Columbia County v. T. R. B.

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
January 8, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2025AP1972 Cir. Ct. No. 2023ME75

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT IV

IN THE MATTER OF THE MENTAL COMMITMENT OF T.R.B.:

COLUMBIA COUNTY,

PETITIONER-RESPONDENT,

V.

T.R.B.,

RESPONDENT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from orders of the circuit court for Columbia County:
ROGER L. KLOPP, Judge. Affirmed.
No. 2025AP1972

¶1 TAYLOR, J.1 T.R.B. appeals from orders extending his
commitment under WIS. STAT. ch. 51 and authorizing his involuntary medication.
T.R.B. argues that at the hearing to extend his commitment, the sole evidence that
he had behaved dangerously was inadmissible hearsay. He further argues that
with this evidence properly excluded, Columbia County (“the County”) did not
present sufficient evidence of his dangerousness to sustain an extension of his
involuntary commitment. I conclude that there was sufficient nonhearsay
evidence in the record to support a conclusion that T.R.B. is “dangerous” pursuant
to WIS. STAT. §§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and 51.20(1)(am). Accordingly, I affirm the
orders of the circuit court.

BACKGROUND

¶2 On December 11, 2023, T.R.B.’s mother, father, and aunt filed a
three-party petition for the involuntary commitment of T.R.B. under WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2. The petition alleged, in pertinent part, that: in the prior ten days,
T.R.B. made 30 calls to police or EMS; T.R.B. alleged that family members who
had recently died of natural causes had been murdered; that his parents are being
controlled by someone; that someone is directing a magnet or a magnetic force at
his house, causing it to shake; that people are out to kill him; and that T.R.B. was
turning off the electricity to the house he shared with his parents, jeopardizing his
father’s insulin medication. The circuit court issued an order for detention and
T.R.B. was placed in protective custody and taken to Winnebago Mental Health
Institute (“WMHI”), with a probable cause hearing scheduled for December 2023.

1
This appeal is decided by one judge pursuant to WIS. STAT. § 752.31(2)(d) (2023-24).
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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¶3 Prior to the probable cause hearing, the parties entered into a
Settlement Agreement (“the Agreement”). The Agreement provided that in
exchange for T.R.B. complying with certain conditions, including taking all
prescribed medications and being transferred to Granite Hills Hospital, the
commitment proceedings would be dismissed in March 2024.

¶4 On January 8, 2024, the State filed with the circuit court a Statement
of Noncompliance, which alleged that T.R.B. had failed to comply with the
requirements of the Agreement to “[k]eep all appointments with treatment
providers and case management staff” and “[r]efrain from acts, attempts, or threats
of harm to self or others.” In support, the State alleged as follows. T.R.B. had
been discharged from Granite Hills Hospital on December 24, 2023, at which time
staff expressed concerns about T.R.B.’s refusal to take medications. T.R.B. failed
to meet with his assigned case worker on two occasions, and during one phone
contact, T.R.B. denied being subject to the Agreement or the need for treatment.
In January 2024, T.R.B. was arrested and charged with felony bail jumping,
domestic disorderly conduct, and domestic battery. The police report indicated
that T.R.B. had a physical altercation with his father and made threats to kill his
parents. The circuit court issued an order that T.R.B. be detained at WMHI
pending the final hearing in the commitment proceedings.

¶5 Pending the final hearing, Dr. Andrew Kordus, T.R.B.’s treating
psychiatrist at WMHI, moved the circuit court for an order for the involuntary
administration of psychotropic medication. At the January 11, 2024 hearing on
this request, Dr. Kordus testified as follows. He diagnosed T.R.B. with an
“unspecified schizophrenia spectrum or other psychosis with a likely diagnosis of
schizophrenia.” After meeting with T.R.B. several times and discussing the
advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives to accepting psychotropic medication,

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Dr. Kordus concluded to a reasonable degree of medical certainty that T.R.B.
could not understand and apply the provided information to make an informed
decision as to whether or not to accept or refuse medication. A medication was
available to treat T.R.B.’s condition, which would not impair T.R.B.’s ability to
prepare for or participate in any future court proceedings. Out of five doses of the
medication offered, T.R.B. accepted two doses and refused three doses.
Inconsistent use of the medication will not establish a therapeutic level necessary
to treat T.R.B.’s condition. T.R.B. does not believe that he has a mental illness
and does not wish to take medication.

