State v. Kevin Joseph Grant

COURT OF APPEALS
DECISION NOTICE
DATED AND FILED This opinion is subject to further editing. If
published, the official version will appear in
the bound volume of the Official Reports.
May 12, 2026
A party may file with the Supreme Court a
Samuel A. Christensen petition to review an adverse decision by the
Clerk of Court of Appeals Court of Appeals. See WIS. STAT. § 808.10
and RULE 809.62.

Appeal No. 2023AP2280-CR Cir. Ct. No. 2021CF597

STATE OF WISCONSIN IN COURT OF APPEALS
DISTRICT III

STATE OF WISCONSIN,

PLAINTIFF-RESPONDENT,

V.

KEVIN JOSEPH GRANT,

DEFENDANT-APPELLANT.

APPEAL from a judgment and an order of the circuit court for
St. Croix County: SCOTT R. NEEDHAM, Judge. Affirmed.

Before Stark, P.J., Hruz, and Gill, JJ.

Per curiam opinions may not be cited in any court of this state as precedent or

authority, except for the limited purposes specified in WIS. STAT. RULE 809.23(3).

¶1 PER CURIAM. Kevin Grant appeals a judgment, entered upon a
jury’s verdicts, convicting him of arson of a building with the intent to defraud;
second-degree recklessly endangering safety; unsafe burning of one’s own
No. 2023AP2280-CR

building; and making a fraudulent insurance claim in an amount greater than
$2,500. Grant also appeals an order requiring him to pay restitution to his insurer.
He claims that the evidence was insufficient to support the verdicts; the prosecutor
made improper comments during closing argument; his sentence was excessive;
and the restitution award was contrary to law. We reject each of these arguments
and affirm both the judgment of conviction and the restitution order.

BACKGROUND

¶2 The charges arose out of a fire that occurred in a building known as
the Cubby Hole in the early morning hours of December 29, 2018. The State
alleged that Grant, who owned the building with his wife, set the fire with a space
heater, bundled matchsticks, and gasoline and subsequently sought to collect
insurance proceeds for damage to the building caused by the fire. A jury found
Grant guilty on all four counts following a nine-day trial.

¶3 The circuit court sentenced Grant to five years’ initial confinement
followed by five years’ extended supervision on the count of arson of a building
with intent to defraud; to a consecutive term of three years’ initial confinement
followed by five years’ extended supervision on the reckless endangerment count;
to a concurrent term of two years’ initial confinement followed by three years’
extended supervision on the count of unsafe burning of one’s own building; and to
a concurrent term of one and one-half years’ initial confinement followed by one
and one-half years’ extended supervision on the count of making a fraudulent
insurance claim. The court subsequently entered an order awarding $582,836.03
in restitution to Grant’s insurer, State Farm Insurance Company.

¶4 On this appeal, Grant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the jury’s verdicts, characterizing it as “circumstantial” and not strong

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

enough “to exclude every reasonable hypotheses of [Grant’s] innocence.” He
further raises a uniformity challenge to the reckless endangerment count.
Alternatively, Grant claims that he is entitled to a new trial under the plain error
doctrine because the prosecutor made comments during closing argument
asserting the prosecutor’s “personal belief or opinion” as to Grant’s guilt. Grant
also argues that the circuit court erroneously exercised its discretion by imposing
what “may well be a life sentence given [Grant’s] age,” based in part upon what
Grant views as the court’s “misplaced” emphasis on the danger faced by
responding firefighters. Finally, Grant contends that the court also erred by
awarding restitution to State Farm when Grant’s wife, who was not involved in the
arson, is a named insured entitled to collect on the policy. Because Grant’s claims
are all highly fact-intensive, we will discuss more detailed facts relevant to each
claim in the corresponding sections below.

DISCUSSION

I. Sufficiency of the Evidence

¶5 Grant contends that the evidence was insufficient to support the
verdicts on the counts of arson, burning his own building, and filing a fraudulent
insurance claim because the evidence could not exclude the possibility that
someone else started the fire. As a threshold matter, we observe that Grant’s
challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence is premised upon a misstatement of
the standard of review applicable to such claims. Grant relies upon Taylor v.
State, 74 Wis. 2d 255, 265, 246 N.W.2d 516 (1976), for the proposition that the
test for the sufficiency of the evidence in a circumstantial evidence case is whether
the evidence is “strong enough to exclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence.” The Wisconsin Supreme Court explicitly overruled that proposition

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

from Taylor, however, in State v. Poellinger, 153 Wis. 2d 493, 504-05 & n.5, 451
N.W.2d 752 (1990).

