* Jessica M. Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate

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FILED
NOVEMBER 3,2015
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
JESSICA MAE GOODEILL, 	) 	No. 32442-7-III
)
Petitioner, 	)
)
v. 	) 	PUBLISHED OPINION
)
MADISON REAL ESTATE, 	)
)
Respondent. 	)
LA WRENCE-BERREY, J. 	This court granted Jessica Goodeill's request for
discretionary review to detennine whether RCW 59.18.280 precludes her landlord from
retaining a portion of her security deposit because it failed to timely provide her a full and
specific statement of the basis for retaining her deposit. Her landlord argues that an
exception to RCW 59.18.280 applies: "[C]ircumstances beyond [its] control prevented [it]
from providing the statement within ... fourteen days." We hold that a landlord may not
avail itself of RCW 59.18.280' s exception unless it accounts for any active or passive
delays sufficient to show that it made a conscientious attempt to comply with the 14 day
statutory notice. Because the landlord's evidence shows it has not met this standard, it
may not avail itself of the statutory exception. We, therefore, reverse and remand.
 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	 	

No. 32442-7-III
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
FACTS
In November 2011, Jessica and Dave Goodeill entered into a seven-month lease
agreement for a home at 1502 West Cora Court in Spokane, a property managed and
ostensibly owned by Baker & Associates, LLC. The Goodeills paid $750.00 per month
for rent, a $750.00 damage security deposit, and a $50.00 pet deposit.
Ms. Goodeill completed a standard move-in condition report and returned it to
Baker within the requisite time. 	She noted a number of nicks, scrapes, stains, dirt marks,
nail holes, and paint spots on the walls and wood trim throughout the house. 	She also
noted nicks on closet doors, two burnt-out lightbulbs in the hallway, a "bad leak" coming
from the washing machine's hot water valve, one garage remote that did not work, dirty
and stained window blinds, peeling wallpaper, a faulty kitchen light, and a broken kitchen
drawer, among other things. Pl.'s Ex. 1 at 31-34. Ms. Goodeill did not mince words
when describing the yard: "Yard looks like hell." Pl.'s Ex. 1 at 32.
During the Goodeills' tenancy, Madison purchased Baker. On August 17,2012,
the Goodeills entered into a new lease agreement with Madison, with a lease end date of
June 30, 2013. After their lease expired, the Goodeills' tenancy became month to month
by operation ofRCW 59. 18.200(l)(a).
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No. 32442-7-III
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
On August 5,2013, the Goodeills gave Madison the requisite 20-day notice that
they intended to vacate 1502 West Cora Court py the end of August. 	By August 27, the
Goodeills had finished moving out of the residence. That same day, they had the carpets
professionally cleaned. On August 28, Madison contacted Ms. Goodeill and requested
approval to show the residence and keys to do so. Ms. Goodeill gave Madison one of her
keys, but retained two other keys.
On August 30, Ms. Goodeill telephoned Madison to arrange a time to turn in her
two remaining keys and complete move-out paperwork. She spoke with an employee
named Marlie who told her that the office would be closed Monday, September 2, in
observance of Labor Day, but that she could turn in her two keys by noon on September 3
to avoid being charged extra rent. On September 3, Ms. Goodeill turned in her last two
keys to Madison. Despite the conversation between Ms. Goodeill and Martie, Madison
treated September 3 as the Goodeills' actual move-out date.
On September 4, Madison completed a move-out condition report, noting that the
house needed a "deep clean" and some other minor repairs in order to be ready to rent.
Def.'s Ex. 1 at 43. The record shows that Madison hired Action Tech Inc., to clean the
blinds, and DavisPro Cleaning & Maintenance to clean, repair, and make the interior and
exterior presentable for a new tenant.
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No. 32442-7-111
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
The record does not establish when Madison contacted Action Tech. However, the
Action Tech invoice shows that the blinds were cleaned on September 11, and the charges
totaled $136.36. This invoice was created on September 11 and was mailed to Madison
on that day.
A work order establishes that Madison did not contact DavisPro until September 9.
The DavisPro invoices show that both the interior and exterior work was completed two
days after Madison requested the work, or September 11. DavisPro billed its work on two
separate invoices, one for $112.50 dated September 18, and the other for $135.69 dated
October 1. These two invoices were mailed to Madison on those separate dates.