¶6 The circuit court found probable cause that due to mental illness,
T.R.B. was not competent to refuse medication and ordered the involuntary
administration of psychotropic medication until the final hearing in the
commitment proceedings.

¶7 The final hearing on the petition occurred on January 18, 2024. The
State presented three witnesses in support of the petition: Dr. James Black, a court
appointed psychologist; Dr. Marshall Bales, a court appointed psychiatrist; and
T.R.B.’s mother.

¶8 Dr. Black testified, in pertinent part, as follows. He spent about one
hour interviewing T.R.B. at WMHI and consulted with staff, in addition to
reviewing records from WMHI, Columbia County, Columbia County Jail, and the
Columbia County Sheriff’s Department, and prepared an examination report.
T.R.B. has a diagnosis of schizophrenia spectrum disorder; he has a history of
verbal and physical aggression, some of which continued at WMHI; he has made
threats to harm his family and got into a physical altercation with his mother and
father; T.R.B. has little insight into his mental illness and would likely not seek

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treatment without a court order; and he is substantially dangerous to himself and
others. Dr. Black opined that the least restrictive placement for T.R.B. would be
in a locked facility until he begins to stabilize from consistent administration of
medication. At that point, T.R.B. can be transitioned into outpatient care.

¶9 Dr. Bales testified as follows. He met with T.R.B. for about thirty
minutes, reviewed records from WMHI and Granite Hills, the three-party petition,
and police reports, and completed an examination report. During the meeting,
T.R.B. was “extremely paranoid, irritable, accusatory, confused and disorganized
in his thinking and hostile.” Dr. Bales diagnosed T.R.B. with paranoid
schizophrenia and concluded that T.R.B. is dangerous to other people, that he has
had months of delusional and paranoid behavior, particularly about his parents,
and spoke in hostile terms about them, and that he has put his family in fear for
their safety. Although T.R.B. is definitely treatable with an antipsychotic
medication, he “simply will not get mental health care voluntarily on his own free
will.” When Dr. Bales discussed the advantages, disadvantages, and alternatives
to accepting psychotropic medication, T.R.B. “was not reasonable, not rational[,]
and could neither express nor properly apply information to himself. He thought
the medicine was part of a conspiracy by his family and others.” Dr. Bales
recommended that T.R.B. be involuntary detained in a locked facility.

¶10 Both examiners’ reports were admitted into evidence with no
objections.

¶11 T.R.B.’s mother also testified about recent incidents with T.R.B., her
fear of him, and her concerns that he would hurt himself or others. I discuss
further details of her testimony below.

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¶12 The circuit court found that T.R.B. was mentally ill and evidences a
substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals pursuant to WIS.
STAT. § 51.20(1)(a)2.b. Accordingly, the court ordered that T.R.B. be involuntary
committed for six months in a locked facility and be involuntarily administered
medication and treatment.

¶13 T.R.B. was released from WMHI to his parents’ house in February
2024, and began participating in and receiving supportive services through the
County’s Community Support Program (“the CSP”). In June 2024, the County
petitioned the circuit court for an extension of the commitment and involuntary
medication orders, “to assist [T.R.B.] in taking his medication(s) as prescribed and
to comply with treatment recommendations.” Dr. Leslie Taylor, a psychiatrist,
was appointed by the court to conduct an examination of T.R.B., and the extension
hearing took place on July 11, 2024. Initially, an extension was contested, and the
circuit court took testimony from Dr. Taylor, who recommended an extension.
The parties eventually stipulated to a six-month extension of the commitment
order, with the same conditions as previously ordered, and an involuntary
medication order.

