Susan Kay Quaranta v. Michael Palma Quaranta

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 9, 2023
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Sheila T. Reiff petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP821 Cir. Ct. No. 2008FA580

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

IN RE THE MARRIAGE OF:

SUSAN KAY QUARANTA,

JOINT-PETITIONER-APPELLANT,

V.

MICHAEL PALMA QUARANTA,

JOINT-PETITIONER-RESPONDENT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Eau Claire County:
JON M. THEISEN, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Hruz, Gill and Grogan, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2021AP821

¶1 PER CURIAM. Susan Quaranta appeals an order denying her
motion to modify the amount and duration of Michael Quaranta’s obligations
under a limited-term maintenance order.1 Susan argues that the circuit court erred
by applying an improper legal standard that required the relevant substantial
change in circumstances be unforeseeable. In the alternative, she argues that the
court erroneously determined that there was no substantial change in
circumstances. We reject Susan’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Susan and Michael married in February 1992 and subsequently had
five children together. The parties later divorced in October 2010, at which time
their children were ages seventeen, fifteen, fourteen, eleven and seven. As part of
the divorce proceedings, the circuit court granted Susan sole legal custody and
primary physical placement of the children.2 The court also ordered that Michael
not receive any periods of overnight placement.

¶3 In reaching its custody and placement decisions, the circuit court
recognized that Michael “lacks significantly in his ability to be an effective
parent” and that “[h]aving five children under the best of circumstances can be
trying. There are always issues. There are always conflicts. There are always
problems to be solved.” The court ordered that Michael attend counseling
sessions “to address his parenting issues and work on his co-parenting skills.”

1
Because the parties share the same last name, we will refer to them by only their first
names throughout the remainder of this opinion.
2
The Honorable Benjamin D. Proctor presided over the original divorce proceedings.
The Honorable Jon M. Theisen presided over Susan’s motion to modify maintenance, which is
the motion at issue in this appeal.

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¶4 The circuit court also ordered Michael to pay Susan $3,387 per
month for child support and $700 per month for maintenance. As each child
became emancipated, the corresponding reduction in Michael’s child support
payments would convert into additional maintenance payments to Susan. In
setting child support and maintenance, the court recognized that Susan had a
college education, was three credits short of a teaching certificate, and earned
approximately $800 per month working part-time. Michael, on the other hand,
had been “employed by IBM for many years and earn[ed] approximately $10,500
per month.” As noted in Susan’s position statement to the court prior to the
divorce, Michael “ha[d] increased his income significantly during his years with
[IBM],” increasing from $51,590 in 1993 to $128,757 in 2009.

¶5 Although Susan had asked for indefinite family support, in lieu of
child support and maintenance, the circuit court ultimately ordered the
above-noted combination of child support and maintenance, and it limited the term
of Michael’s maintenance payments to ten years. The court explained that
maintenance would be for only ten years because after that time, the youngest
child should be a senior in high school and “[Susan] hopefully will have her
teaching certificate and be able to earn a wage where she can be self-sustaining.”
The court later reiterated its decision, stating: “It is the court’s intent that the
maintenance aspect of this order will not go beyond ten years.”

¶6 In June 2020—with less than one year of maintenance payments
remaining—Susan filed a motion to modify the amount and duration of Michael’s
maintenance payments. Susan alleged that Michael had “refused to provide any
meaningful assistance in parenting [their] children,” that he “refused to exercise
his periods of placement with some or all of them,” and that, as a result, Susan was
not able to advance her career or “meaningfully increase [her] earning capacity.”

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Susan requested that maintenance be extended until November 2027—
approximately seven additional years—at a rate of $4,083 per month.

¶7 The circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on Susan’s motion.
Susan testified that she earned her bachelor’s degree in elementary education in
1991 but never taught on a full-time basis. After the parties’ divorce, Susan
worked in number of different positions, including as a part-time cashier, special
education assistant, substitute teacher, and waitress. Susan testified that she quit
her part-time cashier position after Michael failed to exercise his placement of the
children on one particular weekend.

