Daniel L. Lamphere v. Ryan Hulback

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
March 4, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2021AP841 Cir. Ct. No. 2019CV159

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

DANIEL L. LAMPHERE,

PLAINTIFF,

ANN M. LAMPHERE,

PLAINTIFF-APPELLANT,

V.

RYAN HULBACK, JAMES PRESSLEY, JONATHAN FICK,
HOLLY HULBACK AND MARIA HERDAHL,

DEFENDANTS-RESPONDENTS.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Barron County:
MAUREEN D. BOYLE, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz and Gill, JJ.
No. 2021AP841

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Daniel and Ann Lamphere filed a complaint
asserting various claims against three Barron County law enforcement officers—
Sergeant Ryan Hulback, Deputy James Pressley, and Deputy Jonathan Fick—and
two Barron County dispatchers—Holly Hulback and Maria Herdahl.1 At trial,
following the close of evidence, the circuit court granted the defendants’ motion to
dismiss as to some of the Lampheres’ claims. The jury subsequently found in
favor of the defendants on the Lampheres’ remaining claims. The court then
entered a final judgment dismissing all of the Lampheres’ claims.

¶2 Ann, pro se, now appeals, arguing that the circuit court erred by
dismissing some of her claims on the defendants’ motion before the case went to
the jury.2 For the reasons explained below, we conclude Ann has failed to show
that the court erred by partially granting the defendants’ motion to dismiss.
Accordingly, we affirm.

1
Because Ann and Daniel Lamphere share a surname, we refer to them individually by
their first names throughout this opinion. We refer to the respondents on appeal, collectively, as
“the defendants.” We refer to Ryan Hulback as “Sergeant Hulback” and to Holly Hulback as
“Hulback.”
2
The notice of appeal filed in this matter purported to initiate an appeal on behalf of both
Daniel and Ann, but it was signed only by Ann. By order dated May 19, 2021, we informed the
Lampheres that a notice of appeal “cannot be signed by a non-attorney on behalf of another
individual.” We therefore construed the joint notice of appeal “to have been unsigned by
Daniel Lamphere, rather than having been signed on his behalf by Ann Lamphere,” and we set a
deadline for Daniel to file his own signed notice of appeal. We noted that if Daniel failed to do
so, our jurisdiction over the appeal would be “limited to the claims of Ann Lamphere.”
Thereafter, Daniel failed to file his own signed notice of appeal. Consequently, Ann is the only
appellant in this matter.

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BACKGROUND

¶3 On September 12, 2018, Barron County dispatch received a 911
hang-up call from a specific phone number. Before the phone call was
disconnected, dispatch heard yelling in the background. The county’s dispatch
computer system showed that the call came from a cell phone, that the phone
number belonged to Ann, and that Ann resided at an address on Arthur Avenue in
the Village of Turtle Lake. At that time, the county’s computer system was not
able to automatically register the GPS location of incoming calls, and it sometimes
took time for the exact location of an incoming call to register in the system.

¶4 After receiving the hang-up call, dispatch attempted to call the
number back multiple times and eventually spoke with Ann. Ann told dispatch
that a family argument had occurred, but that she could not talk about it or she
would “be in trouble,” and she subsequently hung up. The dispatchers relayed this
information to Deputy Pressley, Deputy Fick, and Sergeant Hulback of the Barron
County Sheriff’s Office and dispatched them to the Arthur Avenue address.3

¶5 When the deputies arrived at the Arthur Avenue address, they
walked around the residence and heard no yelling, but Sergeant Hulback reported
seeing lights on inside. They attempted to make contact with Ann by knocking on
the door loudly and asking to be let in, but no one answered. They also yelled
through an open window and tried other doors and a garage door, but they
received no response. While at the residence, the deputies received information
that Ann had called dispatch back and stated that there was nothing wrong, that

3
Throughout this opinion, we refer to Deputy Pressley, Deputy Fick, and
Sergeant Hulback, collectively, as “the deputies.”

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she did not call 911, that nothing physical had taken place, that there were no
weapons involved, and that it was just a family argument. Herdahl also informed
the deputies that Ann had stated she would not open the door for them.