¶14 T.R.B. continued to participate in the CSP and to live with his
parents, who monitored his medication compliance. From approximately August
through November, 2024, T.R.B. was incarcerated due to numerous pending
criminal cases and concerns about his competency. When the commitment
expiration date approached, the County sought to extend T.R.B.’s commitment.
As a basis for the request, the County attached to the petition a letter titled
“Recommendation for Recommitment” signed by Sarah Niles, the CSP director
who enrolled T.R.B. in the CSP (the “petition letter”). The petition letter stated
that due to T.R.B. being in the community for three months only out of the last six

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No. 2025AP1972

months, CSP would like more time for T.R.B. “to increase his mental health
insight [so that] he can demonstrate consistent daily behaviors of self-
administering his daily medications and remaining safely in the community with
no harm to self or others.” Because of “the probability that [T.R.B.] would cease
receiving any medications and run the risk of further decompensation and re-
hospitalization if not under commitment,” CSP recommended a commitment
extension of six months.

¶15 On January 14, 2025, the circuit court held a contested hearing
regarding the petition for extension of the commitment and involuntary medication
orders. The County presented three witnesses: the court appointed examiner,
psychiatrist Dr. Leslie Taylor, who had also evaluated T.R.B. for the July 2024
extension hearing; T.R.B.’s CSP case manager Devon Webster; and CSP director
Niles.

¶16 Dr. Taylor testified as follows. In addition to meeting with T.R.B.
personally in his house for approximately 30 minutes, she spoke with Niles,
T.R.B.’s mother, and reviewed prior evaluations and treatment records and
prepared an examination report. T.R.B. has been diagnosed with schizophrenia,
which T.R.B. does not believe he has. Instead, T.R.B. believes that people,
particular his father, are lying about him. T.R.B. stated that the psychotropic
medication he takes helps with his anxiety and stress, but “[h]e was very clear,
however, that he doesn’t have schizophrenia; that he doesn’t have delusional
thinking and that the medication is not helping the delusional thinking or treating
the schizophrenia. He said that anyone who diagnosed him with schizophrenia
was, basically, lying.” T.R.B. is incapable of applying an understanding of the
advantages, disadvantages, or alternatives to treatment of his condition in order to

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No. 2025AP1972

make an informed choice about the medication being recommended, and he is not
competent to refuse medication.

¶17 Dr. Taylor further opined as follows. T.R.B. “does pose a
substantial risk of dangerousness to himself or others if treatment were
withdrawn” because he “continues to lack insight into the severity of his
behaviors, the behaviors that led him to be emergently detained. He continues to
believe that his father has been lying about him. He denies that the … version of
events that actually happened.” T.R.B. is not competent to refuse medication, so
an order to treat would be warranted. If treatment for schizophrenia were
withdrawn, “his delusional thinking will, once again, worsen to the level that it
was prior to his being placed on an emergency detention,” and he would once
again become a proper subject for involuntary commitment.

¶18 On the County’s request to move Dr. Taylor’s examination report
into evidence, T.R.B. objected on the ground that it was “riddled with hearsay.”
Although T.R.B. acknowledged that the hearsay statements could be used by
Dr. Taylor to form an opinion, the hearsay statements could not be relied upon for
the truth of the facts asserted. The circuit court overruled the objection and
accepted the examination report into evidence.

¶19 Devon Webster testified as follows. Webster is a social worker and
has been T.R.B.’s case manager in the CSP since May 2024. Webster meets
regularly with T.R.B. at T.R.B.’s house and facilitates supportive services,
including psychotherapy. T.R.B. needs to be recommitted because he
“demonstrates a lack of insight into his mental health. He does not believe he has
schizophrenia of any sort.” T.R.B. has been noncompliant at times with taking his
medication. Most recently, T.R.B. had an extra six days of medication remaining

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No. 2025AP1972

at the end of a five-week medication period. Without an extension, there are
concerns about medication compliance and “rapid decompensation.”

