State v. Sam M. Shareef

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 10, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP661-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2021CT866

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

SAM M. SHAREEF,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Racine County:
SCOTT P. CRAIG, Judge. Affirmed.

¶1 LAZAR, J.1 Sam M. Shareef appeals from a judgment of
conviction for Operating While Intoxicated, second offense, contrary to WIS.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2) (2023-24). All
references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.
No. 2025AP661-CR

STAT. § 346.63(1)(am). Shareef asserts the circuit court erred when it denied his
motion to suppress an evidentiary chemical test of his blood. Specifically, Shareef
argues the arresting officer made a statement just prior to his recitation of the
Informing the Accused form, required by WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4), that rendered
the recitation insufficient to reasonably convey the content of the implied consent
warnings to Shareef and to adequately advise Shareef of his due process rights.
Because this court concludes the officer reasonably conveyed to Shareef the
implied consent warnings and no due process violations were implicated, the
circuit court’s judgment is affirmed.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The facts are undisputed. In November 2021, the State charged
Shareef with operating a motor vehicle while under the influence of an intoxicant,
contrary to WIS. STAT. § 346.63(1)(a), and operating a motor vehicle with a
restricted controlled substance in blood, contrary to § 346.63(1)(am). Shareef
refused to submit to an evidentiary chemical test of his blood upon arrest, and the
State also charged him with unlawfully refusing to submit to an implied consent
test, contrary to WIS. STAT. § 343.305(9)(a). Shareef filed a motion to suppress
the blood test evidence, and the circuit court held an evidentiary hearing on that
motion in October 2022.

¶3 At the hearing, no testimony was provided, but the court received
into evidence two bodycam videos of the arresting officer’s encounter with
Shareef. Just before reading the Informing the Accused form to Shareef, the
officer told him that “[s]ome of this stuff I’m going to read you is not going to
apply to you.” The circuit court issued a written decision denying the motion to
suppress, relying on State v. Piddington, 2001 WI 24, 241 Wis. 2d 754, 623

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No. 2025AP661-CR

N.W.2d 528, and concluding “[t]he objective conduct of the officer rather than the
comprehension of the accused driver determines compliance with [WIS. STAT.
§ 343.305(4)]” and that the arresting officer used reasonable methods to convey
the implied consent warnings to Shareef.

¶4 Shareef ultimately entered a no-contest plea to operating with a
restricted controlled substance, second offense, and the judgment of conviction
was entered in March 2025. Shareef now appeals from that judgment, asserting
the circuit court erred in denying his motion to suppress.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶5 In reviewing a circuit court’s denial of a motion to suppress,
appellate courts first “uphold a circuit court’s findings of historic fact unless they
are clearly erroneous.” State v. Moeser, 2022 WI 76, ¶13, 405 Wis. 2d 1, 982
N.W.2d 45 (citation omitted). Second, courts will “independently apply
constitutional principles to those facts.” Id. (citation omitted); see also State v.
Grady, 2009 WI 47, ¶13, 317 Wis. 2d 344, 766 N.W.2d 729.

DISCUSSION

¶6 Under WIS. STAT. § 343.305(2), “[a]ny person who … operates a
motor vehicle upon the public highways … is deemed to have given consent to
one or more tests of his or her breath, blood or urine, for the purpose of
determining the presence or quantity … of alcohol” and other intoxicating
substances. Immediately prior to requesting an evidentiary test of a suspect’s
breath, blood or urine, however, an officer must recite the following statement:

You have either been arrested for an offense that
involves driving or operating a motor vehicle while
under the influence of alcohol or drugs, or both, or you

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No. 2025AP661-CR

are the operator of a vehicle that was involved in an
accident that caused the death of, great bodily harm to,
or substantial bodily harm to a person, or you are
suspected of driving or being on duty time with respect
to a commercial motor vehicle after consuming an
intoxicating beverage.

This law enforcement agency now wants to test one
or more samples of your breath, blood or urine to
determine the concentration of alcohol or drugs in your
system. If any test shows more alcohol in your system
than the law permits while driving, your operating
privilege will be suspended. If you refuse to take any
test that this agency requests, your operating privilege
will be revoked and you will be subject to other
penalties. The test results of the fact that you refused
testing can be used against you in court.

If you take all the requested tests, you may choose
to take further tests. You may take the alternative test
that this law enforcement agency provides free of
charge. You also may have a test conducted by a
qualified person of your choice at your expense. You,
however, will have to make your own arrangements
for that test.

If you have a commercial driver license or were
operating a commercial motor vehicle, other
consequences may result from positive test results or
from refusing testing, such as being placed out of
service or disqualified.

WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4) (emphases added).

¶7 Our supreme court in Piddington expressed “[t]he purpose behind
the implied consent law is to combat drunk driving by ‘facilit[ating] the gathering
of evidence against drunk drivers[,]’” and that “court[s] must liberally construe the
law to effectuate the legislature’s intent.” Piddington, 241 Wis. 2d 754, ¶17
(citations omitted). It noted the objective of WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4) “is to
‘advise the accused about the nature of the driver’s implied consent.’”

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No. 2025AP661-CR

Piddington, 241 Wis. 2d 754, ¶17 (citation omitted). Further, § 343.305(4)
“notifies the driver of the right to request a second, alternative test to the one
requested by the arresting officer.” Piddington, 241 Wis. 2d 754, ¶17.

¶8 The Piddington court held that whether “law enforcement officers
have complied with WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4) turns on whether they have used
reasonable methods which would reasonably convey the [subsection’s] warnings
and rights[.]” 241 Wis. 2d 754, ¶22. “[T]he onus is upon the law enforcement
officer to reasonably convey the implied consent warnings[,]” and “the State has
the burden of proof of showing, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the
methods used would reasonably convey the implied consent warnings.” Id.