¶6 The deputies then decided to force entry into the residence. After
doing so, the deputies cleared the residence and did not find anyone inside.
Deputy Pressley then asked dispatch to contact Ann again. Dispatch did so and
learned that Ann was sitting outside of the Turtle Lake Police Department in a
yellow Mini Cooper automobile with her young grandson. Dispatch relayed that
Ann was returning to the Arthur Avenue address, and the deputies decided to wait
for her there.

¶7 The deputies subsequently observed a yellow Mini Cooper, which
they knew to be Ann’s vehicle, approaching the Arthur Avenue residence. When
the vehicle got close to the residence, it revved its engine loudly, accelerated
rapidly, and drove into an alley behind the residence. The deputies drove their
squad cars toward the alley with their emergency lights activated and blocked the
Mini Cooper from leaving.

¶8 Deputy Fick then made contact with Ann, advising her to turn her
vehicle off, unlock the doors, and exit the vehicle. Ann refused to comply with
these requests. According to the deputies, Ann was screaming at them; was
uncooperative, excited, and agitated; and seemed out of control. Ann ultimately
unlocked her vehicle’s doors, and Deputy Pressley removed her from the vehicle.
After Ann was handcuffed, she physically fought with the deputies before being
placed in the back seat of one of their squad cars.

¶9 Deputy Fick spoke with Ann’s grandson, who was in the Mini
Cooper. The child told Deputy Fick that Ann and Daniel had been arguing with

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their son, Bradley, and Bradley’s significant other, Bobbi Skye, at Bradley’s house
on Grand Avenue in the Village of Turtle Lake. The deputies then transported
Ann and her grandson to that location. According to the deputies, Ann continued
to act aggressively and was agitated and destructive, attempting to kick a camera
in the back seat of the squad car and trying to kick her way out of the squad car.

¶10 At the Grand Avenue residence, the deputies spoke with Daniel,
Bradley, and Skye. At times, Ann screamed that she wanted medical attention for
her throat, and she told the deputies that she had multiple health problems,
including cancer. Ann also made a suicidal statement and threatened to punch
Skye. Deputy Pressley contacted the county’s crisis line and reported Ann’s
suicidal statement, but Ann refused to speak with the county’s crisis team.

¶11 After conferring with a county crisis worker, the deputies decided to
take Ann to jail. Ann then stated that she needed to use the restroom immediately
because of medical issues and her use of a colostomy bag or similar device.
Deputy Pressley took Ann inside the Grand Avenue residence and allowed her to
use the restroom. While inside the residence, Ann calmed down, and the deputies
decided not to take her to jail. Deputy Pressley then contacted the crisis team
again and put them in touch with Daniel. At that point, the crisis team determined
that Ann could safely be released into Daniel’s care.

¶12 The Lampheres, pro se, subsequently filed the instant lawsuit against
the two 911 dispatchers—Hulback and Herdahl—and Sergeant Hulback,
Deputy Fick, and Deputy Pressley.4 Generally, the Lampheres alleged
4
The Lampheres’ complaint named several additional parties as defendants. Those
parties were dismissed from the case and are not relevant to this appeal. As such, we do not
discuss them further.
(continued)

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that: (1) the dispatchers violated Ann’s right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment when they relayed false and inaccurate information to the
deputies and failed to provide complete information to the deputies; (2) the
deputies violated the Fourth Amendment when they entered the Arthur Avenue
residence without justification; (3) the deputies violated the Fourth Amendment
when they unlawfully detained Ann; and (4) the deputies violated the
Fourth Amendment by failing to provide necessary medical care for Ann.

¶13 The case proceeded to a three-day jury trial. After both sides rested,
the defendants moved for dismissal of all of the Lampheres’ claims based on
insufficient evidence. The circuit court granted the motion to dismiss in part. The
court began by noting that its task was to determine “whether or not there is
sufficient evidence upon which a reasonable jury could find in favor of the
[Lampheres].” The court further stated that the sufficiency of the evidence was
measured against the legal standards set forth in the proposed jury instructions that
the parties had submitted, and those legal standards did not appear to be in dispute.