¶8 In more recent years, Susan applied for two different full-time
teaching positions at a school where she had taught as a substitute teacher, but she
did not receive an offer for either position. However, Susan was later offered a
full-time teaching position at an elementary school with starting pay of about
$39,000 per year and employee benefits. Susan ultimately declined that offer
because it was an hour commute each way, she felt “burnt out” from teaching, and
she was “having major issues” with two children at home. In July 2020, Susan
began working at Kwik Trip, earning approximately $12.75 per hour.

¶9 Susan also testified about the challenges of raising the parties’
children. Susan discussed how one of their daughters repeatedly failed to come
home by curfew, threw a glass of wine at a younger sibling, and often argued with
Susan. Susan also noted that one of their sons refused to go to school his senior
year after scoring “very well on his ACT test.” Susan said that he had to go to
truancy court and that she sometimes left work to get him to school. Susan further
described several instances where she thought Michael undercut her authority and
decisions with the children. In addition, she stated that Michael failed to exercise

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all of his scheduled placements, that he would return the children early and
unannounced, and that he once left their youngest child alone at Susan’s home.

¶10 Susan’s counselor, Dr. Harlan Heinz, also testified at the hearing.
Heinz testified that he had regular meetings and conversations with Susan after the
parties’ divorce and that they often discussed Susan’s challenges with the children
and her employment. Heinz noted that Susan has generalized anxiety disorder and
had depression in the past. Heinz also observed that Susan has some “Post
Traumatic Stress features” but was never diagnosed with PTSD. Heinz opined
that Susan would not have been able to complete any advanced training or to teach
full-time while she was caring for the parties’ minor children. Heinz recognized,
however, that Susan was now capable of working as a teacher, but he thought she
was “burnt out” and would not be happy doing so. Heinz also noted that Susan
had made “great strides in dealing with her anxiety and … depression” in recent
years.

¶11 Michael was the final witness. He testified that he continued to
work at IBM after the divorce and currently made about $173,000 per year. He
said that he had a good relationship with all of the children and that he “always
sought to spend time with [them].” In particular, Michael would ask Susan if he
could take some of the children on trips, but he eventually stopped asking after he
“knew the answer was no.” Michael agreed that the children had some challenges
growing up, but he disagreed that they “had struggles that most children don’t
have.” Michael acknowledged that he would sometimes take the children’s sides
in their arguments with Susan, but he asserted that he never directly or
intentionally tried to undermine Susan’s decisions and that he always encouraged
the children to respect her.

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¶12 At the end of the hearing, the circuit court made a number of factual
findings. The court found that at the time of the divorce judgment, “[i]t was not
unforeseeable that [Susan] would have heightened responsibility for parenting.”
Although the court recognized that there were “some really tough days” and
“sleepless nights,” the court found that the children did not present “uncommon”
behaviors or challenges. Further, the court determined that Michael “ha[d] put in
his parenting and his support, he’s just done it in his own way, which notably is
not [Susan’s] way.” The court also observed that Susan “attach[ed] too much to
[her] opinion of parenting” and did not “have enough deference or respect for
[Michael’s] parenting.”

¶13 The circuit court found that Michael continued working for IBM—a
“blue chip” company—and increased his earnings from $131,000 to $174,000, but
he “did not go back to school and become a doctor or anything like that.” The
court recognized that Susan “is not a person driven to occupations just because of
higher income” but “[t]hat’s a choice she makes.” Regarding Susan’s mental
health, the court noted Dr. Heinz’s testimony that Susan “had some symptoms of
PTSD” and was “burnt out [from] teaching” but had been doing “a lot better” over
the prior couple of years. The court determined that Susan’s mental health and her
challenges parenting did not “substantially interfere[]” with her taking the
full-time teaching position that she had been offered. The court further found that
Susan’s mental health was not “preventing [her] from income.”