¶6 Poellinger explained that the rule directing a jury to exclude every
reasonable hypothesis of innocence refers only to the evidence the jury believes
and relies upon to support the verdict, not to every piece of evidence offered at
trial. Id. at 503. As the trier of fact, the jury may “within the bounds of reason”
reject inferences consistent with a defendant’s innocence based upon its credibility
determinations, its resolution of conflicts in the testimony, its weighing of the
evidence, and its view as to what inferences can reasonably be drawn therefrom.
Id. at 506-07.

¶7 The Poellinger standard of review applies in either a direct or
circumstantial evidence case. Id. at 501. In reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support a jury’s verdict, an appellate court may not substitute its own
judgment for that of the jury “unless the evidence, viewed most favorably to the
[S]tate and the conviction, is so lacking in probative value and force that no trier
of fact, acting reasonably, could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id.
at 507. Under this standard, we are required to search the record for “facts that
support upholding the jury’s decision to convict.” State v. Hayes, 2004 WI 80,
¶57, 273 Wis. 2d 1, 681 N.W.2d 203.

¶8 Grant’s arguments challenging the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the verdicts in this case fail principally because Grant does not apply the
proper standard of review. Grant continually directs this court to testimony and
inferences favorable to his innocence, rather than addressing other evidence and
reasonable inferences a jury could have drawn that support the verdicts. We
conclude that the following evidence, though circumstantial and requiring that

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

inferences be drawn by the jury, was not so lacking in probative value that the jury
could not reasonably determine that Grant had deliberately started the fire that
damaged the Cubby Hole building and then filed a fraudulent insurance claim.

¶9 Grant purchased the Cubby Hole building sometime around 2001,
but the principal space in the building that had once housed a bar of that name had
been vacant since 2012. Grant listed the building for sale for $649,900 from
August 29, 2014, through August 29, 2015. He listed the building for sale
between July 15, 2016, and July 31, 2017, for $550,000. A realtor suggested
Grant reduce the price to $299,000 because it was difficult to sell a building
without tenants, but Grant refused to reduce the asking price by that much. Grant
instead listed the building for sale for $539,000 beginning November 3, 2017, and
that listing was still in effect at the time of the fire.

¶10 Grant received no offers to purchase the property during the years it
was on the market. He was paying about $6,000 a year in taxes and another
$1,000 a year for insurance, plus the cost of utilities, and maintenance, while his
sole income from the building was between $10,000 and $12,000 annually, that
his wife was earning each year from a salon she ran out of the building. Grant told
a State Farm examiner under oath that the reason he had listed the building for sale
was that he was trying to get his wife to retire, “[a]nd if [they] could sell the
building and not worry about that, [they] could do [their] own thing.”

¶11 On September 27, 2018, about three months before the fire, Grant
increased the insurance on the Cubby Hole building from $481,100 to $558,000.
About two days before the fire, Grant created videos documenting the contents of
the building and a storage shed for insurance purposes. Grant did not take
insurance videos of any other properties he owned. Also, shortly before the fire,

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

Grant switched to a different insurer than State Farm for all of the properties he
owned except for the Cubby Hole building.

¶12 On December 24, 2018, five days before the fire, Grant brought a
truck load of cardboard boxes and garbage from his home to the Cubby Hole
building. He piled the debris onto the grease trap in the former bar area.

¶13 Location data from Google showed that Grant’s phone was in the
vicinity of the Cubby Hole building from 1:21 p.m. to 2:43 p.m. on December 28,
2018, approximately 12 hours before the fire. The phone did not return to the
vicinity of Grant’s home until 4:36 p.m.

¶14 Several agents from the Arson Bureau of the Wisconsin Department
of Justice’s Division of Criminal Investigation testified about the cause of the fire.
The lead investigator identified the origin of the fire to be an older style, portable
electric space heater with a metal grate that was located in an 18-inch void space
in a collapsed section of the floor. There was a partially melted red gasoline
container next to the space heater and a noticeable odor of gasoline in the void
space. There was a “fairly straight line of damage” along the floor leading to the
collapsed area that was consistent with the existence of “some type of fuel.”