¶14 Addressing the Lampheres’ claims against the dispatchers, the
circuit court stated that the applicable legal standard “is not one of ‘negligence’;
the standard here is one of ‘recklessness.’” The court concluded there was no
evidence “to suggest that the dispatchers were not doing their jobs, and that they
were acting ‘intentionally’ to cause harm, or even ‘recklessly’ causing harm.” To
the contrary, the court stated, “If there was one constant theme … through the
testimony of the dispatchers, it was that they were struggling to get information;

The Lampheres’ complaint also purported to assert claims on behalf of their minor
grandson who was present during the events described above. The Lampheres agreed to dismiss
those claims, and the circuit court amended the caption to remove their grandson as a party.

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No. 2021AP841

they were attempting to get as much information as they could, even from other
sources, and doing all of this within their other responsibilities … as dispatchers.”

¶15 The circuit court next addressed the Lampheres’ claims that the
deputies unlawfully seized Ann in violation of the Fourth Amendment. First, the
court concluded there was no evidence that Deputy Fick or Sergeant Hulback had
personally seized Ann. The court then concluded the evidence showed that
Deputy Pressley’s seizure of Ann was justified. The court noted that when Ann’s
vehicle approached the Arthur Avenue residence, it “quickly made a turn to the
north and then sped away,” leaving no question that Ann was “fleeing the
officers.” The court further noted that Deputy Pressley “said, a minimum of five
times on the stand, that he had reason to believe that either [Ann] was or had
[been] or would be committing a crime.” Based on Deputy Pressley’s testimony,
the court concluded there “was clearly reasonable suspicion” to detain Ann. The
court further concluded that the extension of Ann’s detention “was appropriate
based on her continued behaviors”—i.e., her “completely uncontrollable,
completely unpredictable” demeanor.

¶16 The circuit court next addressed the Lampheres’ claims that the
deputies violated Ann’s constitutional rights by denying her medical care. The
court explained that, to prevail on those claims, the Lampheres would need to
prove: (1) that Ann was detained; (2) that she needed medical care; (3) that the
deputies denied her medical care; (4) that the denial was unreasonable; and (5) that
she was harmed as a result. Initially, the court concluded that there was “a basis
within the evidence submitted here today” for the Lampheres’ claims regarding
the denial of medical care to go to the jury. Subsequently, however, the court
determined that there was no evidence that Deputy Fick, specifically, had denied
Ann medical care. The court therefore dismissed the denial of medical care claim

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No. 2021AP841

against Deputy Fick but allowed the denial of medical care claims against
Sergeant Hulback and Deputy Pressley to go to the jury.5

¶17 The jury was therefore asked to determine: (1) whether
Sergeant Hulback, Deputy Pressley, and Deputy Fick entered the Arthur Avenue
residence without justification; and (2) whether Sergeant Hulback and
Deputy Pressley unreasonably failed to provide medical care to Ann. The jury
found in favor of the defendants on these claims.

¶18 The Lampheres moved for a new trial, alleging juror misconduct and
improper jury instructions. The circuit court denied those motions and entered a
judgment dismissing the Lampheres’ claims. This appeal follows.6

DISCUSSION

I. Forfeiture

¶19 On appeal, Ann challenges only the circuit court’s decision to
dismiss some of her claims following the close of evidence. In response, the

5
The circuit court rejected the defendants’ alternative argument that all of the
Lampheres’ claims should be dismissed on qualified immunity grounds.
6
We held this appeal in abeyance pending the resolution of Ann’s appeal from the
circuit court’s order denying her petition for waiver of transcript fees. We summarily affirmed
that order on August 15, 2023. See Lamphere v. Hulback, No. 2021AP1954, unpublished op.
and order (WI App Aug. 15, 2023).

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No. 2021AP841

defendants assert that Ann forfeited her right to challenge the court’s dismissal of
those claims by failing to do so in a postverdict motion.7

¶20 In support of their forfeiture argument, the defendants cite Herkert
v. Stauber, 106 Wis. 2d 545, 561, 317 N.W.2d 834 (1982) (citation omitted),
where our supreme court stated, “It is clear that no error of the [circuit] court is
reviewable as a matter of right on appeal without first moving for a new trial based
on such error.” The defendants also cite Hartford Insurance Co. v. Wales,
138 Wis. 2d 508, 514, 406 N.W.2d 426 (1987), where our supreme court
interpreted Herkert as holding that “on appeal the appellant cannot assert certain
objections to the judgment because the objections were waived by the failure to
make the required motion which would have brought alleged errors to the attention
of the circuit court and would have allowed it to correct its own errors.”

