Winnebago County v. A.F.H.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 1, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP1798 Cir. Ct. No. 2023ME32

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF A.F.H.:

WINNEBAGO COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

A.F.H.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Winnebago County:
TERESA S. BASILIERE and MICHAEL S. GIBBS, Judges. Affirmed.
No. 2023AP1798

¶1 LAZAR, J.1 Antonin2 appeals from an order of commitment, an
order for involuntary medication and treatment, and an order denying
postcommitment relief based on his allegation of ineffective assistance of counsel
at his final involuntary commitment hearing. He alleges that his trial counsel
failed to object to hearsay testimony regarding dangerousness and that, excluding
the inadmissible hearsay, Winnebago County failed to offer sufficient evidence of
current dangerousness for the court to order Antonin’s commitment under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20. This court concludes that the County’s evidence of current
dangerousness was sufficient even excluding the alleged hearsay. The orders are
therefore affirmed.

BACKGROUND

¶2 Antonin was incarcerated and placed in the Wisconsin Resource
Center (“WRC”)3 when the County filed a petition seeking his civil commitment
and involuntary medication and treatment on January 26, 2023. After finding that
probable cause existed on February 6, the court commissioner ordered that
Antonin be examined and set a final hearing for February 16, 2023. Witnesses at
the hearing included Dr. George Monese, a psychiatrist at WRC who had treated

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(d) (2021-22). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise noted.
2
In order to protect his confidentiality, this court refers to the subject individual by the
pseudonym he selected. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(1)(g).
3
The WRC is “a correctional institution that provides psychological evaluations,
specialized learning programs, training and supervision for inmates whose behavior presents a
serious problem to themselves or others in state prisons.” WIS. STAT. § 46.056. It is located in
Winnebago County.

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Antonin as a patient since 2017; Michael Natzke, a psychiatric care supervisor at
WRC; and Antonin himself.

¶3 Monese testified that Antonin suffers from schizoaffective disorder,
a major mental illness that grossly impairs Antonin’s judgment, behavior, and
recognition of reality. When asked about Antonin’s dangerousness, Monese
recounted behavior from the month before that was documented in Antonin’s
medical records (which Monese said he also “discussed … with him”): Antonin
“threatened the staff that he was going to kill them, injure them, or do them
physical harm” and “spat at one of the staff members directly” (albeit with a glass
window separating the individuals). Based on Antonin’s history of starting and
stopping medication voluntarily and the fact that “when he [didn’t] take [his
medications], he became more psychotic to the extent that he threatened other staff
members,” Monese was requesting authorization to involuntarily medicate
Antonin with psychotropic medication. No reports from either Monese or the two
other experts who had been ordered to evaluate Antonin were moved into
evidence.

¶4 Antonin’s trial counsel did not object to any of Monese’s testimony.
On cross-examination, she asked whether Antonin acknowledged to Monese any
of “those situations from January.” Monese responded: “He did not
acknowledge—he did not want me to discuss, specifically, he said disorganization,
but that the other instances regarding the dangerousness, those were discussed
with him just at a time when we were filing the petition.” Monese also noted that
since Antonin was back on medication, he was “like a normal person” and “doing
very well.”

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¶5 Natzke began his testimony by describing his interaction with
Antonin that occurred on December 29, 2022, when Natzke was working at the
WRC. During a meeting, he and other staff were “notified that [Antonin] had a
cup of unknown liquid.” After responding to a clarifying question from the trial
court about what it was that Antonin had, he further testified that Antonin “was
threatening to throw [the cup of liquid] at a staff member.” Natzke went to
Antonin’s door to “notify him of a security precaution” and, because Antonin was
whispering, moved closer to the door. Antonin then “spit right at the window
directly in [Natzke’s] eyes.” The window glass prevented Natzke from being
struck. After that incident, Natzke testified that staff implemented the security
precaution of wearing spit masks when interacting with Antonin. Counsel for
Antonin did not cross-examine Natzke or object to any of his testimony.

