State v. James D. Patrick-Yance

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
December 17, 2025
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2024AP2538-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2022CF403

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT II

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

JAMES D. PATRICK-YANCE,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment of the circuit court for Walworth County:
PHILLIP A. KOSS, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Neubauer, P.J., Gundrum, and Lazar, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent

or authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).
No. 2024AP2538-CR

¶1 PER CURIAM. Following the circuit court’s denial of his motion
to suppress, James D. Patrick-Yance appeals from the judgment of his conviction
for possession of a firearm by an out-of-state felon. The conviction stems from a
traffic stop that Patrick-Yance asserts constituted an unreasonable seizure in
violation of the Fourth Amendment. Based upon our review of the briefs and
record, we conclude the seizure was lawful, and thus, the court properly denied
Patrick-Yance’s suppression motion. We affirm.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The arresting officer in this case was the only witness to testify at the
hearing on Patrick-Yance’s suppression motion. His relevant testimony is as
follows.

¶3 While on nighttime patrol, the officer observed a vehicle being
driven “without headlights illuminated.” Instead, the lights that were illuminated
were lights that “some people refer to … as parking lights or daytime running
lights,” which “were significantly more dim” than the headlights of other nearby
vehicles. After stopping the vehicle and making contact with the driver,
Patrick-Yance, the officer informed him that his headlights were not on, and
Patrick-Yance then “move[d] the switch from the parking lights to the headlight
position,” thereby illuminating the front of the vehicle with the headlights.

¶4 On cross-examination, when asked if he observed “the daytime
running lights … on,” the officer responded, “Yes, sir. I believe they go by a
couple different names—what the lights are called.” Focusing again on the
naming of the lights as “daytime running lights,” counsel again asked if the
illumination in the front of the vehicle that the officer had observed was “[f]rom
the daytime running lights,” to which the officer responded, “Yes, any light would

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No. 2024AP2538-CR

illuminate.” When further asked by counsel, “[a]nd when you indicate that those
daytime running lights were operating, you were able to see them as you passed
[Patrick-Yance’s] vehicle, correct,” the officer responded, “I could see that—the
running lights [were] on, yes.” Counsel then asked, “Could you see any other
lights on the front of [Patrick-Yance’s] vehicle other than the daytime running
lights?” The officer responded, “To my knowledge I don’t recall seeing any other
lights, no.” Counsel further asked the officer if he had any particular training or
equipment for testing the level of brightness of the activated lights, and the officer
indicated he did not.

¶5 The relevant statute at issue before the circuit court and before us is
WIS. STAT. § 347.06(1) (2023-24).1 This statute states, as relevant:

[N]o person may operate a vehicle upon a highway during
hours of darkness or during a period of limited visibility
unless all headlamps, tail lamps, and clearance lamps with
which the vehicle is required to be equipped are lighted.
Parking lamps … may not be used for this purpose. This
subsection does not apply if lamps that are automatically
activated whenever the vehicle is started are in use, if the
headlamps are of sufficient intensity to satisfy the
requirements for daytime running lamps under 49 CFR
[§] 571.108, S7.10.13.

(Emphasis added.)

¶6 Patrick-Yance argued to the circuit court that the exception of the
last sentence of this statutory provision applied, asserting that the officer had
observed the daytime running lamps activated when he stopped him for not having
his headlights on. The court disagreed that the last sentence applied, explaining, “I
don’t think there’s been [a] record that these are automatically activated.” After
1
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2024AP2538-CR

determining that the last sentence did not apply, the court denied the suppression
motion, concluding that the officer’s stop of Patrick-Yance was lawful because it
was based upon the officer’s reasonable suspicion that Patrick-Yance was
unlawfully operating his vehicle due to not having his headlights on while driving
during hours of darkness.

¶7 Patrick-Yance pled guilty to the firearm count, with other charges
being dismissed but read in. He was subsequently sentenced, and he now appeals.

DISCUSSION

¶8 “[W]hether a traffic stop is reasonable is a question of constitutional
fact” that is determined based on the totality of the circumstances. State v. Post,
2007 WI 60, ¶¶8, 13, 301 Wis. 2d 1, 733 N.W.2d 634. Where, as here, the
relevant facts are undisputed, we review independently the application of those
facts to constitutional principles. State v. Olson, 2001 WI App 284, ¶6, 249
Wis. 2d 391, 639 N.W.2d 207. An investigatory traffic stop is justified by
reasonable suspicion if the “officer possess[es] specific and articulable facts that
warrant a reasonable belief that [unlawful] activity is afoot.” State v. Young, 2006
WI 98, ¶21, 294 Wis. 2d 1, 717 N.W.2d 729. Reasonable suspicion is an objective
inquiry, decided by what a reasonable officer would reasonably believe under the
circumstances. See State v. Nesbit, 2017 WI App 58, ¶6, 378 Wis. 2d 65, 902
N.W.2d 266. “[P]olice officers,” however, “are not required to rule out the
possibility of innocent behavior before initiating a brief stop.” Young, 294
Wis. 2d 1, ¶21 (citation omitted).

¶9 Patrick-Yance contends the traffic stop here was unlawful because
the officer observed “only that his car lights were dimmer than that of the other

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No. 2024AP2538-CR

vehicles around him.” This is an inaccurate representation of the testimony and
findings from the suppression hearing.