¶21 The Herkert court concluded that the appellants in that case forfeited
their argument that the circuit court erred by failing to give a particular jury

We pause here to note deficiencies in both sides’ appellate briefs. First, we observe
7

that Ann’s brief-in-chief repeatedly cites Ann’s appendix, rather than the appellate record. The
Rules of Appellate Procedure require references to the appellate record, see WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.19(1)(d) and (e) (2023-24), and an appendix “is not the record,” see Ripp Distrib. Co.
v. Ruby Distrib. LLC, 2024 WI App 24, ¶16 n.7, 411 Wis. 2d 630, 5 N.W.3d 930.

Second, the defendants’ brief fails to comply with WIS. STAT. RULE 809.19(8)(bm)
(2023-24), which requires a brief to “have page numbers centered in the bottom margin using
Arabic numerals with sequential numbering starting at ‘1’ on the cover.” Our supreme court has
explained that this pagination requirement “will match the page number to the page header
applied by the eFiling system, avoiding the confusion of having two different page numbers.”
S. CT. ORDER 20-07, 2021 WI 37, 397 Wis. 2d xiii (eff. July 1, 2021).

We admonish both sides that future violations of the Rules of Appellate Procedure may
result in sanctions. See WIS. STAT. RULE 809.83(2) (2023-24).

All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version unless otherwise
noted.

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No. 2021AP841

instruction because they did not raise that argument in the circuit court. See
Herkert, 106 Wis. 2d at 560-61. Hartford Insurance, in turn, involved an
untimely motion for a new trial “on the ground that there was no evidence to
support the verdict and on grounds that either the instructions were erroneous or
that requested instructions were improperly refused.” Hartford Ins. Co.,
138 Wis. 2d at 515.

¶22 Neither Herkert nor Hartford Insurance involved a situation like
the one in this case, where the circuit court granted a party’s motion to dismiss
certain claims following the close of evidence, over the nonmoving party’s
objection. The defendants cite no legal authority specifically supporting the
proposition that a motion after verdict is required to preserve the nonmoving
party’s objection under these circumstances.8 Unlike Herkert and Hartford
Insurance, this is not a case where the appellant failed to “br[ing] alleged errors to
the attention of the circuit court” and therefore prevented the court from
“correct[ing] its own errors.” See Hartford Ins. Co., 138 Wis. 2d at 514.

¶23 To the contrary, the circuit court was well aware of Ann’s opposition
to the defendants’ motion to dismiss, but it nevertheless granted that motion as to
some of Ann’s claims. Applying the forfeiture rule under these circumstances
would not comport with the rule’s purpose. See State v. Counihan, 2020 WI 12,
¶26, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938 N.W.2d 530 (“The purpose of the forfeiture rule is to

8
In support of their forfeiture argument, the defendants also cite Jos. P. Jansen Co. v.
Milwaukee Area District Board of Vocational, Technical & Adult Education, 105 Wis. 2d 1,
312 N.W.2d 813 (1981), which they claim stands for the proposition that “[b]y failing to timely
file motions after verdict, the plaintiffs deprive the circuit court of an opportunity to correct its
own error.” However, the pinpoint citation that the defendants provide for this proposition does
not support it. See id. at 10.

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No. 2021AP841

enable the circuit court to avoid or correct any error as it comes up, with minimal
disruption of the judicial process and maximum efficiency.”); see also State v.
Coffee, 2020 WI 1, ¶21, 389 Wis. 2d 627, 937 N.W.2d 579 (“The forfeiture rule
should not be applied where its application would not further its purpose—the fair,
efficient, and orderly administration of justice.”). We therefore decline to
conclude that Ann has forfeited her appellate arguments.9

II. Dismissal of Ann’s claims following the close of evidence

¶24 “In trials to the jury, at the close of all evidence, any party may
challenge the sufficiency of the evidence as a matter of law by moving
for … dismissal.” WIS. STAT. § 805.14(4). The circuit court may not grant a
motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of the evidence “unless the court is
satisfied that, considering all credible evidence and reasonable inferences
therefrom in the light most favorable to the party against whom the motion is
made, there is no credible evidence to sustain a finding in favor of such party.”
Sec. 805.14(1).

