Winnebago County v. J.D.J.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
February 21, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP1085 Cir. Ct. No. 2023ME24

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF J.D.J.:

WINNEBAGO COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

J.D.J.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Winnebago County:
MICHAEL S. GIBBS, Judge. Reversed.
No. 2023AP1085

¶1 GROGAN, J.1 J.D.J. appeals from an order extending his WIS.
STAT. ch. 51 (hereinafter “ch. 51”) commitment and the corresponding order
requiring the administration of involuntary medication. He claims: (1) the
evidence failed to establish that he was dangerous; and (2) the involuntary
medication order should be vacated because the County failed to present sufficient
evidence to prove he was incompetent to refuse medication. This court reverses.

I. BACKGROUND

¶2 In January 2023, Winnebago County filed a petition to extend
J.D.J.’s involuntary commitment along with a report from J.D.J.’s treating doctor,
Dr. George Monese, who had recommended the extension and had indicated a
corresponding need for involuntary medication.

¶3 The circuit court held a hearing on the petition in February 2023.
The County called only Dr. Monese to testify at the hearing and did not enter
Dr. Monese’s report into evidence. At the hearing, Dr. Monese testified that J.D.J.
suffered from schizophrenia, that schizophrenia is a “major mental illness[,]” that
schizophrenia is a substantial disorder that impacted J.D.J.’s “[t]hought and mood
and perception[,]” and that J.D.J.’s schizophrenia grossly impaired his
“[j]udgment and capacity to recognize reality.” When asked if J.D.J. “would
become a proper subject for commitment” “if treatment were withdrawn,”
Dr. Monese responded that he would “because it has happened before. He was on
a commitment, it was withdrawn, and then he became a proper subject for

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2021-22).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.

2
No. 2023AP1085

commitment again.”2 Dr. Monese did not, however, provide any details as to the
circumstances of the prior withdrawal or the circumstances that resulted in the
subsequent commitment.

¶4 When asked if he had discussed “medication, specifically
psychotropic medication, with [J.D.J.,]” Dr. Monese confirmed that he had done
so and that he had also discussed the advantages, disadvantages, and potential
alternatives with him. Dr. Monese further confirmed that he did not believe J.D.J.
was “capable of expressing an understanding of the advantages and
disadvantages” of medication and that based on his conversations with J.D.J., he
did not believe J.D.J. was competent to refuse medication because J.D.J. did not
believe the medications were working despite evidence to the contrary.

¶5 In response to the County’s question as to whether J.D.J. had
“demonstrated a substantial likelihood that he needs care or treatment to prevent
further disability or deterioration[,]” Dr. Monese responded “[y]es, I would say
that to some degree[,]” and in providing an example from J.D.J.’s treatment
history that led him to that conclusion, Dr. Monese simply explained that J.D.J.
had gained weight—a side effect of the medication he was taking—and that
although something needed “to be changed or” other “measures [needed to be
taken] to remediate those side effects,” J.D.J. “doesn’t believe that that is the right

2
J.D.J.’s counsel objected on hearsay grounds, which the circuit court overruled.

3
No. 2023AP1085

way to do so.”3 The County followed up by asking whether there had “been any
recent acts or omissions that would support [his] conclusion” on this point, and
Dr. Monese explained that J.D.J. “had refused to take those specific medications
that can help with the problems that he has had -- that he’s having” and that J.D.J.
did not “want to take” “[t]he metformin that was prescribed for his symptoms[.]”

¶6 Dr. Monese then went on to discuss J.D.J.’s “underlying physical
conditions”4 and stated that “[t]he single physical condition that he has is called
metabolic syndrome[,]” that J.D.J. “was prescribed those medications specifically
for metabolic syndrome and he’s not taking them[,]” and that if J.D.J. did not take
the medication, “[h]e would continue to have side effects like severe weight gain,
cardiac, elevated BP’s, including the possibility of becoming diabetic.” During
cross-examination, Dr. Monese clarified that metformin had been prescribed to
treat the psychotropic drug’s side effects and that metformin “is the one that he
refuses[.]”

