners.
(2) As 	used 	in this 	chapter, the terms "judgment debtor,"
"redemptioner," 	and 	"purchaser" 	refer 	also 	to 	their 	respective
successors in interest.
Qualifying 	parties 	must 	redeem 	within one 	year 	after 	the 	foreclosure 	sale:
"Unless redemption rights have been precluded pursuant to RCW 61.12.093 et
seq., the judgment debtor or any redemptioner may redeem the property from the
purchaser at any time . . . within one year after the date of the sale."18
18 RCW 6.23.020(1).
-9-
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 73548-9-1 (consol. w/ Nos. 73549-7-1,
73648-5-1, and 73649-3-1 /10
Thus, Ocwen had one year to redeem each property. 	Because it took no
step to redeem within this time, its redemption rights expired. 	The trial court did
not err by dismissing Ocwen's declaratory judgment lawsuits.
Baumans contend that Ocwen had no redemption rights. 	They correctly
note that each order of sale authorized the water district's treasurer to sell each
property as provided in RCW 84.64.080 and RCW 57.20.135. 	They claim that
the water district has two options to foreclose its statutory lien: 	(1) the civil
lawsuit authorized by RCW 57.08.081(4) and (2) a sale by its treasurer in the
same manner as a property tax foreclosure sale authorized 	by chapter 84.64
RCW.
Baumans 	begin 	their analysis with 	RCW 57.08.005(22). 	This statute
authorizes a water district to exercise any powers "granted to cities and counties
with 	respect to the acquisition, 	construction, 	maintenance, operation of, 	and
fixing rates and charges for waterworks and systems of sewerage and drainage."
Former RCW 36.94.150 (1997) grants a county a lien for unpaid water service
charges and provides for foreclosure of that lien "in the same manner as the
foreclosure of real property tax liens." 	Thus, 	a water district can 	use this
alternate tax foreclosure process. 	In this tax foreclosure process, only minors
-10-
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 73548-9-1 (consol. w/ Nos. 73549-7-1,
73648-5-I, and 73649-3-1/11
and persons adjudicated legally incompetent have redemption rights.19 	Thus,
Ocwen had no redemption rights.
Baumans' argument does not persuade us. 	RCW 57.08.005(22) does not
expressly grant any lien or foreclosure rights. 	We see no reason to imply a grant
by this statute of lien and foreclosure 	rights with different procedures when
another statute, RCW 57.08.081(4), expressly addresses the subject. 	To do so
would violate the general rule that a 	specific statute controls over a general
statute.20 Additionally, the exercise of these implied powers could produce harsh
results for which Baumans have shown no legislative intent.
We conclude that the specific language of RCW 57.08.081(4) authorizing
water districts to "bring suit in foreclosure by civil action" provides Cross Valley's
only statutory authority to foreclose on the properties.
CONCLUSION
Because 	a 	trial 	court 	may 	not 	provide 	equitable 	rights 	expanding 	a
statutory grant of the substantive right to redeem property, the trial court erred
when it concluded that Ocwen had an equitable right to redeem the properties
within two 	years. 	Ocwen 	had 	only 	the 	one-year statutory 	redemption 	right
granted by RCW 6.23.020(1). 	Because Ocwen did not attempt to redeem the
19 Former RCW 84.64.070 (2002).
20 Johnson v. Cent. Valley Sch. Dist., 97 Wn.2d 419, 428, 645 P.2d 1088
(1982).
-11-
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 73548-9-1 (consol. w/ Nos. 73549-7-1,
73648-5-I, and 73649-3-1/12
properties within one year, the trial court properly dismissed Ocwen's declaratory
judgment lawsuits. While this was not the basis for the trial court's decision, we
may sustain the trial court on any basis the record supports.21 	We affirm.
WE CONCUR
yyte^rfc
21 	Nw. Collectors. 	Inc. 	v. 	Enders, 	74 Wn.2d 	585, 	595, 	446 	P.2d 	200
-12-
(1968).