¶10 It is undisputed that the evidence presented at the hearing showed
that Patrick-Yance was operating his vehicle without his headlights activated. The
circuit court so found, and Patrick-Yance develops no challenge to this factual
finding. The officer’s observations in this regard provided not only reasonable
suspicion but also probable cause to believe Patrick-Yance was operating his
vehicle in violation of WIS. STAT. § 347.06(1), thereby justifying the traffic stop.

¶11 The officer testified that the lights on Patrick-Yance’s vehicle that
were illuminated were “parking lights or daytime running lights.” Following
Patrick-Yance’s counsel’s repeated characterization of the lights that were
illuminated as “daytime running lights,” the officer appeared to acquiesce in that
characterization and also indicated he could observe no other lights activated on
the vehicle other than those that had been illuminated. Not making a clear,
specific finding on the topic, the circuit court referred to the activated lights as
“running lights … or parking lights.”

¶12 The second sentence of WIS. STAT. § 347.06(1) makes clear that if
the lights that were in fact activated on Patrick-Yance’s vehicle were “[p]arking
lamps,” such lights “may not be used” in lieu of “headlamps”—i.e., a driver is not
absolved of liability for driving with parking lamps on instead of headlights. The
last sentence of subsec. (1), however, does provide an exception to liability for
driving without headlights on “if” the activated lamps are ones “that are
automatically activated whenever the vehicle is started,” and “if” the lamps are “of
sufficient intensity to satisfy the requirements for daytime running lamps under 49

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No. 2024AP2538-CR

CFR [§] 571.108, S7.10.13.” Sec. 347.06(1). In that circumstance, subsec.
(1) “does not apply.” See id.

¶13 In his appellate briefing, Patrick-Yance attempts to focus all of our
attention on the second “if,” but it is the first “if” that is key here. The exception
to liability of the last sentence in subsec. (1) is only applicable “if” the lights that
were illuminated on Patrick-Yance’s vehicle were ones “that are automatically
activated whenever the vehicle is started.” See WIS. STAT. § 347.06(1). As the
circuit court pointed out, however, there was no evidence presented at the hearing
as to whether the illuminated lamps were ones that were “automatically activated.”

¶14 But, even if evidence had been presented that the officer learned
upon communicating with Patrick-Yance at his window that the activated lamps
were in fact daytime running lamps instead of parking lamps, the officer’s initial
traffic stop and engagement with Patrick-Yance would nonetheless be lawful.
That is because at the time the officer effectuated the stop, he knew the headlights
were not activated, contrary to the requirements of the statute. He further
appeared to understand that the lights that were activated were either parking
lamps or daytime running lamps. As indicated, if they were parking lamps,
Patrick-Yance would not be absolved of liability for not having his headlights on.
And, if they were daytime running lamps, they could have been ones that were
either automatically activated or manually activated. There was no evidence
presented to suggest the officer would have had any reason to know whether the
running lamps were automatically activated or manually activated before he
effectuated the stop and made contact with Patrick-Yance at his window. To the
extent there was any evidence presented as to how the running lamps were
activated, the officer testified that when he “informed [Patrick-Yance] that his

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No. 2024AP2538-CR

headlights were not on,” Patrick-Yance manually “move[d] the switch” from the
activated parking (or running) lamps to the headlights.2

¶15 The law did not require the officer here to rule out a potentially
innocent scenario as to Patrick-Yance’s vehicle lighting—that perhaps the
illuminated lamps were daytime running lamps that were automatically activated
and sufficiently bright—when a scenario consistent with reasonable suspicion,
probable cause, and ultimately guilt was also present.3 See Young, 294 Wis. 2d 1,
¶21. As the circuit court observed, “How’s [the officer] gonna know which …
vehicles have automatic lights and which don’t?” Indeed, it is well established
that “[t]he essence of good police work under these circumstances is to briefly
stop the individual in order to maintain the status quo temporarily while obtaining
more information.” State v. Waldner, 206 Wis. 2d 51, 61, 556 N.W.2d 681
(1996).

[P]olice officers are not required to rule out the possibility
of innocent behavior before initiating a brief stop. In this
regard, we pointed out that the suspects in Terry [v. Ohio,
392 U.S. 1 (1968)] “might have been casing the store for a
robbery, or they might have been window-shopping or
impatiently waiting for a friend in the store.” We noted
that suspicious conduct by its very nature is ambiguous,
and the princip[al] function of the investigative stop is to
quickly resolve that ambiguity. Therefore, if any
reasonable inference of wrongful conduct can be
objectively discerned, notwithstanding the existence of
other innocent inferences that could be drawn, the officers

2
And, even if the lamps were automatically activated daytime running lights,
Patrick-Yance still would not be absolved of liability unless they were sufficiently bright, per the
statutory standard.
3
Furthermore, while the issue has not been raised or argued before us, and we do not
decide it, it may well be that the last-sentence exception of WIS. STAT. § 347.06(1) is an
affirmative defense that Patrick-Yance would have to raise and meet the burden of to absolve
himself of liability for failing to use his headlights.

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No. 2024AP2538-CR

have the right to temporarily detain the individual for the
purpose of inquiry.

State v. Anderson, 155 Wis. 2d 77, 84, 454 N.W.2d 763 (1990) (citations
omitted).

¶16 Based on the foregoing, we conclude the officer lawfully conducted
the traffic stop on the basis that he had, at a minimum, reasonable suspicion to
believe Patrick-Yance was operating his vehicle in violation of WIS. STAT.
§ 347.06(1).

By the Court.—Judgment affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

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