¶25 On appeal, we will not “overturn a circuit court’s decision to dismiss
for insufficient evidence unless the record reveals that the circuit court was
‘clearly wrong.’” Weiss v. United Fire & Cas. Co., 197 Wis. 2d 365, 389,
541 N.W.2d 753 (1995) (citation omitted). A circuit court is “clearly wrong”

9
In any event, “the forfeiture rule is a rule of judicial administration, and thus a
reviewing court may disregard a forfeiture and address the merits of an unpreserved issue in an
appropriate case.” State v. Counihan, 2020 WI 12, ¶27, 390 Wis. 2d 172, 938 N.W.2d 530.
Here, even if Ann had forfeited her current arguments, we would nevertheless exercise our
discretion to address them, given Ann’s pro se status, the fact that the circuit court considered and
ruled on Ann’s arguments, and the fact that the parties have addressed the merits of Ann’s
arguments in their appellate briefs.

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No. 2021AP841

when it grants a motion to dismiss based on insufficiency of the evidence despite
the existence of credible evidence to support the plaintiff’s claim. See id.
“Because a circuit court is better positioned to decide the weight and relevancy of
the testimony,” an appellate court must “give substantial deference” to the circuit
court’s “better ability to assess the evidence.” Id. at 388-89 (citation omitted).

A. Claims against the dispatchers

¶26 Ann first argues that the circuit court erred by dismissing her claims
against the dispatchers—Hulback and Herdahl. As noted above, Ann claims that
the dispatchers failed to provide complete information to the deputies and, in fact,
relayed false and inaccurate information to them. More specifically, Ann contends
that the dispatchers violated her right to due process under the
Fourteenth Amendment by: (1) dispatching the deputies to the Arthur Avenue
address without obtaining complete information about the location from which the
911 call was made, even though they knew that the call had come from a cell
phone; (2) failing to confirm whether Ann was located at the Arthur Avenue
address; and (3) falsely telling the deputies that Ann had stated she would not
answer the door for them.

¶27 The Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment prohibits a
state actor from “depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without due
process of law.” U.S. CONST. amend. XIV. “[O]nly intentional or reckless
conduct violates the due process clause.” Salazar v. City of Chicago, 940 F.2d
233, 238 (7th Cir. 1991) (citing Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1218-19
(7th Cir. 1988)). “[N]either negligence nor even gross negligence is a sufficient

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basis for liability.”10 Id. (citing Archie, 847 F.2d at 1218-19). “An act is reckless
in the pertinent sense when it reflects complete indifference to [a] risk” of harm—
that is, when the actor does not care whether the other person is harmed, despite
knowing that there is a significant risk of harm. See Archie, 847 F.2d at 1219.

¶28 Here, the circuit court determined that Ann had failed to present any
credible evidence that the dispatchers’ allegedly harmful conduct on the night in
question was intentional or reckless. Addressing the dispatchers’ conduct in
sending the deputies to the Arthur Avenue address, the court explained:

The evidence that we have, and that the jury would
consider, is that a 911 hang-up call was made; that after
that 911 hang-up call was made, the dispatchers attempted
to call back to a number that came up. Once the 911 call
comes in, the system creates this CAD, which then ties the
cell phone to a specific address and provides this number.
They attempt to call it back. Get no answer at times. And
then at times actually make contact with Ms. Lamphere,
who doesn’t immediately identify—identifies
herself, … but says her name is “Ann.”