On September 16, Madison mailed a letter to the Goodeills, informing them that
their deposit of$800.00 was being held to pay estimated charges for which it claimed
they were liable. The notice estimated that the Goodeills owed $900.00, leaving a
balance owing to Madison of$100.00. Pl.'s Ex. 1 at 4. The estimated charges were
itemized as follows:
9/1/2013 	RENT INCOME-SEPTEMBER 2013 (3DAYS) $75.00
9/16/2013 	ESTIMATED: CITY UTIL-OVERAGES $75.00
9/13/2013 	ESTIMATED: WINDOWS COVERING CLNG $150.00
9/13/2013 	ESTIMATED: GENERAL HOUSE CLEANING $350.00
9/13/2013 	ESTIMATED: LAWN CARE-DRY & WEEDS $150.00
9/13/2013 	ESTIMATED: MAINTIDEBRIS REMOVAL $100.00
PI. ' sEx. 1 at 5. The notice further stated:
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No. 32442-7-111
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
Once all estimated costs have been determined, a final accounting will be
forwarded to you. 	We will verify againt [sic] move-in reported condition
and move-out condition report and account for less normal wear & tear.
Please provide confirmation that utilities have been paid through 06/30/13 and
your account will be adjusted accordingly.
Pl.'s Ex. 1 at 4 (emphasis in original).
On September 18, Ms. Goodeill called Madison to dispute the estimated charges.
She spoke with an associate named Kirsten, who said that Madison typically sends a high
estimate "so tenants would not be surprised" by the final statement. Clerk's Papers (CP)
at 3. Kirsten said she had no receipts or documentation to support Madison's estimate,
and urged Ms. Goodeill to "wait until the final statement," which could take between two
to four additional weeks. CP at 3. Ms. Goodeill asked if it would be possible to return to
the property and go over the estimated charges and was told that the property had already
been occupied by new renters. 	Kirsten took Ms. Goodeill's contact information and told
her someone would call her.
On September 19, Ms. Goodeill called Madison's office again, insisting that she
speak with someone who could explain the estimated charges to her. An associate named
Brandy told her that Ron Dickerson would call her back. Ms. Goodeill informed Brandy
that she knew her rights as a tenant, and that she was entitled to her deposit refund within
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No. 32442-7-II1
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
14 days of moving out. Brandy told Ms. Goodeill that landlords are only required to
provide an estimate of charges within 14 days.
Neither Mr. Dickerson nor anyone from Madison returned Ms. Goodeill's
September 19 call. Four days later, Ms. Goodeill filed suit against Madison in the small
claims court division of district court, seeking $1,600.00, which represented
her $800.00 security deposit plus a penalty equal to her security deposit, as pennitted by
RCW 59.18.280.
On October 9-43 days after the Goodeills vacated their rental and 36 days after
the Goodeills returned their last two keys to Madison-Madison sent the Goodeills the
following full and specific statement as contemplated by RCW 59.18.280: 	.
1561 	vacancy cleaning 	$112.50
6684 	cleaned 7 blinds & 1 shade 	$89.05 1
Avista Util-gas (tenant to reimb owner) 	$22.49
Avista Util-elec (tenant to reimb owner) 	$29.44
City Util-refuse 8/31 (tenant to reimb owner) 	$5.79
City Util-sewer 8/31 (tenant to reimb owner) 	$36.74
City Util-water 8/31 (tenant to reimb owner) 	$46.29
1592 repairs: replaced bulbs, cleaned up yard debris,
pulled gold coin out of vent in entry way, checked all
smoke detectors, repaired back door screen, rehung
laundry room bi-fold doors (50% of 135.69 tenant exp) 	$67.85
Admin Fee Re Inv1561 	$11.25
Admin Fee Re inv6684 	$8.91
I Madison charged the Goodeills roughly 65 percent of the Action Tech bill,
presumably acknowledging that the remaining portion was nonnal wear and tear.
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No. 32442-7-III
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
Admin Fee Re Inv1592 	$6.78
Outstanding Amount (Rent Income Sept. 2013 = 3 days) 	$120.002
Total Charges 	$557.09
Pl.'s Ex. 1 at 35. Madison applied a credit of$845.00, which represented the $800.00
security deposit and a $45.00 prepayment credit. The difference between the $845.00
credit and the total charges of$557.09 was $287.91, which Madison refunded to Ms.
Goodeill with the October 9 notice.
On October 15, Madison received Ms. Goodeill's summons and complaint. On
October 21, Madison filed a counterclaim seeking to offset the total charges from the
requested security deposit. On October 30, the district court received exhibits and heard
testimony from Ms. Goodeill and Madison's representative, Ron Dickerson. Ms.