¶20 Sarah Niles testified as follows. She is the CSP director and case
manager, who enrolled T.R.B. in the program in May 2024 because in 2023 and
2024, “he was inconsistent with his medication compliance and he was
hospitalized.” Niles has periodic contact with T.R.B. because he is a patient in the
program. Specifically, Niles had two recommitment discussions with T.R.B. in
the summer of 2024 and in December 2024. In the summer of 2024, T.R.B. had
fixed beliefs that he was “fixing” the electrical panel in the family home, which
resulted in the electricity being shut off for several days and jeopardizing
medications for other people in the home. During the December 2024 discussion,
T.R.B. stated that “he was feeling a little bit better, that the medications helped
him deal with people – with the stress of people, and his anxiety.” He did not
believe that he had paranoid schizophrenia, as diagnosed by the CSP’s
psychiatrist, who has been treating him since May 2024. T.R.B.’s hallucinations
of being “shredded” and his “fixed beliefs of being controlled by steel magnets
that are controlling and that can control the parents, specifically, the father” were a
little less intense because “the fans were turned down.” T.R.B. lacks “insight into
his mental health and his medications of how it’s affecting his symptoms.” Niles
recommended that T.R.B.’s commitment be extended “due to the lack of insight of
the mental illness and the medication incompliance at times,” which in the past
lead to T.R.B.’s hospitalization.

¶21 When the County moved to introduce the petition letter into
evidence, T.R.B. objected because it contained hearsay that “cannot be taken for
the truth of the matter that’s asserted within this document.” The circuit court
overruled the objection and received the document into evidence, stating that Niles

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compiled the information in the letter in the course of her position as the director
of the CSP and that the document is a medical record.

¶22 At the conclusion of the hearing, the circuit court referenced the
following testimony and made the following factual findings. T.R.B. continues to
exhibit severe delusional thinking and still felt that the “magnets were shredding
him.” In relation to his medications, that because of his delusional thinking, he
would not be able to appreciate the advantages or disadvantages of taking those
medications. Without an order to treat, T.R.B. may not take his medications
regularly and in the appropriate doses. The court made specific references to
Dr. Taylor’s report that, prior to T.R.B.’s initial commitment: T.R.B. called the
police 30 times in ten days for things such as magnets being focused on the family
house, believing electrical equipment was dangerous, and his father needing to be
killed because he was under the influence of spirits; and in January 2024,2 the
police were called to the family home because T.R.B. got into a physical
altercation with his elderly father and threatened to kill his parents. Without an
extension of the commitment and an order to treat, T.R.B. would likely
decompensate and become a danger to others and himself. The court’s written
order for a one year recommitment states that T.R.B. is dangerous because he
poses “a substantial probability of physical harm to other individuals” pursuant to
WIS. STAT. §§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and 51.20(1)(am). The court also ordered
involuntary medication and treatment during the period of commitment.

¶23 T.R.B. appeals.

2
The circuit court states that the police were called to T.R.B.’s family home due to a
January 2025 altercation between T.R.B. and his father. However, the record reveals that this
incident occurred in January 2024, which is the date I reference when referring to this incident.

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DISCUSSION

¶24 T.R.B. alleges that the County failed to prove by clear and
convincing evidence that he was dangerous to himself or others because the circuit
court: (1) erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting Dr. Taylor’s
examination report and Niles’s petition letter, each which contained inadmissible
hearsay; and (2) erred when it relied on hearsay evidence for its factual findings
supporting its determination that T.R.B. was dangerous. As a result, T.R.B. argues
that the evidence of dangerousness for his January 2025 recommitment was
insufficient. Specifically, T.R.B. asserts that because neither Dr. Taylor, Webster,
nor Niles had any personal knowledge about the incidents that lead to T.R.B.’s
initial commitment, “[n]o other admissible evidence was presented to establish
[T.R.B.’s] alleged actions or threatening statements that formed the basis of his
original commitment.” Therefore, T.R.B. argues, the County failed to establish by
clear and convincing evidence that T.R.B. is dangerous pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and 51.20(1)(am).