She also tells the dispatchers that she can’t talk. At no time
does she identify that she’s not at her home or that she’s
someplace else. She specifically tells them that
she … can’t talk. And … the dispatchers have—are also
aware that there was some commotion or yelling in the
background. And, again, there’s a belief by the
dispatchers—I think Dispatcher Hulback referred to the
fact that, you know, … when Ms. Lamphere couldn’t talk,

10
In the circuit court, both sides submitted proposed jury instructions that relied on
Archie v. City of Racine, 847 F.2d 1211, 1218-19 (7th Cir. 1988), for the proposition that the
dispatchers’ conduct violated the Due Process Clause only if the dispatchers acted intentionally or
recklessly in causing harm to Ann. To the extent Ann now intends to argue that a negligence
standard applies to her claims against the dispatchers, we conclude that she forfeited that
argument by failing to raise or adequately develop it below. See Tatera v. FMC Corp., 2010 WI
90, ¶19 n.16, 328 Wis. 2d 320, 786 N.W.2d 810 (“Arguments raised for the first time on appeal
are generally deemed forfeited.”); Schwittay v. Sheboygan Falls Mut. Ins. Co., 2001 WI App
140, ¶16 n.3, 246 Wis. 2d 385, 630 N.W.2d 772 (“A party must raise an issue with sufficient
prominence such that the [circuit] court understands that it is called upon to make a ruling.”).

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to them the assumption was that’s because either someone
was there that she couldn’t speak in front of, or that she
was just not capable of providing any additional
information.

So the dispatchers have very little information. They’re
attempting to use the system that exists in terms of
identifying locations. There was clear testimony about the
fact that there was no specific GPS pin as to where the cell
phone was located. In fact, the information—all the
information [they] had was that this cell phone was
registered to Ms. Lamphere. And that she resided at [the
Arthur Avenue address].

….

Eventually the dispatchers find out that when they get a
phone call from Ms. Lamphere, that her grandson actually
has to speak to them about, that [Ann and the child are] on
their way back [to the Arthur Avenue address]. And so up
until that point, I don’t think there’s evidence in the record
that the dispatchers were aware that Ms. Lamphere was not
at her residence.

The court further explained that while Ann was attempting to argue in hindsight
that the dispatchers should have known that she was not at her address, there was
no evidence “that the dispatchers acted with intentionality, for one thing, to
intentionally misdirect the officers, or to even act with complete indifference to
risk, not caring whether or not anyone was harmed.”

¶29 There is no credible evidence in those portions of the trial record that
are available for our review to support a conclusion that the dispatchers acted
intentionally or recklessly by directing the deputies to the Arthur Avenue address.
Notably, Herdahl testified at trial that she did not take the 911 call from Ann’s
phone number. Thus, she could not provide any testimony regarding the initial
association between that phone number and the Arthur Avenue address. Ann has
failed to provide this court with a transcript of the trial testimony provided by the
other dispatcher—Hulback. The circuit court stated, however, that the evidence

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showed that the county’s internal system provided the Arthur Avenue address as
the address for Ann’s phone number and that there was “no specific GPS pin as to
where the cell phone was located” at the time of the 911 call. It is the appellant’s
burden to ensure that the record is sufficient for us to review the issues raised on
appeal, and we assume that any missing materials support the circuit court’s
decision. See State Bank of Hartland v. Arndt, 129 Wis. 2d 411, 423, 385
N.W.2d 219 (Ct. App. 1986). Thus, here, we must assume that Hulback’s trial
testimony supported the court’s assessment that the information available to the
dispatchers warranted sending the deputies to the Arthur Avenue address.

¶30 On appeal, Ann mainly argues that because the dispatchers knew
that the 911 call came from a cell phone, they should have known that the call
could have been made from a location other than the Arthur Avenue address. Ann
also emphasizes that, during Herdahl’s initial phone conversation with Ann
following the 911 call, Herdahl never asked Ann where she was. These arguments
could, potentially, support a claim that the dispatchers were negligent in directing
the deputies to the Arthur Avenue address. We agree with the circuit court,
however, that these arguments would not have provided a basis for the jury to
conclude that the dispatchers acted intentionally or recklessly by sending the
deputies to the Arthur Avenue address, given the information available to the
dispatchers at the time.