¶7 When asked to opine on whether J.D.J. had “evidenced a substantial
likelihood that, if left untreated, he would lack the services necessary for his health
or safety[,]” Dr. Monese agreed that he would because J.D.J. is “not interested in
getting any specific treatment for the metabolic syndrome.” As to the question of
whether J.D.J. had “evidenced a substantial likelihood that, if left untreated, he

3
In reading Dr. Monese’s testimony as a whole, it is not entirely clear what he meant
when he stated that J.D.J. “doesn’t believe that that is the right way to do so.” The right way to
treat his mental health condition? The right way to treat his metabolic syndrome? Other side
effects from the psychotropic drug(s)? And what does “the right way” refer to? Medication?
Some other type of treatment? For this court to be able to review the Record, the questions asked
of witnesses must be clear with follow-up questions asked if needed to clarify ambiguous
testimony.
4
The circuit court again overruled J.D.J.’s objection as to this line of questioning.

4
No. 2023AP1085

would suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical harm resulting in the loss of his
ability to function independently within the community[,]” Dr. Monese responded
“yes, within the community of the prison system.” Dr. Monese also agreed “[t]o
some degree” that if left untreated, “it” would “be likely to impact [J.D.J.’s]
cognitive control over [his] thoughts and actions[.]”5 It is unclear from the Record
whether these references to J.D.J.’s condition being left untreated were in regard
to J.D.J.’s schizophrenia, the underlying metabolic syndrome, the other side
effects Dr. Monese testified J.D.J. suffered from, or a combination of all of the
above.

¶8 In response to the County’s request that Dr. Monese provide “an
example of severe physical harm that’s likely to result if left untreated[,]”6
Dr. Monese responded: “If left untreated and if he had metabolic syndrome left
untreated in the past, he can have atherosclerosis, he can have a heart attack. In
fact, he does already have some significant cardiac (unintelligible) even before the
treatment, and those things can be very serious too.” He further opined that J.D.J.
“would not avail” himself of treatment “if reasonable provisions for treatment
were made available … in the community[.]” When asked why he believed that to
be true, Dr. Monese simply responded, without further elaboration, “[b]ecause
he’s evidenced that.” Finally, when asked if J.D.J.’s “behavior is being driven by
his mental illness” and whether J.D.J.’s “mental illness is impacting his

5
Specifically, the County’s attorney asked: “Would it be likely to impact his cognitive
control over thoughts and actions?” It is unclear what “it” refers to.
6
Again, it is unclear which untreated condition the question referred to—the
schizophrenia, the metabolic condition, the other side effects of the medication, or all of the
above.

5
No. 2023AP1085

decision-making ability whether to treat his underlying conditions[,]” Dr. Monese
simply responded “[c]orrect.”

¶9 J.D.J. testified on his own behalf and explained that he did not want
to take the medication “because the medication don’t work and it’s caused harmful
effects on my body” and referenced his weight gain and heart problems and stated
that “they put me on pre-diabetic medication as well[.]” J.D.J. elaborated that the
medications were “screwing up [his] senses,” which he said impacted his ability to
pray. J.D.J. also testified that he did not believe the medication he was taking to
treat his schizophrenia was helpful because he continued to hear voices.

¶10 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court stated that this was
“an E[7] standard type of case” and, after making a few brief and vague findings—
which will be discussed and addressed more fully below—entered an order
extending J.D.J.’s commitment for twelve months and a concomitant involuntary
medication order for the same time period.8 J.D.J. appeals.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶11 In a ch. 51 recommitment hearing, the County has the burden to
establish by clear and convincing evidence the necessary elements required for
commitment, i.e., that the individual is mentally ill, is a proper subject for

7
See WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e.
8
Although the doctor’s testimony regarding specific medications focused almost
exclusively on metformin and other alluded-to medications prescribed to treat J.D.J.’s metabolic
syndrome and other side effects stemming from the psychotropic medication, along with J.D.J.’s
refusal to take the metformin, administration of involuntary medication in this case pertains only
to the psychotropic medication(s)—the medication(s) needed to treat the mental illness that left
untreated leads to dangerousness.

