State v. Antonio Bernard Taylor

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
November 19, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP920-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2016CF520

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT I

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

ANTONIO BERNARD TAYLOR,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Milwaukee
County: JEFFREY A. WAGNER, Judge. Affirmed.

Before White, C.J., Donald, P.J., and Colón, J.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP920-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Antonio Bernard Taylor appeals a judgment
convicting him of second-degree sexual assault of a child. On appeal, Taylor
contends he was denied his right to self-representation and the State failed to
comply with the Interstate Agreement on Detainers (IAD) deadline for trying his
case. We reject Taylor’s arguments and affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 In February 2016, a criminal complaint was filed in the Milwaukee
County Circuit Court charging Taylor with one count of second-degree sexual
assault of a child, S.S.G.1 According to the complaint, Taylor allowed fourteen-
year-old S.S.G. to live with him after she ran away from home. Between
November 2014 and January 2015, Taylor repeatedly sexually assaulted S.S.G.,
and she became pregnant with his child.

¶3 At the time the complaint was filed, Taylor was serving an unrelated
sentence in California. In June 2017, Taylor submitted a request for a disposition
of detainer pursuant to the IAD. He was therefore extradited to Wisconsin to face
the second-degree sexual assault charge.

¶4 At the initial bail hearing, the State informed the court that the
deadline for trying Taylor’s case would expire on December 24, 2017, pursuant to
the IAD. Taylor requested a speedy trial and a jury trial was scheduled to begin
on December 4, 2017.

1
Pursuant to WIS. STAT. RULE 809.86(4) (2021-22), we refer to the victim by her
initials. All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.

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No. 2023AP920-CR

¶5 On November 6, 2017, Taylor’s appointed counsel moved to
withdraw based on a breakdown of communication. The circuit court held a
hearing on the motion. Taylor told the court that his attorney had made
“inappropriate” comments and he “don’t want nobody, like, representing me,
period.” The court denied counsel’s motion finding that the complaints about
communication were insufficient.

¶6 On November 22, 2017, Taylor’s appointed counsel filed a second
motion to withdraw, stating there was a breakdown in communication and there
“exists a conflict of interest in this counsel continuing to represent [Taylor].”

¶7 On November 27, 2017, a hearing was held on counsel’s motion to
withdraw.2 The circuit court addressed Taylor and informed him that if appointed
counsel was allowed to withdraw, the court would consider this a waiver of
Taylor’s request for a speedy trial and a prompt disposition. However, the trial
date could be preserved if Taylor was requesting to represent himself. Taylor
confirmed that he was requesting to “represent myself pro se.”

¶8 The circuit court swore Taylor in as a witness and conducted a
colloquy on his self-representation request. During the colloquy, the court
inquired about Taylor’s background, including his age, education level, job
history, marital status, and mental health. Taylor informed the court that he had
“[a] whole bunch” of mental health issues. Taylor told the court that he had
“[p]aranoid schizophrenia, bipolar, depression, [and] ADHD[.]” The court then
inquired whether Taylor was receiving any treatment while in custody. Taylor

2
We note that during the hearing, the circuit court incorrectly referenced WIS. STAT.
§ 971.11, the intrastate detainer statute.

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No. 2023AP920-CR

responded affirmatively, but stated that he discontinued medication against the
advice of his medical professionals. The court asked when Taylor last heard a
voice or had a hallucination related to his mental health, and Taylor said “[i]t is
daily, comes all the time, just comes when it comes.”

¶9 The circuit court then asked Taylor a series of questions about the
charge, penalty, and the nature of criminal proceedings. The court also discussed
the advantages of counsel and disadvantages of proceeding pro se. The court
confirmed that Taylor had not been pressured by anyone to waive his right to
counsel and was not made any promises that would have influenced his decision.

¶10 The circuit court found that Taylor was not competent to represent
himself and was not knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waiving his right to
counsel. The court therefore denied Taylor’s request to proceed pro se and instead
granted counsel’s motion to withdraw so that successor counsel could be
appointed. The trial date was removed from the calendar.

¶11 After successor counsel was appointed, a competency evaluation
was ordered. Several days later, successor counsel filed a motion to withdraw.
The motion asserted that Taylor had become “volatile, hostile and
confrontational.”

¶12 On May 11, 2018, the circuit court found Taylor competent to
proceed to trial and also allowed Taylor’s second attorney to withdraw. During
the hearing, Taylor repeatedly interrupted and cursed at the circuit court. Due to
the need to appoint another attorney, the upcoming trial was adjourned. The court
found that Taylor’s conduct waived his speedy trial and prompt disposition rights.
The court also found Taylor in contempt for his behavior.

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No. 2023AP920-CR

¶13 In January 2019, Taylor proceeded to trial with counsel and was
found guilty as charged. Taylor was sentenced to twelve years of initial
confinement and eight years of extended supervision concurrent with his
California sentence. Taylor now appeals.

DISCUSSION

I. Taylor’s Right to Self-Representation

¶14 On appeal, Taylor contends that he was denied his right to self-
representation at the November 27, 2017 hearing.3

¶15 Both the United States Constitution and the Wisconsin Constitution
grant criminal defendants the right to self-representation. State v. Klessig, 211
Wis. 2d 194, 202-03, 564 N.W.2d 716 (1997); Faretta v. California, 422 U.S.
806, 832 (1975). When a defendant seeks to represent himself or herself, the
circuit court must ensure that the defendant: (1) has knowingly, intelligently, and
voluntarily waived the right to counsel; and (2) is competent to proceed pro se.
Klessig, 211 Wis. 2d at 203. If both conditions are met, the circuit court must
allow the defendant to represent himself or herself. Id. at 204.