Goodeill argued that Madison had clearly violated RCW 59.18.280 and was not entitled
to keep any of her security deposit as a result. Mr. Dickerson stated that Madison's
maintenance department had called the utility companies to obtain final amounts for the
time between when the Goodeills vacated the property and when Ms. Goodeill turned in
her keys to Madison. Mr. Dickerson argued that DavisPro's delay in providing Madison
with invoices for their work on 1502 West Cora Court constituted "circumstances beyond
the landlord's control," allowing Madison to raise the defense of offset to Ms. Goodeill's
2 Although not an issue on appeal, we are unable to find any justification for the
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No. 32442-7-III
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
claim. CP at 31. The small claims court judge asked Mr. Dickerson to provide legal
authority supporting Madison's interpretation ofRCW 59.18.280, to which Mr.
Dickerson replied:
[Mr. Dickerson]: I've been in, I'm sorry to say this, I've been in court a few
times in regards to this and every case we have had through precedence is
basically said there's no way in the world you can get every bill inside of
the time so it gives the provision there that said you are allowed, ifit's
beyond your circumstances that you can get all of the bills, then how are
you going to create a final bill? You can't. Therefore
[Judge]: So I guess what I need to ask you, do you have case law to support
that? What, I mean I know you're telling me that you have been in court
and other judges have said, yeah I get it you can't do it in time, but I'm
somewhat familiar with this portion of the law and I, I've always wondered
about 14 days doesn't seem to be an awfully long time to tum anything
around, but I'm just wondering if you can give me something.
[Mr. Dickerson]: I do not have a case law but I'm sure that I'll be able to
get one.
CP at 31-32. The small claims court ruled in Ms. Goodeill' s favor, and substantially
awarded her requested relief.
Madison, through counsel, appealed the small claims court award to superior court.
The parties filed briefing and the superior court heard argument on March 21,2014.
Madison repeated the arguments it made in small claims court. The superior court
reversed the small claims court award and dismissed Ms. Goodeill's claim, finding that
various administrative fees and any September rent charge beyond $75.00.
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No. 32442-7-III
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
Madison "was prevented from sending a full and specific statement within 14 days
because of circumstances beyond their control, Le., not receiving invoices until
September 18 and October 1, 2013. A final full and specific statement was sent within a
reasonable time after the final invoices were obtained." CP at 53. The superior court
remanded the matter for entry of judgment and awarded reasonable attorney fees and
costs to Madison.
On Apri118, 2014, Ms. Goodeill requested discretionary review from this court. A
commissioner of this court denied Ms. Goodeill's motion. On September 3, Ms. Goodeill
moved this court to modifY the commissioner's ruling. This court granted Ms. GoodeiWs
motion to modifY and granted discretionary review.
ANALYSIS
1. 	Whether the superior court correctly found that DavisPro's delay in submitting its
invoices to Madison constituted "circumstances beyond the landlord's control"
under RCW 59.18.280
a. 	Standard of Review
RCW 12.36.055(1) provides: "The appeal from a small claims judgment or
decision shall be de novo upon the record of the case, as entered by the district court."
Such reviews are controlled by CRLJ 73 and CRLJ 75.3 See RALJ 1.1(b). The superior
3 Despite the 2001 amendment ofRCW 12.36.055, both CRLJ 72(b) and CRLJ 75
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No. 32442-7-III
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
court conducts a de novo review ofthe district court record, generally reading the exhibits
and the transcribed testimony earlier considered by the small claims court. See generally
CRLJ 75(c). Pursuant to CR 52, the superior court thereafter enters findings of fact and
conclusions oflaw. See CR I; CR 81(a).
Appellate courts generally review a superior court's findings of fact for substantial
evidence. This is true even where the trial court's findings are based entirely on
documentary evidence, provided that the trial court was called on to reconcile conflicting
evidence. Inre Marriage o/Rideout, 150 Wn.2d337, 351, 77P.3d 1174(2003).
However,
"where ... the trial court has not seen nor heard testimony requiring it to
assess the credibility or competency of witnesses, and to weigh the
evidence, nor reconcile conflicting evidence, then on appeal a court of
review stands in the same position as the trial court in looking at the facts of
the case and should review the record de novo."
State v. Kipp, 179 Wn.2d 718, 727, 317 P .3d 1029 (2014) (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Progressive Animal Welfare Soc'y v. Univ. o/Wash., 125 Wn.2d 243,
252, 884 P.2d 592 (1994)). In Kipp, the trial court ruled on a motion to suppress an audio
recording. Id at 726. The evidence considered by the trial court was a written stipulation
mistakenly refer to the appeal as a trial de novo, rather than a de novo appeal on the
record. The amendment makes clear that there is no new trial in superior court. LAWS OF
2001, ch. 156, § 2.