6
No. 2023AP1085

treatment, and is dangerous. Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶29, 391
Wis. 2d 231, 942 N.W.2d 277; WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)1-2, (13)(e), 13(g)3. If the
circuit court determines that the County carried its burden, the circuit court must
“make specific factual findings with reference to the subdivision paragraph of
WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.” D.J.W., 391
Wis. 2d 231, ¶3.

¶12 This court’s review of a recommitment order “presents a mixed
question of law and fact.” Waukesha County v. J.W.J., 2017 WI 57, ¶15, 375
Wis. 2d 542, 895 N.W.2d 783. Appellate courts will “uphold a circuit court’s
findings of fact unless they are clearly erroneous[,]” id., and will “‘accept
reasonable inferences from the facts[.]’” Winnebago County v. Christopher S.,
2016 WI 1, ¶50, 366 Wis. 2d 1, 878 N.W.2d 109 (citation omitted). Whether facts
satisfy the statutory standards, however, is a question of law this court reviews de
novo. Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶18, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937 N.W.2d
901.

III. DISCUSSION

¶13 J.D.J. raises two arguments on appeal. First, he contends there is
insufficient evidence in the Record to support the circuit court’s determination that
he is currently dangerous and points to the County’s failure to introduce
Dr. Monese’s report into evidence. Accordingly, he asserts, the only evidence as
to dangerousness is the hearing testimony itself, which he says is insufficient.
Second, J.D.J. contends the evidence is also insufficient to show he is incompetent
to refuse medication.

¶14 The circuit court made its dangerousness determination under the
“E standard,” referring to WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e, which is often also

7
No. 2023AP1085

identified as the fifth dangerousness standard.9 Accordingly, this court must first
determine whether there is sufficient evidence to support that conclusion.
Subparagraph (1)(a)2.e provides that an individual is dangerous if he:

evidences either incapability of expressing an
understanding of the advantages and disadvantages of
accepting medication or treatment and the alternatives, or
substantial incapability of applying an understanding of the
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to his or her
mental illness in order to make an informed choice as to
whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment; and
evidences a substantial probability, as demonstrated by
both the individual’s treatment history and his or her recent
acts or omissions, that the individual needs care or
treatment to prevent further disability or deterioration and a
substantial probability that he or she will, if left untreated,
lack services necessary for his or her health or safety and
suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical harm that will
result in the loss of the individual’s ability to function
independently in the community or the loss of cognitive or
volitional control over his or her thoughts or actions.

¶15 This complex statutory standard requires the County to establish five
elements. First, it must show that J.D.J. is not only mentally ill under WIS. STAT.
§ 51.01(13)(b)10 but also that there is “proof of a substantial probability of
something more than impairment[.]” See State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, ¶20,
255 Wis. 2d 359, 647 N.W.2d 851. Specifically, WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e
“requires proof of a substantial probability of a ‘loss of the individual’s ability to
function independently in the community or the loss of cognitive or volitional

9
This opinion will use these phrases interchangeably.
10
WISCONSIN STAT. § 51.01(13)(b) states that “‘[m]ental illness,’ for purposes of
involuntary commitment, means a substantial disorder of thought, mood, perception, orientation,
or memory which grossly impairs judgment, behavior, capacity to recognize reality, or ability to
meet the ordinary demands of life, but does not include alcoholism.”

8
No. 2023AP1085

control over his or her thoughts or actions.’” Dennis H., 255 Wis. 2d 359, ¶20
(quoting § 51.20(1)(a)2.e).

¶16 The second element under the “E standard” requires the County to
prove that J.D.J. is incompetent to make medication or treatment decisions or,
more specifically, that he is unable, “because of mental illness,” “to make an
informed choice as to whether to accept or refuse medication or treatment[.]” See
WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e; Dennis H., 255 Wis. 2d 359, ¶2. “This must be
evidenced either by an ‘incapability of expressing an understanding of the
advantages and disadvantages of accepting medication or treatment and the
alternatives,’ or by a ‘substantial incapability of applying an understanding of the
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to his or her mental illness.’” See
Dennis H., 255 Wis. 2d 359, ¶21 (quoting § 51.20(1)(a)2.e). “This must occur
‘after the advantages and disadvantages of and alternatives to accepting a
particular medication or treatment have been explained to him or her.’”
Dennis H., 255 Wis. 2d 359, ¶21 (quoting § 51.20(1)(a)2.e).