¶6 Finally, Antonin testified. He denied ever spitting at or threatening
anyone. He stated that Natzke’s testimony was “a lie.” He asked his own counsel
whether she was “badgering” him when she questioned him about whether the
spitting incident had actually happened. He also denied having any mental health
issues. On cross-examination, the County asked Antonin about various
interactions with WRC staff, including an instance of threatening to throw urine
on a staff member, all of which Antonin denied.

¶7 The trial court4 determined that the County had proven grounds for
commitment. Relying on evidence of “the spitting, the threatening to spit or throw

The Honorable Teresa S. Basiliere, hereinafter the “trial court,” presided over the
4

commitment proceeding and issued the orders for commitment and the involuntary administration
of medication and treatment. The Honorable Michael S. Gibbs, hereinafter the “circuit court,”
presided over the postcommitment motion hearing.

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No. 2023AP1798

urine, and the threat to kill,” it concluded that Antonin was dangerous under WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. because he posed “a substantial probability of physical
harm to others.” In addition to a six-month commitment, the court ordered
involuntary medication and treatment for Antonin.

¶8 With new counsel, Antonin filed a motion for postcommitment relief
in early August 2023. He asserted that his trial counsel was ineffective in failing
to object to hearsay testimony of Monese at the final hearing and that, without that
erroneously admitted hearsay evidence, the County offered insufficient evidence
of dangerousness for commitment. At a September 7, 20235 Machner6 hearing on
this motion, Antonin’s trial counsel testified that she elected not to object to
Monese’s dangerousness testimony on hearsay grounds because the facts to which
he testified were contained in “regularly-kept records that the doctor was
reviewing and giving his opinion on” and that when she had made similar
objections in past proceedings she was told that “those are regularly-kept records,
they’re going to be allowed in.”

¶9 She further testified that, when she was representing Antonin, she
was “[n]ot off-the-cuff” aware of either Walworth County v. Therese B., 2003 WI
App 223, ¶9, 267 Wis. 2d 310, 671 N.W.2d 377 (holding that an expert witness
cannot be used “solely as a conduit for the hearsay opinions of others”), or S.Y. v.
Eau Claire County, 156 Wis. 2d 317, 327-28, 457 N.W.2d 326 (Ct. App. 1990),
aff’d, 162 Wis. 2d 320, 469 N.W.2d 836 (1991) (stating that expert’s testimony

5
The hearing was after Antonin’s commitment and involuntary administration of
medication and treatment orders had expired.
6
State v. Machner, 92 Wis. 2d 797, 285 N.W.2d 905 (Ct. App. 1979).

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No. 2023AP1798

about an event not witnessed by the expert was inadmissible to prove
dangerousness, although the error was deemed harmless).

¶10 With respect to Natzke’s testimony,7 trial counsel was questioned as
follows:

Q. He testified, quote, “So we were in a cross shift with
our treatment team, we were notified that…” it goes on
discussing an unknown or a cup of unknown liquid. So
when Mr. Natzke said, “We were notified that,” end
quote, did you object to hearsay at that point?

A. I don’t believe I did.

Q. After he completed the sentence and talked about this
incident with a cup of unknown liquid, did you object at
all then?

A. I don’t think I did at that point either.

7
Antonin did not raise any issue regarding Natzke’s testimony in his initial brief in
support of his postcommitment motion. He included three lines in his reply brief suggesting that
Natzke “never testified that he had personal knowledge of Antonin threatening to” “spit onto a
person directly” and that “he was ‘notified’ by others” about this—thus, according to Antonin,
Natzke’s testimony about Antonin’s threats to spit on a person “is also hearsay.” This
mischaracterizes Natzke’s testimony at the final hearing, which was that he was “notified that
[Antonin] had a cup of unknown liquid,” not notified about any threats to spit on a person. After
the circuit court’s clarifying question about what was in the cup, Natzke testified that “[Antonin]
was threatening to throw [the unknown liquid] at a staff member.”