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No. 32442-7-III
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
to background facts and the 10-minute audio recording. Id. at 723. The question argued
to the trial court was whether the recording was of a "private conversation" within the
meaning ofRCW 9.73.030(1)(b). Id. at 722-24. If so, the recording was required to be
suppressed pursuant to RCW 9.73.050. Id. at 724. The trial court ruled that the recording
was not of a "private conversation" within the meaning of the statute. Id. at 722. The
recording was later considered by the jury, and the jury found Mr. Kipp guilty of the
charged offenses. Id. 	On appeal, the Kipp court applied a de novo review to the order
denying suppression, and reversed the trial court's order. Id. at 726-29, 733. In
determining that de novo review was appropriate, the Kipp court emphasized that the trial
court "made no credibility or other determinations for which its firsthand observation of
the proceedings better positioned it to make," and that the evidence before the trial court,
i.e., the stipulation to background facts and the 10-minute recording, did not present
issues of fact. Id. at 728.
Here, the trial court reviewed documentary evidence that established the relevant
timelines for what happened and when. The trial court was not called on to resolve issues
of fact concerning what happened and when. Rather, it was called on to determine, given
what happened and when, whether the landlord's failure to timely provide the statutory
notice was "beyond the landlord's control." Because there was no conflicting evidence
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No. 32442-7-III
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
which the trial court reconciled to make this determination, our review of the trial court's
decision on this issue is de novo.
b. 	An improperly designated finding offact is treated as a conclusion of law
"If a determination concerns whether the evidence showed that something
occurred or existed, it is properly labeled a finding of fact, but if a determination is made
by a process of legal reasoning from, or interpretation of the legal significance of, the
evidentiary facts, it is a conclusion oflaw." Moulden & Sons, Inc. v. Osaka Landscaping
& Nursery, Inc., 21 Wn. App. 194, 197 n.5, 584 P.2d 968 (1978). Findings of fact that in
reality pronounce legal conclusions are treated as legal conclusions. Fine v. Laband, 35
Wn. App. 368, 374, 667 P.2d 101 (1983). 	"A trial court's conclusions of law are
reviewed de novo." Inland Foundry Co. v. Dep't of Labor & Indus., 106 Wn. App. 333,
340,24 P.3d 424 (2001).
c. 	Application of the two rules of review to challengedfinding offact 5
Ms. Goodeill assigns error to the superior court's critical finding of fact 5:
"Madison Real Estate was prevented from sending a full and specific statement within 14
days because of circumstances beyond their control, i.e., not receiving invoices until
September 18 and October 1,2013." CP at 53. First, the superior court did not weigh
conflicting evidence to make this quoted finding. 	Therefore, as explained above, our
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No. 32442-7-111
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
review of the evidence pertaining to this finding is de novo. 	Second, even had the
superior court weighed conflicting evidence to make finding of fact 5, our review still
would be de novo. This is because finding of fact 5 is actually a conclusion of law. Here,
the superior court interpreted the meaning of "circumstances beyond the landlord's
control" in RCW 59.18.280 and then applied that interpretation to evidentiary facts.
Pursuant to Moulden, this application of law to evidentiary facts constitutes a legal
conclusion. For both of these reasons, we review finding of fact 5 de novo.
d. 	Applying the plain meaning of the statutory exception
RCW 59.18.280 provides, in relevant part:
Within fourteen days after the termination of the rental agreement and
vacation of the premises ... the landlord shall give a full and specific
statement of the basis for retaining any of the deposit together with the
payment of any refund due the tenant under the terms and conditions of the
rental agreement. No portion of any deposit shall be withheld on account of
wear resulting from ordinary use of the premises.
. .. If the landlord fails to give such statement together with any
refund due the tenant within the time limits specified above he or she shall
be liable to the tenant for the full amount of the deposit. The landlord is
also barred in any action brought by the tenant to recover the deposit from
asserting any claim or raising any defense for retaining any of the deposit
unless the landlord shows that circumstances beyond the landlord's control
prevented the landlordfrom providing the statement within thefourteen
days. . . . The court may in its discretion award up to two times the amount
of the deposit for the intentional refusal of the landlord to give the statement
or refund due. In any action brought by the tenant to recover the deposit,
the prevailing party shall additionally be entitled to the cost of suit or
arbitration including a reasonable attorney's fee.
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No. 32442-7-III
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
(Emphasis added.)