¶15 The space heater and gasoline container were covered by debris,
which included wooden stick matches with green tips—some of which had been
bundled together with black electrical tape. In addition to the matches, an analyst
from the Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms and Explosives (ATFE) unit’s crime
laboratory noted that debris from wadded up paper was found inside the space
heater’s grill. Samples of debris from the void space tested positive for gasoline.

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

¶16 An ATFE engineer testified that placing matches and fuel close
enough to a space heater’s heating elements is capable of causing a fire. The lead
investigator testified that there were no signs of forced entry to the doors of the
building. He concluded that the fire had been deliberately set and that an ignitable
fuel had been intentionally distributed as a “trailer” to spread the fire.

¶17 During a search of Grant’s residence after the fire, the lead
investigator recovered a Menards receipt dated November 16, 2018, (about six
weeks before the fire) showing the purchase of matches. Upon reviewing
surveillance video from Menards, the lead investigator identified Grant purchasing
a pack containing two 300-count boxes of green-tipped matches.

¶18 The ATFE analyst found that the matches in the box were of the
same wood type and contained green heads like the matches recovered from near
the fire scene, although the matches from the fire scene were too burned for a
conclusive comparison. A code inside the box showed that the matches were
manufactured on September 4, 2018. A separate ATFE agent testified that he
recovered only one box of 300 green-tipped matches during a search of one of
Grant’s properties. Another Arson Bureau agent testified that she recovered a roll
of black electrical tape from Grant’s residence.

¶19 The insurance video of the storage shed that Grant recorded just two
days before the fire showed a vintage space heater that was missing when the shed
was searched after the fire. Additional personal items from an office and closet in
the Cubby Hole building were no longer there after the fire.

¶20 After the fire, Grant submitted a sworn statement of loss claiming an
actual cash value of $600,000 for the Cubby Hole building and $150,000 for the
contents of the building, with replacement costs of $975,000 for the building and

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

$175,000 for its contents. State Farm’s insurance adjuster described several
potential indicators of fraud for the claim—including that the fire was incendiary,
it happened after 11:00 p.m., the property had been for sale, and there had been a
recent inquiry about increased coverage.

¶21 During the investigation, Grant provided law enforcement with
inaccurate information on several occasions. Grant initially told investigators that
it had been “months or even years since he had last purchased matches,” when he
had in fact bought matches mere weeks before the fire. Investigators found the
insurance videos in a safe in Grant’s residence, even though Grant at first denied
even having a safe. Grant told investigators in one interview that he had been at
the Cubby Hole building on the day before the fire for about 20 minutes to turn up
the thermostats and had then gone over to a storage outbuilding to pick up some
items for a planned trip. After being asked in a subsequent interview if GPS data
from his phone would match the timeline Grant had given, Grant changed his story
and said that he went to a nearby bar after leaving the Cubby Hole building.

¶22 Taken together with the uncontested evidence about how the fire
was started, Grant’s inability for several years to sell the Cubby Hole property for
the price he wanted, his increased insurance coverage just months before the fire,
his recording of videos to document the property and its contents just two days
before the fire, his highly significant possession before but not after the fire of the
type of space heater and matches used in the fire, his piling of flammable materials
in the building days before the fire, his presence in the building hours before the
fire, and his misstatements to police about several circumstances that might seem
incriminating, all support a reasonable inference that Grant was the person who set
fire to his building. Moreover, because Grant testified on his own behalf, the jury
was able to judge for itself the credibility of Grant’s denial of having set the fire.

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

¶23 Finally, Grant also challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to
support the reckless endangerment count because the jury was not asked to
identify the person whose safety was endangered. Based upon the fact that more
than one firefighter was involved in fighting the fire, Grant argues that there is no
way to tell if the jury agreed on which firefighter’s safety was endangered.

¶24 Grant’s argument actually conflates two distinct issues—whether
there was sufficient evidence upon which the jury could rely to find him guilty of
reckless endangerment and whether the jury’s verdict was unanimous.1 Grant has
not established a right to relief under either theory.