To the extent Antonin forfeited his argument that Natzke’s testimony about Antonin’s
threat to throw liquid at a staff member was hearsay and that trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to object to it by failing to raise the issue in the circuit court, see, e.g., Oneida County v.
WERC, 2000 WI App 191, ¶24, 238 Wis. 2d 763, 618 N.W.2d 891, the County does not assert
forfeiture. Instead, it argues that the testimony was not hearsay or was admissible because it falls
under a hearsay exception. This has little practical effect given this court’s conclusion that the
direct testimony about Antonin spitting at Natzke, which Antonin concedes is admissible, is
sufficient to prove dangerousness and makes it unlikely that the outcome of his hearing would
have been different even if an objection had been sustained.

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No. 2023AP1798

When asked whether she had “a strategic reason for not objecting to that
testimony” she said, “[a]gain, we were looking at records from the facility that we
regularly look at.”

¶11 On cross-examination, trial counsel testified that she did not think
objecting to the testimony at issue would have made a difference to the outcome of
Antonin’s case given the strength of the County’s evidence that Antonin had spit
at Natzke, which, she stated, is “dangerous in today’s day and age, and [she knew]
that they were going to have that witness … being called to testify, [who] had
personal knowledge of dangerousness there.” At that point, Antonin interrupted
the proceedings, first telling his attorney to “[g]et away” and then repeatedly
telling the court, among other things, “[s]hut up talking to me.” After Antonin left
the courtroom, trial counsel testified that she knew Antonin intended to testify at
his final hearing and that his testimony would contradict everything the other
witnesses had said regarding his mental illness and the events that had taken place.
She identified the “issue with recency” as the lone strength of Antonin’s case, but
acknowledged that “it was very difficult” and that “[i]t was … uphill in terms of
trying to establish [a] defense there.”

¶12 The circuit court denied Antonin’s motion. It found that Monese’s
testimony “contained items of hearsay” and explained that although an “expert can
rely on such hearsay for forming [his] opinions, … [it] cannot be the basis for the
underlying dangerousness.” The court did not make a finding with respect to any
alleged hearsay in Natzke’s testimony. It found, however, that Natzke’s direct
testimony recounting the December 29 incident in which Antonin spat at him
(albeit separated by the glass of Antonin’s cell door) was “certainly enough
testimony … to establish dangerousness.” Thus, the court concluded that

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No. 2023AP1798

Antonin’s trial counsel had not rendered ineffective assistance at his final hearing
and denied the postcommitment motion.

¶13 Antonin appeals. He does not contest the trial court’s determinations
that he is mentally ill and a proper subject for treatment, both of which are
required for ordering commitment under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a) and involuntary
medication and treatment under WIS. STAT. § 51.61(1)(g)3. He contests only the
court’s determination of current dangerousness, again asserting that absent
inadmissible hearsay, the County offered insufficient evidence on this point. He
points to three factual findings on which the trial court relied in determining that
he was dangerous to others pursuant to § 51.20(1)(a)2.b.: “(1) ‘the spitting,’
(2) ‘the threatening to spit or throw urine,’ and (3) ‘the threat to kill.’” He says the
second and third of these should be disregarded because they were solely based on
hearsay testimony. He further argues that his trial counsel’s failure to object to the
alleged hearsay supporting these factual findings constituted ineffective assistance,
contrary to the circuit court’s ruling on his postcommitment motion for relief.
Antonin also makes an argument on the timing issue he sees with the evidence,
asserting that the County offered only evidence of an incident that occurred forty-
nine days before the final hearing and did not prove that he was dangerous at the
time commitment was ordered. See § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. (requiring “evidence of
recent homicidal or other violent behavior” or “evidence[ of] a recent overt act”
that places others “in reasonable fear” (emphases added)).

