v. Jason Van Engel

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 4, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP2259 Cir. Ct. No. 2023CV346

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

PETITIONER,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

JASON VAN ENGEL,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from an order of the circuit court for Ozaukee County:
SANDY A. WILLIAMS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Gundrum, P.J., Grogan and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2023AP2259

¶1 PER CURIAM. Jason Van Engel appeals from a domestic abuse
injunction order and alleges the evidence was insufficient to issue the injunction.1
We affirm.

Background

¶2 Van Engel and the Petitioner lived together during their two-year
romantic relationship.2 When their relationship ended, the Petitioner moved out of
Van Engel’s residence and into her own. In October 2023, the Petitioner filed a
petition seeking a temporary restraining order alleging that Van Engel “physically
put hands on me and has stalked and harassed me.” The Petitioner asserted among
other things that Van Engel had “stabbed all four of my car tires, stolen my things,
thrown away my children[’]s things from bikes to clothes, stolen my money from
our bank account, taken nudes in my underwear to antagonize me,” and would not
leave her alone.

¶3 The circuit court scheduled an injunction hearing, which occurred in
November 2023. Both the Petitioner and Van Engel appeared pro se. Only the
Petitioner testified. She testified that Van Engel would not let her take her
belongings from his home and made her “beg” him to let her take her things. She

1
Van Engel also argues that the Respondent’s brief failed to comply with WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.19 (2021-22) and requests that this court reverse on that basis. Because Van Engel
failed to satisfy his burden as the Appellant, we reject his request to reverse a valid domestic
abuse injunction based on Respondent’s nonconforming brief. See Gaethke v. Pozder, 2017 WI
App 38, ¶36, 376 Wis. 2d 448, 899 N.W.2d 381 (On appeal, an appellant bears the burden to
demonstrate how the circuit court erred.).

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2021-22 version unless otherwise
noted.
2
We will refer to the woman who filed the petition for a restraining order against
Van Engel solely as the “Petitioner” throughout this opinion.

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No. 2023AP2259

testified about having pictures of bruises on her legs as a result of Van Engel
“throwing” her “all over the place” when she came to pick up her belongings
because he was trying to “physically stop” her. She said that he repeatedly
showed up at her new apartment despite knowing she did not want him there and
that when she installed a security camera, he unplugged it. She testified that all
four of her car’s tires were “stabbed” and that a neighbor saw Van Engel there the
night it happened. When she asked Van Engel what he used to “stab” her tires, he
did not deny doing it and instead said she did not “need to know” what he used.
She also testified about a time he showed up at the grocery store at the same time
she was there and that she then found an AirTag, which can track a person’s
movements, hidden in her car. She explained that when she asked Van Engel
about the AirTag, he did not deny that he put it there but instead “smirked” at her.
She also told the circuit court that Van Engel took her children’s birth certificates
out of the things she had packed up, that he threw her children’s bikes in the
dumpster, and that he texted her pictures of him wearing only her underwear.

¶4 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court granted the
Petitioner’s request and issued a four-year domestic abuse injunction. The court
ruled:

When a court determines whether or not an injunction
should be issued, the Court has to evaluate the testimony.
And quite frankly, there’s no controverted testimony
presented to the Court. We have two people that were
engaged in a relationship. It comes to a conclusion, it ends.
The petitioner is moving out of the residence they shared
for a period of time, and she makes it very clear that the
relationship has ended.

The respondent comes to her residence in a different
location on three separate occasions. There’s no legitimate
purpose. He was made well aware that he wasn’t welcome
there and yet he continues to come to the residence. That
in and of itself is grounds for the Court to grant an

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No. 2023AP2259

injunction, but then you have also an incident probably
about January of ‘23. I’m not exactly sure, but somewhere
in that timeframe where during a break up of the two, the
petitioner’s tires are stabbed.

Now it’s accurate that there was no direct testimony, but
the petitioner shared a conversation by all intents and
purposes, there’s an admission that you stabbed the tires.
When she said what did you stab the tires with; the
response is you don’t need to know that. That’s pretty
circumstantial. Most people, if confronted with something
like that wouldn’t say you don’t need to know what I used
to stab the tires, they’d say what are you talking about, I
didn’t stab the tires. That wasn’t the case here.

Then you have the AirTag; again, circumstantial. It was
highly unusual that they would be at the same place and
shortly after she finds an AirTag in the gas tank flap. But
even if I don’t consider that, I mean that’s not real strong,
but even if I don’t consider that, there’s grounds for an
injunction.

The highlight is the physical bruises she received at the
hands of the respondent. Now when you combine the text
messages with not really giving free access to her property,
it was kind of like throw out the fishing hook, reel it in a
little, throw out the fishing hook, reel it in a little. That’s
really what he was doing through the text messages and
how she had to constantly say well can I have this back?
Well, sure. And then get there and then there’s
unnecessary pressure put on her. Clearly she wants her
property so she finally concedes all right fine we can be
friends. She no sooner makes that concession only for the
reason that she wants her property back, you put pressure
on her to have a sexual relationship with her.

So when you put all of this together, there’s more than
sufficient evidence to grant the injunction and I will grant
it.

Discussion

¶5 Van Engel claims there was insufficient evidence to issue the
injunction because there was no finding or evidence that: (1) Van Engel intended
to harm the Petitioner when he “threw” her around, resulting in bruising on her

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No. 2023AP2259

legs when he physically attempted to prevent her from leaving; and (2) she did not
consent to him slashing all four of her car’s tires or that he was the culprit.