¶25 I reject T.R.B.’s argument that the circuit court erroneously
exercised its discretion in admitting Dr. Taylor’s examination report and Niles’s
petition letter because these documents contained relevant, nonhearsay evidence.
Further, because there is admissible evidence in the record that supports the
court’s factual findings and sufficiently establishes that T.R.B. was dangerous
pursuant to WIS. STAT. §§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and 51.20(1)(am), I affirm.

I. General Principles and Standards of Review

¶26 This case requires me to determine whether: (1) the circuit court
erroneously exercised its discretion in admitting certain documents into evidence
that contained hearsay statements; (2) the circuit court erred in making factual

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findings; and (3) sufficient evidence was presented to conclude that T.R.B. was
dangerous pursuant to WIS. STAT. §§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and 51.20(1)(am) as required
for the January 2025 commitment extension.

¶27 This case involves review of the circuit court’s decision to admit
evidence over hearsay objections, which I review for an erroneous exercise of
discretion. Martindale v. Ripp, 2001 WI 113, ¶28, 246 Wis. 2d 67, 629 N.W.2d
698. The circuit court has broad discretion in admitting evidence at trial, and my
inquiry on this issue is highly deferential. Id., ¶29. I will uphold a decision to
admit or exclude evidence “if the circuit court examined the relevant facts, applied
a proper legal standard, and, using a demonstrated rational process, reached a
reasonable conclusion.” Id., ¶28 (citation omitted). When reviewing a circuit
court’s exercise of discretion, I may search the record for reasons to sustain an
exercise of discretion. State v. Sulla, 2016 WI 46, ¶23, 369 Wis. 2d 225, 880
N.W.2d 659.

¶28 This case also requires me to determine whether there was sufficient
evidence to determine that T.R.B. was dangerous pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§§ 51.20(1)(a)(2)b. and 51.20(1)(am). An involuntary commitment under WIS.
STAT. ch. 51 requires the petitioner to prove by clear and convincing evidence that
the subject individual is: (1) mentally ill; (2) a proper subject for treatment; and
(3) dangerous. Langlade County v. D.J.W., 2020 WI 41, ¶29, 391 Wis. 2d 231,
942 N.W.2d 277.

¶29 In an initial involuntary commitment, a petitioner may prove that a
person is “dangerous” in five different ways pursuant to WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(a)2.a.-e. D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶30. Pertinent here, one of the five
ways is when a subject individual:

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(2) Evidences a substantial probability of physical harm to
other individuals as manifested by evidence of recent
homicidal or other violent behavior, or by evidence that
others are placed in reasonable fear of violent behavior and
serious physical harm to them, as evidenced by a recent
overt act, attempt or threat to do serious physical harm.

§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b.

¶30 Upon petition, a circuit court may extend an initial six-month
commitment for up to a period of one year. See WIS. STAT. § 51.20(13)(g)1. In a
recommitment proceeding, because an individual’s behavior might change due to
receiving treatment, the county may meet its burden in proving that the individual
is “dangerous” by an alternate path, without showing recent dangerous acts or
omissions:

[I]f the individual has been the subject of outpatient
treatment for mental illness … immediately prior to
commencement of the proceedings as a result of a
commitment ordered by a court under this section, … the
requirements of a recent overt act, attempt or threat to act
under [§ 51.20(1)](a)2.a. or b., … may be satisfied by a
showing that there is a substantial likelihood, based on the
subject individual’s treatment record, that the individual
would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment
were withdrawn.

§ 51.20(1)(am). This alternate path for proving dangerousness in a recommitment
hearing “recognizes that an individual receiving treatment may not have exhibited
any recent overt acts or omissions demonstrating dangerousness because the
treatment ameliorated such behavior, but if treatment were withdrawn, there may
be a substantial likelihood such behavior would recur.” Portage County v.
J.W.K., 2019 WI 54, ¶19, 386 Wis. 2d 672, 927 N.W.2d 509.