DISCUSSION

I. Ineffective assistance of counsel

¶14 Our supreme court, in Winnebago County v. J.M., 2018 WI 37, ¶7,
381 Wis. 2d 28, 911 N.W.2d 41, held that individuals subject to involuntary

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No. 2023AP1798

commitment proceedings have a right to effective assistance of counsel and that
the remedy for ineffective assistance is a new trial, see id., ¶47.8 The Strickland
standard applies in evaluating a claim of ineffective assistance in such cases. See
J.M., 381 Wis. 2d 28, ¶34 (adopting standard set forth in Strickland v.
Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984), in WIS. STAT. ch. 51 proceedings). Pursuant to
this standard, it is the subject individual’s burden to satisfy a two-prong test: he
must show both that trial counsel’s performance was deficient (falling “outside the
wide range of professionally competent assistance”) and that he was prejudiced by
the performance (“that, but for counsel’s unprofessional errors, the result of the
proceeding would have been different”). J.M., 381 Wis. 2d 28, ¶¶47-48 (quoting
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690, 694). On review, we will not overturn the trial
court’s factual findings unless they are clearly erroneous. State v. Demmerly,
2006 WI App 181, ¶21, 296 Wis. 2d 153, 722 N.W.2d 585. Whether counsel was
deficient and whether the defendant was prejudiced are questions of law this court
reviews de novo. Id.

¶15 If a court finds that one prong of the Strickland test is not satisfied,
it need not analyze the other. See J.M., 381 Wis. 2d 28, ¶50. Here, it makes sense
to begin with the prejudice prong; Antonin can succeed only if he shows “a
reasonable probability” that the outcome of his commitment case would have been
different had his counsel objected to the alleged hearsay. See id., ¶48 (citation
omitted). Thus, Antonin says that “the real question” that must be answered is
whether Antonin’s spitting incident alone can be deemed dangerous under WIS.

8
Although Antonin argues that his trial counsel was ineffective, he does not explicitly
ask this court to order a new trial—perhaps because the involuntary commitment and medication
orders at issue have expired. Instead, as addressed below, he asks only for reversal of the orders.

9
No. 2023AP1798

STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. because the other two facts set forth to establish
dangerousness were derived from hearsay testimony that was allegedly only
admitted because of his counsel’s deficient performance.

¶16 The statute provides that dangerousness to others must be shown in
at least one of two ways. The first is with evidence of “homicidal or other violent
behavior.” WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. The second is with evidence of an “overt
act, attempt or threat to do serious physical harm” that places others “in reasonable
fear of violent behavior and serious physical harm.” Id. This court agrees with
the County that Antonin’s spitting at Natzke shows his dangerousness to others at
least via the second path.

¶17 The County points out some of the many diseases, some serious or
even fatal, that are commonly known to be transmissible via saliva. It also points
out that spitting at a prison employee is serious enough on its own to constitute a
separate and distinct criminal offense. See WIS. STAT. § 946.43(2m). Antonin
does not dispute these facts but argues that, in his case, the pane of glass
separating the spit from its target meant that he could not have been convicted
under § 946.43(2m) (because the required element of intent for the bodily
substance to come into contact with the victim could not have been met) and that
Natzke could not have been placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and
serious harm from Antonin. He further argues that the mitigation measures taken
by WRC staff after the incident—the implementation of spit masks, which the
County says demonstrates that Natzke did, indeed, fear harm from Antonin—
shows that fear of physical harm from Antonin would be objectively unreasonable;
WRC had “security and safety measures in place” for its employees to avoid any
harm that could come from any further spitting.

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No. 2023AP1798

¶18 The required showing under WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. is that “it
is much more likely than not that [Antonin] will cause physical harm to other
individuals,” Marathon County v. D.K., 2020 WI 8, ¶42, 390 Wis. 2d 50, 937
N.W.2d 901 (emphasis added), not that he did harm others or that recent acts
showing his propensity to hurt others were likely to succeed. “[I]n keeping with
the legislature’s intent to focus upon the mental state of the subject to be
examined, not those who may [have been] affected by the subject individual’s
behavior,” R.J. v. Winnebago County, 146 Wis. 2d 516, 521, 431 N.W.2d 708
(Ct. App. 1988), this court has previously analyzed the actions of subject
individuals without regard to their likelihood of success—with or without security
measures—of causing harm. See, e.g., Winnebago County v. T.M.G.,
No. 2023AP1283, unpublished slip op. ¶13 (WI App Jan. 24, 2024)9 (affirming
conclusion of dangerousness based on individual’s mailing of a white powder to a
federal courthouse despite individual’s argument that powder “was likely to be
harmless given that he was in prison without access to harmful substances”).