¶9 Shareef argues that, when the officer indicated to Shareef that some
portion or portions of the Informing the Accused form may not apply to Shareef
prior to the recitation, the officer “effectively misread[] the form[,]” and thus
failed to reasonably convey to him the implied consent warnings.

¶10 This court cannot conclude the officer failed to reasonably convey
the implied consent warnings to Shareef merely on the basis of the statement he
made prior to reciting the Informing the Accused form. The officer read the form
to Shareef verbatim, and, as the circuit court noted in its written decision, the
officer’s statement that not everything in the form applied to Shareef was true.
For example, Shareef was not “the operator of a vehicle that was involved in an
accident that caused the death of, great bodily harm to, or substantial bodily harm
to a person[.]” WIS. STAT. § 343.305(4). Nor did he have a commercial driver’s
license. See id.

¶11 Though certainly not necessary, it was not unreasonable for the
officer to advise Shareef that some part of the form did not apply to him, and,

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No. 2025AP661-CR

given the nature of the portion that did not apply, it was fairly understandable why
he did so. After the form was fully recited, Shareef asked the officer questions to
clarify his understanding of his rights. This court concludes under these
circumstances that the officer’s advisement, including his prefatory statement,
reasonably conveyed to Shareef the implied consent warnings. Concluding
otherwise would place an undue burden on officers and require perfect, rather than
substantial, compliance with WIS. STAT. § 343.305. See State v. Muente, 159
Wis. 2d 279, 281, 464 N.W.2d 230 (Ct. App. 1990) (quoting Midwest Mut. Ins.
Co. v. Nicolazzi, 138 Wis. 2d 192, 200, 405 N.W.2d 732 (Ct. App. 1987) (stating
substantial compliance suffices if it is “actual compliance in respect to the
substance essential to every reasonable objective of the statute.”).

¶12 Because the Informing the Accused form provides information to
suspects relating to their due process rights, Shareef also asserts this purportedly
flawed recitation impermissibly interfered with his constitutional rights and that
suppression of the evidentiary blood test is “the only recognized sanction for” such
an interference. Shareef relies upon a number of cases he contends support the
notion that “the accused’s right to alternative testing is a guarantee of statutory due
process.” See, e.g., State v. McCrossen, 129 Wis. 2d 277, 385 N.W.2d 161
(1986); State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984); State v.
Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d 451, 351 N.W.2d 503 (1984); State v. Disch, 119 Wis. 2d 461,
351 N.W.2d 492 (1984); State v. Renard, 123 Wis. 2d 458, 367 N.W.2d 237 (Ct.
App. 1985). He argues these cases highlight the “broader dimensionality” of the
Informing the Accused form, showing that it “serves to articulate information
relating to [statutory] due process rights which are reserved to the accused.”
However, none of these authorities support Shareef’s contention that the officer’s

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No. 2025AP661-CR

prefatory statement in this case constitutes a due process violation requiring
suppression as a remedy.

¶13 In McCrossen, the defendant failed a breathalyzer test and requested
an alternative test. 129 Wis. 2d at 281. Officers incorrectly informed her that she
would be required to pay for an alternative test, and, despite her willingness to do
so, the officers never administered the alternative test. Id. “The defendant also
was not informed that she could be released in order to get an alternative test” by
her own means and was kept in custody such that an alternative test could not be
obtained. Id. The McCrossen court concluded that the officers’ denial of the
defendant’s statutory right to an alternative test warranted suppression of the
initial breathalyzer test. Id. at 297. The court also held that, since the
government’s test result was suppressed, it was not a denial of the defendant’s due
process rights to present a defense when she was prevented from introducing
evidence that she had requested an alternative test and was refused by officers. Id.
at 298-99.

¶14 McCrossen highlights that violation of the implied consent statutes
can give rise to due process concerns. However, the McCrossen court was
narrowly focused on the issue of constitutional fairness that arises when the
defendant is prevented from presenting evidence that they were denied the
statutory right to alternative chemical testing.2 Even in that scenario, the
McCrossen court concluded that, due to suppression of the government’s original

2
The other cases cited by Shareef, likewise, focus on the right to access alternative
testing as “internal safeguards of due process.” State v. Ehlen, 119 Wis. 2d 451, 457, 351
N.W.2d 503 (1984). See also State v. Disch, 119 Wis. 2d 461, 479-80, 351 N.W.2d 492 (1984);
State v. Walstad, 119 Wis. 2d 483, 527, 351 N.W.2d 469 (1984). That argument is not
persuasive here.

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No. 2025AP661-CR

test, no due process violation occurred because alternative testing is
“constitutionally material evidence” only when it used to refute the results of an
initial test and allowing evidence of the defendant’s request of an alternative test
in the absence of evidence of the original test would only serve to confuse the jury.
Id. at 299.

¶15 Here, Shareef simply has not alleged a due process violation. Where
McCrossen involves officers affirmatively misstating the law as it relates to the
implied consent warnings,3 the officer in the case at bar merely made an accurate
prefatory statement that not every word of the Informing the Accused form would
apply to Shareef. This court concludes that this statement does not give rise to a
due process violation, and none of the authorities upon which Shareef relies
support that position. For these reasons, this court affirms.

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

3
The officers in McCrossen may have even taken actions to prevent the exercise of the
defendant’s statutory right to alternative testing, as defense counsel argued the defendant was
“kept in custody unnecessarily” because “officers were afraid that if she took a second test the
results would be exculpatory.” Id. at 283.

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