¶17 The third element in the “E standard” requires proof that there is a
“substantial probability” that J.D.J. “needs care or treatment to prevent further
disability or deterioration.” See Dennis H., 255 Wis. 2d 359, ¶22 (quoting WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e). This must be “demonstrated by both the individual’s
treatment history and his or her recent acts or omissions.” Dennis H., 255 Wis. 2d
359, ¶22 (quoting § 51.20(1)(a)2.e). The fourth element of the “E standard”
requires proof that there is “a ‘substantial probability that [J.D.J.] will, if left
untreated, lack services necessary for his … health or safety.’” See Dennis H.,
255 Wis. 2d 359, ¶23 (quoting § 51.20(1)(a)2.e). Finally, the fifth element
requires a showing that there is “a substantial probability that” J.D.J., “if left
untreated,” will “‘suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result

9
No. 2023AP1085

in the loss of [his] ability to function independently in the community or the loss
of cognitive or volitional control over his or her thoughts or actions.’” See
Dennis H., 255 Wis. 2d 359, ¶24 (quoting § 51.20(1)(a)2.e).

¶18 On appeal, J.D.J. asserts the evidence is insufficient to support the
circuit court’s determination that he is dangerous pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(am) and (1)(a)2.e.11 Having reviewed the transcript, this court agrees
that the County failed to establish § 51.20(1)(a)2.e’s fifth element, as set forth
above, by clear and convincing evidence.12

¶19 During the course of Dr. Monese’s testimony, the County’s attorney
questioned him as to whether J.D.J. has “any underlying physical conditions[.]”
Dr. Monese confirmed that J.D.J. did, in fact, have a “single physical condition …
called metabolic syndrome[,]” that J.D.J. had been prescribed medication to treat
metabolic syndrome but refused to take the medication, and that failure to take the
medication would lead J.D.J. to “continue to have side effects like severe weight
gain, cardiac, elevated BP’s, including the possibility of becoming diabetic.” The
following exchange ensued immediately following the exchange regarding J.D.J.’s
metabolic syndrome:

Q. Doctor, has [J.D.J.] evidenced a substantial
likelihood that, if left untreated, he would lack the services
necessary for his health or safety?

A. Correct.

11
Although the extension order includes WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(am)’s language—but not
a direct citation—this opinion only addresses the elements of § 51.20(1)(a)2.e because the circuit
court’s decision referenced only the “E standard[.]”
12
Dr. Monese’s report is part of the appellate Record because it was filed in the circuit
court; however, the report was not introduced into evidence during the hearing, and this court
therefore does not consider it.

10
No. 2023AP1085

Q. Why do you believe that?

A. Because, for example, he’s not interested in getting
any specific treatment for the metabolic syndrome.

Q. And, Doctor, has he evidenced a substantial
likelihood that, if left untreated, he would suffer severe
mental, emotional, or physical harm resulting in the loss of
his ability to function independently within the
community?

A. Within the community of prison, yes, within the
community of the prison system.

Q. And why do you believe that?

A. Because some of those conditions are serious, the
one that we’re talking about.

Q. Was it[13] likely to impact his cognitive control over
thoughts and actions?

A. Say that again.

Q. Would it be likely to impact his cognitive control
over thoughts and actions?

A. To some degree, yes.

Q. Can you give an example, Doctor, based upon your
expertise and your review of records, an example of severe
physical harm that’s likely to result if left untreated?

A. If left untreated and if he had metabolic syndrome
left untreated in the past, he can have atherosclerosis, he
can have a heart attack. In fact, he does already have some
significant cardiac (unintelligible) even before the
treatment, and those things can be very serious too.