¶19 In this case, whether Antonin’s spitting is viewed as an actual
attempt at harm (doomed by the window protecting his target) or a threat to do
future harm (to spit at staff as soon as he got a chance when the window was not
between them, for example), it caused enough fear of harm that WRC staff
implemented the extra security measure of wearing spit masks when dealing with
Antonin. The contention that this security measure was likely to be effective and
thus mitigated the fear of potential targets misses the point that Antonin made an
attempt or threat sufficient to show dangerousness by the second evidentiary path

9
Unpublished cases may not be cited for precedential value, but may be cited for
persuasive value. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3)(a), (b).

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No. 2023AP1798

of WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. The very act of prophylactically wearing spit
masks is evidence of the reasonable fear that the staff had for their safety.

¶20 This court does not hold that spitting is necessarily and always a
violent act sufficient to satisfy the dangerousness standard of WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. But there are many cases listing spitting at a person as factual
evidence supporting a determination of dangerousness. See, e.g., Winnebago
County v. D.E.S., No. 2022AP251, unpublished slip op. ¶17 (WI App Aug. 31,
2022); Winnebago County v. J.D.J., No. 2022AP1357-FT, unpublished slip op.
¶14 (WI App Nov. 23, 2022). The trial court’s factual finding that the spitting in
this case constituted either an attempt or a threat to do harm is supported by the
evidence based on that court’s assessment of witnesses (including their credibility
and demeanor) and in the context of other evidence (including Monese’s
testimony regarding Antonin’s mental illness and its effects on him). See D.K.,
390 Wis. 2d 50, ¶51 (“[W]e do not review [a witness’s] statements in isolation.
Rather, we review his testimony and the circuit court’s findings as a whole.”); see
also T.M.F. v. Children’s Serv. Soc’y of Wis., 112 Wis. 2d 180, 188, 332 N.W.2d
293 (1983) (holding that a circuit court’s legal conclusion may be given weight
when it is “derived from and intertwined with the [circuit] court’s factual inquiry
during which the [circuit] court has had the opportunity to question and observe
the witnesses”).

¶21 Evidence of Antonin’s spitting at Natzke is sufficient to support the
legal conclusion that Antonin presented a danger to others, and he has not shown
that the outcome of his case would be different if the County had offered only this
evidence of dangerousness. Thus, there has been no showing of prejudice and
Antonin’s appeal of the circuit court’s postcommitment order rejecting his claim
of ineffective assistance of counsel fails.

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No. 2023AP1798

II. Hearsay

¶22 As noted, Antonin has not explicitly requested a new trial, which
would be his remedy if he had proven ineffective assistance. In his briefing, he
asks only for this court “to reverse the circuit court’s involuntary commitment and
medication orders” and makes a direct attack on the orders based on the circuit
court’s admission and reliance on the alleged hearsay of both Monese and Natzke.
He cites Morden v. Continental AG, 2000 WI 51, ¶81, 235 Wis. 2d 325, 611
N.W.2d 659, and asserts that this court should review the trial court’s admission
and reliance on this evidence under the erroneous exercise of discretion standard.

¶23 Antonin is mistaken. Morden discusses review of “a circuit court’s
evidentiary ruling.” Id. In Antonin’s case, there is no evidentiary ruling to
review; the trial court did not make a ruling on the admissibility of the testimony
at issue from either witness because Antonin did not object to it. The County is
correct that in such a case, the argument is normally deemed forfeited. See State
v. Ndina, 2009 WI 21, ¶30, 315 Wis. 2d 653, 761 N.W.2d 612 (“[F]ailure to
object [at trial] constitutes a forfeiture of the right on appellate review.”).
“Generally, if a claim is forfeited, we address that claim in the context of
ineffective assistance of counsel.” State v. Counihan, 2020 WI 12, ¶28, 390
Wis. 2d 172, 938 N.W.2d 530. As discussed above, Antonin did not meet his
burden to show ineffective assistance.

