County of Grant v. Brad Alan Hochhausen

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
April 13, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP1065 Cir. Ct. No. 2022TR274

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

COUNTY OF GRANT,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

BRAD ALAN HOCHHAUSEN,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Grant County:
CRAIG R. DAY, Judge. Reversed in part and cause remanded with directions.

¶1 NASHOLD, J.1 Brad Hochhausen appeals a part of his judgment
that suspended his operating privileges for 15 days under WIS. STAT. § 343.30(1n).

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(b) (2021-22).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
No. 2022AP1065

Because I conclude that the 15-day mandatory suspension in § 343.30(1n) does
not apply here, I reverse the suspension.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Hochhausen was cited for speeding. The citation alleged that
Hochhausen was driving 86 miles per hour (mph) in a 55-mph zone on U.S.
Highway 61 in Grant County, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h), as adopted
by GRANT COUNTY ORDINANCE 267-1.2

¶3 It is undisputed that there are signs on Highway 61 posting a speed
limit of 55 mph. Hochhausen filed a motion to dismiss the citation, arguing that
WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h) applies only in the absence of any other fixed speed
limits or the posting of such limits. See § 346.57(4)(h) (establishing speed limit as
follows: “In the absence of any other fixed limits or the posting of limits as
required or authorized by law, 55 miles per hour.”) He argued that, because

2
GRANT COUNTY ORDINANCE 267-1 provides:

Except for the suspension or revocation of motor vehicle
licenses, all provisions of Chs. 341 to 348 and 350, inclusive,
Wis. Stats., describing and defining regulations with respect to
vehicles and traffic for which the penalty is a forfeiture only,
including forfeitures to be imposed and procedure for
prosecution, are hereby adopted and by reference made a part of
this article as if fully set forth herein. Any act required to be
performed or prohibited by any statute incorporated herein by
reference is required or prohibited by this article.

GRANT COUNTY, WIS., ORDINANCES, ch. 1, § 267-1 (2012) (https://ecode360.com/12827071).
Thus, conduct constituting a violation WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h) is also a Grant County
ordinance violation. The same is true with respect to § 346.57(5), discussed infra. For ease of
reading, going forward I discuss the statutory provisions only, without reference to the county
ordinance incorporating them.

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No. 2022AP1065

Highway 61 has posted signs indicating a speed limit of 55 mph, § 346.57(4)(h) is
inapplicable.

¶4 The circuit court held a hearing on Hochhausen’s motion and agreed
that dismissal was warranted for the reasons Hochhausen argued. However, the
court allowed the prosecutor to either move to amend or refile the citation. The
prosecutor moved to amend the citation to allege a violation of WIS. STAT.
§ 346.57(5), and the court granted the motion. Section 346.57(5) provides that
“no person shall drive a vehicle in excess of any speed limit established pursuant
to law by state or local authorities and indicated by official signs.”

¶5 At a subsequent hearing, Hochhausen entered a plea of no contest to
the amended charge of speeding under WIS. STAT. § 346.57(5) and was convicted
of that offense. The County recommended a 15-day suspension of Hochhausen’s
operating privileges and a civil forfeiture. Hochhausen argued that the 15-day
mandatory suspension set forth in WIS. STAT. § 343.30(1n)3 does not apply to an
offense under § 346.57(5). The circuit court disagreed and imposed the 15-day
mandatory suspension under § 343.30(1n). Hochhausen appeals, challenging the
mandatory suspension.

DISCUSSION

¶6 Hochhausen argues that the circuit court erred in applying the 15-
day mandatory suspension set forth in WIS. STAT. § 343.30(1n). This appeal

3
The text of this statute is set forth and analyzed in the Discussion section of this
opinion.

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No. 2022AP1065

requires that I construe § 343.30(1n) and related statutory provisions, WIS. STAT.
§ 346.57(4) and (5).

¶7 “[S]tatutory interpretation begins with the language of the statute. If
the meaning of the statute is plain, [the court] ordinarily stops the inquiry.” State
ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Ct. for Dane Cnty., 2004 WI 58, ¶45, 271 Wis. 2d 633,
681 N.W.2d 110 (internal quotation marks and quoted source omitted). “Statutory
language is given its common, ordinary, and accepted meaning, except that
technical or specially-defined words or phrases are given their technical or special
definitional meaning.” Id. “In construing or interpreting a statute the court is not
at liberty to disregard the plain, clear words of the statute.” Id., ¶46 (internal
quotation marks and quoted source omitted). Statutory interpretation is an issue of
law subject to de novo review. See State v. Ozuna, 2017 WI 64, ¶9, 376 Wis. 2d
1, 898 N.W.2d 20.

¶8 The 15-day mandatory suspension at issue in this case is set forth in
WIS. STAT. § 343.30(1n), which provides in relevant part: “A [circuit] court shall
suspend the operating privilege of a person for a period of 15 days upon the
person’s conviction by the court of exceeding the applicable speed limit as
established by [WIS. STAT. §] 346.57(4)(gm) or (h), by 25 or more miles per
hour.” Hochhausen argues that, because his conviction is not for “exceeding the
applicable speed limit as established by [§] 346.57(4)(gm) or (h),” but is instead a
conviction for exceeding the applicable speed limit as established by § 346.57(5),
the mandatory suspension in § 343.30(1n) is inapplicable. For the reasons set
forth below, I agree.

¶9 It is undisputed that the circuit court concluded that Hochhausen
could not be cited for violating WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h) and therefore allowed

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No. 2022AP1065

the County to amend the citation to allege a violation of § 346.57(5) in place of
§ 346.57(4)(h). It is also undisputed that Hochhausen was subsequently convicted
of violating § 346.57(5). I agree with Hochhausen that, under the plain language
of WIS. STAT. § 343.30(1n), his conviction for violating § 346.57(5) is not a
“conviction by the court of exceeding the applicable speed limit as established by
[§] 346.57(4)(gm) or (h).” See § 343.30(1n).