¶31 Although the alternate pathway set forth in WIS. STAT.
§ 51.20(1)(am) “acknowledges that an individual may still be dangerous despite

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the absence of recent acts, omissions, or behaviors exhibiting dangerousness
outlined in § 51.20(1)(a)[2.a.-e.],” the petitioner must still prove that an individual
is currently dangerous by clear and convincing evidence. J.W.K., 386 Wis. 2d
672, ¶¶24- 25. Moreover, circuit courts must “make specific factual findings with
reference to the subdivision paragraph of § 51.20(1)(a)2. on which the
recommitment is based.” D.J.W., 391 Wis. 2d 231, ¶40. This requirement serves
a twofold purpose: given the significant deprivation of liberty inherent in a civil
commitment, “it provides clarity and extra protection to patients regarding the
underlying basis for a recommitment” and “will clarify issues raised on appeal of
recommitment orders and ensure the soundness of judicial decision making,
specifically with regard to challenges based on the sufficiency of the evidence.”
Id., ¶¶42-44.

¶32 Whether the County has met its burden in a recommitment hearing is
a mixed question of law and fact. Id., ¶24. I will uphold a circuit court's findings
of fact, and all reasonable inferences from those facts, unless they are clearly
erroneous. Id. A finding of fact is clearly erroneous if it is against the great
weight and clear preponderance of the evidence. Id. I independently decide
whether the facts satisfy the legal standard of whether T.R.B. was dangerous. Id.,
¶25.

II. The Circuit Court Did Not Erroneously Exercise Its Discretion in
Admitting Documents

¶33 T.R.B. alleges that the circuit court erroneously exercised its
discretion in admitting two documents into evidence: Dr. Taylor’s examination
report and Niles’s petition letter. For the following reasons, I am not persuaded.

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¶34 In regards to Dr. Taylor’s examination report, Dr. Taylor was
ordered by the circuit court “to examine [T.R.B.] to determine his current mental
condition and deliver a report of such mental examination” to the court and the
parties. In a recommitment hearing, a court may rely on admissible evidence
contained in an examination report if the report is moved, and accepted, into
evidence. See Outagamie County v. L.X.D.-O., 2023 WI App 17, ¶36, 407
Wis. 2d 441, 991 N.W.2d 518 (in a recommitment hearing, an examiner’s report
must be received into evidence to be considered by the circuit court pursuant to
WIS. STAT. § 51.20(10)(c)). Here, the County appropriately moved the
examination report into evidence. As provided by WIS. STAT. § 907.03, if the
facts or data in a particular case is “of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in
the particular field in forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or
data need not be admissible in evidence in order for the opinion or inference to be
admitted.” Dr. Taylor testified that in preparation for her examination report, she
met with T.R.B. personally at his house for approximately 30 minutes, and she
consulted collateral sources for her report, including speaking with T.R.B.’s
mother and Niles, and reviewing prior evaluations and treatment records. There is
no argument propounded by T.R.B. that these sources are not typically consulted
by an expert performing a mental health examination nor that these sources were
improperly referenced in the examination report to provide a basis for Dr. Taylor’s
opinion that T.R.B.’s commitment and order for medication be extended.

¶35 Although T.R.B. is correct that the circuit court provided no
reasoning for the admission of the examination report, and treated the petition
letter as a business or medical record, in my review of the record, I determine that
the court did not erroneously exercise its discretion in admitting these documents.
Both documents were highly relevant and necessary for the court’s determination

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of whether T.R.B.’s commitment and medication orders should be extended.
Although each document contained hearsay statements, both documents also
contained statements that T.R.B. provided directly to the interviewer, which are
excluded from the definition of hearsay as party admissions pursuant to WIS.
STAT. § 908.01(4)(b). Further, both documents provide admissible evidentiary
support for each writer’s recommendation that T.R.B. be recommitted, including
each writer’s personal observations of and conversations with T.R.B. Therefore, I
conclude that the record demonstrates that the court did not erroneously exercise
its discretion in admitting these documents.