¶25 We review the sufficiency of the evidence to support a criminal
conviction by comparison to the instructions actually given to the jury, provided
those instructions conform to the statutory requirements of the charged offense.
State v. Beamon, 2013 WI 47, ¶22, 347 Wis. 2d 559, 830 N.W.2d 681. Here, the
circuit court instructed the jury that the State needed to prove that Grant had
endangered the safety of “another human being.” See WIS JI—CRIMINAL 1347
(2015). That instruction properly relayed the relevant element of the offense set
forth in WIS. STAT. § 941.30(2) (2023-24).2

¶26 Multiple firefighters testified to having battled the fire under
dangerous conditions. Each firefighter plainly constituted “another human

1
Grant also mentions a third theory that evidence about multiple firefighters who may
have been endangered presents a multiplicity problem under the Double Jeopardy Clause. There
can be no multiplicity issue where there is only a single count, however, because there is no risk
of “multiple punishments.” See State v. Kurzawa, 180 Wis. 2d 502, 515, 509 N.W.2d 712
(1994).
2
All references to the Wisconsin Statutes are to the 2023-24 version.

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

being.”3 In conjunction with the evidence discussed above showing that Grant
started the fire, each firefighter who testified as to the dangerous conditions they
encountered fighting the fire supplied sufficient evidence to support the verdict on
the reckless endangerment count.

¶27 As to unanimity, Grant does not cite any authority requiring that a
jury agree upon what person’s safety was endangered for a single count of reckless
endangerment. We note that jury unanimity is required “only with respect to the
ultimate issue of the defendant’s guilt or innocence of the crime charged,
and … not … with respect to the alternative means or ways in which the crime can
be committed.” State v. Derango, 2000 WI 89, ¶14, 236 Wis. 2d 721, 613
N.W.2d 833 (citation omitted).

II. Prosecutor’s Comments During Closing Argument

¶28 Grant challenges the following twelve comments the prosecutor
made during the State’s closing argument (with Grant’s underlined emphasis
added)4:

1. He was planning this out. He was planning to be out of
town for the weekend. We believe that the evidence
supports that [Grant] started planning this out
sometime in November.

2. So, the fact that he was planning on being out of town,
I think that is additional evidence that supports our
theory of the case.

3
Grant’s argument that firefighters are not “human beings” because they are not entitled
to restitution is absurd on its face and does not warrant further discussion.
4
Where there are slight discrepancies between the language quoted in Grant’s brief and
the transcripts, we have used the language from the transcripts. We have also expanded a few
quotes for additional context.

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

3. I think the evidence supports that he was expecting the
building to be completely burned down and there be no
evidence left.

4. So, the biggest motive, $558,000. That’s what he had
his insurance to was $558,000. It was about 70—
almost $77,000, I believe, from what it was back 93
days before the fire.

5. I don’t think it’s disputed that we have an arson here. I
think that it’s disputed on who did it.

6. So we’ve got all this fuel moved to the middle of the
room, right to the middle of the whole building, … and
[Grant] admits that he did all that. Whether it was to
clean out the building or to pile it up there to make a
fire go faster, that’s for you to decide. And the state
believes that the evidence shows that’s his reason to
burn it down.…[t]hat’s why he was cleaning out the
Cubby Hole and bringing more cardboard down there.

7. So, you have renters that went through. I’m not going
to beat this one, but you have renters. And State Farm.
We’ve heard what the—I think the important points
are, on September 26th, the insurance was $481,000.
481,100. And then he upped it to—on 9/27 to
$558,000. That is $76,900, 93 days before the fire.

8. So he bought 600 matches on the 16th. Law
enforcement only recovered one box of those matches.
And the state believes the evidence shows that that
second box of matches went up with the Cubby Hole.

9. So, December 27th, [Grant] records his insurance video
according to the first story that he told Agent
Windorff.… So, I think it’s important for showing his
bar.

10. I’m just going to point out that in Exhibit 31, the
display radius of meters when he was there, the
maximum is 24 meters.

11. I don’t think it’s disputed anymore whether or not the
space heater was actually found where law
enforcement are saying they found it, at the bottom of
the cavity filled with debris on top of it.