¶14 Ultimately, the circuit court denied Susan’s motion, concluding that
there was not a substantial change in circumstances. The court explained that
Michael did not have “an unforeseeable substantial increase in his income” and
that Michael did not have “a lack of parenting.” The court also noted that the
challenges in raising the parties’ children were neither a substantial change nor

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No. 2021AP821

unforeseeable. Finally, the court stated that it did not believe that Susan’s mental
health was a sufficient reason as to why she was not teaching.

¶15 Susan now appeals. Additional facts will be provided as necessary
below.

DISCUSSION

¶16 Before a circuit court can modify a prior maintenance order, the
party seeking modification must establish “that there has been a substantial change
in circumstances warranting the proposed modification.” Rohde-Giovanni v.
Baumgart, 2004 WI 27, ¶30, 269 Wis. 2d 598, 676 N.W.2d 452; see also WIS.
STAT. § 767.59(1c)(a)1., (1f)(a) (2021-22).3 In determining whether there has
been a substantial change in circumstances, “the [court’s] focus should be on any
financial changes the parties have experienced.” Rohde-Giovanni, 269 Wis. 2d
598, ¶30. Specifically, the court “should compare the facts regarding the parties’
current financial status with those surrounding the previous [maintenance] order.”
Kenyon v. Kenyon, 2004 WI 147, ¶38, 277 Wis. 2d 47, 690 N.W.2d 251. If the
court determines that there has been a substantial change in circumstances, the
court must then determine whether maintenance should be modified by
considering “the dual maintenance objectives of support and fairness.” See id.,
¶39.

¶17 We review a circuit court’s determination regarding a substantial
change in circumstances for an erroneous exercise of discretion. Rohde-Giovanni,

3
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.

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No. 2021AP821

269 Wis. 2d 598, ¶17; see also Cashin v. Cashin, 2004 WI App 92, ¶44, 273
Wis. 2d 754, 681 N.W.2d 255 (discussing Rohde-Giovanni and concluding that a
circuit court makes a discretionary decision in determining whether there was a
substantial change in circumstances).4 We will uphold a court’s discretionary
decision “when the record shows that the court employed a process of reasoning in
which the facts and applicable law are considered in arriving at a conclusion based
on logic and founded on proper legal standards.” Murray v. Murray, 231 Wis. 2d
71, 78, 604 N.W.2d 912 (Ct. App. 1999). Whether a circuit court employed
proper legal standards is a question of law that we review de novo. Ulrich v.
Zemke, 2002 WI App 246, ¶8, 258 Wis. 2d 180, 654 N.W.2d 458.

I. The circuit court applied the proper legal standard

¶18 Susan argues that the circuit court applied an improper legal
standard by requiring her to prove a substantial change in circumstances that was
“unforeseeable” at the time of the divorce. She contends that the totality of the
court’s comments demonstrate that the court would only have granted her motion
if “she could show that any substantial changes in circumstances were
unforeseen.”

¶19 We are not convinced that the circuit court applied an improper legal
standard. The parties both expressly informed the court at the motion hearing that
the relevant standard was a substantial change in circumstances, as reflected in
Rohde-Giovanni. The court then employed that standard in both its oral decision
and its written order. Although the court frequently discussed the foreseeability of

4
The parties both state that we must review the circuit court’s decision for an erroneous
exercise of discretion.

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No. 2021AP821

the present circumstances, it never expressly stated that a change in circumstances
must be unforeseeable in order to qualify as a substantial change in circumstances.

¶20 Rather, the circuit court’s comments demonstrate that it considered
the concept of foreseeability in determining whether any changes were substantial.
For example, the court first noted in its oral decision that the difference between
Michael’s income at the time of the divorce and at the time of the motion was
equivalent to a cost-of-living increase. The court later stated that Michael did not
have an “unforeseeable substantial increase in income.” When considered
together, these comments show that the court viewed the cost-of-living increase in
Michael’s income as a fact that would have been expected and anticipated at the
time of the divorce judgment; therefore, the court viewed this change in
circumstances as insubstantial.