III. The Circuit Court’s Factual Findings Are Not Clearly Erroneous
and There Was Sufficient Evidence of Dangerousness

¶36 T.R.B. argues that the circuit court erred when it made factual
findings based on inadmissible hearsay evidence. Specifically, T.R.B. objects to
the court citing passages from Dr. Taylor’s report that T.R.B. had made:

… 30 calls to 911 in 10 days for various concerns, such as a
magnet being focused on the house causing it to shake,
believing electrical equipment was dangerous, and his
father needed to be killed because he was under the
influence of spirits. Further, the police were called to [the]
home [i]n January … 202[4] as [T.R.B.] got into a physical
altercation with his elderly father and threatened to kill his
parents.

T.R.B. argues that there was “[n]o other admissible evidence … presented to
establish [T.R.B.’s] alleged actions or threatening statements that formed the basis
of his original commitment.” I interpret T.R.B.’s argument to include that, based
on these inadmissible hearsay statements, the court erred in its factual findings, in
its determination of dangerous, and that if treatment were withheld from T.R.B.,
he would likely decompensate and pose a substantial risk of danger to others.

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¶37 To be sure, there was admissible evidence which could have been
referenced to provide a more compelling and robust set of factual findings to
further support a determination of dangerousness. However, I am not persuaded
that the circuit court’s factual findings were in error nor that there was insufficient
evidence to establish that T.R.B. was dangerous.

¶38 First, T.R.B. made admissions to both Dr. Taylor and Niles as
detailed in their testimony and in the documents that were admitted to support a
determination of dangerousness. In the “brief history” portion of Dr. Taylor’s
examination report, it states that there was a January 2024, altercation between
T.R.B. and his father, for which criminal charges are pending and that T.R.B. has
“a criminal court hearing coming up in January [2025].” The report also indicates
that T.R.B. made specific statements to Dr. Taylor about an incident with his
father and pending criminal charges: “He said his father ‘beat him and I got
arrested for abuse, they are coming at me hard for these things.’” The examination
report notes that as a result of this incident, there were criminal charges brought
against T.R.B., including for disorderly conduct and domestic battery. The report
also indicates that T.R.B. stated that “he has another felony for calling the police
too many times.” It is reasonable to infer that Dr. Taylor’s statements in her report
about T.R.B.’s past dangerous conduct on which the circuit court relied are
derived from T.R.B.’s own statements, the criminal charges that resulted, and

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reasonable inferences that could be drawn from T.R.B.’s treatment history, all of
which are admissible.3

¶39 Dr. Taylor’s testimony about T.R.B.’s past dangerous conduct is also
supported by T.R.B.’s mother’s testimony in the initial confinement proceeding,
which occurred one year prior to the recommitment hearing. As recognized by
this court, “[d]angerousness in an extension proceeding can and often must be
based on the individual’s precommitment behavior, coupled with an expert’s
informed opinions and predictions (provided, of course, that there is a proper
foundation for the latter.)” Winnebago County v. S.H., 2020 WI App 46, ¶13,
393 Wis. 2d 511, 947 N.W.2d 761. At the initial commitment hearing in January
2024, T.R.B.’s mother testified as follows: that at the time of the original
commitment petition in December 2023, T.R.B. was acting more irrational and
making numerous calls to the sheriff about people wandering around outside the
family home and about a propane gas facility letting off gases and running
equipment that they did not have; T.R.B. had made threats to her and her husband;
she is afraid of T.R.B. because another personality seems to take him over; she is
afraid that T.R.B. might hurt himself or somebody else; T.R.B. had a physical
altercation with her husband, she got caught in the middle, fell down and could not
get up, and T.R.B. was arrested.