12. And I don’t believe that there was a contest on whether
[the space heater] could have fit in there.

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

Grant argues that these repeated references to what the prosecutor thought or
believed constituted plain error and violated Grant’s due process right to have his
case decided upon the evidence.

¶29 The “plain error” doctrine “allows appellate courts to review errors
that were otherwise forfeited by a party’s failure to object.” State v. Miller, 2012
WI App 68, ¶18, 341 Wis. 2d 737, 816 N.W.2d 331. The doctrine is limited to
“obvious” and “substantial” errors that are “so fundamental that a new trial or
other relief must be granted” despite the lack of objection. Id. (citation omitted).

¶30 This court independently reviews the record to determine if a new
trial is warranted due to plain error. State v. Mayo, 2007 WI 78, ¶28, 301 Wis. 2d
642, 734 N.W.2d 115. Here, we conclude that Grant has failed to demonstrate that
any of the prosecutor’s comments constituted plain error.

¶31 A prosecutor is allowed to comment on the evidence, argue
conclusions based upon it, and state that the evidence convinces the prosecutor of
the defendant’s guilt and should convince the jury. State v. Draize, 88 Wis. 2d
445, 454, 276 N.W.2d 784 (1979). A prosecutor crosses the line into
impermissible argument, however, by suggesting that the jury should arrive at a
verdict by considering factors other than the evidence. Id. The constitutional test
is whether the prosecutor’s remarks “so infected the trial with unfairness as to
make the resulting conviction a denial of due process.” State v. Wolff, 171
Wis. 2d 161, 167, 491 N.W.2d 498 (Ct. App. 1992) (citation omitted). Whether
the prosecutor’s conduct affected the fairness of the trial is determined by viewing
the statements in context. Id. at 168.

¶32 Reviewed in context, we conclude that all of the statements Grant
challenges were comments on the evidence and that the conclusions the prosecutor

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

argued could be drawn from the evidence. None of the comments adversely
affected the fairness of the trial. In short, there was no error, much less plain error.

III. Sentences

¶33 Grant challenges his sentences based upon several interwoven
theories without any coherent discussion of the distinct standards applicable to his
tangled claims. Grant primarily asserts that his sentences were “excessive”
because he was 71 years old with no prior criminal history and because the circuit
court heavily weighed the danger to firefighters in its evaluation of the seriousness
of the offenses.

¶34 We first observe that an “excessive” sentence commonly refers to a
penalty imposed in excess of that authorized by law. See WIS. STAT. § 973.13.
Grant does not assert that any of his four sentences actually exceeded the
maximum available penalties.

¶35 To the extent that Grant intended to argue that his sentences were
excessive in the sense that they were unduly harsh, the test is whether they were
“so disproportionate to the offense[s] committed as to shock public sentiment and
violate the judgment of reasonable people concerning what is right and proper
under the circumstances.” See State v. Grindemann, 2002 WI App 106, ¶31, 255
Wis. 2d 632, 648 N.W.2d 507 (citation omitted). There is a presumption that a
sentence “well within the limits of the maximum sentence” is not unduly harsh.
Id., ¶¶31-32 (citation omitted).

¶36 The maximum available penalty for the arson count was a bifurcated
sentence consisting of 25 years’ initial confinement followed by 15 years’
extended supervision. See WIS. STAT. §§ 943.02(1)(b); 973.01(2)(b)3., (d)2. The

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

maximum available penalty for the reckless endangerment count was a bifurcated
sentence consisting of five years’ initial confinement followed by five years’
extended supervision. See WIS. STAT. §§ 941.30(2), 973.01(2)(b)7., (d)4. The
maximum available penalty for the unsafe burning of one’s own building was a
bifurcated sentence consisting of three years’ initial confinement followed by three
years’ extended supervision. See WIS. STAT. §§ 941.11(1); 973.01(2)(b)8., (d)5.
The maximum available sentence for the fraudulent insurance claim count was a
bifurcated sentence consisting of one and one-half years’ initial confinement
followed by two years’ extended supervision. See WIS. STAT. §§ 943.395(1)(a),
(2)(b); 973.01(2)(b)9., (d)6.