¶31 In its decision, the circuit court also specifically rejected Ann’s
argument that Herdahl acted recklessly by telling the deputies that Ann had stated
she was not going to answer the door for them. Our review of the portions of the
trial record that are available to us reveals no credible evidence to support a
determination that Herdahl acted recklessly in that regard.

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¶32 During Herdahl’s initial phone conversation with Ann on the night
in question, following the 911 call, Ann made a comment about not answering the
door.11 Herdahl interpreted Ann’s comment as “I’m not going to answer the door
for them.” Herdahl subsequently told the deputies that Ann had stated she would
not answer the door for them. At trial, Herdahl explained that she believed Ann’s
statement about not answering the door was directed “towards the law
enforcement officers that we had sent there.” Herdahl conceded that Ann did not
specifically reference law enforcement in her comment about not answering the
door, but Herdahl testified she believed that comment was directed toward the
deputies based on “the way the call was going.”

¶33 At another point during the same conversation with Herdahl, Ann
stated, “Oh God, here she comes back.” Herdahl conceded at trial that she did not
ask Ann who “she” was. Ann suggests that Herdahl should have interpreted Ann’s
statement about not answering the door in context with Ann’s comment about a
person coming back, and Herdahl therefore should have understood that Ann
meant she was not going to answer the door for that individual.

¶34 As the circuit court noted in its oral ruling, the situation on the night
when these events occurred was “chaotic,” in large part due to Ann’s own
behavior. As the court explained, because Ann “did not want to relay any
information to the dispatchers at the time, it … created … the urgency for the
dispatchers to figure out what was going on; because the assumptions were that
[Ann] was in trouble.” The court reasoned that under these circumstances, to the

11
We have reviewed the audio recording of this phone call. While Ann says something
during the call about not answering the door, we cannot discern precisely what she says.

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No. 2021AP841

extent the dispatchers “may have been mistaken on certain things … that does not
give rise to ‘intentionality’ or ‘recklessness.’” We agree with the court’s analysis
in this regard.

¶35 In summary, the portions of the trial record that are available for our
review do not contain any credible evidence that would permit a jury to conclude
that the dispatchers acted intentionally or recklessly. As such, the circuit court
properly granted the defendants’ motion to dismiss Ann’s claims against the
dispatchers.

B. Claim against Deputy Fick for failure to provide medical care

¶36 The Fourth Amendment prohibits unreasonable searches and
seizures. U.S. CONST. amend. IV. “[A]n officer violates the [Fourth
Amendment’s] prohibition on unreasonable seizures when, in the course of
making an otherwise lawful arrest, [the officer] does not respond reasonably to an
arrestee’s medical needs.” Florek v. Village of Mundelein, 649 F.3d 594, 598
(7th Cir. 2011). “[F]our factors … are relevant for ascertaining whether a
defendant’s conduct was objectively unreasonable”: (1) whether the defendant
had notice of the arrestee’s medical needs; (2) the seriousness of the medical
needs; (3) the scope of the requested treatment; and (4) any countervailing police
interests, including “administrative, penological, or investigatory concerns.”
Williams v. Rodriguez, 509 F.3d 392, 403 (7th Cir. 2007).

¶37 On appeal, Ann asserts that upon Deputy Fick’s arrival at the
Grand Avenue residence, he asked Daniel why Ann was “freaking out,” and
Daniel responded that Ann “had anxiety.” Ann further asserts that Deputy Fick
later spoke with Bradley Lamphere, who advised him that Ann “had extreme
anxiety.” Ann argues that Deputy Fick should have sought medical care for her

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anxiety and that his failure to do so demonstrated a “complete indifference” to her
medical needs.

¶38 Ann has failed to show that the circuit court’s decision to dismiss her
claim against Deputy Fick for failure to provide medical care was “clearly wrong.”
See Weiss, 197 Wis. 2d at 389 (citation omitted). First, Ann fails to address the
four factors set forth in Williams for ascertaining whether an officer’s response to
an arrestee’s medical needs was objectively unreasonable. In particular, Ann does
not address the scope of any requested treatment or any countervailing police
interests. See Williams, 509 F.3d at 403. We need not address undeveloped
arguments, see State v. Pettit, 171 Wis. 2d 627, 646-47, 492 N.W.2d 633 (Ct. App.
1992), and we will not abandon our neutrality to develop arguments for a party,
see Industrial Risk Insurers v. American Eng’g Testing, Inc., 2009 WI App 62,
¶25, 318 Wis. 2d 148, 769 N.W.2d 82.