¶21 Likewise, the circuit court’s comments regarding the foreseeability
of Michael’s parenting style and of Susan’s struggles with the children show that
the court did not find these circumstances to be a substantial change. The court
recognized that Michael had a different parenting style than Susan but not a lack
of parenting. The court also emphasized that the prior court granted Susan sole
custody and primary physical placement of the children, which indicated that
“there was not really a big expectation about [Michael’s] parenting.” Thus, the
court recognized that at the time of the divorce judgment, the prior court would
have contemplated Susan’s increased responsibility for the children and the
associated challenges.

¶22 We are also mindful of the broader context of the circuit court’s
foreseeability comments. Before determining whether there had been a substantial

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No. 2021AP821

change in circumstances, the court recognized the importance of the prior court’s
decision and the significance of limited-term maintenance:

So Judge Proctor made a decision based upon a trial right at
the time of the divorce[, and] … I’m going to give great
deference to that.… [I]t’s important what he decided and it
was limited term maintenance, ten years and this formula
for support, that’s what he decided and great deference is
given to that and … not just because he was a judge, but
because of the importance of limited term maintenance.

¶23 These comments are consistent with controlling precedent, which
requires courts to “adhere to the findings of fact made in the previous proceeding”
and to “not retry the issues decided in that proceeding.” See Kenyon, 277 Wis. 2d
47, ¶2. Significantly, when granting limited-term maintenance, a court must
exercise some foresight into the parties’ future financial circumstances “[b]ecause
limited-term maintenance is relatively inflexible and final.” See LaRocque v.
LaRocque, 139 Wis. 2d 23, 41, 406 N.W.2d 736 (1987). For example, the court
must consider “the ability of the recipient spouse to become self-supporting by the
end of the maintenance period …; the ability of the payor spouse to continue the
obligation of support for an indefinite time; and the need for the court to continue
jurisdiction regarding maintenance.” Id.; see also WIS. STAT. § 767.56(1c)(e)-(f),
(j). Thus, to avoid second-guessing a prior decision to award maintenance for a
limited term, a court could certainly consider the facts foreseen at the time of the
original order when determining whether a change in circumstances was
substantial.

¶24 These principles are also consistent with prior precedent, which has
considered foreseeable facts in determining whether there was a substantial change
in circumstances. See Rosplock v. Rosplock, 217 Wis. 2d 22, 36-37, 577 N.W.2d
32 (Ct. App. 1998) (concluding that a party’s “efforts to maximize the value of her

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property division and transform it into additional income was well within the
foreseeability of the parties at the time” of the stipulated maintenance and that “the
amounts of this income are not of a dimension which constitute a substantial
change in circumstances”); see also Jantzen v. Jantzen, 2007 WI App 171, ¶¶15,
17, 304 Wis. 2d 449, 737 N.W.2d 5 (considering facts that were “anticipated” at
the time of the prior maintenance order). Further, in the context of a child support
case, we said that “[o]ne shorthand definition for a substantial change in
circumstances is that it is some unforeseen event which occurs after an agreement
has been executed.” Jalovec v. Jalovec, 2007 WI App 206, ¶24, 305 Wis. 2d 467,
739 N.W.2d 834.

¶25 Finally, the parties’ arguments to the circuit court also provide
relevant context to the court’s foreseeability discussion. In her written submission
to the court, Susan argued that “no one foresaw the struggles [she] would have
with the children, the demands they would make on her time, or the lack of
Michael’s involvement. But for those unforeseen and substantial change[s] in
circumstances, Susan would have been able to focus on building her earnings.”
(Emphasis added.) Susan’s attorney again raised the concept of foreseeability at
the motion hearing, arguing that “the children had issues that were not foreseen at
the … time of trial.” Michael’s attorney, in turn, also discussed the facts foreseen
at the time of the original divorce judgment.