Q. Doctor, if reasonable provisions for treatment were
made available for [J.D.J.] in the community, is he likely to
avail himself of these services in your opinion?

13
Again, it is unclear what “it” refers to. The metabolic syndrome, which was seemingly
the subject of Dr. Monese’s prior response? The mental health condition that is the subject of this
WIS. STAT. ch. 51 recommitment hearing? Or something else entirely?

11
No. 2023AP1085

A. No, he would not avail. He wouldn’t -- to my best
medical opinion, he will not be able to avail himself to
those services.

Q. And why do you feel that?

A. Because he’s evidenced that.

¶20 Based on this line of questioning, it appears the County sought to
elicit testimony from Dr. Monese that would satisfy WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e’s
fifth element—that there is “a substantial probability that” J.D.J., “if left
untreated,” would “suffer severe mental, emotional, or physical harm that will
result in the loss of [his] ability to function independently in the community or the
loss of cognitive or volitional control over his or her thoughts or actions.” See
Dennis H., 255 Wis. 2d 359, ¶24 (quoting § 51.20(1)(a)2.e). However, the phrase
“if left untreated” in § 51.20(1)(a)2.e unquestionably refers to what will occur if
J.D.J.’s mental health condition is “left untreated,” whereas the exchange set forth
above suggests that Dr. Monese’s testimony about the consequences of failing to
treat J.D.J.’s condition may have instead referred to J.D.J.’s metabolic syndrome,
rather than to his mental health condition.

¶21 For example, when asked if J.D.J. had “evidenced a substantial
likelihood that, if left untreated, he would lack the services necessary for his health
or safety[,]”—a question that immediately followed Dr. Monese’s testimony
regarding side effects that might occur if J.D.J. failed to treat the metabolic
syndrome—Dr. Monese responded “[c]orrect” and elaborated that he believed this
was the case because J.D.J. is “not interested in getting any specific treatment for
the metabolic syndrome.” (Emphases added). In turn, Dr. Monese’s reference to
J.D.J.’s disinclination to treat the metabolic syndrome was followed directly by the
County’s attorney asking Dr. Monese if J.D.J., “if left untreated, … would suffer
severe mental, emotional, or physical harm resulting in the loss of his ability to

12
No. 2023AP1085

function independently in the community[.]” (Emphasis added.) In the context of
this exchange, it appears that counsel’s questions about leaving the condition
untreated—and consequently Dr. Monese’s responses—were directed at a lack of
treatment for J.D.J.’s metabolic syndrome, rather than J.D.J.’s mental health
condition with which WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e is concerned.

¶22 Similarly, when the County’s attorney shortly thereafter questioned
Dr. Monese as to whether he could provide “an example of severe physical harm
that’s likely to result if left untreated[,]” it is unclear whether the County’s
attorney was referring to the metabolic syndrome being “left untreated,” the
mental health condition being “left untreated,” or both. (Emphasis added.)
Dr. Monese’s response, however, suggests that he interpreted the question as
asking what type of physical harm might occur if J.D.J.’s metabolic syndrome was
left untreated: “If left untreated and if he had metabolic syndrome left untreated in
the past, he can have atherosclerosis, he can have a heart attack.” But again, WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e is concerned with what will occur if J.D.J.s mental health
condition—not the metabolic syndrome—is left untreated.

¶23 While this court does not question Dr. Monese’s medical opinion as
to the importance of treating J.D.J.’s metabolic syndrome or his testimony that
failure to treat the metabolic syndrome could result in severe physical harm to
J.D.J., WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e is concerned with whether physical harm will
occur if J.D.J.’s mental health condition is left untreated. Consequently, absent
greater clarity as to whether counsel’s questions and Dr. Monese’s responses about
what might result if J.D.J. were “left untreated” related to J.D.J.’s mental health
condition, his metabolic syndrome, or a combination of the two, this court cannot
conclude that the County established by clear and convincing evidence that there
is “a substantial probability” that if J.D.J.’s mental health condition is “left