Washington's Residential Landlord-Tenant Act of 1973, chapter 59.18 RCW, does
not define "circumstances beyond the landlord's control." There are only four published
cases citing or interpreting RCW 59.18.280, none of which address the meaning of
"circumstances beyond the landlord's control." See generally Sardam v. Morford, 51
Wn. App. 908, 756 P.2d 174 (1988); In re Marriage of Nelson, 62 Wn. App. 515, 814
P.2d 1208 (1991); Liera v. Senatore, 75 Wn. App. 97, 877 P.2d 700 (1994); State v.
Schwab, 103 Wn.2d 542, 693 P.2d 108 (1985). Accordingly, we must employ rules of
statutory interpretation to discern the meaning of the phrase in question.
"Statutory interpretation is a question of law reviewed de novo." 	Williams v.
TUaye, 174 Wn.2d 57, 61, 272 P.3d 235 (2012). Our Supreme Court articulated the
process of statutory interpretation in Christensen v. Ellsworth:
A court's objective in construing a statute is to determine the
legislature's intent. "[I]fthe statute's meaning is plain on its face, then the
court must give effect to that plain meaning as an expression of legislative
intent." Plain meaning is discerned from the ordinary meaning of the
language at issue, the context of the statute in which that provision is found,
related provisions, and the statutory scheme as a whole. An undefined
statutory term should be given its usual and ordinary meaning. 	Statutory
provisions and rules should be harmonized whenever possible. If the
statutory language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation,
then a court may resort to statutory construction, legislative history, and
relevant case law for assistance in discerning legislative intent.
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No. 32442-7-III
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
162 Wn.2d 365,372-73, 173 P.3d 228 (2007) (citations and internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Dep't of Ecology v. Campbell & Gwinn, LLC, 146 Wn.2d 1, 9-10, 43
P.3d 4 (2002».
With one exception, unless the landlord timely provides the required notice,
RCW 59.18.280 bars a landlord from asserting any claim to the tenant's deposit. The
exception requires "the landlord [to show] that circumstances beyond [its] control
prevented [it] from providing the statement within the fourteen days." RCW 59.18.280.
We see no ambiguity in the statutory exception, and therefore give effect to its plain
meaning: Circumstances are either beyond a landlord's control or within a landlord's
control. Circumstances within a landlord's control can be divided into either active
delays or passive delays. For purposes of this analysis, "active delays" are when the
landlord simply fails to promptly do something, and "passive delays" are when the
landlord permits an unreasonable delay by another. We hold that a landlord may not avail
itself ofRCW 59.18.280's exception unless it accounts for any active or passive delay
sufficient to show that it made a conscientious attempt to comply with the statutory 14
day notice.
Here, Madison has not shown this. First, Madison failed to explain why it did not
provide DavisPro a work order soon after the Goodeills vacated on August 27, 2013, and
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No. 32442-7-111
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
gave it a key the following day. Madison did not provide DavisPro a work order until
September 9-12 days after it had access to the vacant rental. Within two days, DavisPro
cleaned and repaired the inside and outside of the rental so it was rentable. Had Madison
promptly contacted DavisPro, DavisPro would have completed its work well within the
statutory 14 day timeframe. 	Second, Madison did not explain why it could not have
learned of DavisPro's actual charges weeks before October 1. Madison could have
telephoned DavisPro after it did its work and either asked DavisPro for its total charges or
for it to promptly send its invoices. 	Madison did neither. Rather, Madison disregarded
Ms. Goodeill's statutory right and passively waited 20 days for DavisPro's last invoice.
Simply put, Madison's evidence falls woefully short of showing that circumstances
beyond its control prevented it from timely providing Ms. Goodeill the statutory notice.
We, therefore, conclude that Madison may not avail itself of the statutory exception.
2. 	Monetary compensation
Ms. Goodeill requests reasonable attorney fees, costs, and other relief.
RCW 59.18.280 provides, in relevant part: "In any action brought by the tenant to
recover the deposit, the prevailing party shall additionally be entitled to the cost
of suit or arbitration including a reasonable attorney's fee." 	Subject to Ms. Goodeill's
compliance with RAP 18 .1 (d), she is entitled to have a commissioner of this court
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No. 32442-7-111
Goodeill v. Madison Real Estate
determine reasonable attorney fees and costs on appeal. 	We remand for the superior court
to award Ms. Goodeill reasonable attorney fees and costs incurred at that level, to award
Ms. Goodeill her $800.00 deposit together with statutory interest from 14 days after
September 3, 2013, plus up to an additional $800.00 pursuant to RCW 59.18.280.
Reverse and remand.
Lawrence-Berrey, J.
WE CONCUR:
:1. 	J
Fearin~\
17