¶10 This interpretation is also supported by the relevant statutory
language in WIS. STAT. § 346.57. Section 346.57(5), governing “zoned and posted
limits,” provides in pertinent part that “no person shall drive a vehicle in excess of
any speed limit established pursuant to law by state or local authorities and
indicated by official signs.” In contrast, paragraphs (gm) and (h), in subsection (4)
governing “fixed limits,” state in relevant part:

(4) FIXED LIMITS. … [N]o person shall drive a
vehicle at a speed in excess of the following limits unless
different limits are indicated by official traffic signs:

….

(gm)

1. Except as provided in subd. 2., 65 miles per hour
on any expressway.

2. Seventy miles per hour on any freeway,
including freeways that are a part of the national system of
interstate and defense highways, and on any portion of an
expressway that gives preference to through traffic by
utilizing interchanges only.

(h) In the absence of any other fixed limits or the
posting of limits as required or authorized by law, 55 miles
per hour.

Sec. 346.57(4)(gm), (h). The “zoned and posted limits” set forth in subsection (5)
are distinct from the “fixed limits” in subsection (4), including the limits set forth

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No. 2022AP1065

in paragraphs (4)(gm) and (h). Indeed, the circuit court recognized this legal
distinction when it agreed with Hochhausen that, because the 55-mph speed limit
on Highway 61 was posted, Hochhausen could not be cited for violating
§ 346.57(4)(h) but could be cited for violating § 346.57(5).

¶11 The position of both the circuit court and the County is that the
mandatory suspension should apply because the posted limit in this case—
55 mph—is numerically the same as the fixed limit established by WIS. STAT.
§ 345.57(4)(h). The circuit court concluded that “regardless of the section under
which the citation is issued, if the speed is more than twenty-five miles per hour in
excess of the statutory or posted limit, … the provisions of the mandatory fifteen-
day suspension do apply.” In reaching this conclusion, the court construed WIS.
STAT. § 343.30(ln) to mean that the speed limits “established by” WIS. STAT.
§ 346.57(4)(gm) and (h) are 55, 65, and 70. Thus, under the court’s interpretation,
Hochhausen was convicted of exceeding the applicable speed limit as “established
by” § 346.57(4)(h) by 25 or more mph, and the mandatory suspension therefore
applies. This interpretation is contrary to the plain language of §§ 343.30(ln) and
346.57(4)(h).

¶12 The 55-mph speed limit established by WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h)
applies only “in the absence of any other fixed limits or the posting of limits as
required or authorized by law.” The 55-mph speed limit on Highway 61 is a
posted speed limit and therefore that speed limit is not “established by”
§ 346.57(4)(h). See WIS. STAT. § 343.30(1n). Thus, under the plain language of
§§ 343.30(1n) and 346.57(4)(h), the 15-day mandatory suspension is not
applicable here.

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No. 2022AP1065

¶13 The County also offers what it says is a “contextual” interpretation
of WIS. STAT. § 346.57(4)(h)’s phrase “in the absence of any other fixed limits.”
See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (“[S]tatutory language is interpreted in the
context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the
language of surrounding or closely-related statutes ….”). The County argues that
the phrase “[i]n the absence of any other fixed limits” as used in § 346.57(4)(h)
refers to the speed limits delineated in § 346.57(4)(a) through (gm) and (i) through
(k)—namely, the 15, 25, 35, 45, 65 and 70-mph speed limits. According to the
County, it is reasonable to read “in the absence of any other fixed limits” to mean
“that in the absence of any of those other” speed limits, the speed limit is 55 mph.
This argument fails, however, because, at a minimum, it completely ignores the
language in § 346.57(4)(h) that governs here—specifically, the phrase “or the
posting of limits as required or authorized by law.” As stated, it is undisputed that
the 55-mph speed limit is posted on Highway 61 as required or authorized by law.
Therefore, the speed limit was not “as established by” § 346.57(4)(h), as required
for the 15-day mandatory suspension under WIS. STAT. § 343.30(1n).

¶14 The County also argues that Hochhausen’s interpretation leads to
“absurd” results. See Kalal, 271 Wis. 2d 633, ¶46 (statutory language is
interpreted, where possible, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results). Specifically,
the County notes that, under this interpretation, a person is subject to the
mandatory suspension for exceeding the speed limit by 25 mph or more if the
speed limit is not posted but would not be subject to the mandatory suspension if
that same speed limit is posted (and therefore more noticeable).

¶15 As previously noted, however, this court is bound by the plain
language of these statutes. To the extent that there may be unintended or

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No. 2022AP1065

anomalous consequences from applying this clear statutory language, that is for
the legislature—not this court—to fix.

¶16 Accordingly, I reverse the judgment with respect to the suspension
and this action is remanded with directions to amend the judgment to remove the
15-day mandatory suspension under WIS. STAT. § 343.30(1n).4

By the Court.—Judgment reversed in part and cause remanded with
directions.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

4
I note that, during proceedings before the circuit court, the court and parties agreed that
the court had discretionary authority under WIS. STAT. § 343.30(1) to suspend Hochhausen’s
operating privileges for up to one year. I do not address this provision, however, because the
court explicitly stated that it was suspending Hochhausen’s operating privileges pursuant to
§ 343.30(1n) rather than § 343.30(1). Separately, I observe that neither party argues that this case
is moot due to the expiration of the 15-day mandatory suspension. Therefore, I likewise do not
address this issue.

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