¶16 Whether Taylor’s right to self-representation was violated presents a
question of constitutional fact. State v. Imani, 2010 WI 66, ¶19, 326 Wis. 2d 179,
786 N.W.2d 40. “A finding of constitutional fact consists of the circuit court’s
findings of historical fact, which we review under the ‘clearly erroneous standard,’
and the application of these historical facts to constitutional principles, which we

3
Taylor’s brief refers to a November 24, 2017 hearing. The transcript Taylor cites
reflects that the hearing took place on November 27, 2017, not November 24, 2017.

5
No. 2023AP920-CR

review de novo.” State v. Popke, 2009 WI 37, ¶10, 317 Wis. 2d 118, 765 N.W.2d
569 (citation omitted; emphasis added).

¶17 In this case, we conclude that the circuit court properly denied
Taylor’s request to represent himself. As the circuit court found, Taylor was not
competent to represent himself.4

¶18 In Indiana v. Edwards, the United States Supreme Court held that
states may “insist upon representation by counsel for those competent enough to
stand trial … but who still suffer from severe mental illness to the point where
they are not competent to conduct trial proceedings by themselves.” Id., 554 U.S.
164, 178 (2008). The Court explained that a defendant who was fit to stand trial,
but nevertheless lacked the mental capacity to carry out the tasks needed to present
his or her own defense without the assistance of counsel would call into question
the fairness of the proceedings in which he or she was unrepresented. Id. at 178-
79. The Court further observed that circuit court judges are in the best position “to
make more fine-tuned mental capacity decisions, tailored to the individualized
circumstances of a particular defendant.” Id. at 177.

¶19 Here, Taylor told the circuit court that he had “[p]aranoid
schizophrenia, bipolar, depression, [and] ADHD[.]” Further, he stated that he had
stopped taking his medication against the advice of medical professionals.

4
Because we conclude that Taylor was not competent to represent himself, we do not
address whether Taylor knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the right to counsel. See
State v. Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d 688, 703, 442 N.W.2d 514 (Ct. App. 1989) (explaining that we
resolve cases on the narrowest possible ground).

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No. 2023AP920-CR

¶20 The parties agree that there must be a connection between a
defendant’s mental illness and his or her ability to represent themselves in court.
Such a connection is present in this case. The circuit court found that Taylor
“hears voices and/or hallucinates daily.” This is corroborated in the record. When
Taylor was asked how often he hallucinates or hears voices, he responded, “daily,
comes all the time, just comes when it comes.”5 The fact that Taylor would be
hallucinating and hearing voices during the trial would make him not capable of
performing the “significantly expanded role required for self-representation even
if he can play the lesser role of represented defendant.” Edwards, 554 U.S. at 176.

¶21 Taylor contends that the circuit court’s decision “impl[ies] that his
mental illness made him categorically incompetent to represent himself.” The
circuit court, however, did not categorically find that Taylor was incompetent
merely because he has a mental illness. Instead, the circuit court inquired as to
what type of mental health problems Taylor suffered from, asked him whether he
was receiving treatment, when he stopped taking medication, what types of
medications were prescribed, the symptoms he was experiencing, and the last time
he heard a voice or had a hallucination. Subsequently, the court, in finding that
Taylor was not competent to represent himself, specifically noted his symptoms.

¶22 In addition, Taylor contends that the circuit court found him
incompetent to represent himself as a “sanction” for refusing unwanted
medication. Taylor also complains that the court’s colloquy asked irrelevant
questions, such as the number of children he had fathered, his marital history, and

5
The competency report filed after the hearing also noted that Taylor experiences
“visions” in addition to hearing voices.

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No. 2023AP920-CR

what programming he had availed himself of in prison. The record; however, does
not reflect that the court stated or implied that it was imposing a sanction for
Taylor’s refusal to take medication. Nor does the record reflect that the court
relied on the information about Taylor’s children, marital history, or programming
participation when finding that Taylor was not competent to represent himself.

¶23 Thus, we conclude that the circuit court properly denied Taylor’s
self-representation claim.

II. The State’s Compliance with the IAD

¶24 The IAD is “a congressionally approved interstate compact that
establishes procedures for the transfer of a prisoner in one jurisdiction to the
temporary custody of another.” State v. Tarrant, 2009 WI App 121, ¶8, 321
Wis. 2d 69, 772 N.W.2d 750. The compact has been codified in Wisconsin in
WIS. STAT. § 976.05.

¶25 The State calculated the deadline to try Taylor’s case under the IAD
as December 24, 2017. Taylor argues that the failure to try his case by this date
should result in his case being dismissed with prejudice. Taylor notes that when
his first attorney withdrew, the circuit court informed him that there would be no
issue with conducting the trial within the deadline so long as he represented
himself. Taylor then argues that by incorrectly denying his right to self-
representation, the circuit court effectively denied him his right to a prompt

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No. 2023AP920-CR

disposition. As discussed above, however, Taylor’s self-representation claim fails.
Thus, his IAD claim, which depends on his self-representation claim, also fails.6

¶26 Therefore, for all of the reasons above, we affirm.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

6
The State also argues alternatively that the circuit court lawfully extended Taylor’s
IAD deadline for good cause. Because we conclude that the failure of Taylor’s self-
representation claim defeats his IAD claim, we do not address the State’s alternative argument.
See Blalock, 150 Wis. 2d at 703.

9