13
No. 2023AP1085

untreated,” he will “lack services necessary for his … health or safety and suffer
severe mental, emotional, or physical harm that will result in the loss of [his]
ability to function independently in the community or the loss of cognitive or
volitional control over his … thoughts or actions.” See § 51.20(1)(a)2.e.14
Accordingly, there is insufficient evidence to support a finding that J.D.J. is
dangerous pursuant to § 51.20(1)(a)2.e.15

¶24 While the foregoing conclusion is sufficient to establish that reversal
is required, this court also notes that the circuit court’s decision failed to comply
with the requirement that it “make specific factual findings with reference to the
subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the recommitment is based.”
See D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶59 (emphasis added). Although the court here
referenced the “E standard”—meaning WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e—the court
made almost no findings at all as to that standard’s elements—and it certainly did
not make specific factual findings. The court’s findings as to § 51.20(1)(a)2.e are,
in their entirety, as follows:

[J.D.J.] is currently suffering a major -- from a major
mental illness, that being schizophrenia. The Court finds
by clear and convincing evidence that that is a substantial

14
This court also notes that J.D.J.’s apparent disinterest in treating the metabolic
syndrome and his refusal to take the prescribed medication for that condition is present while he
is actively receiving treatment for his mental condition. Based on the evidence presented, it is
unclear how leaving his mental health condition untreated would result in any difference in that
regard.
15
Although this opinion only specifically addresses the County’s failure to establish
WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e’s fifth element, see State v. Dennis H., 2002 WI 104, ¶24, 255
Wis. 2d 359, 647 N.W.2d 851, the County also failed to establish the third and fourth elements,
see Dennis H., 255 Wis. 2d 359, ¶¶22-23, by clear and convincing evidence for similar reasons.
However, because the County is required to prove all required elements in order to establish that
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.e applies, it is unnecessary to address those elements further in light of this court’s
conclusion that it failed to establish the fifth element.

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No. 2023AP1085

disorder of his thought, mood, as well as his perception. It
also impairs his judgment as well as his capacity to
recognize reality, and he is currently a danger to himself.

The Court further finds with respect to the standard that
this is an E standard type of case, and that with the
treatment being resolved, there is a substantial likelihood
that [J.D.J.] would further decompensate.

There is a history here that he has refused medication in
the past. He would also likely not seek such treatment
within the community if it were not ordered by this Court
because he does lack insight into his mental illness.

The Court is understanding with his reasoning,
somewhat, in that he doesn’t like the side effects that the
medication causes, that it causes him some weight gain as
well as a bit of difficulty in praying; however, the benefits
of that medication likely outweigh the negative side effects,
and his lack of insight into his condition inhibits his ability
to understand that. So the Court will also be signing a
medication order to ensure that he gets the proper
medication and that it is taken on a regular basis.

Despite “finding” that J.D.J. “is currently a danger to himself[,]” the circuit court
failed to address most of § 51.20(1)(a)2.e’s requirements and did not make specific
factual findings on each requirement regarding J.D.J.’s dangerousness. Simply
“finding” that an individual is “dangerous” is insufficient to comply with our
supreme court’s mandate in D.J.W. Rather, the circuit court must make specific
factual findings supporting its statement that the subject is dangerous, and its
failure to do so here serves as an alternative basis for reversal of the orders.

¶25 Based on the foregoing, this court concludes that the County failed
to establish each element of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.e by clear and convincing
evidence and that the circuit court likewise failed to comply with D.J.W.’s
mandate that it make specific factual findings as to J.D.J.’s dangerousness. The
recommitment order is therefore reversed as is the order for involuntary

15
No. 2023AP1085

administration of medication and treatment since it can only exist if there is a valid
commitment.16

By the Court.—Orders reversed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

16
This court does not address J.D.J.’s second contention because only dispositive issues
need be addressed. See State v. Lickes, 2021 WI 60, ¶33 n.10, 397 Wis. 2d 586, 960 N.W.2d 855
(“Issues that are not dispositive need not be addressed.” (quoted source omitted)); Martinez v.
Rullman, 2023 WI App 30, ¶5, 408 Wis. 2d 503, 992 N.W.2d 853 (this court decides cases on the
narrowest possible grounds).

16