¶24 On direct appeal, this court reviews the alleged errors only for plain
error. See WIS. STAT. § 901.03(4) (allowing appellate court to “tak[e] notice of
plain errors affecting substantial rights although they were not brought to the
attention of the judge”). Given that the direct evidence of Antonin’s spitting at
Natzke is sufficient to support a determination of dangerousness, as discussed

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No. 2023AP1798

above, Antonin has not shown plain error. He fares no better in attacking the
orders at issue from this angle.

III. Recency of dangerousness

¶25 Antonin’s last argument with respect to the sufficiency of the
evidence relates to timing. He asserts that the spitting incident was not recent
enough; Monese’s testimony that Antonin’s condition at the final hearing was
“like a normal person … very coherent” meant Antonin had “ceased to be actively
dangerous” and thus was not “currently dangerous” as required for commitment.
See WIS. STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. (requiring “recent” behavior or act to show
dangerousness); Waupaca County v. K.E.K., 2021 WI 9, ¶18, 395 Wis. 2d 460,
954 N.W.2d 366 (analyzing the alternative path for proving dangerousness in a
recommitment proceeding and noting that initial commitment requires proof of an
individual’s current dangerousness by recent acts).

¶26 Antonin spat at Natzke on December 29, 2022. Monese drafted a
letter requesting civil commitment on January 5, 2023, and the County filed its
petition seeking commitment on January 26, less than a month after the spitting
incident. The court held a probable cause hearing on February 3 and signed an
order for medication that day—medication that was so effective that Monese
testified thirteen days later, at the February 16 final hearing, that Antonin had
become “like a normal person walking the street” “in the short space of time he’s
been taking the medications.”

¶27 This timeline adheres to the statutory deadlines set out in WIS. STAT.
ch. 51 and Antonin cites no case law supporting the notion that the spitting
incident was not recent enough to support a dangerousness finding at the final
hearing. It would be perverse to hold that commitment and involuntary

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No. 2023AP1798

medication might be warranted only if the medication properly ordered at the
probable cause hearing had been ineffective such that instances of dangerous
behavior continued to take place right up to the date of the final hearing. This
court finds no merit in Antonin’s recency argument.

IV. Mootness

¶28 Finally, because the involuntary commitment and medication orders
at issue expired on August 16, 2023 prior even to the postcommitment motion
hearing, the parties have raised the issue of whether Antonin’s appeal is moot.
Antonin points to the collateral consequences of commitment orders discussed in
Sauk County v. S.A.M., 2022 WI 46, ¶¶22-24, 402 Wis. 2d 379, 975 N.W.2d 162,
in arguing that it is not: the firearms ban and liability for the cost of care. This
court agrees with the County that these collateral consequences may very well be
illusory in a case such as this. First, Antonin was already subject to a firearms ban
because of his multiple felony convictions. And second, WRC, which the County
asserts does not even have a billing department, purportedly “does not bill patients
like Antonin.” Nevertheless, pursuant to S.A.M., the case has been analyzed on
the merits.

CONCLUSION

¶29 Antonin’s is yet another appeal regarding a commitment proceeding
that is not decided until well after the orders at issue are expired and at significant
cost of judicial and party resources. As our supreme court articulated in D.K., 390
Wis. 2d 50, ¶55, “[h]ad certain things happened in the circuit court below, perhaps
[this] appeal would have been unnecessary. The record was sufficient in this case,
but it could have been more detailed.” For instance, as in D.K., the reports of the
experts ordered to evaluate Antonin could have been moved into evidence. In

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No. 2023AP1798

addition, witnesses who observed the additional evidence of dangerousness
discussed by Monese and mentioned in the County’s petition for commitment
presumably could have been produced.10 Nevertheless, this court carefully
considered the issues presented, and for the foregoing reasons, the orders of the
circuit court regarding Antonin’s postcommitment motion and involuntary
commitment and medication are affirmed.

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

10
Allegedly, staff members personally heard threats made by Antonin regarding spitting,
throwing personal fluids, and stating an intent to kill staff. These allegations, which should have
been introduced via witnesses with personal knowledge, have not been relied upon by this court
in this appeal.

16