¶6 Whether a circuit court properly granted a domestic abuse injunction
“presents a mixed question of fact and law.” Welytok v. Ziolkowski, 2008 WI
App 67, ¶23, 312 Wis. 2d 435, 752 N.W.2d 359. “Findings of fact shall not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard shall be given to the opportunity of
the trial court to judge the credibility of the witnesses.” WIS. STAT. § 805.17(2).
When the issue specifically involves the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
issuance of an injunction, we will not reverse the circuit court unless the evidence,
viewed most favorably to the petitioner, is so lacking in probative value that no
factfinder, acting reasonably, could have found that the petitioner satisfied his or
her burden of proof. See Wittig v. Hoffart, 2005 WI App 198, ¶19, 287 Wis. 2d
353, 704 N.W.2d 415. “[O]ur review ultimately is limited to whether that
discretion was properly exercised.” Welytok, 312 Wis. 2d 435, ¶23. We will
affirm as long as the circuit court made a reasonable decision “based upon the
facts appearing in the record and in reliance on the appropriate and applicable
law.” Sunnyside Feed Co. v. City of Portage, 222 Wis. 2d 461, 468, 588 N.W.2d
278 (Ct. App. 1998). “[W]e generally look for reasons to sustain discretionary
rulings.” Welytok, 312 Wis. 2d 435, ¶24.

¶7 In order to have issued the injunction here, the circuit court needed
to find “reasonable grounds to believe” that Van Engel “ha[d] engaged in, or based
upon prior conduct” he “may engage in, domestic abuse of the petitioner.” See
WIS. STAT. § 813.12(4)(a)3. Because Van Engel is the Appellant, he has the
burden of proving that the court erred in issuing the injunction. See Gaethke v.
Pozder, 2017 WI App 38, ¶36, 376 Wis. 2d 448, 899 N.W.2d 381.

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No. 2023AP2259

¶8 The statute governing domestic abuse restraining orders provides as
relevant:

“Domestic abuse” means any of the following engaged in
by an adult family member or adult household member
against another adult family member or adult household
member, by an adult caregiver against an adult who is
under the caregiver’s care, by an adult against his or her
adult former spouse, by an adult against an adult with
whom the individual has or had a dating relationship, or by
an adult against an adult with whom the person has a child
in common:

1. Intentional infliction of physical pain, physical injury
or illness.

….

5. A violation of [WIS. STAT. §] 943.01, involving
property that belongs to the individual.

WIS. STAT. § 813.12(1)(am). Section 943.01(1) says: “Whoever intentionally
causes damage to any physical property of another without the person’s consent is
guilty of a Class A misdemeanor.”

¶9 In order to uphold the circuit court’s injunction, we need to
determine whether there was sufficient evidence that Van Engel intentionally
caused physical injury to the Petitioner or damaged her property. Sufficient
evidence on either one would sustain the injunction.

Physical Injury

¶10 Van Engel argues there was no finding or evidence that he acted
intentionally to cause the Petitioner’s bruises and no evidence that the Petitioner
experienced any pain from the bruises. The sufficiency of the evidence standard
requires Van Engel to prove that the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the
Petitioner, is so lacking in probative value that no factfinder, acting reasonably,

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No. 2023AP2259

could have found he intentionally inflicted physical pain or physical injury on the
Petitioner. See Wittig, 287 Wis. 2d 353, ¶19. He fails to do so.

¶11 The testimony at the injunction hearing was undisputed. Van Engel
“threw” the Petitioner around when she was trying to collect her belongings from
the residence they had shared during their relationship, and he had done so in an
attempt to prevent her from leaving. Although the Petitioner did not use the word
“intentionally” when describing how Van Engel threw her around, it is clear from
the context of her testimony that he did not do this “accidentally.” Based on this
testimony, we cannot say that no factfinder could have found that Van Engel
intentionally inflicted physical pain or physical injury. Further, we are not
persuaded by Van Engel’s argument that the absence of specific testimony that the
bruises caused the Petitioner pain means the evidence is insufficient. It is
undisputed that Van Engel’s actions caused the Petitioner’s bruising, and bruises
are clearly a type of physical injury. Based on the testimony, a factfinder could
reasonably find that Van Engel’s acts of intentionally “throwing” the Petitioner
around—which led to multiple bruises—caused her physical pain.

¶12 Concluding that there is sufficient evidence based on physical
injury/pain is sufficient to reject Van Engel’s claim on appeal; however, for the
sake of completeness, we also address his argument with respect to the physical
damage to the Petitioner’s car tires.

Slashed tires

¶13 Van Engel also argues the evidence was insufficient to support
issuing the injunction on the basis that the Petitioner’s tires were slashed because
she did not testify that they were slashed without her consent. He also contends
there was no proof that he slashed the tires. We reject his argument.

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No. 2023AP2259

¶14 Again, the sufficiency of the evidence standard requires Van Engel
to prove that the evidence, when viewed most favorably to the Petitioner, is so
lacking in probative value that no factfinder, acting reasonably, could have found
he damaged the car tires without her consent. See id. He has failed to do so.

¶15 First, it is clear from the Petitioner’s testimony that she was upset
that all four of her car tires had been slashed and that, as a result, she had to buy
new tires. Van Engel’s argument that there was no evidence that the Petitioner did
not consent to having her tires slashed given these circumstances borders on the
absurd. Second, there is evidence from which a factfinder could find that
Van Engel was the person who slashed the tires: He was in the area when it
happened, and instead of denying that he did it when confronted, he told the
Petitioner she did not need to know what instrument he used to slash the tires. As
the circuit court noted, this is circumstantial evidence supporting a finding that
Van Engel was indeed the culprit.

¶16 Because Van Engel has failed to establish that the evidence was
insufficient to issue the injunction, we affirm.

By the Court.—Order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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