¶26 At one point in the motion hearing, the circuit court attempted to
clarify Susan’s argument, asking: “Your overture is that that is unforeseeable
change in circumstances that is substantial?” In response, Susan’s attorney pushed
back on the possible notion that a substantial change in circumstances had to be
unforeseen, and the court never rejected that position. Thereafter, however, both
parties and the court continued to discuss the foreseeability of certain facts at the

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time of the original divorce. Accordingly, the court’s consideration of
foreseeability tracked the arguments advanced by the parties, and it was couched
in the overall context of whether the current circumstances reflected a substantial
change from those considered in the original maintenance order.

¶27 In short, although the circuit court frequently discussed the
foreseeability of the present circumstances, the court’s comments do not
demonstrate that it changed or deviated from the correct legal standard of whether
there had been a substantial change in circumstances. See WIS. STAT.
§ 767.59(1f)(a); Rohde-Giovanni, 269 Wis. 2d 598, ¶30.

II. The circuit court did not erroneously exercise its discretion

¶28 In the alternative, Susan argues that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion by determining that there was not a substantial change in
circumstances. She contends that there were a number of substantial changes,
including: (1) Michael’s yearly income increasing by approximately $45,000;
(2) her “extraordinary challenges” raising the parties’ children; (3) her mental
health issues; and (4) Michael’s failure to comply with the divorce judgment,
including his failure to exercise his placement of the children consistently. Susan
recognizes that the last three circumstances are not financial circumstances per se,
but she contends that they all impacted her earning capacity.

¶29 Susan’s arguments largely ignore the circuit court’s factual findings,
especially its findings that Michael provided support for the parties’ children and
did not have a “lack of parenting,” that the children did not present “uncommon”
challenges or difficulties, that the children and Susan’s mental health did not
“substantially interfere” with her taking the “more lucrative” full-time teaching
position, and that Susan’s mental health was not preventing her from obtaining

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income. Although Susan expresses some dissatisfaction with these findings, she
never directly argues that any of them are clearly erroneous.5 See WIS. STAT.
§ 805.17(2).

¶30 Despite Susan’s insistence on appeal that her earning capacity was
negatively affected by the challenges with the children, her mental health, and
Michael’s alleged failure to exercise more placement, the circuit court did not find
that any of these alleged circumstances affected her ability to generate more
income. To the contrary, the court found that Susan’s income had increased
overall since the divorce, despite recent decreases, and that she chose to pursue a
vocation other than teaching, which “would be the most lucrative for her.” In
other words, the court recognized that Susan had a higher earning capacity than
that evidenced by her present income. Indeed, Susan had declined a teaching
position that would have paid approximately $39,000 per year, which was well
above her projected yearly income of $26,000 as a service associate at Kwik Trip.
Again, the court found that neither the parties’ children (most of whom were now
emancipated) nor Susan’s mental health substantially interfered with her ability to
take that teaching position. Thus, the court could reasonably determine that Susan
had the ability to obtain a higher paying and self-supporting job.

¶31 Susan attempts to sow doubt in the circuit court’s finding that she
could become a teacher by emphasizing the court’s belief that Susan “ha[d]
emotional issues which do not sit well with teaching.” Susan’s argument,

5
In her reply brief, Susan identifies several “undisputed facts” that support her
arguments. None of those “facts,” however, were found by the circuit court in rendering its
decision. Even if we assumed that Susan’s facts were undisputed, none of them convince us that
the court’s ultimate findings of fact are clearly erroneous or that the court could not reasonably
determine that there was no substantial change in circumstances.