3
This court may generally take judicial notice of facts “capable of accurate and ready
determination by resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned,” which may
include CCAP records. See WIS. STAT. § 902.01; Kirk v. Credit Acceptance Corp., 2013 WI App
32, ¶5 n.1, 346 Wis. 2d 635, 829 N.W.2d 522. I take judicial notice that at the time of T.R.B.’s
January 2025 recommitment hearing, he had four separate criminal cases pending, including
various disorderly conduct and battery counts as a domestic abuse repeater, some of which related
to his telephone contact with law enforcement and the January 2024 incident at the family home.

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No. 2025AP1972

¶40 The mother’s testimony, including her cross-examination, provides
an additional degree of reliability for Dr. Taylor’s summary of past events in her
report that T.R.B. had made threats to his parents, that T.R.B. engaged in a
physical altercation with his father, who was almost 80 years old at the time, and
for which, T.R.B. stated, he was facing criminal charges “for abuse.” The
mother’s testimony also provides additional support for the circuit court’s factual
findings that T.R.B. repeatedly made calls to law enforcement, as T.R.B. also
acknowledged to Dr. Taylor, because of his delusional behavior. Although the
best practice may be for the petitioner to again solicit such testimony at a
recommitment hearing, there was additional admissible evidence in the record
which supports Dr. Taylor’s statements cited by the court in its factual findings
which sufficiently support the court’s dangerousness determination.

¶41 It is true that T.R.B.’s mother never testified that T.R.B. had
threatened to kill her and her husband, as specifically referenced in Dr. Taylor’s
report, nor about the specific number of calls T.R.B. had made to law enforcement
and the subject of those calls. However, given the substance of the mother’s
testimony and T.R.B.’s statements to Dr. Taylor, I conclude that the circuit court’s
reference to the number of calls T.R.B. made to law enforcement and the detail
about the specific threats to the parents was harmless error because there is not a
“‘reasonable possibility’ that the error contributed to the outcome of the action or
the proceeding at issue.” Martindale, 246 Wis. 2d 67, ¶71 (citation omitted).

¶42 Niles’s testimony also supports the circuit court’s factual findings
and its dangerousness determination. As noted, Niles testified that she had two
recommitment discussions with T.R.B. in the summer of 2024 and in December
2024. In the summer of 2024, T.R.B. had fixed beliefs that he was repairing the
electrical panel in the family home, which resulted in the electricity being shut off

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No. 2025AP1972

for several days and jeopardizing medications for other family members. In the
December 2024 discussion, T.R.B. stated that “he was feeling a little bit better,
that the medications helped him deal with people – with the stress of people, and
his anxiety,” but that T.R.B. continued to believe that he was being “shredded”
and “controlled by steel magnets that are controlling and that can control the
parents, specifically, the father,” but that these beliefs were less intense because
“the fans were turned down.”

¶43 This testimony not only supports the circuit court’s factual finding
that T.R.B. continued to have delusional thinking, but underscores the consensus
from all of the witnesses at the recommitment hearing that, because T.R.B. did not
believe that he had schizophrenia, he was not capable of equating his medication
compliance with the amelioration of his mental health symptoms. And without
being monitored for medication compliance and taking the medication, each
witness believed that T.R.B. would decompensate and again engage in behaviors
that were dangerous to others, as detailed by admissible evidence.

¶44 Accordingly, in sum on these issues, I conclude that the circuit court
did not err in its factual findings and that there was clear and convincing evidence
to support its determination that T.R.B. posed a danger to others pursuant to WIS.
STAT. §§ 51.20(1)(a)2.b. and 51.20(1)(am). As a result, it was reasonable for the
court to determine that, given T.R.B.’s treatment history, without orders for a
recommitment and for medication, there was a substantial likelihood that T.R.B.
would be a proper subject for commitment if treatment were withdrawn.

CONCLUSION

¶45 Accordingly, I affirm the order extending T.R.B.’s commitment and
the associated order permitting his involuntary medication.

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No. 2025AP1972

By the Court.—Orders affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)4.

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