¶37 When combined, the sentences here consisted of eight years’ initial
confinement followed by ten years’ extended supervision. Thus, the circuit court
imposed less than a quarter of the available 34.5 years’ initial confinement time
and less than a third of the available 59.5 years’ total imprisonment time that
Grant faced. The lengths of Grant’s sentences were well within the maximum
available penalties, and they do not shock the conscience, even taking into account
Grant’s age and lack of prior criminal history.

¶38 To the extent that Grant argues that his sentences were based upon
an improper factor—which is an entirely separate issue from the length of the
sentences—his argument appears to be premised on the false notion that a
sentencing court is limited to considering what impact a crime had upon any
persons who qualify as victims either under WIS. STAT. § 950.02(4)(a) or for
restitution purposes. However, a court is not only allowed, but required, to
consider the seriousness of the offense. State v. Gallion, 2004 WI 42, ¶23, 270
Wis. 2d 535, 678 N.W.2d 197. As part of its analysis into that factor, a court may
properly look at what harms could have resulted from a defendant’s conduct—

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

even to hypothetical members of the public. See, e.g., State v. Dalton, 2018 WI
85, ¶¶19-20, 383 Wis. 2d 147, 914 N.W.2d 120 (where the court observed that a
driver who operated a motor vehicle while intoxicated “could have killed
someone”). We conclude that a court is not prohibited at sentencing from
considering whether firefighters were endangered by responding to a fire caused
by arson.

¶39 Grant’s remaining arguments amount to nothing more than an
attempt to have this court reweigh the factors that the circuit court properly
considered in its exercise of sentencing discretion. We will not do so.

IV. Restitution

¶40 A circuit court is required by statute to order a criminal defendant to
make full or partial restitution to compensate a victim for losses suffered as a
result of any crime considered at sentencing, unless it finds, and states on the
record, a substantial reason not to do so. WIS. STAT. § 973.20(1r); State v.
Anderson, 215 Wis. 2d 673, 682, 573 N.W.2d 872 (Ct. App. 1997). In addition,
“[i]f justice so requires,” the court may order restitution to any insurer, surety, or
other person who has already compensated a victim for such a loss.
Sec. 973.20(5)(d).

¶41 The scope of a circuit court’s authority to order restitution presents a
question of statutory interpretation subject to de novo review. State v. Ziegler,
2005 WI App 69, ¶10, 280 Wis. 2d 860, 695 N.W.2d 895. However,
determinations as to the amount of restitution, whether the defendant’s conduct
was a substantial factor in causing any claimed expenses, and whether justice
requires compensation to an insurance company all lie within the court’s
discretion. Id.; State v. Fernandez, 2009 WI 29, ¶62, 316 Wis. 2d 598, 764

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

N.W.2d 509. We will uphold a discretionary restitution award so long as the court
applied the correct legal standard to a logical interpretation of the facts of record.
State v. Muth, 2020 WI 65, ¶14, 392 Wis. 2d 578, 945 N.W.2d 645.

¶42 Here, the parties do not dispute that Grant’s wife was a named
insured on the Cubby Hole building policy; that Grant’s wife was not involved in
the arson; and that State Farm jointly paid Grant and his wife $582,836.03 on the
claim for damage to the building. Grant argues that State Farm did not actually
suffer any loss because it was required under case law to pay Grant’s wife as an
“innocent spouse.” That argument entirely misses the point.

¶43 If Grant’s wife was innocent of the arson, then she was a victim of it.
She suffered a loss in the form of extensive fire damage to a building she
co-owned. The jury’s verdicts establish that Grant caused that damage by setting
the fire. State Farm compensated her for that loss. Therefore, WIS. STAT.
§ 973.20(1r) authorized the circuit court to order Grant to pay restitution to State
Farm.

¶44 Grant does not point to any evidence showing that State Farm paid
less than the claimed amount or that Grant had an inability to repay that amount.5
Nor does Grant identify any other factor that would make it unfair for him to pay
restitution. We conclude that the circuit court did not erroneously exercise its
discretion when it determined that justice required Grant to pay State Farm
restitution for the full amount of the insurance claim.

5
To the contrary, Grant points to his wealth as evidence that he did not need the
insurance money and, therefore, had no motive to commit the arson.

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No. 2023AP2280-CR

By the Court.—Judgment and order affirmed.

This opinion will not be published. See WIS. STAT.
RULE 809.23(1)(b)5.

17