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No. 2021AP821

however, conflates the court’s comments about Susan’s ability to become a
teacher and Susan’s suitability for that position. Here, the court reasonably
determined that teaching might not have been the best fit for Susan, but it was a
career that she was nonetheless capable of obtaining, as evidenced by the prior job
offer.6

¶32 With regard to Michael’s increased income, the circuit court
explained that it did not find the increase to be a substantial change in
circumstances because “none of it really amounts to anything other than pretty
much a cost of living [increase] o[f] two or three somewhere percent per year.”
The court also found that this increase was not unforeseeable at the time of the
divorce judgment. Indeed, Michael’s income had increased steadily over his
career, including during the marriage. Thus, at the time of the divorce judgment,
the parties and the court could have anticipated that Michael’s income would
continue to increase during the next ten years.

¶33 Susan disagrees with the circuit court’s cost-of-living rationale,
arguing that Michael’s increased income was not the result of cost-of-living
adjustments because Michael’s income both increased and decreased over the
ten-year period. Even if Michael’s income did fluctuate, there is nothing
unreasonable about the court’s decision to view Michael’s increased income in the

6
Notably, Susan’s financial circumstances at the time of her motion to modify
maintenance appear to be consistent with the circumstances the circuit court had anticipated in
granting limited-term maintenance. As noted earlier, the court set maintenance for a limited term
because it anticipated that the parties’ youngest child would be a senior in high school when
maintenance ended and that Susan “hopefully will have her teaching certificate and be able to
earn a wage where she can be self-sustaining.” At the time of the motion hearing, the parties’
youngest child was a senior in high school and Susan had the ability to work as a teacher where
she could earn nearly $40,000—an income that Susan does not suggest is insufficient.

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aggregate and to consider the average increase over the ten-year period. Other
than emphasizing the alleged fluctuations, Susan provides no basis for us to
disturb the court’s finding that Michael’s income generally increased consistent
with the increased costs of living over time.

¶34 Overall, the circuit court’s view of the parties’ financial
circumstances is consistent with our discussion in Murray, where we questioned
whether the payor’s roughly $43,000 increase in income would constitute a
substantial change in circumstances over a ten-year period of maintenance. See
Murray, 231 Wis. 2d at 83. We further stated that “just because the payor has
achieved a position that enables him or her to live a richer lifestyle than that
enjoyed during the marriage does not mean that the payee may share this lifestyle
as well through maintenance.” Id. Thus, like the court in Murray, the circuit
court could reasonably conclude that Michael’s increased income over a lengthy
ten-year period was not so large as to constitute a substantial change in
circumstances.

¶35 Susan attempts to distinguish herself from the payee in Murray by
arguing that none of her financial circumstances were the result of her own
imprudent financial decisions. See id. at 82-83. Susan’s argument is misplaced,
however, because the Murray court’s discussion of the payor’s increased income
was not directly premised on the payee’s imprudent financial decisions. See id.
at 83. Furthermore, reasonable persons could disagree that Susan made prudent
financial decisions. Despite knowing that Michael’s maintenance payments were
set to expire in the near future, Susan declined a higher paying, full-time teaching
job. Such a decision might have been a good choice from a job-satisfaction
perspective, but a reasonable person could also view it as a poor financial
decision.

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¶36 In sum, the circuit court reasonably determined that Susan’s earning
capacity and Michael’s increased income did not constitute a substantial change in
circumstances since the divorce judgment.7

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

7
Susan also argues in her brief-in-chief that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion by not considering the factors in WIS. STAT. § 767.56(1c) or the maintenance
objectives of support and fairness. In response, Michael correctly observes that a circuit court
need not engage in that analysis if it concludes that there was not a substantial change in
circumstances. See Kenyon v. Kenyon, 2004 WI 147, ¶39, 277 Wis. 2d 47, 690 N.W.2d 251.
Susan does not dispute Michael’s argument. Accordingly, we need not address Susan’s argument
because we conclude the court did not erroneously determine that there was no substantial change
in circumstances.

16