State v. Rodney E. Coleman

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 26, 2024
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10 and
RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2022AP614-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2016CF1223

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

RODNEY E. COLEMAN,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
Kenosha County: JASON A. ROSSELL, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Neubauer, Grogan and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2022AP614-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Rodney E. Coleman, pro se, appeals from a
judgment convicting him of attempted first-degree intentional homicide with use of
a dangerous weapon and from an order denying his multiple pro se postconviction
motions. Coleman challenges numerous aspects of his trial, sentencing, and
postconviction proceedings, alleging that the State withheld exculpatory evidence,
that the circuit court erred in replying to a jury question, that the presentence
investigation report (PSI) had incorrect or incomplete information, that he was
denied a lesser-included offense instruction, that both his trial and appellate counsel
were ineffective, and that judicial bias and prosecutorial misconduct deprived him
of a fair trial. We reject Coleman’s claims and affirm the judgment and order.

¶2 Following a jury trial, Coleman was convicted of attempting to kill
K.W. by shooting him multiple times in a Kenosha bank parking lot on October 28,
2016. The evidence at trial established that Coleman, believing K.W. was involved
with Coleman’s girlfriend, confronted K.W. at close range and fired several rounds
into his groin, abdomen, and upper thigh. After K.W. fell to the ground, Coleman
placed the gun against K.W.’s temple and tried to fire again, but the weapon
misfired. Coleman then fled the scene, leaving behind his cell phone and eventually
departing the state. K.W. survived and identified Coleman as the shooter.

¶3 The State presented eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, and
medical testimony, and law enforcement witnesses tied Coleman to the crime scene.
The jury found him guilty, and the circuit court sentenced him to forty years of
initial confinement and fifteen years of extended supervision.

¶4 After sentencing, Coleman filed multiple pro se postconviction
motions. The circuit court held several evidentiary hearings and ultimately denied
relief. This appeal follows.

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No. 2022AP614-CR

¶5 Coleman first claims that the State violated Brady v. Maryland, 373
U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding exculpatory surveillance footage from the bank
parking lot. He argues this purported video would have shown fewer shots fired
than the State alleged and would have undermined K.W.’s identification of him.

¶6 The circuit court thoroughly addressed this claim at postconviction
hearings. Coleman offered no reliable proof that such footage existed or that the
prosecution withheld it. The investigating officers testified that they reviewed all
available surveillance footage and found either no relevant evidence of the shooting
or no additional recordings that had visible images of the scene. The State disclosed
all known evidence to the defense. Without any evidence that the disputed footage
existed, or was favorable and material, Coleman cannot establish a Brady violation.
See State v. Harris, 2004 WI 64, ¶11, 272 Wis. 2d 80, 680 N.W.2d 737. The circuit
court’s findings are not clearly erroneous. This claim fails.

¶7 Coleman next challenges the circuit court’s answer to a jury question.
During deliberations, the jury asked whether any of the guns discussed at trial were
registered and, if so, to whom. The court replied that the evidence did not address
that topic. Coleman’s trial counsel agreed with this response and did not object.
Because the court’s answer accurately reflected the evidence, and Coleman’s
counsel did not object, Coleman has forfeited his right to challenge it on appeal. See
State v. Booth, 147 Wis. 2d 208, 211, 432 N.W.2d 681 (Ct. App. 1988).

¶8 Coleman next asserts that the PSI report included incomplete, false or
exaggerated information—particularly concerning the number of shots fired—and
that the sentencing court relied on this inaccuracy. Due process prohibits a
sentencing court from relying on materially inaccurate information. State v.
Tiepelman, 2006 WI 66, ¶9, 291 Wis. 2d 179, 717 N.W.2d 1. However, Coleman

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No. 2022AP614-CR

did not object to the PSI report at sentencing or raise this issue in his postconviction
motions. He therefore forfeited his right to raise it on appeal. See State v. Pinno,
2014 WI 74, ¶56, 356 Wis. 2d 106, 850 N.W.2d 207.

¶9 Coleman next argues that the trial court erred by refusing to instruct
the jury on a lesser-included offense, such as first-degree recklessly endangering
safety. A lesser-included offense instruction is appropriate only if a reasonable view
of the evidence supports a conviction on the lesser offense but not the greater. State
v. Barreau, 2002 WI App 198, ¶17, 257 Wis. 2d 203, 651 N.W.2d 12.

¶10 Here, the evidence overwhelmingly supported the charged offense.
Coleman confronted K.W. armed, fired multiple rounds at close range, and
attempted a final, presumably fatal, shot to the victim’s head. This clearly
demonstrated an intent to kill, rather than mere reckless endangerment. The circuit
court properly declined to give the requested lesser-included offense instruction.

¶11 Coleman further argues that his trial counsel was ineffective for
failing to present the alleged bank surveillance footage, failing to challenge the PSI
report’s accuracy, failing to challenge the prosecutor’s narrative, failing to call a
particular witness (Kathleen Mianecki), and failing to effectively cross-examine
witnesses or contest expert testimony. To prevail on an ineffective assistance claim,
Coleman must show deficient performance and resulting prejudice. See Strickland
v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687 (1984).

¶12 As discussed, Coleman has not demonstrated that the purported video
existed or that the PSI report contained material inaccuracies. His claims about
calling Mianecki are speculative. Even if Mianecki heard only three shots, that
would not negate the overwhelming evidence that Coleman fired multiple times,
seriously wounded K.W., and attempted to shoot him again at point-blank range.

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No. 2022AP614-CR

Coleman does not explain what additional cross-examination or strategy would
likely have changed the outcome. Without evidence of deficient performance or
prejudice, his ineffective assistance claims fail.

¶13 Coleman also asserts that his appellate attorney was ineffective.
However, he discharged appellate counsel before postconviction motions were
filed, and the circuit court granted counsel’s motion to withdraw. Since Coleman
represented himself in postconviction proceedings and on appeal, he cannot claim
that appellate counsel’s performance was constitutionally ineffective.

¶14 Coleman next argues that the trial court and the prosecution were
biased against him and created a false narrative of the shooting. Judicial bias
requires proof of a lack of impartiality or unfair predisposition. State v. Herrmann,
2015 WI 84, ¶3, 364 Wis. 2d 336, 867 N.W.2d 772. Coleman provides no evidence
of judicial bias. Prosecutorial misconduct requires proof that the prosecutor’s
actions “so infected the trial with unfairness as to make the resulting conviction a
denial of due process.” State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶43, 301 Wis. 2d 642, 734
N.W.2d 115 (quoting State v. Davidson, 2000 WI 91, ¶88, 236 Wis. 2d 537, 613
N.W.2d 606). The record does not support such a claim. The prosecutor’s
arguments were grounded in testimony from the victim, medical evidence, and
eyewitness accounts. Coleman’s accusations of bias and misconduct lack merit.

¶15 Finally, Coleman argues for a new trial based on cumulative error,
asserting that his mental health issues, witness intimidation, and withheld evidence
deprived him of a fair trial. A new trial in the interests of justice is appropriate only
if the real controversy was not fully tried and there was a miscarriage of justice.
State v. Burns, 2011 WI 22, ¶24, 332 Wis. 2d 730, 798 N.W.2d 166. The circuit
court considered Coleman’s claims thoroughly during postconviction hearings and

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No. 2022AP614-CR

found them meritless. Coleman voluntarily withdrew his NGI (not guilty by reason
of mental disease or defect) plea, and there is no evidence that any defense witnesses
were intimidated or prevented from testifying. His assertions are speculative and
unsupported by credible evidence in the record.

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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