¶39 Second, while the appellate record contains various body camera and
squad car camera videos that were introduced into evidence at trial, the record
does not include transcripts of any of the deputies’ trial testimony or of Ann’s or
Daniel’s trial testimony.12 Without those transcripts, it is impossible for this court
to assess whether the circuit court’s decision to dismiss Ann’s claim against
Deputy Fick for failure to provide medical care was “clearly wrong.” See Weiss,
197 Wis. 2d at 389 (citation omitted). As noted above, it is the appellant’s burden
to ensure that the record is sufficient for us to review the issues raised on appeal,
and we assume that any missing materials support the circuit court’s decision. See

12
The appellate record includes transcripts of only two limited excerpts of the
trial: (1) Herdahl’s testimony; and (2) the circuit court’s oral ruling granting the defendants’
motion to dismiss some of Ann’s claims.

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No. 2021AP841

State Bank of Hartland, 129 Wis. 2d at 423. Thus, in this case, we must assume
that the missing transcripts support the court’s decision to dismiss Ann’s claim
against Deputy Fick.

C. Claims against Sergeant Hulback, Deputy Fick, and Deputy Pressley
for unlawful detainment

¶40 Finally, Ann contends that the circuit court erred by dismissing her
claims that Sergeant Hulback, Deputy Fick, and Deputy Pressley violated the
Fourth Amendment by unlawfully detaining her. An investigatory stop “allows
police officers to briefly detain someone to ‘investigat[e] possible criminal
behavior even though there is no probable cause to make an arrest.’” State v.
Genous, 2021 WI 50, ¶7, 397 Wis. 2d 293, 961 N.W.2d 41 (alteration in original;
citation omitted). “This type of limited stop complies with the Fourth Amendment
‘if the police have reasonable suspicion that a crime has been committed, is being
committed, or is about to be committed.’” Id. (citation omitted). “Reasonable
suspicion must be supported by specific and articulable facts.” Id., ¶8. “The
question is, ‘What would a reasonable police officer reasonably suspect in light of
his or her training and experience?’” Id. (citation omitted).

¶41 Here, the circuit court determined that there was reasonable
suspicion to detain Ann, based on Deputy Pressley’s testimony to that effect.13
Ann, however, has failed to provide us with a transcript of Deputy Pressley’s trial
testimony, or with transcripts of the trial testimony of Sergeant Hulback and
13
As noted above, the circuit court determined that Ann’s claims for unlawful
detainment against Deputy Fick and Sergeant Hulback failed because there was no evidence that
either Deputy Fick or Sergeant Hulback personally seized Ann. Ann disputes that conclusion on
appeal. However, assuming without deciding Deputy Fick and Sergeant Hulback seized Ann, we
see no reason why the circuit court’s reasonable suspicion analysis would not be equally
applicable to Ann’s claims against Deputy Fick and Sergeant Hulback.

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No. 2021AP841

Deputy Fick. While the legal determination of reasonable suspicion is an
objective test, see State v. Anagnos, 2012 WI 64, ¶60, 341 Wis. 2d 576, 815
N.W.2d 675, the deputies’ testimony about the facts known to them at the time
Ann was detained would have been highly relevant to a determination of whether
reasonable suspicion existed for the detention. Similarly, any testimony regarding
the deputies’ training and experience, and how that training and experience
contributed to the decision to detain Ann, would have been relevant to a
reasonable suspicion analysis. See Genous, 397 Wis. 2d 293, ¶8.

¶42 Again, we must assume that the missing transcripts support the
circuit court’s decision. See State Bank of Hartland, 129 Wis. 2d at 423. In other
words, we must assume that the missing transcripts support the court’s
determination that the deputies had reasonable suspicion to detain Ann. As such,
Ann’s failure to provide the necessary transcripts is fatal to her argument that the
court erred by dismissing her claims against the deputies for unlawful detainment.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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